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Abstract 
 
  Climate change is the first anthropogenic alteration of a global Earth system. It is globally 
catastrophic in terms of food production, sea level rise, fresh water availability, temperature 
elevation, ocean acidification, species disturbance and destruction to name just a few crisis 
concerns. In addition, while those changes are occurring now, they are amplifying over decadal 
periods and will last for centuries and possibly millennia. While there are a number of pollutants 
involved, carbon dioxide (CO2) which results from the combustion of any fossil fuel is the primary 
pollutant. It has not been considered a pollutant until recently because of its natural dissociation 
into oxygen and carbon compounds like wood. However, because of its molecular durability and 
ability to acidify water, it has become the primary pollutant as a result of the exponential increase 
in fossil fuel use for the production of energy by Earth’s population that has doubled over the last 
six decades. That increase has exceeded Earth’s ability to handle humanity’s waste CO2. 
Obviously, the involved changes detrimentally affect all life on Earth. Because of the evolving 
nature of the changes, climate change is presently denied primarily in the United States because of 
the costs of eliminating our carbon addiction. Because no similar global natural or anthropogenic 
situation has previously occurred during the lifetime of Homo sapiens, our extant ethical theories 
are incapable of confronting the crisis. Consequently, new ethical paradigms are necessary. This 
dissertation attempts to provide thoughts about the use of Aristotelian ethical theory, the aidōs 
feeling, Aquinian psychology and a possible new virtue of proper primility in an effort to further 
nurture the growth of the new climate change ethics. 
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Part I  Introduction 
 
 
Chapter 1 - The Anthropogenic Phenomenon of Climate Change 
 
Today we face the possibility that the global environment may be destroyed, yet no one 
will be responsible. This is a new problem. It takes a great many people and a high level of 
consumption and production to change the earth's climate. It could not have been done in low-
density, low-technology societies. 
 
—Dale Jamieson (Jamieson, 1992, 149) 
   
  This dissertation addresses the anthropogenic phenomenon of climate change and a possible 
modification of present philosophical virtue ethical theory toward a means of reaching adaptation 
and some mitigation of climate change. I argue the need for a possible modification of that theory 
through the use of a new or revised virtue - something like proper primility which is defined and 
recommended in this dissertation, or some other word or short phrase that is either new or presently 
not in use in order to emphasize the dire need for that adaptation and mitigation. 
 Since environmental ethics became a recognized philosophical subject in about 1970, one of 
its purposes has been the extension of ethical consideration beyond human animals. That "beyond" 
has obviously involved nonhuman animals, plants, ecosystems upon which life depends, and, of 
primary importance, the planet Earth generally because so far human life has not been capable of 
existing beyond Earth for more than a few months and then only in spacecraft.   
 With the advent of climate change, the extension of ethical consideration to future 
generations is critical. Those human animals, of course, are those that do not presently exist but 
will exist in the future - the future generations of human animals. I argue that these future 
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generations must also include future generations of all of life and need to be addressed not only 
for their own sake but also for the sake of the present generation and Earth generally.  
  Ethical consideration for unborn generations of humans specifically has been peripherally 
discussed in the past with arguments both for and against that extension. Because climate change 
is a different concern than any that has ever existed for Homo sapiens, ethical theory must now 
include these future humans and future generations of all life. Climate change is a historically 
unique phenomenon (1) because it is caused by us humans, (2) because its impact is global, (3) 
because its effects are only clearly recognized over decades, centuries, and millennia, and (4) 
because of the present addiction of us humans to its causes. 
 Further, environmental ethics has, of course, been focused on a number of other tasks such 
as pollution prevention and control through any available avenues but has been most successfully 
addressed through the avenue of legislative and administrative regulation. Of course, pollution 
control is extremely important not only to human animals but to all other life and activity of that 
life on Earth. It has been extremely important since about 1969 in the United States of America 
("United States") at the federal legislative and regulatory level because prior to that time it became 
painfully obvious that the States comprising the United States could not adequately control 
pollution of the air, water and land primarily for two reasons. The first, as Martin Schönfeld points 
out, is ecological overshoot which has occurred for a number of reasons but primarily because of 
what has become a worldwide addiction to economic growth where that growth has become 
dependent upon a rapid increase of population and, with that population increase, the rapid increase 
in consumerism which is primarily due to planned obsolescence within the marketplace.    
 The second reason, which in large part results from the first, is the exponential increase in 
transportation miles travelled and labor saving technology both of which have caused an 
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exponential increase in, and addiction to, electrical energy produced from fossil fuels. This 
ecological overshoot results in pollution of the air, water and land because of the increased waste 
products of the relentless increase in population and the relentless increase in the waste that occurs 
from the requirements of economic growth and consumerism.  
 Also, over about the decade before 1969, we finally learned that pollution does not respect 
State and national boundaries (e.g., between the United States and Canada and Mexico) when 
pollution both industrial and residential was causing burning rivers, the pollution of those rivers, 
and polluted air where that pollution was impacting health in the United States and other countries 
many miles away. In the United States specifically when this was clearly recognized, the United 
States Congress, in 1969 and relying on the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, 
began enacting legislation for the regulation of the use of those resources of air and water through 
licensing of that use and through regulation of the disposal of the waste product from that use. 
However, that legislation has only been partially successful because we have in many cases not 
been able to find adequate means of disposal for a number of different wastes such as the waste 
from nuclear electrical generation facilities.  
 In addition, we have now become internationally painfully aware that not only does 
pollution refuse to respect State and nearby country boundaries, but it does not respect any national 
boundaries. As this recognition has become crystal-clear with the advent of anthropogenic global 
warming and its result, climate change, the national governments that make up our global 
community are unwilling to recognize the need for an international commerce clause to provide 
the necessary regulation of, and significant sanctions for, the pollution of the air, land and water 
from the production of carbon dioxide (“CO2”) through the generation of energy from fossil fuels. 
 4 
  
For example, the CO2 that is now causing Earth's climate change has thus far been primarily the 
result of activity in the United States as has been proven and as is reviewed in this dissertation.  
 Because there is no meaningful regulation of, and substantial sanctions against, the 
generation of this pollutant CO2 even in the United States, the pollution it (with the other 
greenhouse gases) is causing is continually increasing not only in the United States but throughout 
Earth. Moreover, of course, the United States has been and remains unwilling to take the laboring 
oar in the necessary mitigation of, and the adaptation to, climate change because our popular 
wisdom and short sighted political system fear that the cost will threaten economic growth and, 
thereby, the United States’ lifestyle. This unwillingness of the United States continues to promote 
climate change because the United States refuses to recognize its guilt, if you will, in having thus 
far been the primary cause of climate change.  
 Not only is the United States the primary cause as a result of its continuing emissions and 
omissions but also because the United States’ lifestyle is the primary cause of other national 
communities seeking a standard of living equivalent to that of the United States through the same 
means of the same constant need to continually keep the economy growing. That constant 
economic growth requires the use of fossil fuel energy because there is not presently any substitute 
for the quantity of energy necessary to support the perceived need for economic growth that is 
gripping most all of the national governments on Earth. And once again the constantly increasing 
use of that fossil fuel energy is the single most important cause of climate change as is shown 
below. 
 In Earth's present global community, only two primary types of governmental entities seem 
to be available for the creation of the necessary regulatory authority and significant sanctions for 
the mitigation of and adaptation to climate change. The first seems to be of the republic or 
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democracy genre. However, again, our presently elected officials especially in the United States 
are unwilling to embrace the scientific reality of climate change. Therefore, the challenge seems 
to be the development of legislators who are willing to accept that reality and the burden of its 
regulation.1  
 The second type of extant governmental unit is the dictatorship which is clearly obvious in 
China and becoming ever more obvious in Russia. Both of these governments are promoting their 
dictatorial powers through the pacification of their respective populations through the promise of 
what might be called the American lifestyle. However, those two dictatorships must be 
differentiated because Russia and other similar dictatorships, while they have the power for 
implementation of regulation and sanctions, are also unwilling to embrace the science and the need 
for regulation. China though seems unique because it is apparently attempting to make a 
technological transition from coal to sun and wind (without oil/gas/fracking in between) and is 
now one of the world's largest, if not the largest, producer of post-carbon energy technology. Still, 
with no international governmental agency, where are we as Earth bound individuals and societies 
to turn for the necessary international regulation and sanctions? 
 From an ethical point of view, it would seem that we must look at the question of who our 
activities are actually harming. Obviously, they are harming all of Earth's present society by virtue 
      
1 Of interest is a February 22, 2015, article entitled "Polluted Air Cuts Years Off Lives Of Millions in India, Study 
Finds" in the New York Times by Gardiner Harris. The article reports that based on a study by researchers from the 
Universities of Chicago, Yale and Harvard, "altogether, 660 million Indians could lose 2.1 billion years as a result of 
air pollution at an enormous cost to the country's economy." Even though a World Health Organization study in 2014 
"found that 13 of the 20 most polluted cities in the world are in India, with New Delhi's the world's worst air," the 
article reports that "India's government has made economic development its priority and has announced its intention 
to double the country's use of coal over the next five years, which is likely to worsen the country's air pollution." The 
article also reports that "a growing array of studies has shown that the costs of India's poor air are substantial. For 
instance, research has shown that India's air pollution problems may cut agricultural production by a third. That might 
explain why wheat and rice yields in India have begun to level off or even drop in some states after decades of growth." 
New Your Times International, Sunday, February 22, 2015, p.13. India is apparently the most populous democracy. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/22/world/asia/polluted-air-cuts-years-off-lives-of-millions-in-india-study 
finds.html  But see page 262 for recent information. India has changed course and quickly. 
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of that society's unwillingness to address what one might describe as sloth - the willingness to do 
relatively nothing but a sort of "greenwash" in order to preserve and increase its standard of living 
through economic growth. But climate change has been called the "Long Emergency"2 because, 
while its effects are of crisis proportion, those effects are growing slowly but relentlessly and will 
continue to grow and be felt over centuries and possibly millennia. This crisis is not the type of 
the 1941 Pearl Harbor crisis or 1929 Wall Street crisis which are immediately recognized and 
which demanded an immediate response. The effects of climate change nevertheless represent a 
crisis and in a word are "climacteric".3 
 The Oxford English Dictionary as one of its definitions for crisis provides the following 
“A vitally important or decisive stage in the progress of anything; a turning-point; also, a state of 
affairs in which a decisive change for better or worse is imminent … .”4 Chapter 12 of this 
dissertation argues that the appropriate location for finding the greatest meaningful experience in 
the world is in the out-of-doors. Martin Schönfeld seems to agree in his essay, “Landscape, 
Traveling, Falling Down a Waterfall: An Examination of Crisis”5 that relates the crisis of climate 
change to the crisis experience of falling down a forty-foot vertical waterfall in a kayak in the 
middle of the Canadian wilds with no one else within many miles after a failed attempt to cross 
the river above the waterfall. He dissects the experience into six different stages and realistically 
relates those stages to climate change. While experiencing hypothermia and somehow reaching 
shore with his kayak and paddle, he understands that he has survived only as a result of having 
      
2 James H. Kuntstler, The Long Emergency (New York: Grove Press, 2005-6). 
3 "having extreme and far-reaching implication or results, critical." The New Oxford American Dictionary, E.J. Jewell 
and F. Abate (eds.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p.320. 
4 http://www.oed.com.ezproxy.lib.usf.edu/view/Entry/44539?redirectedFrom=crisis& 
5 Martin Schönfeld, "Falling Down a Waterfall: An Examination of Crisis," forthcoming; Comparative and 
Continental Philosophy, 9 (2017); herein "Waterfall, p._". 
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taken the precaution to don a dry suit, boots, gloves, hockey helmet and life vest before undertaking 
the failed crossing.  
 In concluding the essay, Schönfeld reminds us, as is shown through Chapter 2 of this 
dissertation, that “the American five percent of the world population have effectively caused global 
climate change, in per capita, cumulative and political terms, such that anthropogenic climate 
change is really Amerigenic climate change such that the American dream has become in reality a 
climatological nightmare.” We in the United States needed to take action long ago but, in any 
event, must now act to mitigate and adapt in order to avoid serious consequences. Actually, he 
suggests that this action represents maturing and is necessary to avoid horrific consequences. That 
analogy of a forty-foot vertical drop in a kayak into icy waters and its aftermath should be retained 
through the remainder of this dissertation. In addition, we should understand that there are seven 
and one-half billion humans in that kayak who are also taking all of Earth’s other life forms with 
them vertically down that waterfall. The dissertation includes twelve Chapters summarized below.  
 Chapter 2 entitled “Climate Change: The Empirical Facts” begins with those facts which 
cover (1) the scientific awareness of the cause of anthropogenic climate change; (2) the explanation 
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”); (3) the lifespan of greenhouse gases 
and particularly CO2; (4) the effects of climate change, present, past and future; (5) the 
responsibility of the United States for climate change; (6) specifically the effects of climate change 
beyond 2100, its irreversibility and the possibility of abrupt changes; and (7) possible pathways 
for adaptation to and mitigation of climate change and the possibility of  sustainable development. 
This portion of Chapter 2 relies heavily on the Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report of the 5000 
plus pages of the three volumes of the Assessment Report 5 of the IPCC’s Working Groups I, II 
and III. 
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 Chapter 2 also covers the basic science of climate change which begins with John 
Tyndall’s paper in 1859 that concludes that Earth will warm because of certain compounds that 
will collect in Earth’s troposphere and there collect the thermal energy emitted by Earth 
(originally supplied, of course, by the Sun) and then reflect some of that energy back to Earth. 
The Chapter also provides a short summary the further works of the Swedish scientist, Svante 
Arrhenius (1859-1927); the English engineer, Guy Stuart Callendar (1898-1964); the Princeton 
University PhD in physics, Gilbert Plass (1920-2004); and Ilias M. Vardavas and Fred W. Taylor, 
both PhDs in physics. Even the United States government admitted in 20146 that:  
What is new over the last decade is that we know with increasing certainty that 
climate change is happening now. While scientists continue to refine projections of 
the future, observations unequivocally show that climate is changing and that the 
warming of the past 50 years is primarily due to human-induced emissions of heat-
trapping gases. These emissions come mainly from burning coal, oil, and gas, with 
additional contributions from forest clearing and some agricultural practices. 
 
While the White House apparently denies those facts, Rex Tillerson, the resent Secretary of State 
of the United States and the prior CEO of Exxon Mobil, apparently believes those facts.7 
 Chapter 3 reviews present human character and argues that anthropogenic climate change 
because of its global nature and because of its lifespan of centuries (and possibly millennia) needs 
the introduction of a new level of human character never before required or experienced. Improved 
human character, especially in the United States, is required.  
      
6 Melillo, Jerry M., Terese (T.C.) Richmond, and Gary W. Yohe, Eds., 2014: Climate Change Impacts in the United 
States: The Third National Climate Assessment. U.S. Global Change Research Program, p.841. 
doi:10.7930/J0Z31WJ2; ISBN 9780160924026; p. 2; http://nca2014.globalchange.gov/. The New York Times stated 
on May 7, 2014 (Page A22 of the Thursday, May 8, 2014, New York Times as the lead editorial) 
Apart from the disinformation sowed by politicians content with the status quo, the main reason neither 
Congress nor much of the American public cares about global warming is that, as problems go, it seems 
remote. Anyone who reads the latest National Climate Assessment, released on Tuesday, cannot possibly 
think that way any longer. The report is exhaustive and totally alarming. 
7 Rex Tillerson apparently recommended that President Trump keep the United States in the Paris Accord before the 
President announced that the United States was withdrawing from that agreement. Michael Shear, New York Times, 
June 1, 2017;  https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/trump-paris-climate-
agreement.html?action=click&content            
 9 
  
 Chapter 4 very generally reviews the basics of the three present major ethical theories, 
Kantian duty theory, utilitarian theory and virtue ethical theory. Chapter 4 concludes that because 
of climate change and its causes, no present ethical theory is capable of providing the necessary 
improved human character. The general character of individuals and legislatures of present 
democracies, oligarchies and dictatorships must improve to a new level for the acceptable and 
legitimate happiness and utility of the citizens of Earth who include all of life on Earth. To achieve 
this, new and/or revised virtues and/or a revised virtue theory are necessary. Neither Kantian duty 
theory nor utilitarian theory provide the necessary foundation and, in fact, both require virtuous 
character for their implementation. For this reason, while present virtue ethical theory is 
insufficient, it does provide a better foundation for revised ethical theory than either of the other 
two. 
 Chapter 5 reviews basic Kantian duty theory and Chapter 6 reviews basic utilitarian theory 
and in both chapters, I argue that their respective authors, in fact, require virtuous character for 
instantiation of their ideals. Concerning virtue ethical theory, I argue that that theory obviously 
requires virtuous character for implementation of its ideal and, therefore, can provide the necessary 
foundation for improved human character. That improved character can provide both 
governmental and/or legislative bodies and individual human beings the resources necessary to 
begin to adequately address climate change mitigation and adaptation. 
 Chapter 7 through 9 investigate Aristotelian continency and incontinency, the Aidōs 
Response and the Aristotelian/Aquinian psychology, and Chapter 10 argues that those three 
concepts, in combination, are a method for the development and implementation of a new virtue 
or virtues for a revised virtue ethical theory. With all of the above in mind, Chapter 11 reviews the 
existing definitions for Aristotelian proper pride and also for Thomas Hill’s proper humility as an 
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actual Aristotelian concept where both are offered as a yinyang concept for a new virtue, proper 
primility. Chapter 12 argues, based on the thoughts of Paul Woodruff and others, that proper 
primility can best be found in natural environments whose continued existence is required within 
the definition of proper primility. 
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Part II  Climate Change and Character Improvement   
 
 
Chapter 2 - Climate Change: The Empirical Facts 
 
Weather is observable as a local, short-lived phenomenon, but climate, which describes regional 
meteorological averages over at least thirty-year time-spans, is not. I cannot ‘see’ climate because it 
is quantitatively a data-set and qualitatively a holistic structure. I cannot point to it, since it envelops 
me, not only in space, but also over time, in the past, at present and in the future. 
 
      —Martin Schönfeld (Schönfeld, 2016, 188) 
 
The solar heat possesses … the power of crossing an atmosphere; but, and when the heat is 
absorbed by the planet, it is so changed in quality that  
the rays emanating from the planet cannot get with the same freedom back into space.  
Thus the atmosphere admits of the entrance of the solar heat, but checks its exit; and the result is 
a tendency to accumulate heat at the surface of the planet. 
 
                            —John Tyndall (Tyndall, 1859, 158) 
 
 
 A. Climate Change – Scientific Awareness of the Cause  
It is not as though the international scientific community has failed to recognize the 
climacteric effects of climate change. Actually, the science of the cause of climate change is simple 
and has been recognized since the middle of the 19th century and is summarized in greater detail 
below. In a few sentences, certain gases, again primarily CO2 (produced from burning fossil fuel) 
and a number of other gases, concentrate in our troposphere which is that portion of our atmosphere 
that is located from Earth’s surface to between about 5 and 12 miles above Earth's surface 
depending upon geographical location. In fact, certain levels of those gases, now normally called 
greenhouse gases, have always been and remain necessary for the climate that Earth has enjoyed 
and that, until recently, its life had enjoyed over the last tens of thousands of years.  
 12 
  
 While CO2 has always been recognized as relatively chemically inert, it does react with 
thermal energy differently according to the wavelength of that energy. Of course, virtually all 
thermal energy upon which Earth now relies is or has been received from the Sun. Most of the 
Sun's thermal energy exhibits short wavelengths which pass relatively easily through the 
tropospheric gases on its journey to Earth. That energy is absorbed by Earth and then is, in part, 
returned back to the troposphere but in longer wavelengths. That longer wavelength energy is 
retained by the CO2 and other greenhouse gases and a portion is returned to Earth. As the 
concentration of CO2 and the other greenhouse gases increase in the troposphere, the amount of 
that energy that is returned to Earth increases and, thereby, raises the temperature of Earth and its 
constituents - air, soil, rock, water, etc. It is interesting that, as early as the nineteenth century, 
scientists had become concerned with the increasing levels of CO2 in the atmosphere.8  
 The effects of this increase are manifold and monumental as is shown below. The initial 
fact involves the increase in Earth's population from 3 billion in about 1960 to about 7 billion 
presently. Again, the next fact is the exponential increase in the use of fossil fuel energy by all of 
those individuals over those decades. Every unit of fossil fuel burned, including natural gas, 
whether in power plants, internal combustion engines, cement manufacturing plants or wherever 
fossil fuels are burned, results in the generation of CO2. Because of these factors, the level of just 
CO2 in the troposphere has increased by about 30% since 1960 while the other greenhouse gases 
are increasing as well. 
  
  
 
      
8 See pages 55-60 below. 
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 B. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ("IPCC")               
 These increases have been recognized since about 19009 and have recently been studied 
for over 30 years by a mammoth group of scientists from around the world known as the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ("IPCC") which was established by the United 
Nations in 198810 in response to concerns about these increases. The IPCC has issued assessment 
reports in 1990, 1995, 2001 and 2007 and has completed the release of its Fifth Assessment Report 
(herein "AR5") and is beginning work on the AR6. The release of the AR5 began in 2013 with the 
initial release by the IPCC Working Group I of the "Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science 
Basis" (herein referenced as "WGI") (now finalized and over 1500 pages) with a Summary for 
Policy Makers (about 30 pages; herein referenced as "WGI, SPM, p.__") and a Technical Summary 
(about 80 pages; herein referenced as "WGI, TS, p.__). It was finalized only after multiple 
examinations by over 1000 reviewers from 55 countries and by 38 governments.11  
 Since 2013, the IPCC has published three further AR5 reports. The first of these three and 
the second of the AR5 is "Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability" 
published by Working Group II in two parts, "Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects" and "Part B: 
Regional Aspects" (over 1800 pages; herein referenced as "WGII, p.__") with a Summary for 
Policy Makers of about 30 pages and a Technical Summary of about 60 pages. The WGII report 
had over 2000 authors and expert reviewers (over 500 from the United States) from 84 countries 
and was reviewed by over 30 governments.  
      
9 See Chapter 2.G.2. Climate Change - The Science at page 55 below. 
10 http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization_history.shtml#.UuVmkaMo7zI. Of interest, at the end of 2007, the 
IPCC was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. 
11The 2013 IPCC AR5 WGI report (the "Physical Science Basis") is found in its entirety at www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5 
and is referenced herein as "WGI." This report had over 800 authors (two from the University of South Florida, Dr. 
Robert H. Byrne and Dr. Don Chambers) and review editors (over 200 from the United States) from 39 nations, was 
based on 41 climate models, 2 million gigabytes of modeling data, and on 54,677 comments, and it cited 9200 papers. 
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 The third AR5 report is "Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change" published 
by Working Group III (over 1400 pages; herein referenced as "WGIII, p.__") with a Summary for 
Policy Makers of about 30 pages and a Technical Summary of about 75 pages. The WGIII had 
over 450 authors, editors and assistants (over 120 from the United States) and over 800 expert 
reviewers (over 140 from the United States) from over 50 countries and by 37 governments. The 
report was finalized after analysis of about 1200 scenarios of socioeconomic development. 
 The above three reports involved over 600 lead authors and over 1200 contributing 
authors and over 3500 expert reviewers from over 80 countries. The three reports received 
line-by-line approval by all 195 governments involved including the United States. 
 The fourth AR5 report is “Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report" published by a core 
writing team of over 50 individuals from 27 countries which, as indicated, coordinates the other 
three reports. This report of about 169 pages (referenced herein as "SYR, p.__") includes a 
"Summary for Policy Makers" (herein referenced as the “SPM”) of about 31 pages.12 The SYR is, 
of course, based on the reports of the three AR5 Working Groups and provides an integrated view 
of climate change as the final part of the AR5.  This report of about 169 pages or at least its SPM 
of about 31 pages is well worth the read and is used below to further summarize the immense 
impact that climate change has had, is having, and will have over the 21st century and beyond on 
Earth and all of its life. 
 The AR5 is used as the very best source of information about the cause and effect of climate 
change for the following reasons: 
1. The AR5 is by far the most comprehensive environmental report ever developed by any 
group or country because it has been developed over about 35 years through each of the 
      
12 IPCC, 2015, Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, [IPCC Core Writing Team and eds. R.K. 
Pachauri and L.A. Meyer], Geneva, Switzerland; WMO; 151 pp.; herein referenced as "SYR, p.__." The SYR is found 
at  http://ipcc.ch/report/ar5/syr/ 
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four prior reports where all five reports have each virtually increased all concerns 
associated with climate change.13  
2. The AR5 is unique because never before has any such international group, especially of 
scientists, ever been assembled for any reason before climate change.  
3. Climate change is unique because never before has there been any natural system which 
has been anthropogenically changed so dramatically and extensively as has Earth's climate 
system over the last 180 years but more importantly especially over the last 75 years.  
4. Climate change is unique because there is no other natural system on Earth which affects 
the entire geographic area of Earth as does its climate system.  
5. Climate change is unique because it dramatically and extensively changes Earth's processes 
for the production of food and, therefore, for Earth's propagation of virtually all of its life 
- all animals including humans, plants, bacteria and virtually all other organisms.  
6. Climate change is unique because it impacts every square mile of Earth's surface through 
the changes that have occurred, are occurring and will continue to occur in Earth's patterns 
of sea level height, rainfall, snowfall, surface and ground freshwater systems, ice 
formation, permafrost formation, geographic disease, among other such patterns.  
7. Climate change is unique because it has been reported that about 38% of climate change 
impacts result from household decisions.  
  
And climate change is unique because it impacts all of the concerns reviewed below which are 
addressed in the IPCC's AR5 and its prior reports.   
 For the purpose of brevity, all specific references in this dissertation to the IPCC AR5 are 
given only to the involved Working Group ("WGI," "WGII," etc.) and the Synthesis Report 
("SYR") and do not use the "AR5" acronym. However, any references to prior IPCC assessment 
reports are given as they are referenced in those Assessment Reports as follows: "FAR" (first AR), 
"SAR" (second AR), "TAR" (third AR), "AR4" (fourth AR). 
      
13 The United States, in May 2014, issued its third "National Climate Assessment" which has not been printed but is 
available at the address below. Climate Change Impacts in the United States: The Third National Climate Assessment, 
JM Melillo, et al. (eds.) (2014: U.S. Global Change Research Program). referenced herein as "US3,  p.__." The report 
is about 840 pages and not nearly as comprehensive as is the IPCC Report, but does include the following two adjacent 
sentences well into the pages of the report: "What is new over the last decade is that we know with increasing certainty 
that climate change is happening now. While scientists continue to refine projections of the future, observations 
unequivocally show that climate is changing and that the warming of the past 50 years is primarily due to human-
induced emissions of heat-trapping gases."(US3, p.3; see also US3, p. 60,"Key Message#1 Traceable Account").  
http://s3.amazonaws.com/nca2014/low/NCA3_Climate_Change_Impacts_in_the_United%20States_LowRes.pdf?do
wnload=1 
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 This dissertation uses the Synthesis Report and particularly its SPM because of the great 
length and detail of the individual reports. Also, the SYR generally and its SPM both use the 
language, the tables, and the figures of the individual reports.  
 
C. The Lifespan of Greenhouse Gases – Particularly CO2  
Of immediate importance, the lifespan of greenhouse gases in the troposphere is critical to 
the understanding of the crisis proportions of climate change. The three greenhouse gases of 
primary importance are carbon dioxide (“CO2”), methane (“CH4”), and nitrous oxide (“N2O”) in 
that order. Of the three, CO2 is of greatest concern both because of its lifetime in the atmosphere 
and because of the present amount emitted to the atmosphere. The SYR summarizes the cause of 
climate change as follows:  
Anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions have increased since the pre-
industrial era, driven largely by economic and population growth, and are now 
higher than ever. This has led to atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide 
[CO2], methane [CH4] and nitrous oxide [N2O] that are unprecedented in at 
least the last 800,000 years. Their effects, together with those of other 
anthropogenic drivers, have been detected throughout the climate system and 
are extremely likely to have been the dominant cause of the observed warming 
since the mid-20th century.  
 
(Italics in original, bolded emphasis added; SYR, p.4) As described below, the greenhouse gases 
once formed can be naturally removed from the atmosphere but over very long periods of time. 
The lifetime of CO2 more so than any other greenhouse gas is of primary concern. The IPCC states 
as follows: 
When emitted in the atmosphere, greenhouse gases get removed through 
chemical reactions with other reactive components or, in the case of carbon 
dioxide (CO2), get exchanged with the ocean and the land. These processes 
characterize the lifetime of the gas in the atmosphere … .  CO2 is …  removed 
from the atmosphere through multiple physical and biogeochemical 
processes in the ocean and the land; all operating at different time scales. 
… . As a result of the significant lifetimes of major anthropogenic 
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greenhouse gases, the increased atmospheric concentration due to past 
emissions will persist long after emissions are ceased. Concentration of 
greenhouse gases would not return immediately to their pre-industrial 
levels [pre-1850] if emissions were halted. Methane concentration would 
return to values close to pre-industrial level in about 50 years, N2O 
concentrations would need several centuries, while CO2 would essentially 
never come back to its pre-industrial level on time scales relevant for our 
society.  
 
(Emphasis added; WGI, FAQ [Frequently Asked Questions] 12.3, p.55)  
Finally, the IPCC states in the AR5:    
Emission of carbon from fossil fuel reserves, and additionally from land use 
change … is now rapidly increasing atmospheric CO2 content. The removal of 
all the human-emitted CO2 from the atmosphere by natural processes will take 
a few hundred thousand years (high confidence) as shown by the timescales of 
the removal process … (Archer and Brovkin, 2008).  
 
(Emphasis added; WGI, Box 6.1, pp.472-73) Consequently, once formed, for example, from the 
burning of fossil fuels, the lifetime of CO2 is of primary concern.  
Therefore, as you read below the major concerns associated with climate change and also 
the science of climate change, always keep in mind that the CO2 that we have emitted today and 
since about 1850 through the generation of electricity from fossil fuels, through industrial 
processes, though the huge increase in number of the cars and miles driven, through the advent of 
air conditioning, etc. will continue to acidify the oceans and will remain in the atmosphere for “a 
few hundred thousand years (high confidence).” More importantly, keep in mind that what we emit 
tomorrow and in this twenty-first century will continue to acidify our oceans and also heat Earth 
and the future generations of life, humans and non-humans, for that same period. 
  
 D. Climate Change - Effect: Present, Past and Probable Future  
 In the AR5, its Synthesis Report (“SYR”) and in the quotes from those documents in this 
Chapter, "the certainty in key assessment findings is communicated as in the Working Group 
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Reports ... ." as follows. Also, that certainty is based on "’the author teams’ evaluations of 
underlying scientific understanding and is expressed as a qualitative level of confidence (from very 
low to very high) … .” Also, when possible, it is expressed “probabilistically with a quantified 
likelihood (from exceptionally unlikely to virtually certain).”  If appropriate, "findings are also 
formulated as statements of fact without using uncertainty qualifiers." (SYR, p.2) Please see 
footnote 14 below for a more specific explanation.14  
Also, note that in this Chapter, the use of italics in quotations is always found in the original 
text and is not specifically recognized as emphasis in the citation of the quotation because, as noted 
in Footnote 14, information about "confidence qualifiers" and "assessed likelihood" is, within the 
AR5, "typeset in italics," for example, "medium confidence". Any emphasis that is added to these 
quotations is bolded and stated to be emphasis. 
(1) Observed changes in the climate system and their causes  
The first two sentences (beyond the explanation of structure) of the SYR are: "Human 
influence on the climate system is clear, and recent anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse 
gases are the highest in history. Recent climate changes have had widespread impacts on 
      
14 The following is a revision for readability of footnote 1 on page 2 of the SYR. "Each finding is" based on “an 
evaluation of the underlying evidence and agreement” of the involved evidence, i.e. various models. “In many cases, 
a synthesis of evidence and agreement supports an assignment of confidence.”  
The three summary terms for "evidence" are: (1) “limited”, (2) “medium”, or (3) “robust”.  
The three summary terms for "agreement," are (1) “low”, (2) “medium”, or (3) “high’.  
The five levels of confidence qualifiers are: (1) “very low”, (2) “low”, (3) “medium”, (4) “high”, and (5) “very high”.  
Assessed confidence is typeset in italics, e.g., medium confidence.  
The eleven “terms used to indicate the assessed likelihood of an outcome or a result” are: (1) “virtually certain 99–
100% probability”; (2) “extremely likely 95–100%”; (3) “very likely 90–100%”; (4) “likely 66–100%”; (5) more 
likely than not >50–100%”; (6) “about as likely as not 33–66%”; (7) “more unlikely than likely 0–<50%”; (8) 
“unlikely 0–33%”; (9) ‘very unlikely 0–10%’; (10) “extremely unlikely 0–5%”; (11) “exceptionally unlikely 0–1%”. 
“Assessed likelihood is typeset in italics, e.g., very likely.” (For more details, see, “Guidance Note for Lead Authors 
of the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report on Consistent Treatment of Uncertainties,” 2010; 
https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/supporting-material/uncertainty-guidance-note.pdf). (Emphasis added; SYR, p.2) 
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human and natural systems." (Emphasis added; SYR, p.2; see WGI, p.15) Also, a few pages 
later: 
The evidence for human influence on the climate system has grown since the IPCC 
Fourth Assessment Report (AR4). It is extremely likely that more than half of the 
observed increase in global average surface temperature from 1951 to 2010 
was caused by the anthropogenic increase in GHG concentrations and other 
anthropogenic forcings together. 
  
(Emphasis added; SYR, p.5; see also WGI, p.17) Human influence of at least “more than half” of 
the 1951 and continuing greenhouse gas emissions is beyond reasonable doubt.  
 Specific concerns are summarized below and reviewed in the following order - first, 
observed changes and causes; second, the present and projected future impacts of two major 
concerns, food security and sea level rise; third, the general climate change history of some 
remaining concerns past to present; fourth, greenhouse gas emissions by economic sector; fifth, 
greenhouse gas emissions by National responsibility; and sixth, the projected future of those 
concerns for the remainder of this twenty-first century. 
 Because anthropogenic greenhouse gases are "mainly driven by population size, 
economic activity, lifestyle, energy use, land-use patterns, technology and climate policy" 
(Emphasis added; SYR, p.8), the AR5 uses “Representative Concentration Pathways” 
(“RCPs”) for developing projections based on those factors for four different twenty-first 
century pathways of greenhouse gases and their atmospheric concentrations, air pollutant 
emissions and land-use. These RCPs represent, in reality, four different present choices that 
Earth's humanity will make during this decade, 2010 through 2019, about climate change. This is 
the third decade during which climate change has been fully recognized and choices for mitigation 
have been available.  
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 The first decade was 1990 through 1999 during which the United Nations Framework 
Convention On Climate Change ("UNFCCC") was signed and yet virtually no meaningful 
response was adopted or implemented. The second decade was 2000 through 2009 during which 
the Third and Fourth IPCC Assessment Reports were published. Earth is now in its third decade 
of choices and, while some responses have reduced greenhouse gases, the continued addiction to 
fossil fuel energy and the increasing emissions of greenhouse gases have overwhelmed those small 
reductions and greenhouse gas emissions continue to grow year by year.  
 The AR5 includes the following RCP choices: the one ethical pathway choice (RCP2.6) 
and two unethical pathway choices (RCP4.5 and RCP6.0) concerning humanity's opportunities for 
mitigation of, and adaptation to, climate change. The AR5 also includes one further unethical 
pathway (RCP8.5) that ignores any meaningful human response to climate change and chooses 
"business as usual" in terms of the use of fossil fuel energy (as generally suggested by the American 
Petroleum Institute in order to support the continuing profitability of its members such as 
ExxonMobil and Chevron Texaco).   
 The AR5 choices included are described at great length in the SYR and are very briefly 
described as follows: "The RCPs include a stringent mitigation scenario (RCP2.6), two 
intermediate scenarios (RCP4.5 and RCP6.0), and one scenario with very high GHG emissions 
(RCP8.5)." Scenarios without further constraints on emissions (“baseline scenarios”) "lead to 
pathways ranging between RCP6.0 and RCP8.5. RCP2.6 is representative of a scenario that aims 
to keep global warming likely below 2°C above pre-industrial temperatures" (see Figure SPM.5.a 
below). "The RCPs are consistent with the wide range of scenarios in the literature as assessed by 
WGIII." (SYR, p.8)15  
      
15 The RCP number for each scenario represents the increase in radiative forcing from anthropogenic causes for that 
pathway in units of watts per square meter of Earth's surface at the year 2100. 
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 If an ethical choice is defined as the present generation passing to future generations an 
Earth that is no more harmed than at present by climate change, then only RCP2.6 qualifies as 
ethical. Because the other three scenarios include continuing harm, they must be found to be 
unethical choices. This dissertation seeks to discover the problems with present ethical theory that 
seem to allow humanity to continue to make unethical choices concerning climate change and 
attempts to address those problems through an enhanced virtue theory. In light of that goal, it is 
necessary to further define climate changes causes and effects.   
 (2) Major concerns  
 As stated above, two major concerns are first reviewed as assessed in AR5 and as briefly 
described in the SYR. Those concerns are food security and sea level rise which are two main 
effect concerns of the IPCC. That Panel has stated the following concerning the benefits of 
mitigation: "The direct benefits of [mitigation in] climate policy include, for example, intended 
effects on global mean surface temperature, sea level rise, agricultural productivity, biodiversity, 
... ." (WGII, p.64 & 232)16  
 Number 1 - Food security: Climate change's impact on Earth's food production processes 
has already been seen in the Somalian drought and its result of starvation in that area. Concerning 
present climate change effects, the SYR states: 
Evidence of observed climate change impacts is strongest and most comprehensive 
for natural systems. In many regions, changing precipitation or melting snow and 
ice are altering hydrological systems, affecting water resources in terms of quantity 
and quality (medium confidence). ... Assessment of many studies covering a wide 
range of regions and crops shows that negative impacts of climate change on 
crop yields have been more common than positive impacts (high confidence). 
  
      
16 Also, the IPCC has named sea level impact one of the three geophysical systems, including floods, droughts and 
sea level rise, that are a subset of impacts called "physical impacts" that, of course, all concern water. Water, further, 
is one of the three materials upon which food production depends and which has an enormous influence on real estate 
values and use as well. 
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(Emphasis added; SYR, p.6) Concerning future catch and crop impacts, climate change is expected 
to substantially decrease food security (see Figure 1(a) & 1(b) (SYR Figure SPM.9) below). Due 
to projected climate change by 2050 and beyond, worldwide marine species redistribution and 
marine biodiversity reduction in certain regions "will challenge the sustained provision of fisheries 
productivity and other ecosystem services (high confidence)". For wheat, rice, and corn/maize in 
tropical and temperate regions, climate change "without adaptation is projected to negatively 
impact production for local temperature increases of 2°C or more above late twentieth century 
levels, although individual locations may benefit (medium confidence)." Worldwide temperature 
increases of about 4°C or more17 "above late twentieth century levels, combined with increasing 
food demand, would pose large risks to food security globally (high confidence)." (SYR, p.13)  
                              Climate change risks for food production  
  
Figure 1(a): SYR Figure SPM.9 (p.15): Climate change risks for food production: 
(a) Projected global redistribution of maximum catch potential of ~1000 
exploited marine fish and invertebrate species. Projections compare the 10-
year averages 2001–2010 and 2051–2060 using ocean conditions based on a 
single climate model under a moderate to high warming scenario, without 
analysis of potential impacts of overfishing or ocean acidification. 
      
17 “Projected warming averaged over land is larger than global average warming for all RCP scenarios for the period 
2081-2100 relative to 1986-2005.” (SYR, p.13)  
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Figure 1(b): SYR Figure SPM.9 (p.15): Climate change risks for food production: 
 
(b) Summary of projected changes in crop yields (mostly wheat, maize [corn], rice, 
and soy), due to climate change over the 21st century. Data for each timeframe sum 
to 100%, indicating the percentage of projections showing yield increases versus 
decreases. The figure includes projections (based on 1090 data points) for different 
emission scenarios, for tropical and temperate regions and for adaptation and no-
adaptation cases combined. Changes in crop yields are relative to late 20th century 
levels. {Figure 2.6a, Figure 2.7}  
 
(SYR, p.15) For example, for 2090-2109, the projected change is a decrease in about 78% of yields 
with only about a 22% increase. The result is an overall decrease of 56% suggests severe shortages. 
One of the many crop studies listed in AR5 is the 2009 study entitled "Nonlinear temperature 
effects indicate severe damages to U.S. crop yields under climate change" authored by Wolfram 
Schlenker and Michael J. Roberts18 which predicts as follows: 
The United States produces 41% of the world’s corn and 38% of the world’s 
soybeans. These crops comprise two of the four largest sources of caloric energy 
produced and are thus critical for world food supply. We pair a panel of county-
level yields for these two crops ... with a new fine-scale weather dataset that 
incorporates the whole distribution of temperatures within each day and across all 
days in the growing season. ... Holding current growing regions fixed, area-
weighted average yields are predicted to decrease by 30–46% before the end 
of the [21st] century under the slowest warming scenario [of 20 C] and decrease 
by 63–82% under the most rapid warming scenario [of about 60C] … . 
      
18 Wolfram Schlenker and Michael J. Roberts, "Nonlinear temperature effects indicate severe damages to U.S. crop 
yields under climate change," PNAS, vol.106, no.37, (9/15/2009) pp.15594–15598 referenced herein as "Schlenker 
2009, p.__." 
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(Emphasis added; Schlenker, 2009, p.15,594) As projected, climate change will have a severe 
impact on global and regional food security. 
 Number 2 - Sea level rise: Over the period 1901 to 2010, global mean sea level rose by 
0.19 [0.17 to 0.21] meters or .62 [.56 to .69] feet (Figure SPM.1.b below). "The rate of sea level 
rise since the mid-19th century has been larger than the mean rate during the previous two 
millennia (high confidence)." (Emphasis added; SYR, p.4)   
    Globally averaged sea leval change 
 
       Figure 2: SYR Figure SPM.1(b) (p.3): 
 
 Annually and globally averaged sea level change relative to the average over the 
period 1986 to 2005 in the longest-running dataset. Colours indicate different data 
sets. All datasets are aligned to have the same value in 1993, the first year of 
satellite altimetry data (red). Where assessed, uncertainties are indicated by 
coloured shading.  
 
(SYR, p.3) Worldwide mean sea-level rise will continue during the 21st century, "very likely at a 
faster rate than observed from 1971 to 2010". For 2081 to 2100 relative to 1986-2005, the total 
rise "will likely be in the ranges of 0.26 to 0.55 [meters][.85-1.8 feet] for RCP2.6, and of 0.45 to 
0.82 [meters][1.5-2.7 feet] for RCP8.5 (medium confidence)". (SYR, p.13; Figure SPM.6.b) 
Across regions, sea-level rise will be varied. "By the end of the 21st century, it is very likely that 
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sea level will rise in more than about 95% of the ocean area. About 70% of the coastlines 
worldwide are projected to experience a sea level change within ± 20% of the global mean." (SYR, 
p.13) 
Global mean sea level rise                                 Mean over 
    (relative to 1986-2005)                                         2081-2100 
 
Figure 3: SYR Figure SPM.6(b) (p.11): Global mean sea level rise  
 
“from 2006 to 2100 as determined by multi-model simulations. All changes are relative 
to 1986–2005.” Projections (time series) and uncertainty (shading) are shown for 
scenarios RCP2.6 (blue) and RCP8.5 (red). "The mean and associated uncertainties 
averaged over 2081-2100 are given for all RCP scenarios as coloured vertical bars at the 
right hand side of each panel." Twenty-one Coupled Model Intercomparison Project 
Phase 5 (CMIP5) models were used to calculate the multi-model means (red and blue 
lines). 
 
(SYR, p.11) The RCP8.5 projection will provide a mean of about .69 [.53 to .96] meters or 2.3 
[1.73 to 3.15] feet of sea level rise by about 2100.  
 The third United States report completed in 2014 is more pessimistic and makes the 
following prediction: "Global sea level ... is projected to rise another 1 to 4 feet by 2100" and 
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included a NOAA study that used a maximum sea level rise by 2100 of 6.6 feet.19 Based on a 
projection of 5 feet, the National Geographic Journal20 in February 2015 published an article 
entitled "Treading Water" that included the following predictions:  
Four southern counties [of Florida] - Monroe, Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm 
Beach - are home to about one third of Florida's population, and about 2.4 million 
people live less than four feet above the high-tide line. … By 2100 seas could rise 
as much as 6.6 feet. That would put much of Miami-Dade underwater. … [At 4 
feet], [w]e will not be able to keep freshwater above ocean levels, so we’re going 
to have salt water intrusion into our drinking-water supply. ... Most [of the Florida 
Keys] are less than 5 feet above sea level.  
 
(NGJ, pp.114-116,123) The article closes with a story about the Mayor of South Miami, Phil 
Stoddard (who is also a biology professor at Florida International University in Miami) who had 
recently attended a meeting where Hal Wanless, Chairman of the University of Miami's Geology 
Department, had delivered the following analysis: 
[T]he accelerating disintegration of the ice sheets will lead to a more rapid rise of 
sea level - faster and higher than the federal government's projections. That night 
as Stoddard and his teenage daughter walked on moonlit Miami Beach, he shared 
what he'd heard. "She went silent, and then said to me, 'I won't be living here, will 
I?' And I said, 'No, you won't.' Kids get it. Do you think we should tell their 
parents?" 
 
(NGJ, p.125) The AR5 has these further comments about the importance of sea level rise. If ice 
sheets continue to lose mass, sea level rise will be larger, and some part of that loss might be 
irreversible. "There is high confidence that sustained warming greater than some threshold would 
lead to the near-complete loss of the Greenland ice sheet over a millennium or more, causing global 
mean sea level rise up to 7 m[eters]." (WGI, p.29; see also p.72) Seven meters, of course, is 
      
19US3, p.44. 
http://s3.amazonaws.com/nca2014/low/NCA3_Climate_Change_Impacts_in_the_United%20States_LowRes.pdf?do
wnload=1 
20 Laura Parker, "Treading Water" National Geographic Journal, vol.227, no.2, Feb. 2015, pp106-127; herein 
referenced as "NGJ, p.__.” 
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equivalent to about 23 feet which would put much of the present American coastline under water. 
Also, irreversibility will result in less albedo21 and additional warming.22 
 In all RCP scenarios, the largest contributor to sea level rise is thermal expansion at about 
30 to 55% of total. (WGI, p.99) Because of this it is "virtually certain that [global mean sea level] 
rise will continue beyond 2100 … for centuries to millennia." (WGI, p.100) This time frame results 
from the continual warming that will continue for centuries from the greenhouse gases presently 
in the troposphere and the further addition of greenhouse gases under all RCPs and also from the 
centuries to millennia required for the oceans to reach equilibrium.23 The IPCC calls this 
"committed climate change". Presently the energy from radiative forcing is being stored in the 
upper 6500 foot depth of the oceans. However, the oceans have an average depth of about 14,000 
feet and, at the deepest point, are about 35,000 feet deep. Circulation of the entire ocean system is 
extremely slow, on the order of centuries and millennia. (WGI, pp.93,1186-1191) Consequently, 
sea level rise will continue for possibly 2000 years and its extent is currently estimated at 10 meters 
or about 32 feet. (WGI, pp.1189-1191) That would submerge all of Florida's beaches, most of 
Florida's and America's high priced real estate, Miami, Tampa, etc. It would also inundate the land 
on which TECO's Big Bend (Tampa) generation facility is located. 
      
21 Albedo is defined as “The fraction of solar radiation reflected by a surface or object, often expressed as a 
percentage.” (WGI, p.1448) 
22 "During the last interglacial period [129,000 to 116,000 years ago], the Greenland ice sheet very likely contributed 
between 1.4 and 4.3 m[eters] to the higher global mean sea level, implying with medium confidence an additional 
contribution from the Antarctic ice sheet." (WGI, p.11) 
23 "Due to the long time scales of this heat transfer from the surface to depth, ocean warming will continue for 
centuries, even if [greenhouse gas] emissions are decreased or concentrations kept constant, and will result in a 
continued contribution to sea level rise (see Section TS5.7).{12.4.3, 12.4.7}" (WGI, p.93) "Due to the thermal inertia 
of the ocean and slow processes in the cryosphere and land surfaces, the climate would continue to change even if the 
atmospheric composition were held fixed at today’s values. Past change in atmospheric composition leads to a 
committed climate change, which continues for as long as a radiative imbalance persists and until all 
components of the climate system have adjusted to a new state." (Emphasis added; WGII, p.1760)  
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 That degree of sea level rise would also cause losses of coastal wetlands with associated 
impacts on water birds and other wildlife species dependent on freshwater and, in addition, will 
cause major losses of hurricane protection from vegetation such as mangroves. (WGII, p.314) 
Thirty-two feet of sea level rise would have a substantial but unknown extent of salt water intrusion 
into the Floridan aquifer which is Florida's primary source of potable water and also impact sewer 
systems which could require different processes that can handle brackish waste water. (See WGII, 
p.746; WGII, p.253; WGIII, p.538) Coastal cliff retreat could be substantially increased. (WGII, 
p.377) Economic effects could include new requirements for high energy products needed for 
acclamation, for example, concrete needed for embankment and other infrastructure. (WGIII, 
p.764-65)24  
 In any event, "it is virtually certain that global mean sea-level rise will continue for many 
centuries beyond 2100 … ." (SYR, p.16) with the amount of rise dependent on present, past and 
future anthropocentric greenhouse gas emissions.   
 (3) The history of climate change  
 Again, the IPCC states that "[i]n recent decades, changes in climate have caused impacts 
on natural and human systems on all continents and across the oceans. Impacts are due to observed 
climate change, irrespective of its cause, indicating the sensitivity of natural and human systems 
to changing climate." (SYR; p.6) Many species, terrestrial, freshwater, and marine, have shifted 
their ranges, their activities both seasonal and migratory, their abundances, and their species 
interactions "in response to ongoing climate change (high confidence). Some impacts on human 
systems are also attributed to climate change, with a major or minor contribution of climate change 
      
24 No information could be found in either the AR5 or the US3 about the impact of climate change on the level of 
freshwater bodies such as the Great Lakes. However, the AR5 does state that "warming near the Great Lakes area of 
North America is projected to be about 50% greater than that of the global mean warming." (WGI, p.1257)  
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distinguishable from other influences." (SYR, p.6) Figure SPM.4 below summarizes these and 
other impacts which are primarily negative impacts as related by the reasons for the symbols found 
in WGII, Table SPM.A1 (included in Appendix A of this dissertation).25 Shown by continent are 
impacts on physical systems such as glaciers, rivers and coastal erosion, impacts on biological 
systems such as ecosystems, wildlife and marine ecosystems and impacts on human and managed 
systems including food production, livelihoods, health and/or economics. 
       
Figure 4: SYR Figure SPM.4 (p.7):26 “Widespread impacts attributed to climate change”: 
Explaining Figure 4 takes more than a short sentence. The figure is based on the available scientific 
literature since that upon which AR427 relied and there are substantially more impacts in recent 
decades now attributed to climate change.  
      
25 WGII, SPM.A1, pp.30-32 (included in its entirety in Appendix A of this dissertation). 
26 The actual AR5 explanation for this figure is also included in its entirety in Appendix A of this dissertation. 
27 AR4 was, of course, published in 2007. 
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Attribution requires defined scientific evidence on the role of climate change. 
Absence from the map of additional impacts attributed to climate change does not 
imply that such impacts have not occurred. The publications supporting attributed 
impacts reflect a growing knowledge base, but publications are still limited for 
many regions, systems and processes, highlighting gaps in data and studies.  
 
(SYR. p.7) The symbols used in the figure indicate "categories of attributed impacts, the relative 
contribution of climate change (major or minor) to the observed impact, and confidence in 
attribution. Each symbol refers to one or more entries in WGII Table SPM.A1, grouping related 
regional-scale impacts." (SYR, p.7) The numbers in the ovals indicate regional totals of climate 
change publications from 2001 to 201028 and provide an overall measure of the available scientific 
literature on climate change across regions.29 (SYR, p.7) 
 That Earth's climate system has warmed is "unequivocal, and since the 1950s, many of the 
observed changes are unprecedented over decades to millennia." The atmosphere and ocean have 
warmed, the amounts of snow and ice have decreased, and sea level has risen. "Each of the last 
three decades has been successively warmer at Earth’s surface than any preceding decade since 
1850. The period from 1983 to 2012 was likely the warmest 30-year period of the last 1400 years 
in the Northern Hemisphere, where such assessment is possible (medium confidence)." The 
globally averaged combined land and ocean surface temperature data, has warmed by "0.85 [0.65 
to 1.06] °C {or 1.5 {1.2 to 1.9} °F} over the period 1880 to 2012, when multiple independently 
produced datasets exist (Figure SPM.1a).” (See page 32 below) (SYR, p.2) 
 While exhibiting strong multi-decadal warming, the globally averaged surface temperature 
exhibits variability over both annual and decade periods. (Figure SPM.1(a) below). "Due to this 
      
28 These totals are "based on the Scopus bibliographic database for publications in English with individual countries 
mentioned in title, abstract or key words (as of July 2011)." (SYR, p.7) 
29 However, the numbers "do not indicate the number of publications supporting attribution of climate change impacts 
in each region. The inclusion of publications for assessment of attribution followed IPCC scientific evidence criteria 
defined in WGII Chapter 18." Also, "[s]tudies for polar regions and small islands are grouped with neighboring 
continental regions. Publications considered in the attribution analyses come from a broader range of literature 
assessed in the WGII AR5. See WGII Table SPM.A1 for descriptions of the attributed impacts." (SYR, p.7) 
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natural variability, trends based on short records are very sensitive to the beginning and end dates 
and do not in general reflect long-term climate trends." As an example, the rate of warming over 
the period 1998-2012 was 0.05 [–0.05 to 0.15] °C per decade which is smaller than the rate 
calculated over the period 1951-2012 which was 0.12 [0.08 to 0.14] °C per decade. (SYR, pp.2-3) 
 Again, human influence evidence on the climate system has increased since the Fourth 
Assessment Report (AR4). "It is extremely likely that more than half of the observed increase in 
global average surface temperature from 1951 to 2010 was caused by the anthropogenic increase 
in GHG concentrations and other anthropogenic forcings together." The best estimate of the 
human-induced warming is similar to the observed warming over that period. (See Figure SPM.3 
below). (SYR, p.5) Ocean warming dominates the increased energy that is stored in the climate 
system, amounting to "more than 90% of the energy accumulated between 1971 and 2010 (high 
confidence) with only about 1% stored in the atmosphere." (SYR, p,4) 
 That increase in warming results in the storage of the thermal energy in the climate system 
of which oceans are a large part. Globally, most ocean warming is near the surface, where the top 
75 meters warmed by "0.11 [0.09 to 0.13] °C per decade over the period 1971 to 2010" and it is 
"virtually certain that the upper ocean (0−700 m[eters]) warmed from 1971 to 2010, and it likely 
warmed between the 1870s and 1971." Concurrent uptake of CO2 by the oceans since about 1850, 
has resulted in ocean acidification where "the pH of ocean surface water has decreased by 0.1 (high 
confidence), corresponding to a 26% increase in acidity ... ." (SYR, p.4) 
 The increase in warming has caused Earth's ice sheets to melt which lowers Earth's albedo 
because ice is reflective. Between 1992 to 2011,  
the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets have been losing mass (high confidence), 
likely at a larger rate over 2002 to 2011. Glaciers continue to shrink almost 
worldwide (high confidence). Northern Hemisphere spring snow cover has 
continued to decrease in extent (high confidence). There is high confidence that 
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permafrost temperatures have increased in most regions since the early 1980s in 
response to increased surface temperature and changing snow cover. 
  
(SYR, p.4) "It is virtually certain that [by 2100] near-surface permafrost extent at high northern 
latitudes will be reduced ... with the area of permafrost near the surface (upper 3.5 m[eters]) 
projected to decrease by 37% (RCP2.6) to 81% (RCP8.5) ... (medium confidence).” (SYR, p.12) 
Because CO2 is held by permafrost, its reduction causes an increase in those emissions which again 
become trapped in the troposphere and increase Earth's radiative forcing. 
 Arctic sea-ice extent decreased "over the period 1979 to 2012, with a rate that was very 
likely in the range 3.5 to 4.1% per decade." Arctic sea-ice extent "has decreased in every season 
and in every successive decade since 1979 ... (high confidence)." Antarctic sea-ice extent "very 
likely ... increased in the range of 1.2 to 1.8% per decade between 1979 and 2012. However, there 
is high confidence that there are strong regional differences in Antarctica, with extent increasing 
in some regions and decreasing in others." (SYR, p.4) The extent of sea ice is important, again, for 
many reasons including decreasing albedo because ice is much more reflective than open ocean. 
 All of the above is caused by the ever-increasing surface temperature resulting from the 
accumulation of greenhouse gases, primarily CO2, in the troposphere from fossil fuel combustion. 
Globally averaged combined land and ocean surface temperature anomaly 
 
Figure 5: SYR Figure SPM.1(a) (p.3) (a) Annually and globally averaged 
combined land and ocean surface temperature anomalies relative to the average 
over the period 1986 to 2005. Colours indicate different data sets.  
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Concerning the causes of the above changes, again,  
anthropogenic [greenhouse gases] have increased since the pre-industrial era, 
driven largely by economic and population growth, and are now higher than ever. 
This has led to atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane and 
nitrous oxide that are unprecedented in at least the last 800,000 years. Their 
effects, together with those of other anthropogenic drivers, have been detected 
throughout the climate system and are extremely likely to have been the dominant 
cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century. 
 
(Emphasis added; SYR, p.4) Anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions since the pre-industrial era 
have resulted in large increases in the atmospheric concentrations of CO2, CH4 and N2O (see 
Figure SPM.1c below). "Between 1750 and 2011, cumulative anthropogenic CO2 emissions to 
the atmosphere were 2040 ± 310 GtCO2." Just as a refresher, a gigaton ("Gt") is one billion (109) 
tons. About 40% of these greenhouse gas emissions have remained in the atmosphere or 880 ± 
35 GtCO2 where the CO2 and some others will stay for decades and possibly millennia. The 
remainder was removed from the atmosphere and has been stored on land in plants and soils and 
in the ocean. About 30% of these anthropogenic CO2 emissions have caused ocean acidification. 
"About half of the anthropogenic CO2 emissions between 1750 and 2011 have occurred in 
the last 40 years (high confidence) ... ." (Emphasis added; SYR, p.4; see Figure SPM.1d below)  
 Total anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions continued increasing between 1970 to 2010 
"with larger absolute increases between 2000 and 2010, despite a growing number of climate 
change mitigation policies." In 2010, anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions reached 49 ± 4.5 
GtCO2-eq/yr.30 CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes accounted 
for "about 78% of the total [greenhouse gas] emissions increase between 1970 and 2010, with 
a similar percentage contribution for the increase during the period 2000 to 2010 (high 
      
30 "Greenhouse gas emissions are quantified as CO2-equivalent (GtCO2-eq) emissions using weightings based on the 
100-year Global Warming Potentials, using IPCC Second Assessment Report values unless otherwise stated. {Box 
3.2}" (SYR, p.5 fn3) 
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confidence) … ." (Emphasis added; SYR, p.5; see Figure SPM.2 below) "Globally, economic 
and population growth continued to be the most important drivers of increases in CO2 
emissions from fossil fuel combustion." (Emphasis added; SYR, p.5) The contribution of 
population growth from 2000 through 2010 remained roughly identical to the previous three 
decades, while the contribution of economic growth has risen sharply. "Increased use of coal has 
reversed the long‐standing trend of gradual decarbonization (i.e., reducing the carbon intensity of 
energy) of the world’s energy supply (high confidence)." (SYR; p.5; see also SYR, pp.47-48)31 
     Globally averaged greenhouse gas concentrations 
 
            Figure 6: SYR Figure SPM.1(c) (p.3): Globally averaged greenhouse gas 
 concentrations: 
 
(c) Atmospheric concentrations of the greenhouse gases: carbon dioxide (CO2, 
green), methane (CH4, orange), and nitrous oxide (N2O, red) determined from ice 
core data (dots) and from direct atmospheric measurements (lines). 
 
(SYR, p.3) Again, atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations are at unprecedented levels in 
at least 800,000 years. In percentages, "concentrations of CO2, CH4 and N2O have all shown 
      
31 See footnote 1 on page 5 above concerning India's decision to increase its use of coal, since reversed. 
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the following increases since 1750 (40%, 150% and 20%, respectively) ... ." (Emphasis added; 
SYR, p.44)32 
      Global anthropogenic CO2 emissions 
                                                          
 (Quantitative information of CH4 and N2O emission time series from     (Cumulative CO2 
 1850 to 1970 is limited)                                                                                   emissions) 
                                                                                                                                              
            Figure 7: SYR Figure SPM.1(d) (p.3): 
(d) Global anthropogenic CO2 emissions from forestry and other land use as well 
as from burning of fossil fuel, cement production, and flaring. Cumulative 
emissions of CO2 from these sources and their uncertainties are shown as bars and 
whiskers, respectively, on the right hand side. … .  
 
(SYR, p.3) Between 1970 and 2011, total CO2 emissions (in gigatons) have more than doubled 
the total gigatons of CO2 emissions between 1750 and 1970. About 28% of those emissions 
were United States’ emissions. See page 40 below. 
 The origination of the increase in annual anthropogenic greenhouse gases between 1970 
and 2010 is instructive both for that period and the future and is shown in Figure SPM.2 (SYR, 
p.5) below. 
  
 
 
      
32 "The total anthropogenic radiative forcing over 1750–2011 is calculated to be a warming effect of 2.3 [1.1 to 
3.3] W/m2 (Figure 1.4), and it has increased more rapidly since 1970 than during prior decades. [CO2] is the 
largest single contributor to radiative forcing over 1750–2011 and its trend since 1970." (Emphasis added; 
SYR, p.44) 
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  Total annual anthropogenic GHG emissions by gases 1970-2010 
 
 
            Figure 8: SYR Figure SPM.2 (p.5):  
 
Total annual anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (gigatonne of CO2-
equivalent per year, GtCO2-eq/yr) for the period 1970 to 2010 by gases: CO2 from 
fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes; CO2 from Forestry and Other Land 
Use (FOLU);" CH4, N2O and Kyoto Protocol fluorinated gases (F-gases). “Right 
hand side shows 2010 emissions, using alternatively CO2-equivalent emission 
weightings based on the Second Assessment Report (SAR) and AR5 values. … .”33  
 
(SYR, p.5) It is noteworthy that the right-side bars show (1) that the predictions of the Second AR 
(1995) and the actual values (2010) of the AR5 (2014) are very close and (2) that the AR5 values 
are somewhat higher than the earlier predictions.  
 The rate of greenhouse gas emissions is increasing. The contributions to surface warming 
of the above anthropogenic greenhouse gases over a slightly different period, 1951 to 2010, 
      
33 The SYR explanation for SYR Figure SPM.2 continues as follows: "Unless otherwise stated, CO2-equivalent 
emissions in this [AR5, WGI] report include the basket of Kyoto gases (CO2, CH4, N2O as well as F [fluorinated] 
gases) calculated based on 100-year Global Warming Potential (GWP100) values from the SAR ... . Using the most 
recent 100-year GWP100 values from the AR5 (right-hand bars) would result in higher total annual GHG emissions 
(52 GtCO2-eq/yr) from an increased contribution of methane, but does not change the long-term trend significantly. 
{Figure 1.6, Box 3.2}" (SYR, p.5) 
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indicates that those greenhouse gases were the virtual cause of the surface temperature increase 
over that period as Figure 8 shows. (SYR, p.6) 
    Contributions to observed surface temperature change over the period 1951-2010 
 
 
 
            Figure 9: SYR Figure SPM.3 (p.6):  
 
Assessed likely ranges (whiskers) and their mid-points (bars) for warming trends 
over the 1951–2010 period from well-mixed [greenhouse gases], other 
anthropogenic forcings (including the cooling effect of aerosols and the effect of 
land-use change), combined anthropogenic forcings, natural forcings, and natural 
internal climate variability that arises spontaneously within the climate system even 
in the absence of forcings).34 35 (SYR, p.6) 
  
  
 
      
34 "Natural internal climate variability" is "the element of climate variability that arises spontaneously within the 
climate system even in the absence of forcings." (SYR, p.5)   
35 The SYR explanation for SYR Figure SPM.3 continues as follows: "The observed surface temperature change is 
shown in black, with the 5 to 95% uncertainty range due to observational uncertainty. The attributed warming ranges 
(colours) are based on observations combined with climate model simulations, in order to estimate the contribution of 
an individual external forcing to the observed warming. The contribution from the combined anthropogenic forcings 
can be estimated with less uncertainty than the contributions from greenhouse gases and from other anthropogenic 
forcings separately. This is because these two contributions partially compensate, resulting in a combined signal that 
is better constrained by observations. {Figure 1.9}.” 
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 (4) Greenhouse gas emissions by economic sectors  
 Mitigation opportunities are, of course, directly tied to the source of emissions. Therefore, 
both the source of total greenhouse gas emissions and the source of increasing emissions are 
important. In 2010, direct emissions of greenhouse gases came from the following sources: 35% 
were released by the energy sector, 24% (net emissions) from agriculture, forestry, and other land 
use ("AFOLU"), 21% by industry, 14% by transport and 6.4 % by the building sector.36 When 
electricity and heat production emissions are "attributed to the sectors that use the final energy (i.e. 
indirect emissions), the shares of the industry and building sectors in global greenhouse gas 
emissions are increased to 31% and 19%, respectively ... ."37 (SYR, p.46; see Figure 10 below) 
 Total annual anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions have increased by about 10 GtCO2-
eq over the ten-year period between 2000 and 2010. "This increase directly came from the energy 
(47%), industry (30%), transport (11%) and building (3%) sectors (medium confidence). ... Since 
2000, greenhouse gas emissions have been growing in all sectors, except in [AFOLU] ... ." (SYR, 
p.47) 
 In summary, in 2010, about 70% of greenhouse gas emissions came from energy, industry 
and transport while that  group accounted for  about 88% of the increase between 2000 and 2010.   
Another important fact about climate change and greenhouse gas emissions regards the quantity 
of those emissions that result from household decisions such as the miles traveled, the temperature 
of the home, etc. Thomas Dietz, et al38 report in their article, "[d]irect energy use by households 
accounts for approximately 38% of overall U.S. CO2 emissions, or 626 million metric tons of 
      
36 The constituents of these sectors are defined in WGIII, Annex II.9.1 (pp.1302-1306). 
37 See "{WGIII SPM.3, 7.3, 8.1, 9.2,10.3, 11.2.} See also Box 3.2 for contributions from various sectors, based on 
metrics other than 100-year Global Warming Potential (GWP100)." (SYR, p.46)  
38 T. Dietz, G. Gardner, J. Gilligan, P. Stern, and M. Vandenbergh, "Household actions can provide a behavioral 
wedge to rapidly reduce United States carbon emissions," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 106, 
no.44, 2009, 18452-18456; herein referenced as "Dietz et al., p.__". 
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carbon (MtC) in 2005 ... approximately 8% of global emissions ... ."  (Emphasis added; Dietz, 
p.18452) G. Gardner and P. Stern seem to concur and report that: 
Households and individuals, at home and in nonbusiness travel, consume 38.0 
percent of total energy in the United States, more than the industrial sector alone 
(32.5 percent), and the commercial/service (17.8 percent) and nonhousehold 
transportation (11.7 percent) sectors combined. The percentage for households and 
individuals has increased from 32.4 percent in 2000.39 
 
Greenhouse gas emissions by economic sectors as reported in the SYR are: 
 
 
 
            Figure 10: SYR Figure 1.7 (p.47):  
      Total anthropogenic greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions [(GtCO2-eq/yr)] from 
economic sectors in 2010. The circle shows the shares of direct GHG emissions (in 
% of total anthropogenic GHG emissions) from five economic sectors in 2010. The 
pull-out shows how shares of indirect CO2 emissions (in % of total anthropogenic 
GHG emissions) from electricity and heat production are attributed to sectors of 
final energy use.40 (SYR, p.47) 
      
39 G. Gardner & P. Stern, "The Short List: The Most Effective Actions Households Can Take to Curb Climate Change," 
Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development, (2008), vol. 50, no. 5, pp.12-25; p.16 DOI: 
10.3200/ENVT.50.5.12-25. 
40The explanation for Figure 10 (SYR, Figure 1.7) continues as follows: "‘Other energy’ refers to all GHG emission 
sources in the energy sector as defined in WGIII Annex II, other than electricity and heat production {WGIII Annex 
II.9.1}. The emission data on agriculture, forestry and other land use (AFOLU) includes land-based CO2 emissions 
from forest fires, peat fires and peat decay that approximate to net CO2 flux from the sub-sectors of forestry and other 
land use (FOLU) as described in Chapter 11 of the WGIII report. Emissions are converted into CO2 equivalents based 
on 100-year Global Warming Potential (GWP100), taken from the IPCC Second Assessment Report (SAR). Sector 
definitions are provided in WGIII Annex II.9. {WGIII Figure SPM.2}”. (SYR, p.47) 
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 Dietz, et al. borrowed the phrase "behavioral wedge" from a 2004 article about climate 
change which defined that phrase as "an activity that reduces emissions to the atmosphere that 
starts at zero today and increases linearly until it accounts for 1 GtC/year of reduced carbon 
emissions in 50 years."41 Dietz, et al. reported that the change in household behavior outlined in 
the article could result in reductions of 123 MtC total per year or roughly 3 such wedges. (Dietz, 
et al., p.18455) 
 Consequently, mitigation through reduction of greenhouse gas emissions is both a point 
source problem, for example, through control of power plant CO2 emissions (which is 
technologically possible but extremely expensive and, therefore, not presently used anywhere in 
the world), and a societal problem in terms of gallons of gasoline used and kilowatts of electricity 
used (which now is an ethical concern). Actually, power plant control is an ethical concern to the 
extent that cost is the basis for the corporate decision to refuse control of emissions. Another ethical 
concern involves the failure of those that have caused climate change to date, primarily the United 
States, to take responsibility for those past emissions. 
 (5) Greenhouse gas emissions - past and present National responsibility  
 As indicated above, the increase in greenhouse gases and particularly CO2 began about the 
middle of the 19th century with the advent of the Industrial Revolution. Since then, tropospheric 
CO2 concentrations (as shown in Figure SPM.1(c) above) have increased from about 280 ppm to 
about 390 ppm in 2010. The largest contributor to that increase has been the United States and its 
use of and now addiction to fossil fuel energy. Through 2010, the United States has been the largest 
      
41 S. Pacala and R. Socolow, "Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Climate Problem for the Next 50 Years with Current 
Technologies," Science, vol. 305, 968-972 (8/13/2004). 
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cause of climate change. The following figure shows the contribution of the major national 
contributors to that increase.  
 
  Figure 11: Relative contribution from various countries: Fig. 3 (CLC, p.404):  
 
 The effect of excluding recent (2000–2010) emissions, and non-CO2 and land use 
emissions, on the relative contributions of selected countries and regions to 
cumulative global GHG emissions. The reference value includes all GHGs, from 
all emissions sources, over the period 1850–2010.  [Also, "[n]ote that these 
reference values would not change much if emissions over the period 1750–1849 
were included, as these are very small compared to recent emissions (Höhne et al., 
2011).”]42 
 
(CLC, pp.401,404) Therefore, over the last millennia and through 2010, the United States "wins" 
in all categories with only the 27 EU countries close. In 2010, the United States had 4.5% of  
Earth's population while the 27 EU countries had 6.6% of that population. (CLC, p.406-407, Table 
2)  Further, the United States remains the largest major per capita contributor even though its 
      
42 M.G.J. den Elzen, J.G.J. Olivier, N. Höhne & G. Janssens-Maenhout, "’Countries’ contributions to climate change: 
effect of accounting for all greenhouse gases, recent trends, basic needs and technological progress" in Climatic 
Change, 2013, 121:397–412 (DOI 10.1007/s10584-013-0865-6), p.401,404; herein referenced as "CLC, p.__". Also, 
Höhne N, Blum H, Fuglestvedt J et al “Contributions of individual countries’ emissions to climate change and their 
uncertainty” in Climatic Change, 2011, 106:359–391.  
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annual emissions were eclipsed by China in about 2007 which has about seventeen percent of  
Earth’s population and a per capita contribution of about one-fifth of the United States.  
As Schönfeld states in his recent essay, "American Disenlightenment, or Climate Change 
made in USA,"43  
[t]he real perpetrators of the climate crisis are the cumulative perpetrators - the 
highly developed nations. Great quantities of coal, oil, and gas have been burned 
far longer there than anywhere else. From 1850 to 2009, developed nations injected 
76 percent of the total CO2 emissions into the Earth system. The other 24 percent 
originated in developing nations such as China, all newcomers to the GHG club. 
According to recent calculations (2013) of historically accumulated carbon 
footprints, the [United States] is number one on the cumulative list: from 1850 to 
2010, in terms of all GHG emissions, the [United States] contributed 18.6 percent 
to the total (all 27 countries of the more populous EU contributed 17.1 percent); in 
terms of energy CO2 emissions, the [United States] contributed 27.6% of energy 
CO2 emissions (24.8% for the EU).  
 
(Emphasis in original; ADUSA, p.5; CLC, p.402, Table 1) While it is clear that the United States 
has been primarily responsible for the emissions that are causing climate change and while the 
United States can probably take credit for enticing the rest of the world into fossil fuel energy 
addiction, the United States has been unwilling not only to take responsibility for its portion of 
those emissions but also has refused to, in any meaningful way, address mitigation of its present 
and future emissions. 
 Please always recall the statements of the IPCC as quoted on pages 16 and 17 of this  
dissertation that: 
As a result of the significant lifetimes of major anthropogenic greenhouse gases, 
the increased atmospheric concentration due to past emissions will persist long 
after emissions are ceased. Concentration of greenhouse gases would not return 
immediately to their pre-industrial levels if emissions were halted. …  CO2 
would essentially never come back to its pre-industrial level on time scales 
relevant for our society.  
      
43 Martin Schönfeld, "American Disenlightenment, or Climate Change made in USA," in Environmental Ethics for 
Canadians, 2nd edition, ed. B. Williston (Toronto: Oxford University Press, forthcoming); referenced herein as 
"ADUSA, p.__." 
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(Emphasis added; AR5, WGI, FAQ [Frequently Asked Questions]12.3, p.55) Never come back!  
In addition and again, the IPCC in the AR5 states:  
Emission of carbon from fossil fuel reserves, and additionally from land use 
change … is now rapidly increasing atmospheric CO2 content. The removal of 
all the human-emitted CO2 from the atmosphere by natural processes will take 
a few hundred thousand years (high confidence) as shown by the timescales of 
the removal process … (Archer and Brovkin, 2008).  
 
(Emphasis added; AR5, WGI, Box 6.1, p.472-73) The United States is responsible for and, 
therefore, should ethically take its share of the responsibility for the world-wide mitigation of and 
the adaptation to climate change. Again, keep in mind that CO2 that we emit today and have 
emitted in the past since about 1850 will continue to acidify the oceans and will remain in the 
atmosphere for “a few hundred thousand years (high confidence).” 
It is interesting that the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation 
and Liability Act of 1980 (42 USC § 9601 et seq.; herein "CERCLA") imposes strict civil liability 
for the cleanup of past waste disposal where that disposal was, at the time it occurred, neither 
illegal under any law nor known to be detrimental to public health or welfare.44 Criminal liability 
can be imposed for failure to cleanup and tort liability is available to those harmed. But, of course, 
there is no recognized United States federal or international law or sanction requiring cleanup of, 
or compensation for, the past or present disposal of CO2 and other greenhouse gases. There is 
sufficient evidence to attribute national responsibility for about 18% of the last 150 years of 
greenhouse gas emissions to the United States. 
 However, United States corporate interests generally are not genuinely interested in climate 
change and certainly not in recognizing their own or the United States’ responsibility for climate 
      
44 It is interesting that the airfields of the United States Armed Forces were, during the 20th century, one of the major 
causes of groundwater solvent pollution. The United States federal government has been required under CERCLA to 
undertake and pay for the millions (billions?) of dollars for the cleanup of those locations. (Personal knowledge). 
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change. As an example of important interest, Michael Bloomberg and others have organized what 
is called the “Risky Business Project” which is reported to be attempting to get the United States 
Congress and businesses to take climate change seriously and prepare for its impacts. One of the 
participants in this Project is Greg Page, Executive Director of Cargill, Incorporated, the huge 
agricultural conglomerate. He was quoted in the New York Times' article about the Risky Business 
Project as follows:  
"It would be irresponsible not to contemplate [climate change],” Mr. Page said, 
bundled up in a wool sport coat layered over a zip-up sweater. “I’m 63 years old, 
and I’ve grown up in the upper latitudes. I’ve seen too much change to presume we 
might not get more.” Mr. Page is not a typical environmental activist. He says he 
doesn’t know — or particularly care — whether human activity causes [climate 
change]. He doesn’t give much serious thought to apocalyptic predictions of 
unbearably hot summers and endless storms.45  
 
But, the article continues, he is spending time, effort and money to get Congress and corporate 
interests to plan for the effects of climate change. However, while he is correct that not 
contemplating climate change is irresponsible, it is also irresponsible to refuse to address the cause 
of climate change - human activity and specifically United States human activity. It is irresponsible 
because presently in most all countries, fault and guilt are the basis of the legal system as they 
certainly are in the United States. Fault matters and, for climate change, the United States is at 
fault and should address that fault responsibly. This is a part of the ethical concern that is involved. 
 (6) Future climate changes - risks and impacts  
 The IPCC reports that "[c]ontinued emission of greenhouse gases will cause further 
warming and long-lasting changes in all components of the climate system, increasing the 
likelihood of severe, pervasive and irreversible impacts for people and ecosystems." Containing 
      
45 This “Climate Change’s Bottom Line”, Bert Helm, January 31, 2015, article also appeared in print on February 1, 
2015, on page BU1 of the New York edition of the New York Times with the headline: “The Climate Bottom Line.” 
It also appears at  www.nytimes.com/2015/02/01/business/energy-environment/climate-changes-bottom-line.html 
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present climate change requires "substantial and sustained reductions in greenhouse gas 
emissions which, together with adaptation, can limit climate change risks. Cumulative 
emissions of CO2 [will] largely determine global mean surface warming by the late 21st 
century and beyond." (Emphasis added; SYR, p.8) Because anthropogenic greenhouse gas 
emissions are "mainly driven by population size, economic activity, lifestyle, energy use, land-
use patterns, technology and climate policy," the projected greenhouse gas emissions included in 
the four RCPs, "vary over a wide range, depending on both socio-economic development and 
climate policy." (SYR, p.8) 
  Figure 12 below projects the results of the choice to be made between the four RCPs.    
 
        Figure 12: SYR Figure SPM.5(a) (p.9): Again, this Figure takes a somewhat lengthy 
explanation. The (a) portion above shows the time series for CO2 emissions only for each of the 
RCPs (lines) and the associated scenario categories of GtCO2 per year that are used in WGIII 
(colored shaded areas show 5-95% range across the distribution of individual models).46  47 
      
46 "The WGIII scenario categories summarize the wide range of emission scenarios published in the scientific literature 
and are defined on the basis of CO2-eq concentration levels (in ppm) in 2100. The time series of other greenhouse gas 
emissions are shown in Box 2.2, Figure 1[SYR, p.57]." (SYR, p.9). 
47 The entire explanation for Figure 12 (SYR Figure SPM.5(a)) follows: “(a) Emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) alone 
in the Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) (lines) and the associated scenario categories used in WGIII 
(coloured areas show 5 to 95% range). The WGIII scenario categories summarize the wide range of emission scenarios 
published in the scientific literature and are defined on the basis of CO2-eq concentration levels (in ppm) in 2100. The 
time series of other greenhouse gas emissions are shown in Box 2.2, Figure 1[SYR, p.57].“ 
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     Figure 13: SYR Figure SPM.5(b) (p.9): The (b) portion of SYR Figure 5 above shows "global 
mean surface temperature increase at the time global CO2 emissions reach a given net cumulative 
total, plotted as a function of that total, from various lines of evidence." The colored plume shows 
"the spread of past and future projections from a hierarchy of climate-carbon cycle models driven 
by historical emissions and the four RCPs over all times out to 2100." The plume fades with the 
decrease in the number of available models. The ellipses show "total anthropogenic warming in 
2100 versus cumulative CO2 emissions from 1870 to 2100 from a simple climate model (median 
climate response) under the scenario categories used in WGIII." Ellipses width regards 
temperature "caused by the impact of different scenarios for non-CO2 climate drivers. The filled 
black ellipse shows observed emissions to 2005 and observed temperatures in the decade 2000-
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2009 with associated uncertainties. {Box 2.2, Figure 1[SYR, p.57]; Figure 2.3}[SYR, p.63]" 
(SYR, p.9)48 
 Specific projected changes in the climate system are as follows.49 Surface temperature is 
projected to increase over the 21st century under all four assessed emission scenarios. "Future 
climate will depend on committed warming caused by past anthropogenic emissions as 
well as future anthropogenic emissions and natural climate variability." In addition, "[i]t 
is very likely that heat waves will occur more often and last longer, and that extreme 
precipitation events will become more intense and frequent in many regions. The ocean will 
continue to warm and acidify, and global mean sea level to rise." (SYR, p.10) 
  The global mean surface temperature change for 2016 through 2035 relative to 1986 
through 2005 is much the same for all "four RCPs and will likely be in the range 0.3°C to 0.7°C 
(medium confidence)" assuming no major volcanic eruptions, changes in some natural sources 
(for example, CH4 and N2O), or unanticipated differences in total solar irradiance. By about 
2050, the projected climate change is substantially affected by the RCP chosen and 
[t]he increase of global mean surface temperature by the end of the 21st century 
(2081-2100) relative to 1986-2005 is likely to be 0.3°C to 1.7°C under RCP2.6, 
1.1°C to 2.6°C under RCP4.5, 1.4°C to 3.1°C under RCP6.0, and 2.6°C to 4.8°C 
under RCP8.5 ... . The Arctic region will continue to warm more rapidly than the 
global mean. (Figure SPM.6a, Figure SPM.7a). {2.2.1,Figure 2.1, Figure 2.2, Table 
2.1}"  
 
      
48 The explanation for Figure 12 (SYR Figure SPM.5(b)) follows: “(b) Global mean surface temperature increase at 
the time global CO2 emissions reach a given net cumulative total, plotted as a function of that total, from various lines 
of evidence. Coloured plume shows the spread of past and future projections from a hierarchy of climate-carbon cycle 
models driven by historical emissions and the four RCPs over all times out to 2100, and fades with the decreasing 
number of available models. Ellipses show total anthropogenic warming in 2100 versus cumulative CO2 emissions 
from 1870 to 2100 from a simple climate model (median climate response) under the scenario categories used in 
WGIII. The width of the ellipses in terms of temperature is caused by the impact of different scenarios for non-CO2 
climate drivers. The filled black ellipse shows observed emissions to 2005 and observed temperatures in the decade 
2000–2009 with associated uncertainties. {Box 2.2, Figure 1 [SYR, p.57]; Figure 2.3[SYR, p.63]}” 
49 The changes projected for 2081-2100 are relative to 1986-2005 unless otherwise indicated. (SYR, p.10) 
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(SYR, p.10) The IPCC projects that "a large fraction of species faces increased extinction risk due 
to climate change during and beyond the twenty-first century, especially as climate change 
interacts with other stressors (high confidence)" such as precipitation variations, habitat 
modification, lowered ocean oxygen levels, pollution and numbers of others. Most plant species 
cannot shift their geographical ranges fast enough to keep up with not only current but also the 
high projected rates of climate change in most areas. (SYR, p.13) In addition, most small mammals 
and freshwater mollusks will not be able to cope with the rates projected under RCP4.5 and above 
in flat areas during the  twenty-first century.  
 Future risk is indicated as high  
by the observation that natural global climate change at rates lower than current 
anthropogenic climate change caused significant ecosystem shifts and species 
extinctions during the past millions of years. ... Coral reefs and polar ecosystems 
are highly vulnerable. Coastal systems and low-lying areas are at risk from sea-
level rise, which will continue for centuries even if the global mean temperature is 
stabilized (high confidence). {2.3[SYR, pp.64-73], 2.4[SYR, p.73-74], Figure 2.5 
[SYR, p.66]} 
  
(SYR, p.13) In addition, through 2050, "projected climate change will impact human health mainly 
by exacerbating health problems that already exist (very high confidence).” Through this century, 
“climate change is expected to lead to increases in ill-health in many regions and especially in 
developing countries with low income, as compared to a baseline without climate change (high 
confidence)." For RCP8.5 and by 2100, "the combination of high temperature and humidity in 
some areas for parts of the year is expected to compromise common human activities, including 
growing food and working outdoors (high confidence)." (SYR, p.15) 
 Also during this century, "[i]n urban areas, climate change is projected to increase risks for 
people, assets, economies and ecosystems, including risks from heat stress, storms and extreme 
precipitation, inland and coastal flooding, landslides, air pollution, drought, water scarcity, sea-
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level rise, and storm surges (very high confidence)." Such risks are worsened where necessary 
infrastructure and services are not available or where people live in exposed areas. Rural areas can 
be "expected to experience major impacts on water availability and supply, food security, 
infrastructure and agricultural incomes, including shifts in the production areas of food and non-
food crops around the world (high confidence)." (SYR, pp.15-16) 
 Total economic losses will increase with "increasing temperature (limited evidence, high 
agreement) but global economic impacts from climate change are currently difficult to estimate." 
Where poverty exists, climate change "impacts are projected to slow down economic growth, make 
poverty reduction more difficult, further erode food security and prolong existing and create new 
poverty traps, the latter particularly in urban areas and emerging hotspots of hunger (medium 
confidence)." Of considerable concern, climate change "is projected to increase displacement of 
people (medium evidence, high agreement). Populations that lack the resources for planned 
migration [will] experience higher exposure to extreme weather events, particularly in developing 
countries with low income." Also, climate change "can indirectly increase risks of violent conflicts 
by amplifying well-documented drivers of these conflicts such as poverty and economic shocks 
(medium confidence)." (SYR,p.16) 
  
 E. Climate Change Beyond 2100, Irreversibility and Abrupt Changes  
 Many elements of climate change and its many associated impacts will be present for 
centuries, even if anthropogenic emissions cease. "The risks of abrupt or irreversible changes 
increase as the magnitude of the warming increases." (SYR, p.16) Concerning warming, the IPCC 
states that:   
Warming will continue beyond 2100 under all RCP scenarios except RCP2.6. 
Surface temperatures will remain approximately constant at elevated levels for 
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many centuries after a complete cessation of net anthropogenic CO2 emissions. A 
large fraction of anthropogenic climate change resulting from CO2 emissions 
is irreversible on a multi-century to millennial time scale, except in the case of 
a large net removal of CO2 from the atmosphere over a sustained period. {2.4, 
Figure 2.8} 
  
(Emphasis added; SYR, p.16) The removal of CO2 from the atmosphere by scrubbing is possible 
because the science and technology are available but extremely expensive such that to date no 
large-scale scrubbing has occurred and is not expected to occur anytime soon. Also, stabilization 
of global average surface temperature does not imply stabilization for the climate system generally. 
"Shifting biomes, soil carbon, ice sheets, ocean temperatures and associated sea level rise all 
have their own intrinsic long timescales which will result in changes lasting hundreds to 
thousands of years after global surface temperature is stabilized. {2.1,2.4}" (Emphasis added; 
SYR, p.16) If CO2 emissions continue, "[t]here is high confidence that ocean acidification will 
increase for centuries ... and will strongly affect marine ecosystems." (SYR, p.16)  
 Finally, the “magnitudes and rates of climate change” under RCP4.5 and higher "pose an 
increased risk of abrupt and irreversible regional-scale change in the composition, structure, and 
function of marine, terrestrial and freshwater ecosystems, including wetlands (medium 
confidence)." (SYR, p.16)  
  
 F.  Future Pathways for Adaptation, Mitigation and Sustainable Development 
 The Synthesis Report states that:  
Adaptation and mitigation are complementary strategies for reducing and managing 
the risks of climate change. Substantial emission reductions over the next few 
decades can reduce climate risks in the 21st century and beyond, increase prospects 
for effective adaptation, reduce the costs and challenges of mitigation in the longer 
term and contribute to climate-resilient pathways for sustainable development. {3.2, 
3.3, 3.4}50  
      
50 The phrase "sustainable development" as regards the economy may ultimately become an oxymoron as suggested 
by John Stuart Mill in about 1850. See footnote 108 on page 115 of Part III of this dissertation.  
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(SYR, p.17) Effective decision-making can rely on a multitude of analyses for evaluating future 
risks and benefits, "recognizing the importance of governance, ethical dimensions, equity, value 
judgments, economic assessments and diverse perceptions and responses to risk and 
uncertainty." (Emphasis added; SYR, p.17) 
 Sustainable development and equity must be involved when assessing different climate 
policies for RCP2.6 through RCP6.5. Limiting climate change effects is necessary to achieve both 
of those ends and especially the elimination of poverty to the extent possible. In addition, 
"[c]ountries' past and future contributions to the accumulation of [greenhouse gases] in the 
atmosphere are different, and countries also face varying challenges and circumstances and have 
different capacities to address mitigation and adaptation." (SYR, p,17) Both of those contributions, 
past and future, must be evaluated to assess the responsibility of each country. Both “[m]itigation 
and adaptation raise issues of equity, justice, and fairness." Most of the countries that are most 
vulnerable to climate change have contributed and still contribute minimally to greenhouse gas 
emissions. As above, the United States is the responsible country for most of the past 
emissions prior to about 2010.  
 Obviously as the IPCC observes, "[d]elaying mitigation shifts burdens from the present to 
the future, and insufficient adaptation responses to emerging impacts are already eroding the basis 
for sustainable development." (SYR, p.17) Comprehensive climate change strategies that support 
sustainable development take into account "the co-benefits, adverse side effects and risks" that are 
projected to arise from all adaptation and mitigation alternatives. (SYR, p.17)  Designing climate 
change policy must consider the way in which "individuals and organizations perceive risks and 
uncertainties and take [those perceptions] into account" and whether those positions are merely 
selfish or have benefits for present and future human interests generally. Evaluation methods using 
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"economic, social and ethical analysis are available to assist decision-making." (Emphasis added; 
SYR, p.17) These evaluations can assess a multitude of possible impacts, "including low-
probability outcomes with large consequences. But they cannot identify a single best balance 
between mitigation, adaptation and residual climate impacts. {3.1} [SYR, p.76]" (SYR, p.17) 
 Climate change now demands global collective action, because again most greenhouse 
gases "accumulate over time and mix globally, and emissions by any agent (e.g., individual, 
community, company, country) affect other agents. Effective mitigation will not be achieved if 
individual agents advance their own interests independently." (SYR, p.17) Cooperation - 
international cooperation - is necessary to effectively reduce and eliminate greenhouse gas 
emissions and address climate change issues generally. Also, effective adaptation measures "can 
be enhanced through complementary actions across [national] levels," through international 
cooperation. In addition, equitable projected results can lead to effective cooperation. (SYR, p.17) 
The IPCC is right on point with its assessment of necessary mitigation and adaptation 
action. 
Without additional mitigation efforts beyond those in place today, and even with 
adaptation, warming by the end of the 21st century will lead to high to very high risk 
of severe, widespread and irreversible impacts globally (high confidence) … . In 
most scenarios without additional mitigation efforts (those with 2100 atmospheric 
concentrations [greater than] 1000 ppm CO2-eq) warming is more likely than not to 
exceed 4°C above pre-industrial levels by 2100. … The risks associated with 
temperatures at or above 4°C include substantial species extinction, global and 
regional food insecurity, consequential constraints on common human 
activities, and limited potential for adaptation in some cases (high confidence). 
… {2.3, Figure 2.5, 3.2, 3.4, Box 2.4, Table SPM.1} 
 
(Emphasis added, SYR, p.18-19) Also, some climate change risks, such as those "to unique and 
threatened systems and risks associated with extreme weather events, are moderate to high [even] 
at temperatures 1°C to 2°C" greater than pre-industrial levels. (SYR, p.19)  
 The IPCC continues;  
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Substantial cuts in [greenhouse gas] emissions over the next few decades can 
substantially reduce risks of climate change by limiting warming in the second half 
of the 21st century and beyond. Cumulative emissions of CO2 largely determine 
global mean surface warming by the late 21st century and beyond. Limiting 
risks across [the five Reasons for Concern51] would imply a limit for 
cumulative emissions of CO2. Such a limit would require that global net 
emissions of CO2 eventually decrease to zero and would constrain annual 
emissions over the next few decades (Figure SPM.10) (high confidence). But 
some risks from climate damages are unavoidable, even with mitigation and 
adaptation. {2.2.5, 3.2, 3.4} 
 
(Bolded emphasis added; SYR, p.19) Figure SPM.10 is included in Appendix A. 
 Ethical considerations are included in the SYR, all in a positive context, for example. as 
possibly helpful in adaptation and mitigation efforts. (SYR, p.17) A number of those instances are 
the following. Initially, the SYR defines the role of ethics: "Ethics analyses52 the different values 
involved and the relations between them. Recent political philosophy has investigated the question 
of responsibility for the effects of emissions." (SYR, p.76) At the very least, it seems that that is 
what ethics and political philosophy ought to do. However, the dysfunctional legislatures in the 
United States particularly seem in need of something to recognize reasonable political philosophy.  
 The IPCC endorses "[t]ransformations in economic, social, technological and political 
decisions and actions" and states that such transformations "can enhance adaptation and promote 
sustainable development (high confidence)." (SYR, p.20) It suggests these "transformations" at a 
national level obviously because there is no reasonable expectation for transformations of actions 
at any international level because national interests have yet to overcome their dedication to their 
      
51 "Five Reasons For Concern (RFCs) aggregate climate change risks and illustrate the implications of warming and 
of adaptation limits for people, economies and ecosystems across sectors and regions. The five RFCs are associated 
with: (1) Unique and threatened systems, (2) Extreme weather events, (3) Distribution of impacts, (4) Global aggregate 
impacts, and (5) Largescale singular events. In this report, the RFCs provide information relevant to Article 2 of 
[United Nations Framework Convention On Climate Change United Nations (1992)]." (SYR, p.18) 
52 "Analyses" is the third person present form of the verb "analyse" which is the British spelling of "analyze." The 
New Oxford American Dictionary, ed. E. Jewell and F. Abate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p.55. 
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own interests primarily for reasons of economics and promotion of individual wealth. But the IPCC 
states:  
Planning and implementation of transformational adaptation could reflect 
strengthened, altered or aligned [or possibly new] paradigms and may place 
new and increased demands on governance structures to reconcile different 
goals and visions for the future and to address possible equity and ethical 
implications. Adaptation pathways are enhanced by iterative learning, deliberative 
processes and innovation.  
 
(Emphasis added; SYR, p.20) While "ethical implications" are mentioned, transformations of 
ethics and ethical theories are not mentioned possibly because ethics and their associated theories 
may seem so remote as to defy transformations. However, new or revised theories are continually 
proposed and, therefore, new theories or at least revised theories should not only be possible but, 
as argued in this dissertation, are necessary. Whether theories are sufficient is a matter of 
application. In any event and in any context in the AR5, the reference was to existing ethical 
positions and in no location was there any hint that different or revised ethics or ethical theory 
would be helpful or hurtful. 
 Those few portions of the Synthesis Report referenced or quoted above are offered in an 
attempt to crystallize the severity and global nature of the impacts associated with climate change. 
It is the position of this dissertation, however, that at least a revised ethic - specifically a climate 
change virtue ethic - a transformational ethic, if you will - would not only be helpful but is 
necessary. Consequently, the task of this dissertation is beginning the possible revision of virtue 
ethical theory where the hope is the awakening of philosophy to the different impacts and puzzles 
that climate change has invented. But first the science of climate change is offered in order to 
understand not only the impacts of climate change but also the natural scientific facts involved. 
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 G. Climate Change - The Science  
 The science of climate change (and, its cause, global warming) is fairly simple. It regards 
certain gases, and the nature of those gases, that accumulate in Earth's troposphere, the atmospheric 
layer from Earth’s surface to about 5 to 12 miles above Earth's surface.53 Again, the important 
gases are CO2, CH4, N2O and certain other gases of lesser importance collectively called 
"greenhouse gases” which are relatively transparent to the thermal energy that Earth receives from 
the Sun but which are relatively opaque to the thermal energy then returned to space by Earth. The 
Sun's thermal energy is primarily received in the short ultra-violet wavelength band while Earth's 
retained thermal energy that is then returned to the troposphere is emitted in the longer infrared 
wavelength band.  
 Virtually all of the thermal energy presently available on Earth has been thermal energy 
generated by the Sun over Earth's life of the past 4 billion plus years. Much of that energy has been 
retained by Earth in the form of fossil fuels which, of course, have resulted from the decay of 
plants and animals and when privatized are transformed into gasoline, heating media, plastics and 
other chemicals. When burned, those compounds create heat and CO2.  
 That energy from the Sun warms Earth's surface and its atmosphere, lakes and oceans on a 
daily basis. Also, on a daily basis, as Earth rotates away from the sun, Earth cools, and, upon 
cooling, some of the thermal energy that Earth has received is then given up by Earth but in the 
      
53 The troposphere is “the lowest part of the atmosphere, from the surface to about 10 km in altitude at mid-latitudes 
(ranging from 9 km at high latitudes to 16 km in the tropics on average), where clouds and weather phenomena occur. 
In the troposphere, temperatures generally decrease with height.” AR5, WGII, p.1774. As explained in Wikipedia 
"The troposphere is the lowest layer of Earth's atmosphere … . It contains approximately 75% of the atmosphere's 
mass and 99% of its water vapour and aerosols. ...   The lowest part of the troposphere, where friction with the Earth's 
surface influences air flow, is the planetary boundary layer. This layer is typically a few hundred meters to 2 km (1.2 
mi) deep depending on the landform and time of day." http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Troposphere 
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longer infrared wavelengths.54 This difference in wavelength of the thermal energy transmitted to, 
and from, Earth allows the Sun's thermal energy to pass through the gases in the troposphere but 
allows the retention by those gases of the thermal energy given up by Earth. Some of that retained 
thermal energy is then transmitted back to Earth and provides for additional warming of Earth.    
 The unit of this thermal energy in present science is the "photon" which is, of course, also 
the unit of visible light which has a wavelength between the ultraviolet and the infrared bands. 
Photons may act as both a particle and a wave.55 Further, the absorption of Earth's thermal infrared 
radiation by molecules of these greenhouse gases in the troposphere depends on their 
concentration, and type.56  
[The] molecular bands [of the greenhouse gases] that absorb significantly in the 
spectral region [of the Earth's surface longwave radiation emission] play an 
important role in atmospheric absorption and emission, and hence control the 
outgoing longwave radiation to space and hence the Earth's long wave radiation 
budget. This, in turn, determines the greenhouse effect of the atmospheric 
molecules as the balance between the net incoming [short wave] solar radiation and 
the outgoing longwave radiation [which] primarily determines the Earth's surface 
temperature. 
 
(R&C, p.114) While some details of this process have been refined recently, the science of the 
basic process is far from new. Jean-Baptiste Joseph Fourier (1768-1830), a French physicist, in 
1827, discovered that Earth loses, by infrared radiation, some of the thermal energy it receives from 
      
54 Animal bodies, both human and nonhuman, generate thermal energy, or heat, in similar infrared wavelengths that 
allow what is sometimes called “night vision” that refers in part to equipment that can identify these wavelengths 
where our eyes cannot. 
55 "Newton conjectured the particle aspects and observed wave aspects ("Newton's rings"). Young showed wave 
interference in his double-slit experiments, and Einstein formulated light as particles (photons) to explain the 
photoelectric effect." J. R. Sambles, "Structured photons take it slow," Science, vol. 347, issue 6224, Feb. 20, 2015. 
56 "Absorption of terrestrial thermal infra-red radiation by molecules in the atmosphere depends on their concentration, 
type and whether they are heteronuclear (e.g. CO2, H2O, CH4, O3, NH3) or homonuclear (e.g. N2 and O2), that is 
whether or not they have an electrical dipole that can interact with infrared radiation. The atmosphere consists of 
mainly homonuclear molecules and hence it is the trace [heteronuclear] molecules, which strongly absorb infra-red 
radiation emitted by the Earth's surface to space, that determine the strength of the greenhouse effect." I.M. Vardavas 
and F.W. Taylor, Radiation and Climate: Atmospheric Energy Budget from Satellite Remote Sensing (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007) herein referenced as "R&C," p.86.  In summary, "[i]n planetary atmospheres, natural emission 
is … restricted to the infra-red . … ." (R&C, p.56) I owe the recommendation of this book to Dr. Martin Hoffert, 
Emeritus Professor of Physics, New York University.  
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the Sun.57 Fourier theorized that the thermal energy given off by Earth was not all transmitted into 
space but that some was retained by Earth's atmosphere. John Tyndall, an Irish/British scientist 
(1820-1893), in 1859, found that the primary atmospheric gases, oxygen and nitrogen, were 
transparent to infrared radiation while water vapor, CO2 and some other gases were opaque to that 
radiation.58 Tyndale states; 
The solar heat possesses … the power of crossing an atmosphere; but, and when 
the heat is absorbed by the planet, it is so changed in quality that the rays emanating 
from the planet cannot get with the same freedom back into space. Thus the 
atmosphere admits of the entrance of the solar heat, but checks its exit; and the 
result is a tendency to accumulate heat at the surface of the planet. 
 
(Tyndale, p.158) Thus, Earth's atmosphere retains thermal energy which is then radiated back to 
Earth, and, thereby, keeps Earth warmer than it would otherwise be.  
 Also, about this same time, the possibility of a prehistoric ice age was postulated. That idea 
was investigated by a Swedish scientist, Svante Arrhenius (1859-1927), who, in a paper written 
about 1896,59 postulated that the amount of CO2 in the atmosphere could change as a result of 
events like volcanic eruptions and their attendant emissions that would include large amounts of 
CO2 and that this could provide a warmer Earth. Conversely, if volcanic eruptions ceased, CO2 
would be absorbed into soil and ocean  water that would result in  the cooling of the air. Thus, the  
air would hold less water vapor, also a potent gas opaque to infrared radiation which would further 
cool Earth. He postulated that the continuation of this process could result in an Ice Age.  
      
57 Jean-Baptiste Joseph Fourier, "On the Temperatures of the Terrestrial Sphere and Interplanetary Space" in 
M´emoires d l’Acad´emie Royale des Sciences de l’Institute de France, VII 570-604 1827; see Nature, vol. 432, Dec.9, 
2004, p.677 for a translation. The existence of infrared radiation had only been discovered about 25 years earlier by 
Frederick Herschel (1738-1822), a German scientist. 
58 John Tyndall, "On the transmission of heat of different qualities through gases of different kinds" in Proceedings 
of the Royal Institution of Great Britain 3: 1859, pp. 155–158, herein referenced as “Tyndall, p.__” 
https://archive.org/details/noticesofproceed03roya; see also Mike Hulme, "On the origin of ‘the greenhouse effect’: 
John Tyndall’s 1859 interrogation of nature," in Weather, vol. 64, no. 5, May 2009, pp.121-23.  
59 Svante Arrhenius, "On the Influence of Carbonic Acid in the Air upon the Temperature of the Ground," in 
Philosophical Magazine and Journal of Science, series 5, vol. 41, April 1896, pp.237-276. 
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 Arrhenius also attempted to calculate the quantity of CO2 added to the atmosphere through 
anthropogenic activities and actually suggested that, if these activities doubled the CO2 content of 
the atmosphere, it would raise Earth's temperature by 5°C or 6°C. However, he suggested that this 
doubling might take thousands of years. Apparently, his prediction was based on Earth's population 
which was then about 1 billion.  Within a few years, his prediction was erroneously dismissed as 
wrong and was actually close to today’s science. 
 In 1938, Guy Stuart Callendar (1898-1964), an English engineer, told the Royal 
Meteorological Society that the warming that had occurred in areas of Earth was caused by human 
industrial activity through the burning of fossil fuels and the attendant emissions of millions of 
tons of CO2 which was, as a result, changing Earth's climate.60 Callendar stated:  
Few of those familiar with the natural heat exchanges of the atmosphere, which go 
into the making of our climates and weather, would be prepared to admit that the 
activities of man could have any influence upon phenomena of so vast a scale. In 
the following paper I hope to show that such influence is not only possible, but is 
actually occurring at the present time. 
 
(Callendar, p.223). About this time, the term "greenhouse effect" had begun to be used. While a 
strict misnomer because greenhouses simply prevent the heated air inside a building from 
escaping, this terminology caught on. This, of course, is not what occurs through global warming 
where the infrared thermal radiation from Earth is collected in the troposphere with some being 
sent back to Earth. In 1956, Gilbert Plass, Ph.D. (1920-2004) suggested, after computer 
calculations, that human activity would increase the average temperature of Earth "at the rate of 
1.1 degree C per century" but the scientific community rejected the conclusion because of crude 
computation.61   
      
60 G. S. Callendar, "The artificial production of carbon dioxide and its influence on temperature," in Quarterly Journal 
of the Royal Meteorological Society, vol. 64, issue 275, April 1938, pp.223–240. 
61 G.N. Plass, "Infrared Radiation in the Atmosphere," American J. Physics 24, 1956, pp.303-21; G.N. Plass, "Carbon 
Dioxide and the Climate," American Scientist 44, 1956, pp. 302-16; G.N.Plass, "Effect of Carbon Dioxide Variations 
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 However, over the last few decades, the primary concern of global warming and climate 
change has become the length of time that anthropogenic CO2 will remain in the atmosphere.  
Climatologist, David Archer stated in a peer-reviewed journal that:  
The carbon cycle of the biosphere will take a long time to completely neutralize and 
sequester anthropogenic CO2. We show a wide range of model forecasts of this 
effect. For the best guess cases, ... , we expect that 17-33% of the fossil fuel carbon 
will still reside in the atmosphere [a 1000 years] from now, decreasing to 10–15% 
at [10,000 years], and 7% at [100,000 years]. The mean lifetime of fossil fuel CO2 
is about [30,000-35,000 years].62  
 
This, of course, means that the CO2 from, for example, fossil fuel being emitted into the 
atmosphere today, will be with Earthbound humanity for a long, long time and will be with future 
generations for hundreds, thousands, and possibly tens of thousands of years.  
 In 2013, after the IPCC first published its Science portion of AR5, Richard A. Kerr, a News 
Writer for the weekly journal Science, in its October 4, 2013, issue, summarized the history of 
climate change science as follows:63 
Back in 1979, the late Jule Charney of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
convened a committee for the U.S. National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to 
consider what effect, if any, increasing amounts of atmospheric CO2 might be 
having on climate (Science, 13 August 2004, p. 932). One of the two U.S. groups 
modeling climate at the time told the committee that in their model, doubled 
atmospheric CO2 warmed Earth by 2°C. The other group said it’s equally 
rudimentary model warmed 4°C after a doubling. ... Charney simply took 0.5°C as 
a not-unreasonable margin of error and came up with the now-iconic range for 
climate sensitivity of 1.5°C to 4.5°C. It has endured through nearly 3 decades of 
reports, first from the NAS and then from the IPCC. 
 
However, there is a huge difference between 1979 and the present. 
  
      
on Climate," American J. Physics 24, 1956, pp. 376-87; G.N. Plass, "The Carbon Dioxide Theory of Climatic Change," 
Tellus VIII, 2. (1956), pp.140-154; G.N. Plass, "Carbon Dioxide and Climate," Scientific American, July1959, pp.41-
47. Plass stated: “[T]he temperature at the surface of the earth is controlled by the transparency of the atmosphere in 
the visible and infrared portions of the spectrum.” Gilbert N Plass, PhD, 1956. 
62  Archer, David, "Fate of Fossil Fuel CO2 in Geologic Time," Journal of Geophysical Research, Oceans. 110 (2005), 
[C09S05, doi:10.1029/2004JC002625]; p.5 
63  “The IPCC Gains Confidence in Key Forecast,” Science, Vol. 342, Issue 6154, October 4, 2013, p.23; herein  
“Science 6154, p.__”.  
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[E]ven though the sensitivity numbers have stayed the same, the work behind them 
has advanced dramatically. “Our estimates are supported by actual data to an extent 
that was probably unimaginable in Charney’s time,” writes climate scientist and an 
IPCC report author, Gabriele Hegerl of the University of Edinburgh in the United 
Kingdom, in an e-mail. ... The [IPCC] report now assigns "high confidence" to 
climate sensitivity falling in the canonical range. … , Hegerl writes.  
 
(Science, Vol. 342, Issue 6154, p.23) For three plus decades, scientists have given us the range of 
1.5°C to 4.5°C for the impact of our anthropogenic CO2 emissions and yet there are still politicians 
who are deniers for the simple purpose of pandering for votes. And there are still corporate boards 
that approve advertising and marketing strategies that encourage the expansion of the use of fossil 
fuel energy for the vicious purpose of generating big paychecks and bonuses for executives. 
   
 H. Summary - Chapter 2 
 In summary, the primary reasons for the anthropogenic influence are (1) population - about 
three billion in 1960 and about seven billion (in about 2010), an increase of about four billion or 
about one hundred thirty percent in fifty years and increasing to produce economic growth, (2) 
consumerism for that purpose as well through purchasing what is not needed, what is unsatisfying, 
what is just bigger, what will not last, or just what we are told to purchase,64 and (3) the fossil fuel 
energy addiction of that world population through the increased number of vehicles per capita, the 
exponential increase in the use of electrical energy to operate new technology (such as the 
computer, television, etc.), the construction of more and larger homes, the increased use of air-
conditioning which uses electrical energy to remove heat from an enclosed area and dumps it into 
the outdoor atmosphere thus increasing outdoor temperatures, and all those other electrical items 
that have only become “necessary” over the last 50 years (“there, there little luxury, don’t you cry. 
      
64 “con·sum·er·ism, noun; 1:  the promotion of the consumer's interests; 2:  the theory that an increasing consumption 
of goods is economically desirable; also :  a preoccupation with and an inclination toward the buying of consumer 
goods.” http://unabridged.merriam-webster.com/ unabridged/consumerism 
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You will be a necessity by-and-by.”) And all of those new fossil fuel electrical energy uses increase 
the quantity of CO2 that overloads Earth’s natural “sinks” for CO2 (1) in Earth’s atmosphere that 
heats up Earth through its accumulation in that sink (along with the other greenhouse gases), (2) 
in Earth’s oceans that also heats up that sink and, in addition, acidifies those oceans that among 
other things destroys coral and requires migration of the oceans’ habitants to other areas of cooler 
temperatures where they can be found, and (3) in Earth’s soils. 
The resulting major ethical concerns are the following. First, the obvious fact that the 
emissions of CO2 from the present generation’s use of fossil fuel energy will be retained in Earth's 
atmosphere for centuries and millennia (see pages 16 and 17 above) and, thereby, cause the crises 
described above over those periods. Further, under these circumstances present ethical theories do 
not even clearly mandate shame when ethical consideration is extended only to the present 
generation because of the required reciprocity of those theories and our general laws. Second, the 
present generation has forgotten tradition and past generations even though it has benefited from 
that tradition and those generations while refusing any responsibility for the activities of its 
ancestors and its own generation that have caused climate change. It seems that a problem of 
character is involved. Therefore, defining character and reviewing the need for improvement of 
character are important and are addressed in the next chapter. 
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 Chapter 3 - Character Improvement                  
 
(b) In order to carry out the policy set forth in this Act, it is the continuing responsibility of the Federal 
Government to use all practicable means, consistent with other essential considerations of national policy, to 
improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources to the end that the Nation may-- 
(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for succeeding 
generations: … . 
 
                               42 USC 4331; Sec 101. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 
 
 
 Why should character be a critical component of the mitigation of and adaptation to climate 
change? As Schönfeld has observed, environmental ethics has morphed into climate change ethics. 
As I argue in this dissertation, present ethical theory does not adequately address climate change. 
As is argued in Part III below, none of the three major ethical theories adequately address climate 
change because of the global impact of this anthropogenic change and because the duration of that 
change is centuries and millennia. The human inhabitants of Earth are the cause of the global 
impact and the duration of climate change. As argued herein, character is the critical ingredient in 
the response to this change. 
 
A. Character - A Definition  
 Because of this anthropogenically caused lengthy climacteric, this dissertation focuses on 
the character of both the individual human being and groups of those beings particularly in the 
United States. In addition, the definition of “character” is needed particularly when discussing 
Aristotle’s ethics which defines “virtue” as a “state of character” of the individual. "Character" as 
defined in the Merriman-Webster Unabridged Dictionary65 is lengthy because that word covers 
      
65 http://unabridged.merriam-webster.com/unabridged/character. 
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much ground in the English language. For example, it starts with "a distinctive differentiating 
mark" that is "capable of being impressed or engraved". While metaphorically applicable to a 
living being, that definition is generally thought to regard an imprint on metal or other material, 
for example, paper. That, of course, is not the definition of “character” as that word is used in this 
dissertation. 
That dictionary does contain the following definition which much more closely describes 
the use of “character” herein: "the complex of accustomed mental and moral characteristics and 
habitual ethical traits marking a person, group, or nation or serving to individualize it … ." I argue 
that the necessary moral characteristics and habitual ethical traits to address climate change have 
not been made philosophically important. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy explains the 
Aristotelian concept of "Moral Character" 66on which this dissertation seeks to focus as follows:  
By calling excellence of character a state, Aristotle means that it is neither a feeling 
nor a capacity nor a mere tendency to behave in specific ways. Rather it is the 
settled condition we are in when we are well off in relation to feelings and actions. 
We are well off in relation to our feelings and actions when we are in a mean or 
intermediate state in regard to them. If, on the other hand, we have a vicious 
character, we are badly off in relation to feelings and actions, and we fail to hit the 
mean in regard to them.  
 
(SEP, §2.4) While the concept involved in this dissertation through the word “character” does 
focus on the idea of excellence, it also attempts to focus generally on present human character as 
"neither a feeling nor a capacity" but as a disposition to behave in specific ways. It specifically 
attempts to focus on the disposition of the present generation in the United States "to behave in 
[the] specific ways" that exacerbate climate change rather than those that mitigate climate change 
or provide adaptation to climate change. Further, those dispositions represent a bad "settled 
      
66 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Moral Character, §2.4; http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-
character/#Ari384BCE ; herein referenced as “SEP, §__.” 
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condition" of the character of this present United States generation though we do not seem to 
believe it.  
Through focusing on that "settled condition," it is hoped that that settled condition can be 
changed through a new and/or revised virtue or virtues within virtue ethical theory and, thereby, 
come closer to the remainder of Aristotle's idea of the state of excellence of character described in 
the above Stanford definition. Moreover, especially for climate change, Aristotle's original 
thoughts and recommendations remain valuable and as applicable today as during his life.   
 Aristotle names the virtues "states of character" and recognizes that the vices are as well 
states of character. Again, as the above Stanford quotation notes, if we have a vicious character 
"we are badly off in relation to our feelings and actions." Today we are badly off because those 
feelings and actions of the many have been detoured toward financial gain to support an un- and 
under-regulated capitalism and rabid consumerism required to support the luxuries of the few. That 
detour has produced an oligarchy in the United States; has not fostered democracy or a republican 
governmental form; and has produced a confused less than virtuous electorate that seeks financial 
gain above all else.  Also, that electorate and the present politicians seem willing to blame anyone 
else for the inability to produce that undefined financial gain, and, finally, refuse to recognize the 
clear fact that it is this generation in the United States that is the climate change problem.  
 This generation seems to believe that, as one of its members stated, “one can never have 
too much money.” Even Aristotle in the fourth century B.C.E. recognized and argued that too 
much money just as too much of anything material is bad. As argued below, recognition of 
Aristotle’s concepts of aidōs, incontinence, and continence seem necessary in searching for a new 
and/or revised virtue to address this twenty-first century and its concerns. Also, Aristotle’s 
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psychology, as organized by Thomas Aquinas, seems necessary for implementing aidōs, 
continence and incontinence. Actually, character seems to be both the concern and the opportunity. 
  
 B. Improved Character - The Need Especially in the United States 
To meaningfully address climate change, I argue that all three major ethical theories require 
a greatly improved individual character especially in the United States and that a revised virtue 
ethical theory can begin to accomplish that goal. This chapter provides evidence of the need for 
that improved character. Part II of this dissertation reviews both Kantian ethics and utilitarian 
ethics briefly and concludes that (1) both are necessary to address climate change, (2) that an 
improved individual virtuous character is needed by both of those theories in that regard and 
neither provides the means for generating that character, and (3) present virtue ethical theory does 
provide a point of departure for the necessary improvement. Part III explains the foundation that 
present virtue ethical theory provides for the improvement of individual character and specifically 
the emphasis on the parts of that present theory that can provide for that improvement.  
 A greatly improved individual character in the United States is now necessary not only 
because in the past decades that character has arguably deteriorated but climate change itself now 
requires an elevated level of character beyond that general level thought necessary in the past, 
especially in the United States. The character of the rational human being can be described as the 
attributes or features that make up and distinguish the individual and as such it is an integral 
component of the individual's imprint on society. Character is also a contingent feature of the 
individual - it can and does change over time and as such it is a malleable feature of the rational 
human being.  
 During the past few decades, it has been argued that there has been a general deterioration 
in the character of many if not most of the citizens of at least the United States where that character 
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is said to have deteriorated from a generally virtuous character to a generally less than virtuous 
character over those decades. In support of that possible deterioration, some evidence that amounts 
to hearsay evidence is summarized below. That evidence has not been subjected to peer review 
and, therefore, does not provide any scientific confirmation. However, there is little evidence, 
hearsay or other, that argues that character has remained acceptable or improved over that period. 
In fact, one of the United States political parties has taken the specific position that making 
“America great again” is the specific work immediately necessary. Character must be involved. 
Others take the position that while there are always concerns about what needs improvement and 
about the present failure of present political cooperation, the United States needs to move forward 
but still cooperation of the parties seems nonexistent and, regarding climate change, neither party 
seems overly concerned about it and some still deny its existence.   
Character seems more easily described on an individual level rather than a collective, 
communal level. When looking for examples of individual virtuous character those that come to 
mind are Mahatma Gandhi, Jimmy Carter, Abraham Lincoln, Angela Merkel, Nelson Mandela 
and others like them in the governmental arena; Mother Teresa, Pope Francis (Jorge Mario 
Bergoglio) and others like them in the religious arena; Bill and Melissa Gates and Warren Buffett 
and others like them in the business arena, and Tony Dungy and others like him in the sports arena. 
In the group arena, the IPCC (which was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2007) does seem like 
a very good example. So, there are positive examples of individuals and some groups that most 
would describe as virtuous.  
However, there are many individuals who come to mind as examples of vicious character. 
The following individuals have been offered as examples of character deterioration though the 
references again are not peer reviewed or subject to any known present simple means of publicly 
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available verification: (1) Dennis Kozlowski of Tyco International, Ltd. for fraudulent accounting 
practices for which he served about eight years of a jail term; (2) Bernard Ebbers of MCI 
WorldCom for fraudulent accounting practices that again resulted in jail; (3) Bernard F. Madoff 
for the largest United States accounting fraud estimated at 60 billion and a prison sentence of 150 
years; (4) Kenneth Lay and Jeffrey Skilling of Enron Corp. again for fraudulent accounting 
practices which again resulted in prison time; (5) Joseph Nacchio, CEO of Qwest Communications 
for securities fraud involving among other things false statements to the public. As further evidence 
of the deterioration of character, these sports examples have been offered: Lance Armstrong's years 
of doping and loss of his cycling records, Pete Rose's gambling, Alex Rodriguez’s confession of 
his use of steroids after months of denial.  
Further, some fraudulent practices may seem to be corporate rather than individual, for 
example the Volkswagen scandal, but that scandal like all others had to involve individuals that 
willfully and knowingly made the fraudulent decisions. Someone and possibly accomplices at 
Volkswagen decided to construct software that would only detect an emissions violation under the 
testing procedures required by the United States Environmental Protection Agency and would 
allow road performance without the necessary compliance.67  
When assessing the character of an individual or individuals at least in the United States, 
legality and not morality seems to be used in the determination. Generally, there seems to be less 
interest in using the virtues to make that assessment. It seems, in addition, that even a candidate 
for president of the United States can use the idea of shooting a person in plain view as a means to 
      
67 For most of the above examples, information about the involved scandal can be found by googling the name of the 
individual or the company with the word "scandal" following that name. And of course, evidence other than hearsay 
is available with some difficulty through court and governmental records or corporate records which become available 
through lawsuits. 
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produce more votes for that candidate.68 And it seems there are those voters that applaud that kind 
of idea. Actually, it seems today generally that the assessment of an individual’s character 
generally depends upon legality rather than morality. It seems that there is a general feeling that if 
an action is legal, it is considered moral.   
While there seem to be no acceptable metrics for judging the character of groups of 
individuals such as states and nations, there are, of course, many authors who have judged such 
entities on the basis of personal perception of the activities of individuals and groups within those 
states or nations.    
 There have been a number of authors since the World War II years that have commented 
at some length about what they perceive as the deterioration of individual character in the United 
States. Wendell Berry in his 1977 book, The Unsettling of America Culture & Agriculture,69 
argued that the character of the American community and the American individual had deteriorated 
substantially. The Los Angeles Times is reported to have opined at its publication that it “may be 
one of the most important books of the decade.” His book provided over 200 pages of information 
that he argues supported that charge of deterioration. Initially, Berry reported that, in the mid-
1970s, it had been revealed  
that some of our largest and most respected conservation organizations [in the US 
such as the Sierra Club] owned stock in the very [United States’] corporations and 
industries [such as Exxon, General Motors, and Tenneco] that have been notorious 
for their destructiveness and for their indifference to the concerns of 
conservationists. 
 
      
68 "I could stand in the middle of Fifth Avenue and shoot somebody and I wouldn't lose any voters, okay? It's, like, 
incredible,” USA Today, January 23, 2016; https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/onpolitics/2016/01/23/ 
trump-could-shoot-person-and-not-lose-votes/79232258/ 
69 Wendell Berry, The Unsettling of America Culture & Agriculture (New York: Avon Books (through arrangement 
with Sierra Club Books), 1977) herein referenced as "Berry, p.__." Wendell Berry (1934 - ) is an American writer, 
poet, teacher, farmer, environmentalist, and the author of numerous books. 
 69 
  
(Berry, p.17) Berry noted that these conservation organizations quickly made changes in their 
investment choices but he further opined that; 
[If it was] only a question of policy, these investments could easily be forgotten, 
dismissed as aberrations of the sort that inevitably turn up now and again in the 
workings of organizations. The difficulty is that, although the investments were 
absurd, they were not aberrant; they were perfectly representative of the 
modern [American] character."  
 
(Italicized emphasis in original, bolded emphasis added; Berry, p.17) He continues: "We are 
dealing, then, with an absurdity that is not a quirk or an accident, but is fundamental to our 
character as a people [of the United States]." (Berry, p.18)  Berry also stated that there was no 
divisibility of organizations or individuals into "environmental saints and sinners" because life in 
general had become a matter of requiring some destruction and pollution in greater or lesser 
degrees. He argues that we in the United States were really all involved to some degree in this 
destruction and pollution because of our use of fossil fuel energy and dedication to a continual 
"improvement" of the consumerist lifestyle. 
 Berry further states that "these public absurdities are, and can be, no more than the 
aggregate result of private absurdities; the corruption of community has its source in the 
corruption of character. This realization has become the typical moral crisis of our time." 
(Emphasis added; Berry, p.19) 
 Berry also in that 1977 book argues that an important aspect of the moral problem relates 
to fossil fuel energy. In discussing this form of energy, he states that we cannot "pursue our ideals  
of affluence, comfort, mobility and leisure indefinitely based on the belief that we can develop 
unlimited  new sources of energy." He also  argues that  the problem is not  scarcity of energy but 
it is moral ignorance and weakness of character. We don't know how to use energy, 
or what to use it for. And we cannot restrain ourselves. Our time is characterized as 
much by the abuse and waste of human energy as it is by the abuse and waste of 
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fossil fuel energy. ...  If we had an unlimited supply of solar or wind power, we 
would use that destructively, too, for the same reasons. 
 
(Emphasis in original; Berry, p.13)  While he was thought to be ahead of his time in those concerns, 
as early as 1938, some scientists had become publicly concerned about the increasing CO2 content 
in the global atmosphere as related above on pages 55 to 60 above. 
 Berry continues his assessment of the reason for this deterioration: 
The community disintegrates because it loses the necessary understandings, forms, 
and enactments of the relations among materials and processes, principles and 
actions, ideals and realities, past and present, present and future, men and women, 
body and spirit, city and country, civilization and wilderness, growth and decay, 
life and death - just as the individual character loses the sense of a responsible 
involvement in these relations. 
 
(Emphasis added; Berry, p.21)  Concerning climate change and as reported at pages 40 through 
43, the United States has been responsible since about 1850 for about 28% of the CO2 presently in 
Earth's troposphere which represents the largest share and the largest per capita share of that 
tropospheric CO2 of any nation on Earth through 2010. Recall that Dietz, et al. reported that 38% 
of the CO2 in the atmosphere results from household decisions made by individuals. In addition, 
individuals direct corporations and governmental agencies and those individuals daily make 
decisions affecting climate change. Climate change is the result of individual character and its 
mitigation and adaptation methods must be developed and implemented by individuals.  
David Callahan, in his 2004 book, The Cheating Culture: Why More Americans Are Doing 
Wrong to Get Ahead70 (which reviews many of the above items) provides insight through a number 
of examples one of which involves Sears, Roebuck & Company automobile service policies in the 
1990s and early 2000s. Callahan recounts Sears’ problem of a major decline in earnings at the 
      
70 David Callahan, The Cheating Culture: Why More Americans Are Doing Wrong to Get Ahead (New York: Harcourt, 
Inc., 2004); herein referenced as "Callahan, p.__." 
 71 
  
beginning of that decade that resulted in the company cutting 48,000 jobs. As one effect in its auto 
service shops, Sears instituted a commission compensation system based on the billings of 
individual mechanics which resulted in customers being billed for unneeded work and parts and 
in some cases for work and parts never provided. Callahan reports that “[p]eople complained of 
getting billed for repairs they didn’t want or need and of pervasive dishonesty at the Sears repair 
centers. Sears became the target of official investigations in forty-four states and eighteen class 
action [law] suits were filed against the company.” (Callahan, p.31) Callahan suggests that this 
compensation system could have been instituted by management to encourage cheating by 
pressuring the mechanics. This type of compensation plan provides the material circumstances that 
encourage cheating by the employees because it allows the employee no structural freedom. 
Callahan provides other examples of compensation generated cheating in such diverse fields as the 
law and sports.  
Callahan reminds us that in the prior decade workers lost the security provided by unions 
and that in the 1990s and 2000’s inordinate compensation was paid for such items as hours worked 
or home runs. Further, in the decades that followed World War II, we in the United States have 
been subjected to increasing consumerism. The consumer has been and is subjected to advertising 
and other forms of encouragement to acquire more stuff where that citizen and his/her spouse have 
had to, and still have to, work more hours to pay for that stuff because his/her compensation did 
not and does not increase like that of the few percent already wealthy at the top of the earning 
curve. Here again cheating is encouraged to meet the requirements of capitalistic consumerism.  
 Callahan calls this cheating the result of "morally corrosive ... extreme capitalism" 
(Callahan, pp.17, 135) and its "narrow, bottom line ideas that too often foster dishonesty" 
(Callahan, pp.18-20, 281-86) in CEOs, CFOs, and other high-level executives. Callahan states that: 
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[T]he character of Americans has changed. Those values associated with the market 
hold sway in their most caricatured form: individualism and self-reliance have 
morphed into selfishness and self-absorption; competitiveness has become social 
Darwinism; desire for the good life has turned to materialism; aspiration has 
become envy. There is a growing gap between the life that many Americans want 
and the life they can afford - a problem that bedevils even those who would seem 
to have everything. Other values in our culture have been sidelined: belief in 
community, social responsibility, [and] compassion for the less able or less 
fortunate. The decline of civic life … has both fueled these changes and been fueled 
by them. Everywhere the collective spirit needed for a vibrant civil society is 
struggling to survive in an era where shared goals are out of fashion. 
 
(Callahan, pp.19-20)  Callahan wrote these words in or about 2004 and was referring to individuals 
in the United States. 
 Tom Brokaw, in his 1998 book, The Greatest Generation,71 recorded the general character 
of the generation born in about 1920 that lived through the Great Depression and then through 
World War II. He relates the service, courage, dedication, honor, honesty, sacrifice, personal 
responsibility, achievement, and duty that defined the character of that generation. In the last 
chapter of the book, he comments that that generation has provided succeeding generations with 
"the opportunity to accumulate great economic wealth, political muscle and the freedom from 
foreign oppression to make whatever choices they like." While Brokaw finds the challenges for 
those succeeding generations "much different [than] but equally important [as]" those of the Great 
Generation, he states, in 1998,  
there is no world war to fight today nor any prospect of one anytime soon but racial 
discrimination remains an American cancer. There is no Great Depression, but 
economic opportunity is an unending challenge, especially in a high-tech world 
where education is more important than ever. Most of all, there is the need to 
reinstate the concept of common welfare in America, so that the nation doesn't 
squander the legacy of this remarkable [prior] generation by becoming a collection 
of well-defined, narrowly cast special interest fiefdoms, each concerned only with 
its own place in the mosaic. World War II and what came after was the result of a 
nation united not a nation divided. 
      
71 Tom Brokaw, The Greatest Generation (New York: Random House, Inc., 1998), referenced herein as "Brokaw, 
p.__." 
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(Brokaw, pp.388-89) The United States (1) has recently come through its "Great Recession" that 
some have claimed was caused by the general failure of character in the financial sector, Wall 
Street and the governmental agencies assigned to maintain compliance; (2) is in the throes (with 
the rest of the world) of a war on terrorism; and (3), based on common knowledge, is deeply 
divided politically. Consequently, that legacy that Brokaw celebrates seems arguably to have been 
squandered and Brokaw's warning seems to have become reality during the past three or four 
decades, where the United States has arguably become that "collection of well-defined, narrowly 
cast special interest fiefdoms."   
 Bill Bryson's words from his 2015 book, The Road to Little Dribbling,72 are indicative of 
his concern about character in the United States. At the end of the book, he describes what he finds 
appealing in Britain's culture and unappealing in the culture of the United States. First, he praises 
the United States. 
[...] Britain is fundamentally sane. I appreciate that in a country. I regret to say that 
this point also occurred to me while traveling in my native land (the US). Let me say 
at once that America is a wonderful country. Think what the world would be like 
today if the United States hadn't intervened in the Second World War and led the 
reconstruction afterward. America has given us a pretty decent modern world and 
doesn't always get enough thanks for that. But for reasons that genuinely escape me, 
it is also becoming spectacularly accommodating to stupidity. 
 
(Bryson, p.373) He then explains his reference to "becoming spectacularly stupid" that he finds in 
the United States where his example is gun control. 
Where this thought most recently occurred to me was in a hotel coffee shop in 
Baltimore, where I was reading the local paper, the Sun, and I saw a news item noting 
that Congress had passed a law prohibiting the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services from funding research that might lead, directly or indirectly, to the 
introduction of gun controls. 
      
72 Bill Bryson, The Road to Little Dribbling (New York: Doubleday, division of Penguin Random House LLC, 2015) 
herein referenced as ”Bryson, p.__.” 
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Bryson's further elaborates: 
Let me repeat that in slightly different words. The government of the United States 
refuses to let academics use federal money to study gun violence if there is a chance 
that they might find a way of reducing the violence. It isn't possible to be more stupid 
than that. If you took all the commentators from FOX News and put them together 
in a room and told them to come up with an idea even more pointlessly idiotic, they 
couldn't do it. 
  
He then explains his preference for Britain in still greater detail. 
Britain isn't like that, and thank goodness. On tricky and emotive issues like gun 
control, abortion, capital punishment, the teaching of evolution in schools, the use 
of stem cells for research, and how much flag-waving you have to do in order to be 
considered acceptably patriotic, Britain is calm and measured and quite grown up, 
and for me that counts for a great deal. 
 
(Bryson, pp.374-45) Interestingly, Brexit prevailed and that United States Congressional ban on 
gun control remains in force and effect today even in the face of the recent written renunciation 
(Fall 2015) by Congressman Jay Dickey (in office 1993-2001), Republican, Arkansas, who 
authored the original bill back in about 1998 at the request of the National Rifle Association.73 
Concerning gun control, it does seem interesting that owning an operable vehicle that is capable 
of major property damage and deadly force, requires a license and a valid vehicle registration while 
owning an operable gun capable of concealed deadly force requires neither.   
Most importantly, the United States Legislature, and the Florida Legislature seem to have 
become dysfunctional. As examples, (1) the National legislature cannot deal with improving the 
Affordable Care Act, and (2) the Florida Legislature spends valuable time at the direction of the 
      
73 See Section 218 of ”PUBLIC LAW 112-74-DEC. 23, 2011 125 STAT. 1085:” “Sec. 218. None of the funds made 
available in this title may be used, in whole or in part, to advocate or promote gun control” which remains in force 
and effect today as a result of further funding Public Laws the latest of which is in force and effect today. Rep. Jay 
Dickey’s statement is found at https://mikethompson.house.gov /newsroom/press-releases/thompson-former-rep-jay-
dickey-calls-to-end-federal-ban-on-gun violence. Rep. Dickey has stated that the NRA will not now return his 
telephone calls. What about organizations that will not return telephone calls when they have paid someone to do their 
bidding? See http://www.npr.org/2015/12/06/458661944/two-sides-come-together-on-gun-research-funding. 
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National Rifle Association debating “open carry” of loaded firearms on Florida campuses. Such 
examples seem to be the ultimate evidence that individual character is in serious need of 
rectification. Again, however, the above is hearsay and not subject to easily available conformation 
though no similar evidence was found that supported a present acceptable or improved character 
of the United States population generally or in its legislators specifically.  
Even if it is accepted that no such deterioration has occurred, the advent of climate change 
requires an increased level of character because of the new and never before fully recognized or 
addressed issues of (1) necessarily extending ethical consideration to the unborn,74 and (2) 
mitigating, and adapting to, a truly global problem of anthropogenic environmental deterioration 
that will change life on Earth and will last for centuries if not millennia. However, that malleable 
human character can both reverse any human United States deterioration and provide for the 
elevation of character to that necessary new level.  
While deterioration may or may not have been a factor in the cause of climate change, the 
other causes of consumerism, the exponential increase in the use of fossil fuels, and un- and under-
regulated capitalism must be addressed if climate change is to be necessarily mitigated and the 
required adaptation achieved. With the assistance of revised and/or enlarged ethical theory, climate 
change can actually facilitate the reversal of any deterioration and provide the increased level of 
character necessary to adapt to, and mitigate, climate change.   
  
  
      
74 United States law concerning recognition of rights relative to the unborn has been reviewed by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.113,161,163-164(1973): "In areas other than criminal abortion, the law has been 
reluctant to endorse any theory that life, as we recognize it, begins before live birth or to accord legal rights to the 
unborn except in narrowly defined situations and except when the rights are contingent upon live birth. … . With 
respect to the State’s important and legitimate interest in potential life, the ‘compelling’ point is at viability. … . If the 
State is interested in protecting fetal life after viability, it may go so far as to proscribe abortion during that period, 
except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother." 
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 C. Summary 
 The two sub-theses of this Part I are, again, that no present ethical theory acceptably 
addresses either harms to unborn generations or damages from changes in an Earth wide "natural" 
system such as climate which has actually become an "unnatural" system because the origin of 
those system changes are anthropogenic. Those changes, named climate change, impact future 
unborn generations in an extreme manner while impacting the present generation to a much lesser 
degree. Present ethical theory seems to be generally based upon intragenerational relationships 
with reciprocity as a controlling factor, where reciprocity has been concerned both legally and 
morally primarily with intragenerational relationships between existing humans and to a much 
lesser extent between those humans and collectively nonhuman life and Earth that those humans 
inhabit. Present ethical theory has not meaningfully been able to address intergenerational 
concerns like climate change where that inability manifests itself in a number of ways such as in a 
present overly narrow and lessened concept of community.   
 As the present state of affairs is reviewed relative to ethical theory, it is interesting to recall 
the following eighteenth-century words of David Hume in his An Enquiry Concerning the 
Principles of Morals,75 which discussed rights and property.  
[W]herever any benefit is bestowed by nature in an unlimited abundance, we leave 
it always in common among the whole human race, and make no subdivisions of 
right and property. Water and air, though the most necessary of all objects are 
not challenged as the property of individuals; nor can any man commit 
injustice by the most lavish use and enjoyment of these blessings.  
 
(Emphasis added: Hume, Enquiries, §145, p.184) While that was the situation on Earth through 
about the end of the 19th century and arguably through about the middle of the 20th century in the 
      
75 David Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, 3rd Ed., intro. 
and index L.A. Selby-Biggs and ed. and notes P.H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975 (reprinted 2010)), 
herein referenced as "Hume, Enquires, p.__." 
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United States and other highly developed countries, since about 1970 and with increasing 
frequency through the present, most uses of both of those "blessings" have been and now are 
necessarily and significantly limited through national permitting regulation that can be enforced 
with serious sanctions, both civil and criminal. This is the result of humanity's major "overshoot" 
of many of Earth's boundary limits in at least the last five to ten decades.  
 Schönfeld76 describes this overshoot as follows: 
Climate change, like climate itself, is not tangible to the senses. … The same 
cognitive issues [that obscure climate] obscure the “ecological overshoot,” which 
is a concept that stems from comparing two datasets. One dataset is the rate of 
supply by the Earth system. Another is the rate of demand by global civilization. 
On the supply side is the renewal rate of biotic resources, such as wood fiber, 
together with the assimilation rate (the absorptive capacity) of environmental 
services like the carbon cycle. On the demand side are the rates of resource use and 
service pressure. The spatial frame for the datasets is the entire planet, and their 
time frame is an entire year. Should human demand outpace natural supply in a 
given year, overshoot obtains. Demand reached 100 percent of supply in 1970 [or 
before] and has since then exceeded Earth’s limits every year by a wider margin. 
… In 2014, overshoot passed 160 percent. … . Civilization is going about its 
business as if it had at its disposal the resources and services of one-and-a-half 
planets. 
 
(Schönfeld, Wisdom, p.189) In addition, until that overshoot occurred, humankind has been able 
to rely on science and technology for the solution to its environmental problems including those 
involving air and water. However, science and technology have not been able to save those two 
common goods from privatization and from what has become much more than the then idea of the 
"most lavish use and enjoyment". Also, even though the science and technology for the mitigation 
of, and adaptation to, climate change are available and because of climate change's delayed impact 
and the associated problem of lack of present concern, science and technology have not been 
      
76 Martin Schönfeld, “Future-Oriented Philosophy and Wisdom East and West” in Wisdom and Philosophy: 
Contemporary and Comparative Approaches, eds. Hans-Georg Moeller and Andrew K. Whitehead (New York: 
Bloomsbury Academic, 2016) pp.187-204; herein referenced as Schönfeld, Wisdom, p.__”. 
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implemented to the extent necessary to even begin to adequately address that mitigation or 
adaptation.  
 In the past, implemented technological systems, for example, (1) have generally improved 
cleanliness of the air, water and land; (2) have increased agricultural production that has provided 
the food for sustained population growth; (3) have provided the systems necessary for such 
sanitary improvements such as sewers (for those that can afford them); (4) have provided the 
necessary inexpensive energy through the use of fossil fuels; and (5) have provided for adequate 
disposal of wastes and other substances that now have been recognized as pernicious to society. 
Also, population growth which is a necessity for the economic system of un- and under-regulated 
free market capitalism has been served by medical science through the lowering of the infant 
mortality rate and improved longevity of life. And, of course, consumerism has provided another 
necessary requirement of that un- and under-regulated free market capitalism. In fact, climate 
change is the greatest failure of the present growth capitalistic economic strategy. Schönfeld states: 
“[C]limate change is a market failure, [and therefore] it is more than a normative problem. It is a 
material problem—a structural problem with existential significance; and it highlights flaws in the 
hegemonic design of civilization.” (Emphasis in original; Schönfeld, Wisdom, p.194) Also, that 
market failure has no technological solution. Its only solution seems to be the improvement of 
moral character. 
 All of this, it seems, has suggested to most of the existing generation that there is no need 
to be concerned about future generations because the hoped-for less costly technology to be 
generated and implemented by those future generations (it is nice to assume) will solve any 
problems that may confront them. Of course, the existing generation has not solved many of the 
more recent population related concerns, for example, nuclear waste disposal and the pollution of 
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the oceans through the waste produced by the exponential increase of humans over the last century. 
Also, again, the existing generation has not implemented the technology necessary to abate the 
steady increase of CO2 and the other greenhouse gases in the troposphere that cause climate change 
and will sustain it for centuries if not millennia.   
 That entire situation, of course, has arisen primarily from the increase in population. As 
always, it is important to recall that in about 1900, there were approximately 1.6 billion people on 
Earth; by 1960, there were about 3 billion; and now there are over 7 billion all of whom 
individually contribute exponentially more waste and other pernicious substances than did prior 
individuals. It is predicted that by 2050, Earth can expect a population of about 9 billion and, 
beyond that, there are predictions of up to 11 billion. As a result, environmental concerns generally 
have also escalated exponentially and will continue to do so. Also, it should always be remembered 
that human activities have changed and are continuing to change natural systems, particularly 
climate (which in fact changes most other natural systems) to the detriment of both the present, 
but far more seriously, the future inhabitants of Earth. 
 Because of the inability of present ethical theory to motivate the present generation, that 
theory cannot meaningfully address climate change. In addition, it seems that unless generations 
present or future seek an improved character, those future generations will be as amenable to 
passing those responsibilities on to yet unborn generations as our existing generation is willing to 
do today. The result of doing nothing substantial to abate climate change could render Earth 
uninhabitable for humans and, therefore, at least a heightened level of character is necessary. 
  Climate change, un- and under-regulated capitalism, and consumerism are the new 
challenges of the last few decades that we are now facing as individuals and as a nation and that 
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require new character traits that were unnecessary until about the 1970s and thereafter but that now 
are critically necessary. This dissertation offers primility as a possible answer to these challenges. 
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Part III   Climate Change and Present Major Ethical Theories 
  
[T]he part of our moral theory in which this problem arises …  
is the part that covers how we affect future generations.  
This is the most important part of our moral theory,  
since the next few centuries will be  
the most important in human history. 
  
                                                          —Derek Parfit (Parfit, 1984, 351) 
Chapter 4 - Present Major Ethical Theory Generally 
 
 Because none of the three major ethical theories seem to have the capability of coping with 
climate change and its delayed, intergenerational impact and its global anthropogenic impact, 
ethical theory needs to be improved. Deontological ethics (herein "Kantian ethics" or "duty ethics") 
clearly address existing relationships -  "Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your 
own person or in any other person, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means."77 
(Kant, GMM, Hill, p.230 (Ak4:429)) That concept does reference humanity and future generations 
of that humanity would seem to be included.  
 But, the question becomes, how can an existing individual treat a non-existing entity either 
as an end or a means? So far it does not seem that duty ethicists have generated an accepted theory 
that meaningfully addresses the treatment of either future individuals or future society as an end 
or that addresses global anthropogenic changes in Earth's systems. (Actually, though, the present 
generation seems to have no difficulty treating future generations as a means, for example, in terms 
of handing those generations the duty for the implementation of the technology necessary for the 
      77 Immanuel Kant [1724-1804], Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Arnulf Zweig, ed. Thomas E. Hill, 
Jr. and Arnulf Zweig (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p.230 (Ak4:429); referenced herein as "Kant, GMM, 
Hill, p._(Ak4:__).” 
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mitigation of, and adaptation to, climate change and, by the way, for trillions of dollars of debt 
where climate change and that debt have been caused by the actions of the present and past 
generations.)   
 Utilitarianism as a route to the end of happiness/flourishing has also meaningfully 
addressed that end only as it relates to existing entities and local environmental concerns. And, of 
course, utilitarianism in large part seems to focus on the happiness of the individual and, therefore, 
on the present generation in terms of producing societal happiness and utility. Why should the 
individuals of the existing generation give up the so called "happiness" of its present lifestyle for 
an unborn generation?   
 The third major ethical theory, virtue ethical theory, in its present format seems no better 
equipped regarding climate change than the above two theories. It also seems to address 
relationships between existing entities inasmuch as the virtues that are presently offered and 
recognized seem directed to providing acceptable existing relationships and it has not been 
meaningfully accepted as extending ethical consideration to all life on Earth. However, virtue 
ethical theory does not attempt to provide specific answers to existing situations through principles 
or rules but concentrates on virtue and the associated good character of the agent as the basis for 
(1) her/his selection of goals; (2) deliberation about, and choice of, the means toward reaching 
those goals; and (3) the action necessary for implementation of those means and achievement of 
those goals. Further, virtue theory seems to be more amenable to new concepts such as new or 
revised virtues.  
 As Schönfeld emphasizes, each of the above three theories operates on a different level. 
As a theory resting on an exemplary ideal, Kantian ethics offers a basic foundation for extending 
ethical consideration to all existing human relationships through the duty of agents to patients and 
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to other agents through the agent's recognition and acceptance of necessity and universalizability. 
As I argue the agent must be able to accept the necessity of individual duty toward 
universalizability. Even for Kant, the good character of the agent is required but his ethics do not 
provide the means for generating that good character.  
 Utilitarian ethics operate on a practical level through the recognition of reasoned utility and 
the action that follows not only by and for each individual agent but, also, by summation for 
hopefully at least a majority of all involved agents. The agent must recognize and promote general 
utility as a result of that agent's individual utility. But, again, utilitarianism requires the good 
character of the agent and again does not provide the means for generating that good character.  
 Virtue theory seems to operate on an intermediate level where the characteristics of virtue 
or vice promote or hinder relationship. The agent must be able to recognize and habituate those 
characteristics that promote good individual relationships and good community and then act on 
those characteristics where that action then defines both the individual character of that agent and, 
collectively, societal character. Aristotle defined moral virtue as "a mean ... between two vices, the 
one involving excess, the other [involving] deficiency, and that is such because its character is to 
aim at what is intermediate in passions and in actions ... ." (Ross. p.35-6 (1109a20-23)) 
 Because the agent is, of course, the actor in any ethical theory, it therefore seems that the 
good character of the agent is essential for each of these three theories.  Further, proponents of 
each of these theories, Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill and Aristotle, all rely at least in part on 
the good character of the agent as a necessary means to the ends of each theory. In addition, both 
Kant and Mill recognize that the character of the agent is promoted by good virtue while, of course, 
Aristotle is an early major author of virtue theory.78 Consequently, it seems productive to begin 
      78 Aristotle further defines virtue as "a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative 
to us, this being determined by reason, and by that reason by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it.” 
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with present virtue theory in an effort to both understand the character of the agency that is failing 
to address climate change and to attempt to suggest a possible revision of, and/or addition to, that 
theory that will encourage the character willing to take action toward the mitigation of, and 
adaptation to, climate change.  
 Therefore, the next two chapters focus briefly on the basic principles of both Kantian ethics 
and utilitarian ethics and also on how both rely on virtuous character. That reliance aids the 
identification of the assistance that virtue theory can provide to those theories and also supports 
the focus of this dissertation which is the revision of, and/or addition to, virtue ethical theory in 
addressing climate change. Also, the advocates of all three theories require legislation or require 
that all individuals think like legislators. Consequently, the discussion of Kantian and utilitarian 
ethics in the next two Chapters also reviews briefly the positions of those theories concerning 
legislation.   
 Regarding the present general state of legislation, it does not seem as though those with the 
legislative power especially in the United States are willing to think in other than the short-term 
apparently in an effort to legislate whatever will provide the greatest immediate “happiness” or 
“utility” for the existing generation of voters. It seems that most present legislators are interested 
only in the maintenance of, or more often in the "improvement" of, existing lifestyles (and for 
some, primarily their own personal lifestyle). In addition, the legislators of some (but not all) other 
nations seem intent on attempting to give their constituents a lifestyle like those of us in the United 
States either to keep those constituents voting “correctly” or in the state of refusing to rebel against 
those legislators. Also, many of those constituents - both voters and disenfranchised citizens - seem 
      
Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. D. Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p.31 (1106b37-1107a2), 
herein referenced as "Ross, p.__ ((Bekker numbers))". 
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to have embraced those immediate goals of "maintaining" and "improving" lifestyle without 
concern for the substance of that lifestyle, especially as it relates to community. 
 In summary, the thesis of this dissertation is that the state of the general character of 
individuals and legislatures of present democracies, oligarchies or dictatorships, needs 
improvement and escalation to a new level for the acceptable and legitimate happiness and utility 
of the citizens of Earth including not only existing human individuals and non-human living 
entities but unborn organisms of both of those groups as well. The means for that improvement 
and escalation of character seems best addressed through present virtue ethical theory as further 
developed to meaningfully extend ethical consideration to unborn generations and to address 
global anthropogenic changes to Earth's systems.  
 To support the above, Chapters 5 and 6 review the basics of the ethics of Immanuel Kant, 
Jeremy Bentham and J.S. Mill as well as their recognized need for good character (which I argue 
new virtues and/or a revised virtue ethical theory can provide). No in-depth review of recent 
development of those theories is considered necessary because that development does not seem to 
make those theories any more generally amenable to worldwide crises or unborn generations. 
Derek Parfit, a utilitarian, and a few other ethicists have specifically attempted to address the 
unborn and will be reviewed in a later paper. Chapter 7 begins the argument for a new virtue, 
primility, and/or a revised virtue ethical theory. 
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Chapter 5 - Kantian Duty Ethical Theory: Duty, Character, Legislation, and Virtue 
  
 A. Kantian Duty Ethics - General Theory  
 The objective of this review is (1) a general determination of the assistance Kantian ethical 
theory can provide in addressing climate change and (2) a determination of the need of Kantian 
theory for improved individual virtuous character in order to successfully address climate change. 
Also, the general importance of legislation within Kantian theory is reviewed. Duty ethical theory 
seems best reviewed through Immanuel Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals.79 To 
both identify duty’s need for virtue theory and to describe the use of duty theory in addressing 
climate change, a summary of basic Kantian theory is required. Also, while it may seem somewhat 
lengthy, this summary is considered necessary to indicate the reasons for the dependence of 
Kantian theory on character. 
 As the basis of his theory, Kant provides four "formulations" of his Categorical Imperative. 
The first and primary formula is his "Formula of Universal Law”: "Act only in accordance with 
that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law." (Emphasis 
in original; Kant, GMM, Wood; p.37 (Ak4:421)) This statement is followed closely by the 
following variation, the Formula of the Law of Nature: "So act as if the maxim of your action were 
to become through your will a universal law of nature." (Emphasis in original; Kant, GMM, 
Wood; p.38 (Ak4:421)) The concept of a universal law of nature seems especially important 
      
79 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. and ed. Allen W. Wood (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2002) herein the “Groundwork” and referenced herein as "Kant, GMM, Wood; p.__ (Ak4.__)" which 
provides the marginal volume and page numbers of the definitive German edition, Immanuel Kants Schriften, Ausgabe 
der königlich preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1902-), for example, "Ak4:430”. 
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because a law of nature by definition applies to all forms of life and generally applies over extended 
time. It is not as ephemeral as statutory law which generally can change quickly if the legislature 
is agreeable. As such, a law of nature is thought of as more of a universal. Consequently, the 
concept of a law of nature as universalized legislation (or, in other words, the concept of natural 
universalized "collective law") adopted by every rational individual is required for the fulfillment 
of this formula.   
 The second80 and third81 formulas, which Kant states follow from the first, address personal 
relationships and the autonomy of individuals respectively. Actually, the second is an example of 
a universal legislative concept while the third again references the same universality of legislation 
as does the first formulation. Kant's legislative requirement seems better described as 
universalizability because it is the concept of the action that Kant requires, not only of every 
governmental body or person given legislative authority, but of every rational individual being on 
Earth. The first and third formulas (and the fourth formula, the formula of the "Kingdom of Ends" 
(see below)) instruct the agent to recognize and use maxims of action from duty while the second 
formulation is a maxim that requires specific action toward a specific end. The question then 
becomes why and how should the individual accept that duty to use those maxims to order her/his 
life? 
 Initially, Kant argues that the consequences of the action are unimportant (see Kant, GMM, 
Wood; p.33 (Ak4:416)); what matters is the maxim from duty of the agent that embraces the 
"practical law". Though none of the above formulations specifically include the word "duty”, they 
      
80 Kant states the second formulation as his formula of humanity as an end in itself: "Act so that you use humanity, as 
much in your own person as in the person of every other, always at the same time as end and never merely as means." 
(Emphasis in original; Kant, GMM, Wood; p.47 (Ak4:429)) 
81 Kant states the third formulation (which has been called his "formula of autonomy"). "Not to choose otherwise than 
so that the maxims of one's choice are at the same time comprehended with it in the same volition as universal law." 
(Kant, GMM, Wood; p.58 (Ak4:440)) 
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all, as an imperative, represent duties/obligations. Kant requires that these duties be performed out 
of a good will and not out of any kind of inclination. Kant gives the example of a person who is 
basically a good person but one who has financial concerns that cause him/her grief. Nevertheless, 
that person who has the means to assist others does so with some misgivings because of her/his 
own difficulties. Kant finds that this assistance is from inclination and not from duty.  Kant states: 
"now, where no inclination any longer stimulates him to it, he tears himself out of this deadly 
insensibility and does the action without any inclination, solely from duty; only then does it for 
the first time have its authentic moral worth."  (Kant, GMM, Wood; p.14 (Ak4:398)) Moral worth 
depends on action done from duty. 
 Further, some of Kant's definitions need review. He defines the word “maxim” as follows: 
"A maxim is the subjective principle of the volition [or voluntary action]; the objective principle 
(i.e., that which would serve all rational beings also subjectively as a practical principle if reason 
had full control over the faculty of desire) is the practical law." (Emphasis in original; Kant, GMM, 
Wood; p.16fn* (Ak4.400-401)) Stated differently, a maxim is any principle of action that an 
individual follows while the "practical law" involves that maxim that the rational being should 
follow as duty.  
 Kant defines duty as: "the practically unconditioned necessity of action; thus, it must be 
valid for all rational beings (for only to them can an imperative apply at all), and must only for this 
reason be a law for every human will." (Emphasis in original; Kant, GMM, Wood; p.43 (Ak4:425)) 
The maxim from duty follows the "practical law" which is the objective principle that an individual 
would follow if reason could totally exclude inclinations. Kant calls such reason "pure reason" 
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which originates a priori or from within the individual and not directly from experience. (Emphasis 
in original; Kant, CPR; pp.41-42 (B1-3,A1-2))82 
 Kant confirms that "an action from duty" removes any "influence [from] inclination, and 
with it every object of the will," so that nothing determines the action "except the law as what is 
objective and also subjectively pure respect for this practical law" which becomes the maxim of 
compliance with that law "even when it infringes all" of the agent's inclinations. (Kant, GMM, 
Wood; p.16 (Ak4:400-401))  Kant defines "inclination" as: "the dependence of the faculty of desire 
on sensations" that are individually experienced and where only logical, and not pure, reason is 
involved. (Kant, GMM, Wood; p.30 (Ak4:413))  
 He, therefore, requires that the agent recognize a maxim from duty as that objective 
principle of law that eliminates all the agent's inclinations and objects (ends, objectives or goals of 
the agent's action) of her/his will and subjectively requires the agent to perform the involved action 
solely from the agent's duty to respect the "practical law”. Kant contrasts "inclination" with "duty." 
In other words, a maxim from duty includes no inclinations or sensory experience and, therefore, 
can be universalized while a maxim from inclination includes no duty and cannot be universalized 
because all rational individuals will not be involved in the same life experiences and inclinations. 
 However, to recognize a maxim, at least the general end for which the action is intended 
seems necessary even for maxims from duty. For example, "do not lie," which Kant labels a maxim 
from duty, would not seem to apply to a trip that I might intend though the maxim of "do not be a 
spendthrift," a probable maxim of duty, might apply. "Do not lie" would, of course, apply if I was 
intending to apply for a loan or intending to answer a question. It does seem that some 
circumstances might be involved, for example, the person asking the question might be important 
      
82 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N.K. Smith (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), referenced 
herein as "Kant, CPR; p.__ ((A and B numbers)). 
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if that person was not an identified person to receive an answer to a military question or if the 
answer might cause the person unnecessary grief.   
   Kant also defines an "interest" as "that through which reason becomes practical, i.e., 
becomes a cause determining the will" where the "principles of reason" are involved. (Kant, GMM, 
Wood; p.30 (Ak4:413), p.76 (Ak4:459-60))  Sensations (resulting from experience) are not to be 
trusted while reason seems to be trusted. He further distinguishes between "immediate interests" 
and "mediate interests." The "immediate interest" seems to recognize a general maxim from duty 
such as "do not lie" and is what Kant calls a "pure rational interest" and not a "logical rational 
interest". (Kant, GMM, Wood; p.76 (Ak4:459-60)) The "mediate" interest apparently is invoked 
when logic is required to address empirical information where desire or feelings develop the 
agent's "aims" or end. Kant seems to argue that "immediate interests" do not involve aims or ends 
of the agent and are only involved with maxims of duty.  
 "Mediate interests" may be available to consider the circumstances involved and the 
various means available to reach that specific end in making the final choice of action to be 
undertaken relative to any maxim other than one from duty. Some argue that the maxim from duty 
and the "immediate interest" can include consideration of those other concerns but that seems 
unlikely because, if the maxim has to involve circumstances and means, then the recognition of 
the maxim becomes much more involved than Kant seems to expect for an "immediate interest”.83 
 As an example of a maxim from duty, Kant argues that the principle "do not lie" becomes 
the maxim of compliance with the law and requires that the agent use that maxim at all times no 
matter the circumstances or the consequences of the action. This, of course for example, provides 
a problem with the situation of the murderer at the door who asks if his intended victim is within. 
      
83 Shelley Kagan seems, however, to suggest that individual maxims should include the involved circumstances 
confronting the agent. (Kant, GMM, Wood; p.128) 
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Some commentators argue that this requires an exception to the maxim. However, it seems that a 
different maxim is available based on the second formulation if the Categorical Imperative is to be 
based on consideration of the intended victim. In consideration of the victim as an end, it might 
become "do not harm innocent persons." That would seem to require the agent to choose between 
the two maxims. However, I am not aware of any of Kant's texts that suggest that an agent might 
have to choose between two or more maxims generated by different formulations of the single 
Categorical Imperative or even that, for the same set of circumstances, different maxims might be 
generated by different formulations of the Categorical Imperative. If such a choice is required, 
individual character and virtue seem to be required to determine the maxim for action. 
 However, the use of different maxims from different formulations would seem strange 
under Kant's statement that there is only one Categorical Imperative though described through 
three or four separate statements. In any event, it would seem that the "mediate interest" might 
well be the opportunity for an argument for a further requirement beyond the maxim from duty for 
consideration of what Aristotle and Aquinas call circumstances and what Bentham and Mill call 
consequences.  
 As is argued in this dissertation, the complexity of life in this twenty-first century requires 
that an intended action not only consider a maxim such as "do not lie," but also, in making a final 
choice of the action to be performed, include the following additional requirements of (1) 
consideration of the involved circumstances, (2) development of ethical means for completing the 
action, and (3) determination that the expected consequences of the action are ethical. Here virtue 
theory and utility theory seem to become very important. But the maxim of "do not lie" seems to 
be immediately required to provide the basic principle involved while a good will, virtue and 
character seem necessary to generate the respect needed for the initial identification of that maxim. 
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Reasoned utility could then assist in light of the circumstances to consider the various means 
available toward an ethical result. The apparent specifics of this process are addressed in Chapters 
7, 8 and 9. 
 Because the human will is recognized as the initiator of individual action in all of the three 
ethical theories under consideration, some further specifics of the will's Kantian work are 
instructive. In conjunction with the third formulation, Kant describes the work of the individual 
will as follows: "The will is ... not [only] solely subject to the law, but is subject in such a way that 
it must be regarded also as legislating to itself, and precisely for this reason as subject to the law 
(of which it can consider itself as the author)." (Emphasis in original; Kant, GMM, Wood; p.49 
(Ak4:431))  Therefore, the individual through her/his will must be the author of collective law (the 
maxim from duty) that governs her/his action - personal legislation that initially applies to the 
individual but that also must be acceptable universally.  Kant makes clear that the will of each 
rational being is, in fact, the "author" of all the universal or other maxims upon which the individual 
acts. While the first formulation focuses on a single act, the third formulation focuses on all of the 
acts of the individual as lawgiver who now must follow her/his own imperatives. Moreover, it 
must then be the will of the individual that determines the character of the individual agent (which 
is consistent with Aquinas as argued below and where Kant's maxims appear to be the means to 
any end). 
 Kant recognizes the importance of character in the first paragraph of the First Section of 
the Groundwork where he mentions a number of traits such as understanding, courage and wit and 
remarks that those traits "are without doubt in some respects good and to be wished for; but they 
can also become extremely evil and harmful" depending on the state of the will. He calls these 
traits "gifts of nature" where the "constitution" of the traits "is therefore called character" and 
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argues that that character can be other than good if the will is "adorned with no trait of a pure and 
good will”.  He further argues that the good will "appears to constitute the indispensable condition 
even of the worthiness to be happy." (Emphasis in original; Kant, GMM, Wood; p.9 (Ak4:393)) 
While Kant discusses the importance of character at some length in various of his writings, he first 
requires the good will of the rational individual which also seems to require the prior presence of 
good character. 
 Recent authors suggest that Kant intended a fourth formulation within the Groundwork that 
has been called the formula of the Kingdom of Ends that reinforces the above "author" concept of 
the maxims generated by the good will.84  
The rational being must always consider itself as giving law in a realm of ends 
possible through freedom of the will, whether as member or as supreme head … 
[where the complete determination] of all maxims [is] through that formula, namely 
‘That all maxims ought to harmonize from one's own legislation into a possible 
realm of ends as a realm of nature’.  
 
(Kant, GMM, Wood; pp.52-54 (Ak4:434-436))  Here, as in all the formulations, the emphasis is 
on the universalizability of the maxims on which the individual acts. When legislating universal 
law, the individual, as a member of a social order, must ensure that all its maxims harmonize with 
the maxims of all other rational members of that social order.85 Again, the individual’s will and, 
therefore, the individual’s character seem to be the means for that harmony. Kant states that this 
fourth formulation must be recognized as an ideal but as an exemplary ideal (as are the other three 
formulations as well). (Kant, GMM, Wood; p.51 (Ak4:433)) 
 Kant does separate imperatives into two types, hypothetical and categorical, where he 
describes them as follows:  
      
84 "Act in accordance with maxims of a universally legislative member for a merely possible realm of ends." (Kant, 
GMM, Wood; p.56 (Ak 4:439)) 
85 At present, one means of determining rationality relies on whether the involved individual accepts the present 
available science, the present available technology, and the present and future importance of climate change. 
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The [hypothetical imperatives] represent the practical necessity of a possible action 
[maxim from inclination] as a means to attain something else which one wills (or 
which it is possible that one might will). The categorical imperative [maxim from 
duty] would be that one which represented an action as objectively necessary for 
itself, without any reference to another end. 
 
(Kant, GMM, Wood; p.31 (Ak4:414)) Also, as a "categorical imperative" or as such imperatives, 
Kant's four formulations represent objective principles that are necessitating for the will and are 
"a ‘command’ (of reason)" (Kant, GMM, Wood; p.30 (Ak4:413)) that requires action by the will.  
 Kant's apparent intended qualities of his Categorical Imperative in its four formulations 
seem to be its objectivity and its simplicity. For example, any rational person recognizes that if all 
people regularly lied, stole, were greedy, dropped bombs, killed other people, etc. (see, Kant, 
GMM, Wood; p.47fn64; also Ak4:429-30), there would ultimately be no people and, or at least, 
no society. Maxims incorporating those actions are immediately recognizable by any rational being 
as not universalizable. Also, though Kant states that the Categorical Imperative is simply 
objectively necessary without any reference to another end, it does have the end of an acceptable 
human community, society or realm.  
 Further, Kant says that all rational humans have a single hypothetical imperative of 
happiness. 
There is one end, however, that one can presuppose as actual for all rational beings 
(insofar as imperatives apply to them, namely as dependent beings) and thus one 
aim that they not merely can have, but of which one can safely presuppose that 
without exception they do have it in accordance with a natural necessity, and that 
is the aim at happiness. 
  
(Emphasis in original; Kant, GMM, Wood; p.32 (Ak4:415))  Here, happiness is argued as a "natural 
necessity" for all rational beings which are interestingly described as "dependent beings”.86   
      
86 "Dependent beings" are distinguished from the independent being who is God or other un-Earthly supreme entity. 
Dependent beings are those dependent on universal law and maxims. Kant calls all rational humans "dependent 
beings" as Alasdair MacIntyre also argues but in a much wider sense.  
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 But, for Kant, happiness is not simple pleasure or enjoyment:  
idleness, amusement, procreation, in a word … enjoyment … [is impossible] to will 
that this should become a universal law of nature, or that it should be implanted in 
us as such by natural instinct. For as a rational being he necessarily wills that all 
the faculties in him should be developed, because they are serviceable and given to 
him for all kinds of possible aims. 
  
(Emphasis in original; Kant, GMM, Wood; p.39-40 (Ak4:423)) In addition, Kant relates that 
happiness is not necessarily a result of the implementation of the Categorical Imperative because 
that imperative can require that one act directly against one's own inclination especially if that 
inclination is perceived as personal happiness. (Kant, GMM, Wood; p.33 (Ak4:416))  Keep in 
mind though that, for Kant, the totally rational individual ignores inclinations.87 
 Marcia Baron reminds us that Kantian duty "is tied not to social expectations or laws, but 
to rationality. 'Duty' for Kant means, roughly, what one would do if one were fully rational." (Kant, 
GMM, Wood; p.95)  Kant, of course, recognizes that the human being is not fully rational and is 
subject to inclinations but he emphasizes that the fully rational duty is not imposed upon us from 
an outside source and that the rationality of the good will ultimately produces happiness.  
 Kant justifies the value of maxims from duty and universalizability as follows:  
I at least understand this much, that [universal legislation] is an estimation of a worth 
that far outweighs everything whose worth is commended by inclination, and that 
the necessity of my actions from pure respect for the practical law is what constitutes 
duty, before which every other motive must give way because it is a condition of a 
will that is good in itself, whose worth surpasses everything.  
 
(Emphasis in original; Kant, GMM, Wood; p.19 (Ak4:403)) Thus, the worth of such duty surpasses 
the worth of anything that results, or can result, from inclination. This, of course, is an ideal but a 
worthy ideal. 
      
87 Kant argues that the ultimate and final end of creation is the moral human being as subject to the maxim of duty. 
Immanuel Kant, Critique of the power of judgment, trans. P. Guyer & E. Matthews, ed. P. Guyer (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp.302-303*fn (Ak5:435-36*fn); herein referenced as Kant, CPJ; p.__ 
(Ak5:___)). 
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  However, acting with duties, Kant argues, can result in happiness. Kant states: “To secure 
one's own happiness is a duty (at least indirectly), for the lack of contentment with one's condition, 
in a crowd of many sorrows and amid unsatisfied needs, can easily become a great temptation to 
the violation of duties.” Kant elaborates: "But even without looking at duty, all human beings 
always have of themselves the most powerful and inward inclination to happiness, because 
precisely in this idea all inclinations are united in a sum.” (Emphasis in original; Kant, GMM, 
Wood; p.14-15 (Ak4:399))  While happiness seems to be at least a goal of all ethical theories under 
consideration in this dissertation, Kant's goal of embracing duty requires his concept of a good will 
which is the work of reason and does not necessarily result in immediate happiness especially for 
us, the agents, who are less than totally rational individuals. 
 Kant further describes the work of reason in its relation to the will and duty.  
For since reason is not sufficiently effective in guiding the will safely in regard to 
its objects and the satisfaction of all our needs (which it in part itself multiplies), 
and an implanted natural instinct would have guided us much more certainly to this 
end, yet since reason nevertheless has been imparted to us as a practical faculty, 
i.e., as one that ought to have influence on the will, its true vocation must therefore 
be not to produce volition as a means to some other aim, but rather to produce a 
will good in itself, for which reason was absolutely necessary, since everywhere 
else nature goes to work purposively in distributing its predispositions. 
 
(Emphasis in original; Kant, GMM, Wood; p.12 (Ak4:396)) Here, Hill and Zweig translate this 
last phrase as "as nature has everywhere distributed her abilities so as to fit the functions they are 
to perform; reason's true vocation must therefore be to produce a will which is good in itself, not 
just good as a means to some further end." (Emphasis in original; Kant, GMM, Hill, p.198 
(Ak4:396))88 
      
88 Here, Kant is disagreeing with Aristotle and Aquinas who assign the will the task of either rejecting or enacting an 
end originally chosen by reason. See Chapters 7 and 9 below. Aristotle and Aquinas rely on habituation to provide 
both reason and the will with goodness. Kant seems to begin with the goodness of reason for the purpose of generating 
a good will where the goodness of reason is somehow generated a priori through the necessity of recognizing 
universalizability. For Aristotle and Aquinas, character seems generated by virtuosity which is generated by 
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 This text seems to relate Kant's observation that Nature always works at producing 
teleologically organized life and, therefore, a human being through her/his good will should do so 
as well. Kant recognizes that human reason is imperfect but he seeks to give it the singular purpose 
of influencing the will toward the production of a good will where that will must then generate 
duty and then discover and act on universal maxims. Admittedly, that seems to be Herculean work 
in and of itself. Because our imperfect reason cannot always overcome the desire for a particular 
object, reason's primary responsibility should be the production of the good will that ensures a 
continuing good character. However, to generate that good will, good character is initially 
necessary for generating and encouraging duty as I argue.  
  For Kant "duty, as duty in general, lies prior to all experience in the idea of reason 
determining the will through a priori grounds.” (Emphasis in original; Kant, GMM, Wood; p.24 
(Ak4:408))  Kant argues that sensible experience cannot be involved because that is the genesis of 
inclination and because each rational will has the capability of supplying a priori the grounds from 
which duty to the Categorical Imperative arises. Kant does acknowledge that "all our knowledge 
begins with experience.” However, he argues that “though all our knowledge begins with 
experience, it does not follow that it all arises out of experience." He argues that "our empirical 
knowledge" can create its own knowledge and he calls this a priori knowledge which is 
"independent of all experience”.89 90 This knowledge seems similar to instinct, innate information 
      
habituation. For Kant, character is generated by a good will which is generated by reason’s understanding and 
acceptance of necessity and universalizability. However, that acceptance seems to initially require good, virtuous 
character which seems to require the cooperative work of both the will and reason. 
89 Kant, CPR; pp.41-43 (B1-B3,A1-2).    
90Kant states: "Rational nature exists as end in itself. The human being necessarily represents his own existence in 
this way; thus to that extent it is a subjective principle of human actions  ... [and actions of] every other rational being 
… ." (Emphasis in original; Kant, GMM, Wood; p.46 (Ak4:429))  Kant, of course, argues that it is, in fact, also an 
objective principle because all rational beings can and should embrace it and thereby the principle, the Categorical 
Imperative, represents a supreme practical ground from which all laws can be derived. As such a principle based on 
rational human nature, is it reasonable to limit the ability of that rational nature as Kant seems to suggest? 
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or intuition such as automatically stop for all red traffic lights which though it becomes automatic, 
results from education, habituation, and, in many cases, the existence of criminal penalties.  
 Notwithstanding, Kant's 1785 Categorical Imperative still seems to be the best objective 
moral standard available today because of its simplicity and objectivity. It represents the best 
available ethical ideal toward which to work for climate change and all other social issues 
including other environmental issues. For example, present global society knows enough through 
AR5 to declare the unrestricted burning of fossil fuels and the attendant creation of CO2 as not 
universalizable but that society refuses to provide any enforceable restrictions for that activity. 
That society simply does not recognize any immediate or mediate duty to restrict that activity 
through the general will of society as memorialized in enforceable legislation. 
 Further, while to argue as Kant does that reason cannot cope with volition without duty, 
that position even as an ideal seems unnecessarily limiting concerning reason. Though Kant seems 
to argue that habit arises from inclination and, therefore, is not necessarily good (Kant, GMM, 
Wood, p.18-19 (Ak4:403-4)), it seems that the additional work of reason is to recognize the value 
of good habit and to initiate good habits. What habit accomplishes, as reflection on life makes 
clear, is the will's ability to guide the individual and her/his understanding "safely in regard to their 
objects" through that habituation which can result in duty and the satisfaction of the individual's 
needs.  
 At present, the development of improved good character, let alone the development of a 
good will, seems necessary as an initial goal and that goal seems to be the work of virtue ethical 
theory. As argued below, improved character through virtue ethical theory seems required for 
acceptance of the Categorical Imperative, and Kant, in fact, seems to recognize that need. But first, 
just a further word about legislation and Kant's theory.    
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 B. Kant - Legislation  
 While the Categorical Imperative is an ideal, Kant charges humanity with building reality 
from this ideal through the concept of individual and collective legislation. The concept of 
personal, individual legislative thought is of critical importance because of the rational requirement 
of universalizability. In this regard, Kant's charge is to the individual rational human and as such 
includes all legislators, whether democratic or despotic. While the details of this legislation need 
further clarification, it should be enough to presently accept that Kant requires personal and social 
legislation as the means to the necessary personal and social law that ensures the recognition of 
appropriate duty. Consequently, as it turns out, this legislative requirement of Kantian ethics is 
consistent with the requirements of the other two major ethical theories as argued below.  
  
 C. Kant - Virtue and Character  
 Moving Kant's concept forward seems to require a much-improved individual character 
which Kant seemed to recognize. Kant does endorse the need for good character that this  
dissertation argues virtue can produce. As above, Kant lists a number of characteristics generally 
thought of as virtues but argues that these "gifts of nature … whose peculiar constitution is 
therefore called character" can become evil and harmful if the will is not good. (Emphasis in 
original; Kant, GMM, Wood; p.9 (Ak4:393)) After discussing self-control and moderation, he 
states: "not only are [these gifts] good for many aims, but seem even to constitute a part of the 
inner worth of the person; yet they lack much in order to be declared good without limitation 
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(however unconditionally they were praised by the ancients).” (Emphasis in original; Kant, GMM, 
Wood; p.10 (Ak4:394))91  
 Also, after discussing the attribute of a good-natured temperament, Kant states: "Just here 
begins the worth of character, which is moral and the highest without any comparison, namely that 
he is beneficent not from inclination but from duty." (Kant, GMM, Wood; p.14 (Ak4:398-99)) 
While Kant describes virtue as arising from duty, duty in this twenty-first century seems to equate 
only to anything that is legal, or especially on the fringe of legal, for example, the collateralized 
debt obligations or CDOs and credit default swaps or CDSs of the last decade that caused the Great 
Recession. Those CDOs and CDSs transferred billions of dollars to the pockets of the few from 
the pockets of the many who were the home mortgagors and shareholders of the huge banks and 
brokerage houses. A very few investors acquired those billions by selling those CDOs and CDSs 
short because those instruments had been legislatively deregulated. The challenge seems to be the 
recognition that morality must be much more than mere legality (i.e., CDOs and CDSs) which in 
reality is also the challenge of climate change because we seem to recognize nothing immoral 
today about any "business as usual" that is allowed by statutory, case, and common law. 
 Kant comments specifically on what he calls "principles" which are the virtues of "fidelity 
in promising" and "benevolence from principle" which he states have an "inner worth."  
Lacking these principles, neither nature nor art contain anything that they could put 
in the place of them; for the worth of these principles does not consist in effects that 
arise from them, in the advantage and utility that they obtain, but rather in the 
dispositions, i.e., the maxims of the will, which in this way are ready to reveal 
themselves in actions, even if they are not favored with success.  
 
(Emphasis added; Kant, GMM, Wood; p.53 (Ak4:435)) Here, Kant finds the worth of these 
principles not in personal advantage or utility but in the dispositions, "the maxims of the will," that 
      
91 These ancients seem to include Plato and Aristotle and possibly Aquinas. 
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they apparently create. This seems to indicate that these principles or virtues are necessary for the 
generation of the maxims. This, therefore, seems to argue that the maxims do not exist without 
these principles which are in fact virtues which arise from education, habituation and legislation. 
 Kant returns to this idea of the use of virtues for personal advantage when he discusses 
moral feeling which he says "nevertheless remains closer to morality and its dignity by showing 
virtue the honor of ascribing to it immediately the satisfaction and esteem we have for it, and not 
saying directly to its face, as it were, that it is not its beauty, but only our advantage, that attaches 
us to it." (Emphasis in original; Kant, GMM, Wood; p.60 (Ak4:442-43))  
Kant here seems to be responding to David Hume who did name utility and advantage as 
the "sole source" of "virtue's high regard”.92 Kant’s criticism is valid and is addressed at page 151-
152 below. In any event, a virtue by any other name is still a virtue - a state of character - and 
necessary in the production of a good will. 
 Kant, in his later book, the Metaphysics of Morals93 defines virtue (a part of his "Doctrine 
of Virtue") as follows: virtue "is the strength of a human being's maxims in fulfilling his duty. - 
Strength of any kind can be recognized only by the obstacles it can overcome, and in the case of 
virtue these obstacles are natural inclinations, which can come into conflict with the human being's 
moral resolution ... ." (Kant, MM; p.156 (Ak6:394)) (This sounds like Aristotelian incontinence.) 
Virtue here has the responsibility of overcoming "natural inclinations" which stand in the way of 
action based on duty to the Categorical Imperative (where this sounds like aidös; see Chapter 8). 
Consequently, virtue again seems to be of critical importance to dutiful action. Kant did appreciate 
      
92 David Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. L.A. 
Selby-Bigge and later P.H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1975), p.231, herein referenced as “Hume, 
Enquiries, p. __.” Kant famously stated that it was Hume who awakened him from his "dogmatic slumbers." Immanuel 
Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, trans, P. Carus, revd. L.W. White (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice 
Hall Inc., 1997), p.8 (Ak4:260)).    
93 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, ed. and trans. M. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), first published in 1797 and referenced herein as "Kant, MM; p.__ (AK6:_)." 
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virtue but always required that it be preceded by duty apparently because of his concern that it had 
been, and still was, (and still is) associated with personal advantage.  
 In endorsing the virtues of "fidelity in promising" and "benevolence from principle", Kant 
calls beneficence a duty and suggests that practice can turn beneficence into love (which is not a 
duty). Kant's "practice" here seems like the habit of virtue ethics even though Kant states that 
beneficence cannot be based on habit because habit is generated by inclination. (Kant, MM; p.167 
(Ak6:409))  However, Kant does not seem to provide any apparent means to improve character 
other than through the a priori work of the will of the individual as legislator and then possibly 
through legislatures generally. Moreover, Kant does not seem to offer any suggestions about 
locating, or improving once found, this a priori capability of the will responsible for generating 
both the duty toward, and the recognition of, the Categorical Imperative and specific moral duties 
such as beneficence.  
 In this twenty-first century, what we need is the maxim from duty of "do not use fossil fuel 
energy." However, Kant's duty seems to be too much of an ideal especially now for a number of 
reasons, some of which are, again, the present contempt held by many for much legislation and 
most legislatures, and, also, the general unwillingness of most to attempt to understand and endorse 
specific legislative needs, let alone actually engage in any form of legislative activity or even 
legislative thinking. Especially for those reasons, it still seems that habit toward recognized goods 
for both the individual and society - the virtues – remains the present best means for improvement 
of character toward reliance on the ethical functioning of the human rational will. 
 Many recent commentators argue that Kantian ethics need adjustments to meet present 
circumstances, particularly climate change. Climate change ethics, of course, had its genesis in 
environmental ethics. Environmental ethics became recognized as a separate philosophical subject 
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in or about 1970 and has successfully argued that ethical consideration must be extended beyond 
humans to some or all nonhuman entities including nonhuman animals, plants, ecosystems, Earth, 
or essentially to all life and to that which supports life. Ethical consideration of humans by humans 
has always been addressed by the traditional ethics of philosophers such as Kant, Mill and 
Aristotle. Climate change has turned all of that on its head because climate change includes not 
only what environmental ethics had previously included but now also includes how humans must 
treat present and future humans and all of life, present and future.  
 As Schönfeld points out, 
[t]oday, [because of climate change] environmental issues are existential threats. 
The ecological overshoot, the collision with planetary limits, and the destabilization 
of the Earth system highlight a new reality: humans and nonhumans sit in the same 
boat, and climate chaos may sink us all. The conflict [for environmental ethics] was 
between humans and nature, the conflict now is of humans and nature against the 
free market.94 
 
Kant has been a problem for environmental ethics because Kant explicitly included only human 
beings as rational beings as the only entities entitled to “absolute worth” and, therefore, ethical 
consideration. (Kant, Wood, GMM; pp.45-46 (Ak4:428); Gregor, MM; pp.191-92 (Ak6.442-43)) 
In addition, some environmental ethicists have argued that Kant’s anthropocentrism is 
unacceptable. 
 Toby Svoboda, in his book, Duties Regarding Nature: A Kantian Environmental Ethic,95 
raises Kant’s duty of perfection as a means of recognizing Kant’s exclusive condition while still 
providing the Kantian imperfect human duty of self-cultivation through the indirect duty to extend 
      
94 Martin Schönfeld, Review of Toby Svoboda, Duties Regarding Nature; A Kantian Environmental Ethic (New 
York/London: Routledge, 2015),   
http://www.academia.edu/28653198/Book_review_Svoboda_Duties_Regarding_Nature_2015_2016_ 
95 Toby Svoboda, Duties Regarding Nature: A Kantian Environmental Ethic (New York/London: Routledge, 2015), 
referenced herein as "Svoboda, p.__.” 
 104 
  
the Kantian maxim of benevolence to nonhuman teleological/purposive life that Kant recognizes.96 
Svoboda states: “[A]lthough [indirect duties] depend on a direct duty to oneself these indirect 
duties have far-reaching implications, including a strict moral prohibition against causing 
unnecessary harm to non-human organisms.” (Svoboda; p. 157) That argument seems to get closer 
to extending ethical consideration not only to all of present life but to unborn life as well. 
 As Schönfeld observes in his review of Svoboda’s book, Svoboda’s arguments assist in the 
expanded use of Kantian ethics especially to address climate change. However, the same lack of 
the means to improvement of character needed for the acceptance of all Kantian duties including 
that argued by Svoboda still exists. Even attempting to approach Kant’s legislative ideal is initially 
seen as requiring individuals with exemplary character and it seems that presently there are very 
few that are candidates. Radical improvement of character of twenty-first century individuals 
seems required and character has been and still seems to be the work of virtue.  
 Finally, Allen Wood97 seems to characterize Kant's ethics correctly with regard to the way 
it is incorrectly understood by present society, especially in the United States, which seems openly 
to disregard those ethics because of this kind of Categorical Imperative characterization.  
Clearly, both Kant’s moral principles and his theory of human nature are designed 
only to add to our discontent with ourselves. For Kant the task of philosophy is not 
(as it is for Hegel), to reconcile us to the human condition. Kant thinks that as 
rational creatures our condition must be one of dissatisfaction, self-alienation, and 
endless striving.  … From a Kantian standpoint, ... any other way of representing 
our condition appears complacent, cowardly, and dishonest. 
 
When consumerism, present lifestyle, and the free market economy control present society as they 
do, the Categorical Imperative seems easily ignored. 
      
96 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans. Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000); herein referenced as "Guyer, CPJ; p.__”; p. 244 (5:372-73). 
97 Allen W Wood, Kant’s Ethical Thought (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 334; herein referenced 
as "Wood, KET, p.__.” 
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 In summary, Kant looks upon the virtues as apparently being similar to the vices in that 
both are seen as the opportunity for personal advantage. His concern seems warranted because, in 
our competitive world today, individuals seem to be intent on finding the unfair advantage when 
sanctioned by law (or not) and not the common advantage and have little, if any, concern about 
moral sanction. Kantian ethics are insufficient for presently raising the level of character necessary 
for addressing climate change and intergenerational concerns generally because those concerns 
were not extant during Kant’s lifetime. In any event, improvement of individual character through 
virtue ethical theory seems at the very least a possible step toward the Kantian ideal.   
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Chapter 6 - Utilitarian Ethical Theory: Utility, Character, Virtue and Legislation 
   
 As with the review of Kantian ethics, the objective of this review of utilitarian ethical 
theory is (1) a general determination of the assistance that that theory can provide in addressing 
climate change and (2) most importantly a determination of the need of utilitarian theory for 
improved individual virtuous character in order to successfully address climate change issues. 
Also, the importance of legislation for utilitarianism is reviewed.  
 Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) are regarded as two 
philosophers who in the 18th and 19th centuries developed utilitarian ethical theory. Certainly, 
utility is extremely important in addressing climate change because the efforts toward mitigation 
and adaptation obviously must exhibit recognizable utility. Also, as argued below, while 
utilitarianism is needed in that effort, improved and elevated character through virtue ethical theory 
is necessary for the use of utilitarianism in that regard. Bentham says little about the importance 
of character, but he does address virtue. Mill has much to say about the importance of both 
character and virtue which identifies utility's need for the use of virtue theory. In order to both 
identify that need for virtue theory and to describe utility's use in addressing climate change, a 
summary of basic utilitarianism theory is necessary to indicate the reasons for the dependence of 
that theory on character. 
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 A. Jeremy Bentham (1748 – 1832) 
 (1) Bentham (1748 - 1832)  - utility 
 Bentham's primary work that included his utility theory was An Introduction to the 
Principles of Morals and Legislation98 ("IPML") which was published initially in 1789 (though 
first printed in 1780). Chapters I-VI of the IPML describe Bentham's principle of utility, the 
arguments offered against it, and the importance of pleasure and pain all of which are considered 
to be Bentham's statement of his theory of utilitarianism.99 
 The concepts of security and equality are particularly important to Bentham's theory. 
Concerning security, the following words of Bentham in his Principles of the Civil Code100 explain 
his perceived importance of security, of the anticipation of future events, and of imagination. In 
addition, the following quote can be read to argue that Bentham did think beyond the present 
generation. 
In order to form a clear idea of the whole extent which ought to be given to the 
principle of security, it is necessary to consider, that man is not like the brutes, 
limited to the present time, either in enjoyment or suffering, but that he is 
susceptible of pleasure and pain by anticipation, and that it is not enough to guard 
him against an actual loss, but also to guarantee to him, as much as possible, his 
possessions against future losses. The idea of his security must be prolonged to 
him throughout the whole vista that his imagination can measure.  
 
      
98 Jeremy Bentham [1748-1832], An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, ed. J.H. Burns and 
H.L.A. Hart with introduction by F. Rosen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), herein referenced as "Bentham, 
Burns, IPML; p.__."   
99 Fred Rosen, in the Introduction to the IPML, points out that Bentham did not found the utilitarian ethic. Cesare 
Beccaria (1738-1794) apparently introduced the phrase "the greatest happiness of the greatest number". Rosen 
additionally recognizes that earlier formulations of that phrase were used by Francis Hutchison (1694-1746) a Scottish 
philosopher and possibly even by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. (Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics, 
in G.W. Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, ed. and trans. Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company, Inc., 1989), pp.37-38,67-68). 
100 Jeremy Bentham, Principles of the Civil Code, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 1, ed. John Bowering (New 
York: Russell & Russell, Inc., 1962); herein referenced as "Bentham, Bowering, PCC; p.___." 
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(Emphasis added; Bentham, PCC; p.308)  Because concern for progeny (at least close progeny) is 
a normal concern for a human being, that concern arguably is included in “the whole vista of his 
imagination”. In this regard, it is important to note that Bentham enlists the individual's 
imagination in establishing the time period over which to guarantee to that individual the security 
of the possessions involved. That period would at least be the individual's lifetime. It is unfortunate 
that Bentham did not clearly include future generations as well.  
It is again interesting to note that in the second phrase of the first sentence of the above 
quote, Bentham does not use an article before the word "man." As described in most any dictionary, 
the word "man" when used without a preceding article means "the human race: mankind: human 
beings personified as an individual."101 When, in the second sentence in the above quotation, the 
word "man" (or "human race," "mankind," or "humanity") is used in place of each of the singular 
personal pronouns, that quotation becomes applicable to future generations: "the idea of man's 
security must be prolonged to man throughout the whole vista that man's imagination can 
measure." That reading is what Bentham's use of the word "man" in the first sentence of the quote 
seems to require, and, therefore, the quote arguably extends beyond the then present generation to 
generations that follow. Arguably, if Bentham could think beyond the present generation in or 
about 1780, the present generation of the United States should be able and want to do so as well.   
 The common interpretation of the above quote is at least extending through the life of an 
extant individual and based on the individual's imagination argues for concern about climate 
change at least through her/his lifetime. However, even the present generation refuses meaningful 
concern because climate change threatens that generation's perceived "security”. That perception 
results from climate change's projected costs of mitigation and adaptation and the impact of those 
      
101 The Unabridged Merriman-Webster Dictionary, http://unabridged.merriam-webster.com/unabridged/man. 
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costs on present lifestyle which generally seems to be unfortunately viewed by that generation as 
the basic source of "happiness”. 
 Further, Bentham's reference to the use of imagination here requires that not only the 
existing individual but the legislator as well use imagination to determine the security of the 
individual. Bentham's recommendation of imagination is then relevant in this twenty-first century 
for careful legislative consideration of the security of at least the present generation throughout its 
life span. However, we actually do not have to use much imagination in contemplating climate 
change because we have the work of the IPCC though many refuse to consider it seriously because, 
again, it threatens current lifestyle because of projected cost and because of its threat to fossil fuel 
use and to those assets and the corporations that own and distribute those assets. 
 The above quotation is additionally interesting because of the importance of its suggestion 
of "guaranteeing" possessions against future loss. Man's or humanity's possessions should be 
viewed as Earth's physical resources and can certainly include nonphysical possessions such as 
honour. As argued in this dissertation, possibly the individual's future honour (or shame) should 
be of greater concern to the individual than his/her physical possessions which will perish.  
 Concerning "looking forward," Bentham also states: 
This disposition to look forward, which has so marked an influence upon the 
condition of man, may be called expectation - expectation of the future. It is by 
means of this we are enabled to form a general plan of conduct; it is by means of 
this, that the successive moments which compose the duration of life are not like 
insulated and independent points, but become parts of a continuous whole. 
Expectation is a chain which unites our present and our future existence, and 
passes beyond ourselves to the generations which follow us. The sensibility of 
the individual is prolonged through all the links of this chain. 
 
(Emphasis added; Bentham, PCC; p.308)  Here, again, the lack of an article preceding the words 
"man" and "life" clearly mean humanity and not only existing human life on Earth but future 
human life on Earth as well. In addition, this reading is required by the last sentence and its 
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reference to all the "links of this chain" of "generations which follow us." This idea of 
“expectations” of a present generation passing beyond its own generation to future generations and 
the possibility that an individual's sensibility is prolonged beyond her/his own life and generation, 
is or should be of considerable interest to an existing individual and generation. This again is not 
the apparent concern of most present individuals (but should be) and is addressed throughout this 
dissertation.  
 When Bentham wrote these words, he could have had no actual concept of a climate change 
kind of crisis. However, here his words about "generations which follow us" and the "prolonged 
sensibility of the individual" throughout those generations suggest that he, at the very least, 
imagined activity of a present generation impacting "generations which follow us" where utility 
and happiness are involved. Certainly, he considered his theory of utility as continuing through the 
following generations of human life. He, of course, also was the first to suggest that ethical 
consideration be extended to nonhuman animal life. He famously stated "the question is not, Can 
they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?"102  
 Because the suffering of humans is still of greater concern than the suffering of nonhuman 
animals, it is reasonable to believe that, if Bentham were alive today, he would fully support the 
extension of ethical consideration to future generations and support present efforts of both 
mitigation and adaptation to minimize the suffering of those future generations as a result of 
climate change. Also, that the sensibility of a present individual and generation could and should 
continue beyond its own life and generation seems at least to be a challenge to that present 
individual and generation to incorporate in his/her/its own sensibility the good of future 
generations but that is not the collective attitude of the present generation.   
      
102 Bentham, Burns, IPML; p.282-83.  
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 Returning to Bentham's focus on security as a primary route to, and the maximization of, 
happiness, Bentham follows David Hume (1711-1776) who argued that secure possession of one's 
life and property was a primary task of government.103 Not only security but equality was 
important to Bentham. While equality seems less important to Bentham than security, equality was 
a factor in Bentham's efforts in reforming government through legislative action and, therefore, 
was also a necessary condition for greatest happiness. As a result, Bentham's utilitarianism was 
dependent upon appropriate legislation to ensure not only security of life and property but 
apparently equality of life and, to some extent, equality of property as well.   
 However, again, this does not describe today's emphasis of most of the present generation 
which seems intent on maximizing "happiness" through the maximum accumulation of property 
—consumerism—which, if anything, is a very short-term kind of “happiness” and “utility” and 
not a lasting expression of either. Unfortunately, utilitarianism seems to promote this accumulation 
in spite of Bentham's thoughts about equality of property and sensibility of the future because of 
his theory's emphasis on individual utility and happiness. But this emphasis should not be taken as 
the focus of Bentham's thoughts if he is understood as argued above. 
 (2) Bentham - concept of virtue  
 Another aspect of Hume's influence was Bentham’s adoption of Hume's position about 
virtue. In Bentham's A Fragment on Government104 published anonymously in about 1776, 
Bentham related about Hume that he, Bentham, "felt as if scales had fallen from my eyes [and] I 
then, for the first time, learned to call the cause of the People the cause of Virtue."  (Bentham, 
FOG; p.268-69[h2]) Bentham added "I learnt to see that utility was the test and measure of all 
      
103 Bentham, Bowering, PCC: p.307; Hume, Enquires; p.192-95. 
104 Jeremy Bentham, A Fragment on Government, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 1, ed. John Bowering (New 
York: Russell & Russell, Inc., 1962), p.268-69[h]2; herein referenced as "Bentham, Bowering, FOG; p.__" 
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virtue … and that the obligation to minister to general happiness was an obligation paramount to 
and inclusive of every other."   Hume had written the following about utility:105  
It appears to be a matter of fact, that the circumstance of utility, in all subjects, is a 
source of praise and approbation: That it is constantly appealed to in all moral 
decisions concerning the merit and demerit of actions: That it is the sole source of 
that high regard paid to justice, fidelity, honour, allegiance, and chastity: That 
it is inseparable from all other social virtues, humanity, generosity, charity, 
affability, lenity, mercy, and moderation: And, in a word, that it is a 
foundation of the chief part of morals, which has a reference to mankind and 
our fellow creatures. 
 
(Emphasis in original (italics) and added (bolded); Hume, Enquiries; p.231; see also p.280)   While 
Hume (and Bentham later) acknowledge the importance of virtue and some individual virtues 
specifically, Hume saw the source of virtue as utility.  
 Bentham defined his principle of utility more succinctly than Hume as follows:  
The principle here in question [that of utility] may be taken for an act of the mind; 
a sentiment; a sentiment of approbation; a sentiment which, when applied to an 
action, approves of its utility, as that quality of it by which the measure of 
approbation or disapprobation bestowed upon it ought to be governed. 
 
(Bentham, Burns, IPML; p.12fn)  While not attributing to utility the "sole source" of Hume's listed 
virtues, Bentham’s statement is similar to Hume's statement because both embrace utility as the 
determining factor of right and wrong. Bentham's focus is on utility as an agent's act of the mind 
—a sentiment—which determines the measure of approbation—approval— or disapprobation— 
disapproval—of the agent or a third party to which the involved act is attributed. That sentiment 
defines the acting agent’s character which may be good or bad, right or wrong. 
   In explaining utility, Bentham argues that "Nature has placed mankind under the 
governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we 
      
105 These words of Hume were first published in 1751 (Hume, Enquiries, p.viii) and may be the cause of Kant's concern 
with virtue as an opportunity for personal advantage. Advantage over other individuals is a factor that must be 
addressed in most (if not all) cases as a vice and must be differentiated from virtue generally. (See page 151-152 
below).  
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ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do." (Bentham, IPML; p.11)  For Bentham, 
these masters of pain and pleasure provide the system under which human agents live and again 
define the individual’s character. He further argues that any contrary systems that "attempt to 
question [the principle of utility], deal in sounds instead of sense, in caprice instead of reason, in 
darkness instead of light" (which he recognizes as "metaphor and declamation”) and not the means 
of improving "moral science". (Bentham, Burns, IPML; p.11)106 This was an extremely harsh and 
unnecessary apparent judgment of virtue ethics even in the eighteenth century.  
 He then sets out through the IPML to explain the meaning of the utility principle which 
"approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears 
to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question; or, what is 
the same thing in other words, to promote or to oppose that happiness." (Id.; p.12) Also, those 
actions are explicitly to include "not only of every action of a private individual, but of every 
measure of government." (Id; p.12) Legislation is not only important but again necessary and 
should focus on promoting the happiness, and opposing pain, not only of the current generation 
but of future generations as well because all legislation should be viewed as of a continuing nature. 
Climate change requires that the present generation consider diminishing its own "happiness" in 
order to promote that of future generations in the sense of Bentham's above quoted statements. 
Also, as Mill suggests below there may be more genuine happiness in recognizing one's part in 
facilitating future generations. 
 For Bentham, though, the existing individual remains of primary importance. The interest 
of the individual's "community" becomes the summation of individual interests (Bentham, Burns, 
      
106 The subject of morality still seems to be much more of an art than a science. 
 114 
  
IPML; p.12) which is one of the root problems of utilitarianism. The concept of community today 
must be a much larger concept as explained in the remaining chapters. 
  In summary, while the fact that utility is necessary in implementing mitigation of, and 
adaptation to, climate change; while we should heed Bentham's words about the "generations 
which follow us"; while the concept of legislation should consider future generations; and while 
the need for the use of imagination is as great as it has ever been; Bentham's theory relies on the 
legislator following the sum of the desires of present individuals and those desires do not generally 
include climate change mitigation or adaptation and look only at prolonging present "happiness" 
through personal acquisition through consumerism. Though Bentham's thoughts of present 
sensibility of, and to, the future are necessary in addressing climate change, I argue that, because 
of climate change, the general level of the character of even the past must be elevated, and that 
virtue theory is the theory that must be employed.  
However, while Bentham's (and Hume's) position concerning virtue seems misdirected and 
in need of assistance, Mill's position concerning virtue and the importance of character is 
essentially positive and as such provides the possibility of assistance to utilitarianism through the 
improvement of character through new and/or revised virtues or a revised virtue theory. 
  
 B. John Stewart Mill (1806-1873)  
 John Stuart Mill's thoughts combined with those of Bentham's are important concerning 
climate change's need of utility and also because of Mill's recognition of the benefit of a virtuous 
character. Again, utility seems important in identifying and addressing both mitigation and 
adaptation but is insufficient without virtuous character. Virtue is morally important to Mill where 
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it was interpreted as personal advantage by Hume and Bentham. Mill in his book Utilitarianism107 
expands on Bentham's thoughts, changes some of the detail of Bentham's ideas, and discusses the 
importance of virtue and character at some length.  
 (1)  Mill - general utility theory  
 Mill does, of course, adopt Bentham's utilitarian ethics. However, Mill's thoughts do not 
seem as favorable to future generations as the above few thoughts of Bentham because Mill's 
emphasis seems fully directed to a present generation as is the case with most  nineteenth century 
and prior ethicists.108 Concerning future generations, only one reference in Utilitarianism could be 
found that had an indication that other than the present generation might be considered.109 Mill 
states that he wrote the book for the "cultivated mind" which he defined as: 
A cultivated mind - I do not mean that of a philosopher, but any mind to which the 
fountains of knowledge have been opened, and which has been taught, in any 
tolerable degree, to exercise its faculties - finds sources of inexhaustible interest in 
all that surrounds it; in the objects of nature, the achievements of art, the 
imaginations of poetry, the incidents of history, the ways of mankind, past and 
present, and their [mankind's] prospects in the future. 
 
(Emphasis added; Mill, 1861; p.14)  It does seem interesting that Mill in 1861 had enough foresight 
to suggest that a cultivated mind should find interest in the "ways of mankind, past and present" 
and apparently in mankind's "prospects in the future" where that last thought can be interpreted to 
include the ways that present individuals might affect a future "mankind”.110 However, again, 
      
107 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, 2nd ed (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2001); herein referenced 
as "Mill, 1861; p.__). 
108 Mill does discuss the future but I have not found references to "future generations." Mill in his essay "Of the 
Stationary State" predicts a future stationary state for the economy and the end of economic growth. He states that 
those conditions "would be, on the whole, a very considerable improvement on our present condition" which he 
describes as "that of struggling to get on; that [of] the trampling, crushing, elbowing, and treading on each other's 
heels, which form the existing type of social life ... ." John Stuart Mill, Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, vol. 3, 
ed. JM Robson (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, Inc., 2006), pp.752-57; herein referenced as "Mill, CW3; p.__." 
109 Mill does mention "a long succession of generations" but there the reference is only to the passage of time and not 
to any consideration to be given those generations. (Mill, 1861; p.15) 
110 Possibly Mill here was following Bentham's words about the future as discussed above. 
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additional statements supporting that idea of affecting the future could not be found in 
Utilitarianism. 
  In describing utilitarian theory, Mill begins with what it is not - it is not "referring 
everything to pleasure”. (Mill, 1861; p.6)  Mill explains: "utilitarian writers in general have placed 
the superiority of mental over bodily pleasures chiefly in the greater permanency, safety, 
uncostliness, etc., of the former - that is, in their circumstantial advantages rather than in their 
intrinsic nature." (Mill, 1861; p.8)  Mill states: 
According to the greatest happiness principle, … the ultimate end, with reference 
to and for the sake of which all other things are desirable - whether we are 
considering our own good or that of other people - is an existence exempt as far as 
possible from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments, both in point of quantity 
and quality … .  
 
(Mill, 1861; p.12) Therefore, based on the above two quotes, mental pleasure should take 
precedence over physical pleasure and the good of others is stated but with the prior reference to 
"our own" individual good. Mill defines happiness as follows:  
If by happiness be meant a continuity of highly pleasurable excitement, it is evident 
enough that this is impossible. A state of exalted pleasure lasts only moments or in 
some cases, and with some intermissions, hours or days, and is the occasional 
brilliant flash of enjoyment, not its permanent and steady flame. ... The happiness 
[of philosophers who have embraced happiness as life's end] was not a life of 
rapture, but moments of such, an existence made up of few and transitory pains, 
many and various pleasures, with a decided predominance of the active over the 
passive, and having as the foundation of the whole not to expect more from life 
than it is capable of bestowing. 
 
(Mill, 1861; p.13) The above thoughts provide a needed hierarchy and certain limits on the 
utilitarian concept of happiness. 
 Like Bentham, the individual is of paramount importance in Mill's theory. About attention 
to the self, Mill states that utilitarians should never cease to claim "self-devotional morality" as a 
"possession which belongs by as good a right to them as either to the Stoic or to the 
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Transcendentalist." (Mill, 1861; p.16)  Mill does consistently seem to want to fully recognize the 
general nature of the individual as willfully giving more, or at least as much, importance to her/his 
own needs and wants than to the needs and wants of others because Mill does recognize that the 
selfish feeling generally controls. (Mill, 1861; p.34) He states: "[The social] feeling in most 
individuals is much inferior in strength to their selfish feelings, and is often wanting altogether." 
(Mill, 1861; p.34) Things do not seem to have changed that much in about one hundred and fifty 
years. 
 Mill does provide an exception to the utility principle for what might be called social 
responsibility. Though he does not seem to use that term, his following statements fit that 
description. For example, Mill argues that utilitarianism requires that the individual "be as strictly 
impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator" and gives "the golden rule of Jesus of 
Nazareth" as the "complete spirit of the ethics of utility" and "the ideal perfection of utilitarian 
morality”. As the means of approaching this ideal, he states:  
utility would enjoin, first, that laws and social arrangements should place the 
happiness or (as ... it may be called) the interest of every individual as nearly as 
possible in harmony with the interest of the whole; and, secondly, that education 
and opinion, which have so vast a power over human character, should so use 
that power as to establish in the mind of every individual an indissoluble association 
between his own happiness and the good of the whole ... .  
 
(Emphasis added; Mill, 1861; p.17)  Here, the individual is apparently given the responsibility to 
consider the "good of the whole" in securing her/his own good. Also, apparently any legislature 
should attempt, "as nearly as possible," to harmonize all social interests. While this is not 
universalizability, it seems to be approaching that concept. Finally, and importantly, Mill here 
emphasizes the significance of "human character" generally.  
 In addition, Mill specifically addresses the public or social utility responsibility of the 
individual and in doing so declares that the object of virtue is the multiplication of happiness. 
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The multiplication of happiness is, according to the utilitarian ethics, the object of 
virtue: the occasions on which any person (except one in a thousand) has it in his 
power to do this on an extended scale—in other words, to be a public benefactor—
are but exceptional; and on these occasions alone is he called upon to consider 
public utility; in every other case, private utility, the interest or happiness of some 
few persons, is all he has to attend to. 
 
(Mill, 1861; p.19) Mill states that the individual has only limited opportunity or need to be 
concerned with public utility and would generally be concerned only with the promotion of private 
utility or happiness where this was certainly the general situation in the nineteenth century. This 
statement has been turned on its head in this twenty-first century. Practically everything we do 
today requires us to think as a public benefactor and a benefactor of future generations.  Also, as 
argued in this dissertation, virtue's object must be viewed as exponentially broader than Mill's 
stated object of happiness and interests of the person and close associates. 
 In a similar manner and again consistent with 1861, Mill concludes that individual actions 
need consider the entire world only on rare occasions where:  
the thoughts of the most virtuous man need not on [other than these rare] occasions 
travel beyond the particular persons concerned, except so far as is necessary to 
assure himself that in benefiting them he is not violating the rights, that is, the 
legitimate and authorized expectations, of anyone else. 
  
(Mill, 1861; p.19) Here the “most virtuous” person is recognized as the example, and the rights 
and expectations of "anyone else" are stated as limitations on the thoughts of that person. However, 
again, she/he need not be concerned with other than "anyone else" in the immediate vicinity unless 
the activity violates the rights of "anyone else" which in Mill's time were local rights but which 
again have changed radically over the past 150 years and where now “anyone else” includes the 
rights of Earth and all of its inhabitants, present and future. 
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 Mill also importantly and directly discusses "abstinences" where he addresses society 
generally and imposes a duty of forbearance that seems to be at least a part of Kant's duty of 
universalization. 
In the case of abstinences indeed—of things which people forbear to do from moral 
considerations, though the consequences in the particular case might be beneficial 
—it would be unworthy of an intelligent agent not to be consciously aware that the 
action is of a class which, if practiced generally, would be generally injurious, and 
that this is the ground of the obligation to abstain from it. 
 
Immediately, Mill states that this "regard for the public interest" is no more than is “demanded by 
every system of morals" because “they all enjoin to abstain from whatever is manifestly pernicious 
to society." (Mill, 1861; p.19-20)  Consequently, Mill recognizes "pernicious to society" as a basis 
for social responsibility's precedence over the utility principle. The thoughts in this quote apply 
directly to climate change and require all intelligent agents to refrain from the use of fossil fuel 
and energy generated therefrom to the extent possible. 
 He states "it is the business of ethics to tell us what are our duties, or by what test we may 
know them … ." (Mill, 1861; p.18)  Happiness of and utility for the present generation are his test 
and duties. In fact, he states: "ninety-nine hundredths of all our actions are done from [motives 
other than duty], and rightly so done if the rule of duty does not condemn them." As above, Mill’s 
rule of duty does condemn whatever is pernicious to society and most all that are recognized as 
such today, including climate change, were unknown in Mill's life time.  
 Further, while Mill does respect character, he could not be found to relate in any detail how 
utilitarianism can improve human character beyond the means of finding utility in activity and 
through education and opinion.111 In summary, it seems that virtue and character count but only 
      
111 Of interest, Mill comments on the then state of education and social arrangements as follows: “The present wretched 
education and wretched social arrangements are the only real hindrance to [happiness] being attainable by almost all.” 
(Mill, 1861; p.13). 
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insofar as they contribute to the happiness of present humanity generally and apparently only after 
that of the individual has been satisfied. That satisfaction of the individual's concept of happiness, 
in fact, seems to be the present belief of most of those in the United States today.  
 (2) Mill - virtue and character  
 According to Mill and also Bentham, the "object of virtue" is the "multiplication of 
happiness”. (Mill, 1861; p.19) Again, Mill does include positive comments about virtue and 
character throughout his book. Initially, he comments that, while self-sacrifice is noble because it 
involves "resigning entirely one's own portion of happiness, or chances of it," it must be for some 
end other than the simple end of being virtuous. He comments that the necessary end could be 
earning "for others immunity from similar sacrifices." (Mill, 1861; p.16-17) Further, he calls 
sacrifice "the highest virtue which can be found in man" but is not "itself a good". Any sacrifice 
"which does not increase or tend to increase the total sum of happiness, [the utilitarian] considers 
as wasted." (Mill, 1861; p.16) Consequently, virtuous sacrifice is only acceptable if it contributes 
to the happiness of another or of others (which could arguably include unborn others).  
 Concerning motive and the worth of the agent, Mill states: "utilitarian moralists have gone 
beyond almost all others in affirming that the motive has nothing to do with the morality of the 
action, though much [to do] with the worth of the agent." (Mill, 1861; p.18) The consequences of 
the action are paramount while the "worth of the agent" is of secondary importance. This position 
is problematic because, while an individual might produce a good action here and there, no one 
can count on his/her character to provide continuing good action when continuing good action is 
critical. Mill does directly acknowledge that good character is important: "I grant that [utilitarians] 
are, notwithstanding, of opinion that in the long run the best proof of a good character is good 
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actions; and resolutely refuse to consider any mental disposition as good of which the predominant 
tendency is to produce bad conduct." (Mill, 1861; p.20) 
 But does Earth really need vicious agents who on occasion do a virtuous act possibly by 
mistake? Further, is "predominant tendency" the best that can be expected? Better than those 
results have been needed many times in the past and much better than that is needed now. In 
addition, Mill's sentence seems to suggest that, because a good character apparently results in good 
actions continually or at least over the "long run”, a good character should be, in fact, recognized 
as necessary for any acceptable ethical theory.    
  It seems that an ethical theory that tolerates a second-class attitude toward character will 
not in the "long run" produce anything like exceptional happiness or utility. Virtuous character 
seems to be of initial and primary importance. Again, while Mill recognizes the importance of 
good character, he does not describe how the utility principle improves or promotes good 
character. Mill simply seems to state that the object of happiness and utility will promote or does 
promote virtue and good character through education and opinion. But that education and opinion 
need to originate from an improved and elevated character if those two methods are going to be 
useful. At present, neither seem directed to that improved and elevated character. 
  (3) Mill - legislation and deterrent sanctions  
 Mill identifies what seems to be an appropriate question: what is the deterrent sanction of 
the moral standard and what is the source of that standard's obligation and from what does it derive 
binding force? Deterrent sanctions unfortunately seem necessary for humans and Mill discusses 
both those that are external and internal. His external sanctions are, of course, external reward and 
punishment through legislation and/or threat of pain.   
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 Mill describes the internal sanction as "duty:" and states "duty, whatever our standard of 
duty may be, is one and the same—a feeling in our own mind; a pain, more or less intense, 
attendant on violation of duty, which in properly cultivated moral natures rises, in the more serious 
cases, into shrinking from [duty] as an impossibility." While Mill in Utilitarianism does not use 
the words "shame," "guilt" or similar words, those feelings seem to be the essence of his "pain”. 
Also, this feeling of duty (which appears similar in its mandate to that of Kant’s duty), Mill argues, 
arises from all of the various feelings of an individual's past and that the binding force of this duty 
is this "mass of feeling which must be broken through in order to do what violates our standard of 
right, and which, if we do nevertheless violate that standard, will probably have to be encountered 
afterwards in the form of remorse." (Mill, 1861; pp.28-29)112 or, again, shame. This "mass of 
feeling" seems to be the actual foundation of the virtuous individual and the source of her/his 
strength of will. Also, this "mass of feelings" seems to be the result of the individual's education 
and opinion but also habituation of the individual which fosters and forms this "mass of feelings”.  
 Mill argues that the "conscientious feelings of mankind" are, and, therefore, the individual's 
conscience is, the ultimate internal sanction of all morality. As to its binding force, Mill states: 
"Undoubtedly this sanction has no binding efficacy on those who do not possess the feeling it 
appeals to; but neither will these persons be more obedient to any other moral principle than the 
utilitarian one. On them morality of any kind has no hold but through the external sanctions." (Mill, 
1861; p.29)  That description, in fact, seems to accurately describe this twenty-first century so far, 
and new external sanctions must be secured through someone or some body like a legislature where 
the involved individuals cannot be as inclined to self-devotion as at present but must be inclined 
      
112 However, Mill's duty seems to be one of determining present social acceptability while Kant's duty is one of 
universalizability which ought to be the basis of social acceptability but which is not. Improved character is necessary. 
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to seek honour or avoid shame or to find some other feeling of worth or reward rather than personal 
monetary gain or its equivalent. That seems to require virtuous character.    
 Mill argues that as civilization progresses, the individual comes to realize that the interests 
of others cannot be disregarded (Mill,1861; p.32) and that, in this way, concern for the good of 
others becomes a natural and necessary thing for attention "like any of the physical conditions of 
our existence”.  Mill calls this concern "sympathy" which becomes, he argues, a necessary concept 
for individuals where that feeling is "nourished" by education but is supported by "the powerful 
agency of the external sanctions”.  (Mill, 1861; p.33)  However, again, someone or some body 
must legislatively or dictatorially impose those sanctions. Hopefully, it will be someone or some 
body with a virtuous character. 
In addition, Mill seems to say that utility is self-motivating because of the recognition that 
it is the natural social objective. (Mill, 1861; p.34)  But again, in light of the emphasis on the self-
devotion and happiness of the present individual, the questions seem to remain whose utility and 
who will impose the external sanctions necessary where there is no universal consent and also how 
does this sympathy grow and mature? 
 Of considerable interest is Mill's recognition, a mere one hundred fifty or so years ago, of 
what he calls "the comparatively early state of human advancement in which we now live" where 
this sympathy with others may only be developing and slowly at that.113 But he believes that there 
are those in whom this feeling is developing to the point that a person "cannot bring himself to 
think of the rest of his fellow creatures as struggling rivals with him for the means of happiness, 
whom he must desire to see defeated in their object in order that he may succeed in his." (Emphasis 
added; Mill, 1861; p.34)  Initially, given that Homo sapiens has only used written expression for 
      
113 While Mill does not specifically define this "early state", it seems in context to relate to a longer period of time, 
possibly centuries or millennia if not epochs, rather than such short periods of time as years or decades. 
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about six thousand years and that Earth is at least four billion years old, we humans are still, and, 
if Homo sapiens survives, will still be in this "early state of human advancement" for some 
centuries and millennia to come.  
Also, presently, we obviously have not yet overcome this concept of "struggling rivals" 
and this feeling of "desire to defeat" which both seem to be increasing and seem to fuel our daily 
need for some form of competition which always remains evident certainly on a vocational level 
and through competitive sports ("enjoyed" vicariously) on which not only we in the United States 
but the world generally spends huge amounts of time and money.  
    Nonetheless, Mill believes that there are those on Earth who have those feelings that 
desire harmony where the feeling does possess the characteristics of a natural feeling and where it 
is "an attribute which it would not be well for them to be without." Mill then comes back to the 
importance of "the sensitiveness and thoughtfulness" of the individual “character” in supporting 
this attitude. (Mill, 1861; p.34)  However, he admits that it has not been achieved and “in this early 
state” maybe “impossible”. Maybe climate change will even somehow help get us there. 
 (4) Mill - virtue ethical theory assistance  
 Based on the above review, there are a number of concerns that climate change raises for 
utilitarianism with which virtue theory can assist. The basic climate change concern is utility for 
unborn generations which, again, is an obvious concern associated with all three of the major 
ethical theories and which I argue can be addressed by improved character though an improved 
and elevated virtue theory. This general concern is associated with three additional specific 
concerns with utilitarianism with which improved character can assist.   
 First, Mill's minimal concerns about public utility and abstinences are major climate 
change concerns. They were for Mill exceptions to the general rule of concern for oneself and 
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those persons in relatively close contact but now should have become the most important concerns 
for every individual at least in the United States. For example, regarding climate change, 
abstinence of the use of fossil fuel is now globally necessary. Also, as reported above through 
Dietz, et. al., thirty-eight percent (38%) of greenhouse gas emissions result from household 
decisions. (Chapter 2 above, pages 38-40). And that percentage is growing because of the 
individual household’s constantly increasing dependence upon fossil fuel energy. Lowering of that 
percentage requires that every present person must be constantly aware of the effect of each of 
his/her actions in the production of CO2 and greenhouse gas generally. The importance of public 
utility and abstinences has increased exponentially. Because the majority of the present generation 
chooses to ignore these concerns, an improved and elevated character is necessary. 
 Second, Mill's position that virtue has as its only object the "multiplication of happiness" 
or the positive interest of the individual where those objects become those of society generally, is 
but a small portion of what virtue can, and needs to, deliver.  What virtue is believed capable of 
initially delivering is sufficient individuals who recognize the need for improved virtuous character 
as defined by both past characteristics recognized as virtuous and new and/or revised virtues that 
can also direct our ethical concern to an enlarged community of both present patients and the 
unborn generations of all life on Earth.  
 Third, Mill's concept of utilitarianism includes an equal consideration of the self and 
existing others but this must be revised to include consideration of unborn generations as primary 
over the individuals of the present generation if only because the existing and past generations 
have caused climate change. Again, this requires an elevation of our individual characters through 
a recognition of some present but ignored virtues and some new and/or revised virtues.  
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 The above three specific concerns with which improved character can assist are considered 
primary regarding the ability of utilitarianism to assist in the mitigation of, and adaptation to, 
climate change. 
 
 C. Summary – Part III  
As an ethical foundation for addressing climate change, the Kantian ideal of 
universalizability seems the most appropriate because it is the more objective theory and, through 
that universalizability, includes Mill's concepts of abstention and social responsibility. In the 
circumstances of climate change with the necessity of recognizing global consequences, the 
Kantian theory also provides Mill’s requirement of a "common umpire" (Mill,1861, p.26) again 
through universalizability. However, the use of universalizability requires an individual or group 
to make judgments and that introduces the importance of the character of that individual or the 
individuals in the group. That individual or group of individuals seems to be an administrator and 
legislators in democratic societies. In dictatorial societies, as Confucius found, the leaders are 
difficult to transform. But possibly things have changed. 
 But whatever the description of the umpire, that entity needs virtuous character, for 
example, for legislatures at least in some individuals initially. The character of that individual or 
those individuals must have the ability to exclude personal desires and partialities and be able to 
universalize them. Today that character needs revised and/or new virtues to exclude the 
exponential daily onslaught of new potential desires and partialities that the individual is required 
to encounter (and hopefully discard for the most part) but which mask the reality of concerns such 
as climate change. 
 In fact, Mill argues that the common umpire is necessary   
 127 
  
until the influences which form moral character have taken the same hold of the 
principle which they have taken of some of the consequences - until, by the 
improvement of education, the feeling of unity with our fellow creatures shall 
be … as deeply rooted in our character, and to our own consciousness as 
completely a part of our nature, as the horror of crime is in an ordinarily well-
brought up young person. 
  
(Emphasis added; Mill, 1861; p.27)  Mill seems to suggest that the influences of moral character 
must somehow take hold of at least a large portion of the entire population of Earth before moral 
character can achieve anything and until then, moral character cannot be found to be reliable for 
the achievement of the good. Until then, deterrent sanctions must be provided as the means to 
achieving the good. But the influence of moral character must begin in some small portion of a 
population before even the appropriate sanctions can be enacted that will influence a larger part of 
that population.  
 In any event, based on the above thoughts of Kant, Bentham and Mill, a strong case can be 
made for the position that nothing good ever happens without virtuous character in an actor or 
actors somewhere. The good must begin somewhere and a virtuous character must initiate any 
good entitled to that description. As with any need for social change, there must be a starting point 
that attempts to look beyond the present circumstances that seem to be acceptable but are not and 
that also attempts to look beyond the past because any attempt to re-create the past will fail at least 
because circumstances change and what was cannot address those circumstances. Society, because 
of those changed circumstances, must look long and carefully at those circumstances and strive to 
deal reasonably with them. There is no going back; only going forward in an attempt to find 
flourishing either within or without those circumstances.  
Society today needs to build character in its legislators to address those circumstances and 
the only means to that end is building character in the individual who either becomes the legislator 
or elects the legislator and that can only begin with individuals that can see and appreciate the need 
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for, and the worth of, improved character. Therefore, that necessary character, as acknowledged 
by Aristotle, Confucius, Kant, Bentham, Mill, and others, can be addressed through the concept of 
virtues and can begin to be addressed as argued in this dissertation and hopefully through future 
papers from many other authors. 
 As Mill admits, the "knotty points both in the theory of ethics and in the conscientious 
guidance of personal conduct" are generally solved "according to the intellect and virtue of 
the individual". (Emphasis added; Mill, 1861; p.25-26)  Revised and/or new virtues are generally 
needed for new circumstances especially those which have never been encountered previously 
such as climate change. Interestingly, both utilitarian and Kantian ethics need the concept of duty 
in the agent and it seems that virtuous character is necessary if that duty is to be recognized and 
embraced to become the activity of the individual and of humanity generally. 
 Utilitarianism is a form of what G. E. M. (Elizabeth) Anscombe named 
“consequentialism”114 because, unlike utilitarianism which considers pleasure and pain or benefit 
and detriment, consequentialism seems to attempt to track what consequences are “best” and, 
therefore, consequentialism becomes a broader concept (and more indistinct) than utilitarianism. 
In fact, Anscombe states: 
It is a necessary feature of consequentialism that it is a shallow philosophy. For 
there are always borderline cases in ethics. Now if you are either an Aristotelian, or 
a believer in divine law, you will deal with a borderline case by considering whether 
doing such-and-such in such-and-such circumstances is, say, murder, or is an act of 
injustice; and according as you decided it is or it isn’t, you judge it to be a thing to 
do or not. 
 
      
114 G.E.M. (Elizabeth) Anscombe, "Modern Moral Philosophy" in Philosophy vol.33, no.124, pp.1-19, p.12. 
Anscombe further states: [T]he consequentialist, in order to be imagining borderline case at all, has of course to assume 
some sort of law or standard according to which this is a borderline case where then does he get the standard from? In 
practice the answer invariably is: from the standards current in his society or his circle." 
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(Anscombe, p.12) Samuel Scheffler, in his book The Rejection of Consequentialism: A 
Philosophical Investigation of the Considerations Underlying Rival Moral Conceptions115  
considers criticisms of consequentialism: (1) it requires agents to disregard their own personal 
projects because it entails an impersonal consideration of the circumstances thereby questioning 
the agent’s personal integrity, and (2) it does not consider distributive justice. Both seem 
justifiable criticisms.  
 The alternatives of Kantian ethics and virtue ethics rely on an agent-centered consideration 
of circumstances where both rely on the good character of the agent to address the circumstances 
morally. Further, as identified above, utilitarian ethics and generalized consequentialist ethics do 
not seem to provide a method for generating the character necessary to choose the best outcome 
for the involved circumstances. 
 Interestingly, Scheffler argues for a “hybrid” theory which attempts to address the first 
criticism through what he calls a “agent-centered prerogative” and the second criticism through 
what he calls “a distribution-sensitive conception of the good”. In support of maintaining 
consequentialism in his hybrid theory, he quotes John Rawls as follows: “All ethical doctrines 
worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would 
be simply irrational, crazy.”116 (Rawls, 1999; p.26; Scheffler; p.127-28)  Aristotelian virtue theory 
through “choice” considers consequences and Kantian ethics must consider consequences in 
applying the Categorical Imperative. I further argue that through the “Aidōs Response,” through 
“Broadie’s contingent choice,” and through the Aristotelian/Aquinian psychology involved in 
choosing as detailed in Chapters 7 through 12, consequences of the moral choice are more 
      
115 Samuel Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism: A Philosophical Investigation of the Considerations 
Underlying Rival Moral Conceptions, rev’d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1994) herein referenced as 
“Scheffler, p.__”. 
116 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Revised Edition (Cambridge, MA: Belnap Press of Harvard University Press, 
1999) referenced herein as “Rawls, 1999, p __.” 
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thoroughly considered and that the moral choice depends on the character—the moral character— 
of the agent. 
 As Rawls states: “Utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between persons,” 
which seems the most important of its shortcomings. Scheffler, in attempting to consider the 
possibility of hybrid moral theories that include the opportunity to consider that concern, offers 
what he calls “agent-centered restrictions” and “agent-centered prerogatives” and favors the 
prerogatives approach because he finds therein a “liberation strategy” rather than a “maximization 
strategy”. He chooses the liberation strategy because it seems to give the agent greater flexibility 
in expressing her/his personal position concerning the circumstances and yet holds to some 
semblance of the utilitarian focus on consequences. However, he ultimately concludes that either 
of these strategies will serve his purpose of considering hybrid theories. He states: 
Rather than trying to show that one strategy really does give more weight than the 
other to the independence of the personal point of view, one might suggest that they 
are simply two different ways of giving weight to personal independence, with the 
choice between them properly dependent on one’s ultimate moral attitudes, 
and not on any supposedly neutral determination of the magnitudes of the 
respective weights. 
 
(Scheffler; p.63)  Because he concludes that either strategy is acceptable for his hybrid project and 
that “the choice between them properly [may be] dependent on one’s ultimate moral attitudes”, 
these individual ultimate moral attitudes are obviously of significant importance and seem to be 
the result of the moral character of the individual.  
 Granted that it is Scheffler’s project to show the possibility of the value of hybrid theories, 
it is at least interesting that he suggests the importance of those ultimate moral attitudes which 
must relate to the individual’s moral character. Further, it seems obvious that the individual’s 
embrace of any moral theory is dependent upon that individual’s character, and, therefore, in light 
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of climate change and its requirement for improved moral character, it seems necessary to 
introduce new methods toward character improvement.  
 As is argued in the further Chapters of this dissertation, that improvement is best served 
under a revised virtue ethical theory with the possibility that a new virtue, such as proper primility, 
is needed to extend ethical consideration to future generations of all life and, therefore, to what 
supports that life, Earth, and also to address the global pollution causing climate change. Possibly 
a hybrid theory including utilitarianism could help but it does not seem to be a necessary element 
in achieving that character improvement to embrace those objectives and the correction of their 
causes, un- and under- regulated capitalism, consumerism and addiction to fossil fuel energy. 
 The next chapter, Chapter 7, Incontinence – A possible Aristotelian Answer for Climate 
Change, (1) attempts to explain the character that virtue ethical theory may not now but can provide 
and also (2) will explore the necessary nature of the virtues that are needed to provide the improved 
and elevated virtuous society needed to address climate change. 
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Part IV Climate Change and Aristotelian Incontinency, the Aidōs Response and 
Aristotelian/Aquinian Psychology 
 
     Chapter 7 – Incontinence: A Possible Aristotelian Answer for Climate Change 
 
[W]e need to construe our efforts to progress morally as superordinate to developments in 
economic and technological systems, and this entails that the latter must become objects of our 
conscious control to an extent we have not yet achieved. 
 
                                                         —Byron Williston (Williston, 2015, 40)  
 A, Aristotelian Virtue and Character 
 Having reviewed the circumstances of the climate change situation, those being defined as 
the nature of the climate change emergency, the identification of the centrality of character for all 
present major ethical theories, and the recognition of virtue ethical theory as the present theory 
most useful for climate change, those concepts of Aristotle’s ethical theory that are useful in 
addressing climate change are next reviewed. Initially, Aristotle’s theory incorporates reality 
beyond that found in either Kantian ethical theory or utilitarian ethical theory. By “incorporating 
reality”, that phrase is used to indicate that the ideal found in any theory is not sufficient for its 
acceptance by humanity. The ideal is, of course, necessary in regard to embracing any ethical 
theory and Aristotle uses the ideals of practical wisdom (phronēsis, φρόνησις) and the person of 
practical reason (the phronimos).  
 However, he includes continence and incontinence as specific states of character, , which 
explicitly recognize reality as being less than the ideal of virtuosity but much more than 
viciousness. These two states recognize the reality of the less than perfect individuals who are 
called upon to embrace the ideal where those states must be considered in attempting to work 
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toward or possibly achieve the ideal. In addition, Aristotle recognized that most (maybe virtually 
all) of the individuals within his polis were not phronimoi (though, of course, he could not so state 
to his audience). That aspect of his theory provides an entrance to a possible answer for climate 
change. These thoughts will be a part of this Chapter, Chapters 8 and 9, and the remainder of this 
dissertation as well. 
 First, a review of Aristotle’s thoughts about the importance of character is necessary, and 
then his thoughts about the failure that results in his concept and state of incontinency. Again, I 
argue that virtue ethical theory can support a meaningful climate change ethical theory and that a 
new or revised virtue such as proper primility, which incorporates proper pride and proper 
humility, is needed within that theory to provide the character necessary to embrace that theory.  
 While Socrates, Plato and prior philosophers considered elements of what we might call a 
virtue ethical theory, Aristotle was the first major Western author of a detailed virtue ethical theory. 
Aristotle’s theory provides explicit support for the importance of character generally and of proper 
pride specifically and also provides thought that supports proper humility. Initially, Aristotle 
argues that there is a single ultimate aim for all individual humans and society generally. That aim 
is eudaimonia which is translated as “happiness” or probably more appropriately as “flourishing”. 
He concludes that eudaimonia is "rational activity in accordance with virtue" where rational 
activity results in part from function that is performed well "in accordance with the appropriate 
virtue". (Ross, pp.x, 10-12 (1097a15-1098b8))  He further states that we choose virtues "for the 
sake of [eudaimonia]" but eudaimonia being an end in itself is not chosen for the sake of virtues.  
 For Aristotle, virtues are necessary for the achievement of happiness and flourishing. 
Aristotle defines "virtues" as follows: 
 [Virtues] are means [middle points between extremes] and … states of character, 
and … they tend, and by their own nature, to the doing of the acts by which they 
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are produced [habituation], and that they are in our power and voluntary, and act as 
reason prescribes. But actions and states of character are not voluntary in the 
same way; for we are masters of our actions from the beginning right to the end, if 
we know the particular facts, but though we control the beginning of our states of 
character the gradual progress is not obvious, any more than it is in illnesses; 
because it was in our power, however, to act in this way or not in this way, therefore 
the states are voluntary.  
 
(Emphasis added; Ross, p.48 (1114b26-115a2))  His virtues as states of character are habits that 
are produced by "the doing of the acts by which they are produced." In other words, an individual 
acquires virtues, for example, the virtuous state of character of generosity by doing generous acts.  
"A state of character" may be defined as "a disposition to act" which is consistent with the 
Aristotelian definition above but more succinct and, therefore, more easily understood and 
adopted. 
 While a “disposition to act” is prior to action itself, a moral action requires a moral 
disposition to act and it is impossible to read Aristotle as other than requiring action for the 
development of character through the development of virtues. When discussing the virtue of 
practical wisdom and defining it, Aristotle expresses his thoughts about the relation between action 
and that virtue. Practical wisdom requires that a person deliberate well about "the good life in 
general". (Ross, p.106 (1140a25-28)) Concerning action and after concluding that practical 
wisdom cannot be scientific knowledge or art, Aristotle states "the remaining alternative, then, is 
that it is a true and reasoned state of capacity to act with regard to the things that are good or bad 
for man." (Ross, p.106 (1140b5-10))  
 Explaining these words, Lesley Brown117 states: “'State of capacity to act' means a 
disposition manifested in actions, in contrast to art, manifested in making something. So, to be 
      
117 Lesley Brown, Fellow in Philosophy Emeritus, Somerville College, Oxford University, Oxford UK, revised and 
provided the Introduction and Notes for the book Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans David Ross (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009). Her Introduction and Notes are referenced herein as "Ross, Brown; p.__.” 
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practically wise a person must act, and not merely deliberate." (Emphasis in original; Ross, 
Brown, p.238) It seems reasonable that if the human being has “a state of capacity to act,” that 
capacity must be used if the entity is to remain a human being because a human being and her/his 
character is defined by her/his actions.   
 Regarding the importance of action, Aristotle is clear again that it is through action that we 
acquire the virtues (and for that matter the vices). Aristotle states “we must examine the nature of 
actions, namely how we ought to do them; for these [actions] determine also the nature of the 
states of character that are produced, as we have said [at 1103a 31-1103b 25].” (Emphasis added; 
Ross, p.24 (1103b29-33)) Aristotle adds: 
[strength] is produced by taking much food and undergoing much exertion, and it 
is the strong man that will be most able to do these things. So too it is with the 
virtues … by being habituated to despise things that are fearful and to stand our 
ground against them we become brave, and it is when we have become so that we 
shall be most able to stand our ground against [things that are fearful].   
 
(Ross, p.25 (1104a33-1104b4)) Confronting circumstances whenever the nature of those 
circumstances requires action and, for the virtue of courage for example, action is necessary to 
become brave and it takes action to acquire that virtue and the other virtues as well. 
 Aristotle's idea of action associated with any virtue "is desire and reasoning with a view to 
an end" (Ross, p.103 (1139a39-1139b4)) where achieving that end is the result of choice and the 
doing of the action of the involved virtue with the right person, for the right motive, at the right 
time, in the right amount and for the right reason. (Ross, p.30 (1106b18-25); p.36 (1109a24-29); 
p.50 (1115b16-20))  Therefore, after deliberation and finding that the right circumstances exist, 
the involved virtuous action is not only the appropriate action but is also the only action for the 
virtuous person. Obviously, a given individual or community has a choice to act or not act. If the 
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virtuous action is chosen, it is, of course, virtuous action; if it is not chosen under those 
circumstances, the decision to fail to act seems to be vicious action. 
  Also, Aristotle states: "it is activities exercised on particular objects that make the 
corresponding character." (Emphasis added; Ross, p.47 (1114a4-15)) In other words, doing 
virtuous actions gives us virtuous character. For example, the virtue of liberality or generosity is 
generated through intentional actions that exhibit that virtue and through repeated actions of this 
type (habituation), the individual develops that state of character which understands that under 
certain circumstances liberality is the virtue to be voluntarily and gladly exhibited through action 
as prescribed by reason. In describing the characteristics of generosity, Aristotle, makes the 
following observation: "[I]t is more characteristic of virtue to do good than to have good done to 
one, and more characteristic to do what is noble than not to do what is base ... ." (Ross, 
p.60(1120a10-15))  “Doing” (action) that is noble is then characteristic of noble action. Also, by 
way of example for all virtues, he holds that it is not in the virtuous individual's power to be vicious 
because that individual has a fixed disposition to choose and undertake the virtuous action. (Ross, 
p.97 (1137a5-15))          
 States of character, of course, can be either good or bad, virtues or vices. Aristotle names 
six kinds of moral states of character where three kinds are to be avoided—vice, incontinence, and 
brutishness. "The contraries of two of these are evident—one we call virtue, the other continence; 
to brutishness it would be most fitting to oppose superhuman virtue, a heroic and divine kind of 
virtue … ." (Ross, p.118 (1145a15-20))  He explains that human beings, of course, are not brutes 
but like brutes, humans cannot become gods. When defining continence and incontinence, he 
maintains that they are neither virtue nor vice but that they are specific states of character in 
addition to virtue and vice. In defining them further, he explains that continence is "thought to be 
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included among things good and praiseworthy" while incontinence is "among things bad and 
blameworthy". (Ross, p.119 (1145b7-20)) This dissertation is concerned particularly with virtue, 
continence, and incontinence which are discussed in more detail below.   
 In summary, Aristotle's route to a virtuous and, therefore, a flourishing life (likely a happy 
life) is through a moral character that results from the rational recognition that the doing of actions 
must be based on the deliberated choice of a mean, an intermediate action. A virtue as a state of 
character is the correct choice between actions that exhibit vices as excess or deficiency of that 
virtuous mean.118,119 That moral character that requires recognition and choice of the intermediate 
or mean will not only promote individual relationships but will support a virtuous and flourishing 
community in which the individual will have a much better opportunity to live a flourishing life. 
Aquinas, as argued below at pages 220-257, provides a systematic means of adopting Aristotle's 
psychology of habitual acting that facilitates the development and maintenance of the virtuous or 
the continent states of character. 
  
 B. Aristotelian Continency and Incontinency 
Aristotle introduces continence and incontinence in the initial chapter of the Nicomachean 
Ethics when he references “another irrational element in the soul—one which in a sense, however, 
shares in reason.” He states: 
For we praise the reason of the continent [person] and of the incontinent, and the 
part of their soul that has reason, since it urges them aright and towards the best 
      
118 Douglas L Cairns, Aidōs: The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1993, referenced herein as "Cairns, p.__." All hexeis (singular hexis) for Aristotle are aretai 
(virtues) or kakiai (vices (excesses and deficiencies)). A hexis "is a kind of disposition (diathesis), one which is long- 
lasting and hard to change ... [and] one who possesses a hexis (of character) is either well or badly off, well or badly 
disposed, with regard to a particular pathos ["an affect" or “non-essential attribute" (Cairns; p.393) - a passion].” 
Cairns, p.398. 
119 The Greek words are: virtue - arete; state of character - ἕξει, hexis (LSJ9,p.595L); vices -kakiai as excess -ὑπερβολὴ, 
(LSJ9,p.1861R) or deficiency - ἔλλειψις (LSJ9,p.536L); continence - ἐγκράτειαν (LSJ9,p.473); incontinence - ἀκρασία 
(LSJ9,p.54); virtuous mean - μέσον, mesotēs,meson (? (LSJ9, p.1107R (1109b26)). 
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objects; but there is found in them also another natural element beside reason, 
which fights against and resists it. 
 
(Ross, p.21 (1102b13-18)) This other natural element that fights against reason Aristotle names  
“the appetitive and in general the desiring element”. That element occurs in both the continent and 
the incontinent person and its concept is praised because it is accompanied by recognition of the 
reasoned alternative in these two states. However, the actual desiring element itself is blameworthy 
because it causes a struggle in both states that is not found in the virtuous temperate person, the 
phronimos. Also, it is blameworthy because it causes the failure of the incontinent person to follow 
reason. (Ross, p.120 (1146a3-4)) What causes the continent person to abandon the desiring 
element and follow the reasoned principle is reviewed in Chapter 8 below and is initially named 
the “motivator” in this dissertation.  
Aristotle explains that the state of continence is something less than or below the moral 
state of virtue and incontinence is something above the moral state of vice. Aristotle argues that 
"continence" must be discussed as a moral state of character that falls short of virtue. He further 
states: “[W]e must treat each of the two [continence and incontinence] neither as identical with 
virtues or wickedness nor as a different genus.” (Emphasis added; Ross, p.118 (1145a35-a2))  
He then explains the purpose of his Book VII which specifically explores continence and 
incontinence: 
We must, as in all other cases, set the apparent facts before us and, after first 
discussing the difficulties, go on to prove, if possible, the truth of all the common 
opinions about these affectations of the mind, or failing this, of the greater number 
and the most authoritative. 
 
(Ross, p.118 (1145a35-a2)) As stated, that book discusses “the truth” and falsity of “all the 
common opinions of these affectations of the mind” where most of those addressed opinions seem 
authoritative. Because virtue and wickedness (vice) are moral states of character and because 
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continence and incontinence are of the same genus, continence and incontinence are Aristotelian 
moral states of character subject to habituation in the same manner as virtue and vice. 
Consequently, continence and incontinence are for Aristotle extremely important moral states of 
character. 
 The incontinent person recognizes but does not follow reason and instead follows appetite. 
For Aristotle, the appetite is part of what he names the “soul”. Aristotle recognizes the part of the 
soul that has reason in the full sense and names it the “intellect”. He finds that the appetite while 
being part of the “soul,” is rational in a secondary way in that the “appetite” is responsive to reason 
and intellect though not itself rational. Further, Ross calls Aristotle’s moral virtues “the excellences 
of the semi-rational soul part containing appetites (including emotions)” and states that these moral 
virtues must be responsive to reason. (Ross, p. xiv). Also, Aristotle does specifically argue that the 
“appetite” is, or “appetites” are, passions and not states of character.120 
It would seem that because most people during Aristotle’s life as well as today struggle 
against desire and against reasoned principles, at least at times, very few people then and today 
seem virtuous at all times. As discussed below, Aristotle recognizes that finding the median that 
is the virtue is far from easy and takes particularly the virtues courage, temperance and practical 
reason. (Ross, p.36(1109b11-17)) 
Aristotle also addresses blame which is involved in both continence and incontinence and 
is characterized as something less than goodness because he states that the person “who deviates 
little from goodness is not blamed, whether he do so in the direction of the more or of the less, but 
      
120 Aristotle names three parts of the soul, “passions,” “capacities’ and “states of character.” He defines “passions” as 
"appetite, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, friendly feeling, hatred, longing, emulation, pity, and in general the 
feelings that are accompanied by pleasure or pain.” He defines “capacities” as "the things in virtue of which we are 
said to be capable of feeling” these passions. He defines "states of character" as "the things in virtue of which we stand 
well or badly with reference to the passions, e.g. with reference to anger we stand badly if we feel it violently or too 
weekly, and well if we feel it in an intermediate way and similarly with reference to the other passions." (Ross, p.28 
(1105b5-28)). 
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only the man who deviates more widely; for he does not fail to be noticed.” (Ross, p.36 (1109b17-
20))  Aristotle here seems to be concerned with the outward appearance of the individual’s action 
while he is generally concerned with the cause of the individual’s action where that cause is 
voluntary and within the individual’s control. This third-party judgment is important to Aristotle, 
and its importance focuses on the example that the individual exhibits to the community where 
again his definition of virtue includes the mean as determined—and exhibited—by the person of 
practical wisdom who then is the example of the ideal.  
Aristotle also holds that it is not only the act, as in the case of incontinence, that is 
blameworthy, but it is also the struggle against improper desires as in the case of continence that 
is blameworthy. Practical wisdom should control all choices, and where practical wisdom is 
involved, there should be no struggle because, as Aristotle states, practical wisdom is the strongest 
of all states, and as a result, the individual who has it should have the other virtues as well. (Ross, 
p.120 (1146a3-6)) Again, this does not seem to be the state of affairs in this twenty-first century.   
The specific qualities of continency and incontinency are reviewed individually below but 
their difference is first summarized. Aristotle explains the fundamental differences as follows: 
"[T]he incontinent man, knowing that what he does is bad, does it as a result of passion, a part of 
appetite, while the continent man, also knowing that his appetites are bad, refuses on account of 
his rational principle to follow them."  (Ross, p.119 (1145b12-14))  That rational principle of 
refusal seems to originate in the sense or the feeling of a motivator that includes anticipated 
feelings like shame. In other words, the incontinent person recognizes that his/her appetites are not 
good and that there may be regret or something similar later but he/she still acts badly because of 
appetite that is the cause of incontinency.  
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The continent person on the other hand recognizes that her/his appetites are bad but refuses 
to follow those appetites and act in that manner because of his rational principle and a motivator. 
The virtuous temperate person has good appetites and follows them because of her/his virtuous 
rational principle and her/his recollection of the motivator (which he does not need but remembers) 
while the vicious person does not even recognize that his appetites are bad and follows them with 
no regret.  
Consequently, all humans by definition have human appetites and, at least on occasion, 
will fall into the continent, incontinent or possibly vicious state, but hopefully into the continent 
state while constantly striving for the virtuous state that then produces happiness and flourishing. 
 (1) Continency features 
 The continent person struggles with his/her appetite but does the right thing as reason 
dictates and the motivator emphasizes. Aristotle uses the temperate person to explain continency 
and states that the temperate person cannot be continent because that person “will have neither 
excessive nor bad appetites” which the continent person “must” have to conform to the definition. 
(Ross, p.120 (1146a10-16))  Aristotle states that the temperate individual will never be described 
as continent nor the continent individual as temperate.  
He also states that continence and incontinence are “not badness but only analogous to it… 
.” (Ross, p.126 (1148b8-12))  He states that both states “are concerned with bodily appetites and 
pleasures” but there are differences, of course, between those two states. (Ross, p.129 (1149b26))  
What separates the continent individual from the virtuous temperate person is then the struggle 
with her/his appetites that is resolved by reason and the motivator. The continent person struggles 
with his/her appetite but is motivated to do the right thing that reason dictates. In further 
differentiating the continent person from the virtuous temperate person, Aristotle states that the 
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virtuous person has no struggle with the desiring element and, though the virtuous person 
recognizes that element, the virtuous person has no difficulty in rejecting the desiring element. 
(Ross, p.138 (1153a35)) 
After explaining what he understands as the present general concept of continent (and 
incontinent) individuals, he then proceeds to explain how he perceives those two states of character 
in respect to the virtuous state and the vicious state. He begins by indicating that names such as 
continence and incontinence are applied analogically and it is by that means that it has become 
common, for example, to speak of the “continence” of the temperate individual. He indicates that 
both the continent individual and the temperate individual will do nothing contrary to reason for 
the sake of bodily pleasure. Aristotle further describes the differences between the continent 
individual and the virtuous temperate individual as follows: 
[B]oth the continent man and the temperate man are such as to do nothing contrary 
to reason for the sake of the bodily pleasures, but the former has and the latter has 
not bad appetites, and the latter is such as not to feel pleasure contrary to reason, 
while the former is such as to feel pleasure but not to be led by it.  
 
(Ross, p.134 (1151b34-1152a7))  The difference between them is, of course, that “[the continent 
individual] has and the [temperate individual] has not bad appetites, and the [temperate person] is 
such as not to feel pleasure contrary to reason, while the [continent individual] is such as to feel 
pleasure [contrary to reason] but not to be led by it.” (Ross, p.134 (1152a1-7)) 
 Concerning pleasures, Aristotle states that “A temperate man avoids pleasures.” (Ross, p. 
135 (1152b13-14)) but the temperate individual does have “pleasures of his own”. (Ross, p.138 
(1153a35)) Aristotle further suggests that there is both disgraceful pleasure and acceptable 
pleasure. He gives an example of acceptable pleasure as an individual who refused to lie for the 
sake of a noble pleasure; therefore, Aristotle states not everyone who does something for pleasure 
is self-indulgent, bad or incontinent but only that person who does something for a “disgraceful 
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pleasure”. A disgraceful pleasure would seem to be something like greed, avarice or an improper 
sexual relationship.  
Considering pleasure generally, Aristotle states that “for most men their pleasures are in 
conflict with one another because these are not by nature pleasant.” However, for people who are 
“the lovers of what is noble find pleasant the things that are by nature pleasant; and virtuous actions 
are such … .” In addition, these people have “no further need of pleasure as a sort of adventitious 
charm” but find pleasure in life itself. Aristotle concludes that “happiness then is the best, noblest, 
and most pleasant thing in the world.” (Ross, p.14 (1099a12-25)) In any event, throughout Book 
VII, Aristotle clearly wants to convey the idea that the incontinent person is aware of the moral 
conclusion, using Aristotle’s example, of “do not eat this” but decides against that result because 
of appetite and consumes the sweet food. Finally, Aristotle states “there is no one thing that is 
always pleasant … .” (Ross, p.140 (1154b22)) Circumstances make a difference. 
Aristotle states: “Now if continence is good, both the contrary states must be bad, as they 
actually appear to be; but because the other extreme is seen in few people and seldom, as 
temperance is thought to be contrary only to self-indulgence, so is continence to incontinence 
thought to be contrary only to incontinence.” (Ross, p.133 (1151b29-33))  Brown explains as 
follows: “[T]he alleged (rare) fault is one in which a person has a correct belief about the 
appropriate pleasures to enjoy, but falls short in such enjoyment through a failing opposed to 
incontinence.” (Ross, Brown, p.250) Because incontinence is giving in to inappropriate pleasures, 
this failing opposed to incontinence must be failing to enjoy the appropriate pleasures without 
struggle even though the individual recognizes that they are appropriate.   
This seems to suggest that an individual who has “a correct belief about enjoying the 
appropriate pleasures” but refuses to enjoy them, has this “alleged (rare) fault” through which the 
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individual “falls short in such enjoyment” or experiencing those appropriate pleasures “through a 
failing opposed to incontinence”. Now this failing “opposed to incontinence” is not continence 
because the continent person could still struggle to correctly enjoy those bodily pleasures. This 
failing would seem to be similar to the opposite of self-indulgence or the deficiency of temperance 
and would, in fact, seem be a rare fault.  
Aristotle comments on this rare individual who “takes less delight than he should in bodily 
things and does not abide by reason” in making the decision to avoid acceptable pleasure and who 
is unnamed. Aristotle goes on to say that “[the individual] who is intermediate between [that 
individual who takes less than the appropriate amount of delight/pleasure in bodily things] and the 
incontinent man [who takes more than the appropriate amount of delight/pleasure in bodily things] 
is the continent man.” Consequently, the continent man does finally take the right amount of 
delight in bodily pleasures but still struggles with that choice. Aristotle explains the reason being 
“the continent man abides by reason and does not change on either account [of deciding on too 
little or too much of the bodily pleasures but apparently still struggles].” (Ross, p.133 (1151b22-
32))  
Aristotle describes the fall into incontinency with regard to pleasures and pains as follows:  
“not all of them, and not so much with regard to the pains—the mean is temperance, the excess 
self-indulgence. Persons deficient with regard to the pleasures are not often found; hence such 
persons also have received no name but let us call them ‘insensible.’” (Ross, p.32 (1107b4-8)) 
Here Brown comments: “Aristotle is prepared to invent a name where common usage has not 
marked off a given vice (or virtue, cf. 1107b30 on ambition, 1108a5 on ‘good-temper’). In this he 
is going beyond the mere codifying of current moral views.” (Ross, Brown, p.216)  Just as Aristotle 
felt justified in inventing names for which current moral views did not have names, it is now 
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necessary with the advent of climate change to invent or suggest uncommon names for virtues 
such as “primility” or to otherwise modify present ethical theory to address the new circumstances 
involved in climate change. 
Pleasure described as delight in bodily things is recognized and experienced in the states 
of virtue, continence, incontinence and vice where the difference between those states in part 
results from distinguishing appropriate pleasure from inappropriate pleasure and may also include 
struggle for appropriate pleasure which does seem to occur infrequently. To know whether a 
pleasure is appropriate or inappropriate may not sometimes seem clear and, in that case, it would 
seem that Aristotle would suggest avoiding pleasures that are not clearly appropriate. The 
mechanism for distinguishing though would seem to be what the virtues have to offer in support 
of pleasures.   
There would seem to be times when every individual struggles against the bodily pleasures 
before being able to discard appetitive “reasoning” and use right reason to make the right choice. 
The individual can focus excessively on those pleasures and, consequently, fall into the incontinent 
or vicious classification. Today and regarding climate change, most people seem to fall, most of 
the time, into the incontinent classification (at least) because of acting toward inappropriate 
excessive pleasure, for example, through the inappropriate excessive use of fossil fuel energy and 
through the refusal to curtail that use. 
In summary, the continent person follows the reasonable choice but her/his struggle is still 
blameworthy because the virtuous temperate person acts without struggle. Also, as a result of the 
struggle, the continent person may fall back into incontinency. 
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 (2) Incontinency features 
The incontinent person also knows that her/his appetites are bad but follows those appetites 
notwithstanding because of passion/appetite and against his/her reasoned principles and the 
motivator through which he/she calls to mind those reasoned principles. As argued below, it is the 
incontinent person who should be attempting to become the continent person and it is the 
incontinent person who is at the very heart of the cause of climate change.121 
Aristotle focuses more on incontinence than continence because the incontinent individual 
while recognizing good action, engages in bad action. Aristotle points out that Socrates did not 
admit the existence of incontinence because Socrates argued that incontinence was only the result 
of an individual’s ignorance and neither reason nor knowledge is present with ignorance. Socrates 
argued that no one acts against what seems to be the better course—no one would proceed with 
action Y knowing that action X is better. In Book VII of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle argues 
that, in fact, the incontinent person recognizes that action X is better but still precedes with action 
Y. In order to characterize the incontinent person, Aristotle compares that person with the self-
indulgent person who represents the excessive vice of the virtue of temperance: “[T]he incontinent 
and the self-indulgent man are also like one another; [but] they are different, but both pursue bodily 
pleasures - the latter, however, also thinking that he should do so while the former does not think 
this.” (Ross, p.134 (1151b34-1152a7)) The self-indulgent person thinks/believes that he should 
pursue excessive bodily pleasures while the incontinent person does not think/believe that he 
should pursue those pleasures but allows appetite to move him/her toward the excessive pleasure. 
      
121 An early example of the state of incontinency is given by Paul the Apostle: “I do not understand my own actions. 
For I do not do what I want, but do the very thing I hate.” (Romans 7:15. The New Oxford Annotated Bible, Fully 
Revised Fourth Edition, ed. M.C. Coogan (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 2010) p.1986) Thanks to Dr. 
Richard Lamborn for this example. 
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Specifically, about incontinence, Aristotle declares that no individual can have the virtue 
of practical wisdom and be incontinent at the same time “for it has been shown that a man is at the 
same time practically wise, and good in respect of character.” (Ross, p.134 (1152a7-9))  He further 
states an individual “has practical wisdom not by knowing only but by being able to act; but the 
incontinent man is unable to act… .” (Ross, p.134 ((1152a5-10))  
Amelie Oksenberg Rorty edited the book Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics (Los Angeles, 
California: University of California Press, Ltd., 1980) and contributed an essay, “Akrasia and 
Pleasure: Nicomachean Ethics Book 7,” to that book. While the Greek word akrasia is generally 
translated as “incontinence,” Rorty relates in a footnote that it has “unacceptable connotations” 
which she does not further identify but which seem to involve the present common meaning of 
that word as being unable to control certain bodily functions rather than Aristotle’s incontinence 
which involves the inability to control all bodily functions required to enact the conclusion of a  
moral syllogism. She states that “psychological weakness and powerlessness are more appropriate 
but both are too broad.” (Rorty, p.283fn1)  However, if Ross, Terence Irwin and Douglas Cairns 
willingly translate akrasia as incontinence, it seems that it easily can include psychological 
weakness and powerlessness at least to bodily pleasures. Consequently, Rorty simply uses the 
word akrasia and refers to such an individual as the, or an, akrates. While Rorty’s exegesis about 
incontinence which follows is eminently accurate and consequently very useful in this discussion 
of climate change, her use of the word akrasia is not as serviceable concerning climate change as 
is the word incontinence as is reviewed after the following review of Rorty’s exegesis. 
 Rorty agrees that the bad person, the self-indulgent person, and the akrates are all capable 
of voluntary and deliberate action. (Rorty, p.271; Ross, p.46-49 (1113b3-1115a3)  But the akrates 
is, however, not a bad person, but is a weak person whereas the self-indulgent person is bad as a 
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matter of principle. Also, the self-indulgent person is misled by pleasure because she/he is possibly 
even unaware of the good but today in regard to climate change no individual who reads a 
newspaper or gets news from the internet or from television can remain unaware or ignorant of 
climate change.  
The akrates, in comparison to the phronimos (the person with practical wisdom), has to 
use knowledge in the resistance of improper pleasures. Therefore, in deciding on action, the 
akrates is conflicted where the phronimos is not. The akrates is moved by passion that Rorty says 
is primarily outside oneself, and results in his/her will’s reaction instead of action. (Rorty, p.275)  
She further states that the akrates can “come to pursue pleasure as his end, treating his action as 
merely what he does toward that end [of pleasure]. Such a person is prone to the sorts of errors 
that arise from merely reacting to particular situations, forgetting how the point of his enterprises 
reflects its more general ends.” (Rorty, p.277) This forgotten point, of course, indicates that our 
enterprises may easily become other than moral and may display a purpose of nothing more than 
personal pleasure. 
Characterizing Aristotle’s position, she states “Against hedonists he argues that because 
pleasure is ingredient in and not product of activities, it cannot be evaluated or measured 
independently of the worth of the activity.” (Rorty, p.278)  She then characterizes the akrates as 
having “a kind of ignorance, an ignorance of the real pleasures of what one does”. (Rorty, p.278) 
This “kind of ignorance” however does not seem to be ignorance of the specifics of an action 
undertaken but ignorance of the psychological need to find pleasure in the end result of an action. 
Rorty comments on that “kind of ignorance” as a failure of character of the akrates:  
That he has the wrong sorts of reactions, or that he acts from his reactions, or that 
he tends to place himself in the sorts of situations in conditions where he will 
predictably misperceive his pleasures and act from those misperceptions is a failure 
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of character. He has habits that give his pathe [passions] undue dominance in the 
determination of his actions.  
 
(Emphasis added: Rorty, p.279) Rorty’s statement of failure of character recognizes Aristotle’s 
categorizing both continence and incontinence as states of character.  
 She continues to explain why these failures of character make the akrates blameworthy.  
His character is a result of his constitution, his early education, the habits he 
developed almost before he knew that they were habits. It is, I think, important 
to realize that Aristotle’s attitude toward the issues of responsibility is primarily a 
practical one: he is interested in determining what type of person can be given 
responsibility to investigate the conditions for thoughtful action … . Few are 
endowed with the constitution, have the capacities or the good fortune to 
receive the early education that assures the sort of character that is capable of 
determining itself. Such people are not, among other things, capable of 
realizing the formative power of their habits, especially their habits of 
pleasure. 
 
(Emphasis in original in italics; emphasis added bolded: Rorty, p.279-80) While those last 
individuals seem to exist on Earth and specifically in the United States as a majority, they seem to 
be refusing appropriate psychology when the individual today should have increasingly more 
control of his/her constitution than ever due to the availability of educational experience and 
opportunity. Still, they seem to represent a majority because of society’s general bad ends of 
focusing on pleasure and accumulation of wealth that is presently accepted as the best route to 
pleasure when it is probably one of the worst. 
 Rorty concludes that “if one is the sort of person whose character is capable of self-
determination, then one is responsible for having the sort of character one develops, because one 
has, by hypothesis, the sorts of character traits that can determine the ends one adopts and how one 
acts from them (1114a30-1114b26).” (Emphasis added; Rorty, p.280; Ross, p.47-48 (1114a30-
1114b26))  Today, if not all then most, human beings in first world countries seem to have the 
tools for self-determination, and consequently, those human beings should be responsible for their 
own constitution and character. That includes most all human beings in the United States, Canada, 
 150 
  
Europe, Australia and growing numbers in countries like China and India. Most of these 
individuals are clearly responsible for their character, but many seem to refuse to take that 
responsibility and, in addition, are willing to blame others for their irresponsibility if they even 
consider responsibility. 
She explains the basis for people refusing to take responsibility. Citing Aristotle, she states 
“Aristotle differs from Socrates in his diagnosis of the causes of the akratics’ ignorance: he 
emphasizes the character-sources of the akratic condition, viewing it as resting on badly formed 
habits concerning pleasures.” (Rorty, p.281)  She notes that Aristotle especially counsels against 
a focus on pleasures and against some activities that are viewed as pleasurable. Further, she 
characterizes Aristotle as follows:  
While the pleasures of natural activities are, or can be, intrinsically good, a person 
who attends primarily to the activity as pleasurable will tend to separate out the 
pleasurable in the activity from the activity itself. He will come to value the activity 
for its pleasure instead of seeing the pleasure as dependent on the character of the 
activity. Even the best of men runs the danger of akrasia under those circumstances.  
 
(Rorty, p.282) This seems to be the description of the concept of pleasure in the United States 
when one considers how much time is spent in viewing spectator sports, violent films and 
television programs and other spectator activities generally. Those activities seem valued for their 
pleasure rather than the character, the moral character, of the activity itself.  
 While she does not reference Hume, Bentham, or Kant, she counsels as follows:  
Aristotle might equally have warned the virtuous not to focus too much on the way 
their virtues empower them, or assure them with self-esteem, not to focus too 
closely on the ways in which the virtues work to make life conventionally 
successful and the virtuous self-respecting. Such a focusing would run the danger 
that the person might come to be primarily motivated by these considerations 
rather than see the extent to which they are dependent on the character of 
virtuous activity. The virtuous are no more virtuous for the sake of self-respect 
than they are for the sake of pleasure. 
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(Emphasis added; Rorty, p.283) Rorty recognizes the need for appropriate motivation and 
recognizes that the motivations of a conventionally successful life and virtuous self-respect are not 
appropriate Aristotelian motivations. Hume, of course, concluded that the basic reason individuals 
seek the virtues is for personal advantage and Kant, apparently in response to Hume, indicated 
that, without a good will, personal advantage could be the basis for pursuing a virtuous life. Rorty 
does not, however, suggest appropriate motivation apparently other than virtuosity itself and does 
not seem to suggest anything specific other than personal conflict and regretting the results of 
incontinent action.  
[Aristotle’s] akrates is precisely the sort of person who is conflicted because his 
moral development is uneven. His knowledge of general principles is at a different 
level of actualization from his habits of perception and his habits of action. Because 
even general knowledge of practical principles is expressed in a tendency to action, 
the akrates will be conflicted: he regrets what he has done … . 
 
(Rorty, p.282-283; Ross, p.131 (1150b28-30)) If regret is required, then possibly there are not 
many akrates in the United States today. It may be that regret comes later because the full effect 
of our actions today, for example concerning climate change, are delayed to the extent that they 
reflect at least a careless attitude in our regard for posterity. While personal conflict and regret can 
motivate, this dissertation suggests that Aristotle was rather specific in regard to the appropriate 
motivator.  
 Also, in defense of Aristotle as against personal advantage as a motivator, he was explicit 
about the importance of the polis as the province and function of the individual. For example, in 
the Politics, Aristotle calls the citizen “a member of a community” where the salvation of the 
community is the “salvation” and “common business” of all of its citizens. (Everson, p.65 
(1276b17-30); see also p.31 (1261a15-25))  Aristotle cannot be read without recognizing the polis 
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as of primary importance to both Aristotle and his individual citizen and especially to his 
phronimos.  
 Further and back to the last above Rorty quote, over the last six decades in the United 
States, it is very difficult to conclude other than that moral development has been uneven as argued 
in Chapter 3 of this dissertation. Therefore, incontinence (and worse) is alive and well and living 
in the United States and elsewhere. But Aristotle reminds us that “incontinence is not vice (though 
perhaps it is so in a qualified sense); for incontinence is contrary to choice while vice is in 
accordance with [unreasonable] choice … .” (Ross, p.131 (1151a5-7))  Consequently, emphasis 
on an appropriate motivator seems fruitful as argued below. 
Rorty sheds light on the difference between Socrates’ diagnosis of the causes of the akrates 
ignorance and Aristotle’s diagnosis:  
Socrates had to direct his account largely to those who had to be persuaded of the 
central role of knowledge in virtuous action, while Aristotle—in the position of 
being able to take those arguments for granted—could concentrate on arguments 
against the Academy and against hedonists.   
 
(Rorty, p.281)  At the very least, this position is a reasonable explanation of the differences 
between Socrates’ world and Aristotle’s world. Further, she explains the significant differences 
that exist in Aristotle’s accounts of pleasure in Book 10 and Book 7 of the Nicomachean Ethics:  
It is true that the analysis of pleasure in Book 10 introduces considerations not 
mentioned in Book 7. But the issues at stake in the two discussions are quite 
different. In Book 7, in the context of a discussion of varieties of wrongdoing, we 
are given an account of how (despite its being a good) pleasure can mislead a person 
into forgetting what he knows. The account of pleasure in Book 7 appears as part 
of a discussion of the sources of akrasia. But in Book 10 Aristotle must make good 
his claim that the virtuous life assures not only Aristotelian eudaimonia but also the 
goods associated with traditional eudaimonia. Indeed, he wants to go further, to 
show how his analysis of happiness and virtue explain the plausibility of the 
traditional account (1098B22-30).  
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(Rorty, p.281-282) Akrasia can and does mislead but pleasure—appropriate pleasure—is 
functionally necessary to human life. Akrasia seems not so much the individual’s forgetfulness as 
it is “being led about like a slave” by pleasure when we should be led by reason. While reason and 
pleasure can be simultaneously experienced, pleasure can convert the appetitive alternative into 
unconditionality and destroy regard for the reasonable choice where we are fully aware of both the 
reasonable choice and what we consider to be the pleasurable alternative. The difference also 
seems to be exactly what Rorty is explaining, the separation of pleasure/leisure from the value—
the moral value—of the activity, the action itself. 
Rorty does reference the idea of being “dragged like a slave” in her essay.122 She states: 
“Aristotle’s diagnosis of the sources of akratic ignorance picks up one strand in the Socratic 
description of the phenomena: that the person is led by [passion or appetite] like a slave, dragged 
around by (the thought of) pleasure.” (Rorty, p.268)  She continues: “While the akrates has the 
right theoretical attitudes toward pleasures, he does suffer a weakness for them. … .  What then is 
it for the akrates to be diverted from his use of his knowledge, being dragged around by [passion 
or appetite]?”  
She then explains why the akrates allows him/herself to be thus dragged: “The primary 
way that a person can go wrong about the pleasures of necessary activities is to pursue them to 
excess or—what is, in view of the motivational force of pleasure, rare—to fail to pursue them 
sufficiently.” (Rorty, p.276) “It is the manner of his reactions to pleasures that misleads the akrates: 
he acts from his reactions to what is before him, perceiving—misperceiving—what he does in 
      
122 We are dragged about like slaves (Ross, p.119(1145b25)); "being utterly dragged around by all these other things 
as if it were a slave,"—Plato, Protagoras, in Plato Complete Works, ed. JM Cooper (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1997), p.782 (352b and c) herein referenced as "Plato, p.__." 
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terms of its pleasurable effects on him rather than seeing his situation, and his actions in it, as 
defined by his proper intentional ends.” (Rorty, p.277) As an example, Rorty states:  
Someone can forget that the real point of eating is to be well-nourished, and though 
he knows generally that granola is more nourishing than sweets he forgets and feeds 
himself on sweets. He need not gorge himself on sweets; he need not eat more than 
the well-nourished person; indeed, he may eat quantitatively less than the person 
who eats properly. But when sweets are set before him, he forgets the proper 
pleasure of eating and concentrates on the pleasures of certain sorts of tastes rather 
than on the well-being that is the proper pleasure of nourishment (1152b26-
1153a23; 1173b20-1171a1). 
 
(Rorty, p.276-277)  In most cases however, the akratic person does seem to eat quantitatively more, 
for example, rich and fatty foods, and does at times gorge herself/himself to the extent of improper 
eating habits that result in the unhealthy condition of being overweight. The akratic person may 
forget the problems associated with being overweight but forgetfulness lasts only during the time 
that she/he is consuming the excessive quantity of the food involved. Or the akratic person may 
not be forgetful but just overwhelmed by his appetite as suggested in Chapter 3 of Book VII and 
possibly regretful later. Whether the akrates forgets or is overwhelmed as Rorty suggests, this 
indicates a difference in kind rather than in degree which is further discussed following the next 
paragraph below. 
 As Rorty points out: “Besides [Aristotle’s] standard dialectical courtesy, the reasons for 
[his comments on pleasure] are that the object of inquiry in the [Nicomachean] Ethics is, as he 
says, to determine how to become good [as that word is defined therein] and not merely to know, 
theoretically, what virtue is (1103b27-31).” (Rorty, p.282)  In terms of Aristotle’s object, emphasis 
on motivation seems critical and is addressed in Chapter 8 below. 
 As indicated above and concerning serviceability in relation to climate change, the word 
incontinency seems necessary. The Greek word akrasia is certainly appropriate but it is unknown. 
The word incontinence is much more widely known and can be found designating certain aisles in 
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pharmacies. Further, concerning climate change, the connotation associated with incontinence is 
the inability to dispose of wastes appropriately. This is the basic problem involved with climate 
change and is especially manifest in humanity’s inability to dispose of CO2 appropriately. 
 There are two issues concerning incontinence as the correct word to use for the state of 
character that Aristotle describes. The first issue is whether incontinence is an appropriate word 
that still conveys the correct meaning that Aristotle intended while the second issue is whether it 
is a word of kind or a word of degree. The first issue is obvious while the second issue is important 
because differences of kind are more easily addressed and understood than words of degree where 
the degree aspect lends itself toward individual subjective decisions where the agent can decide 
against a given concept based on the agents view of a possible degree involved. 
 Rorty, of course, is an example of the first issue. Rorty again in her footnote number one 
explains her position concerning the word “incontinence” which she describes in part as follows: 
“Incontinence also has unacceptable connotations.” (Rorty, p. 283)  While she does not otherwise 
explain the unacceptable connotations, they seem clearly to result from the present dictionary 
definition that regards the inability to regulate the body’s ability to eliminate its wastes. Again, 
this definition by analogy directly defines climate change. Aristotle, however, uses the word in a 
much larger sense to describe the inability of an individual to regulate his/her mental and bodily 
abilities to act virtuously and not viciously. Also, as the word is used presently, incontinence 
implies something offensive if not repulsive and it, therefore, seems appropriate for the inability 
to acknowledge climate change and the need for adaptation and mitigation.  
 Again, its present meaning having to do with waste materials is directly appropriate for 
climate change which results from the refusal and unwillingness of the majority of United States’ 
citizens to even attempt to control its fossil fuel waste of CO2 which is a primary cause of climate 
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change. Therefore, the word incontinent appropriately describes a huge concern for the failure to 
appropriately regulate wastes. Consequently, incontinence is offered as an appropriate and apt 
description of especially the United States’ inability and unwillingness to realistically address 
climate change. 
 The second issue of whether incontinence describes a state of kind or a state of degree 
needs to be resolved in favor of a state of kind. In Byron Williston’s book, The Anthropocene 
Project: Virtue in the Age of Climate Change, he describes the concept of incontinence as “moral 
weakness” where weakness is a word of degree because the condition of being weak is a matter of 
more or less. An individual can be weak in the sense that a two-year-old child cannot lift the 
average weight that a twenty-five-year-old person can lift. The difficulty arises from the inability 
to closely describe the idea of weakness in other than a comparative manner. Aristotle’s 
incontinence, however, must be described in terms of the ability to determine the moral and 
immoral alternatives involved in a set of circumstances and then adopt the immoral alternative. 
 One can argue at length about the state of an individual necessary to make that judgment 
but Aristotle’s state of incontinence requires that judgment and the adoption of other than the moral 
alternative. In describing the difference between incontinence and vice, again Aristotle states: “For 
the [self-indulgent and vicious agent] is led on in accordance with his own choice, thinking that he 
should always pursue the present pleasure; while the [incontinent agent] does not think so, but yet 
pursues it.” (Ross, p. 121-22 (1146b22-24)) Importantly, a state of kind is much more easily 
defined and, therefore, adopted than a state of degree. It seems that an agent can more easily 
describe himself/herself as relatively morally strong than to assess a set of circumstances and with 
struggle choose the moral alternative.  
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 Williston’s book is an excellent exposition of the anthropocene problem and project but 
could be stronger through the use of the word incontinent rather than moral weakness. Williston 
recognizes the common translation of the Aristotelian state of incontinence as indicated by Note 8 
on page 178 and explains continence and incontinence correctly on page 81 as follows: “The strong 
[continent] have to fight contrary-to-virtue impulses and desires in order to do the right thing, but 
always manage to do so. The weak [incontinent] undergo the same internal struggle, but always 
succumb to the wayward impulse or desire.” Here, Williston uses the word “always” which 
arguably relates to a difference in kind about the circumstances involved. He then describes the 
difference between “the weak” and “the vicious” as the failure of the former of “proper self-
constitution” while of the latter fail “to recognize the authority of external moral standards”. He 
continues as follows: 
In the [weak case], the main problem is likely to be volitional while in the [vicious 
case] it is likely moral-epistemic. And note that we need to know quite a bit about 
an agent to decide which of these criticisms applies to her in cases of moral failure.  
 
(Williston, 2015; p. 81)  He argues that we need to know “quite a bit” about the agent in order to 
determine the level of weakness. Whereas, through the use of the word, incontinent, the observer 
knowing the circumstances and the action chosen, can make the judgment about the action without 
knowing much about the agent. Also, here Williston seems to acknowledge the degree problem 
when he uses the words “likely”. 
 The Greek word for incontinence is “ἀκρασία” which is transliterated as “akrasia” and the 
person that exhibits this characteristic is an akrates. While the Greek word for continence is 
ἐγκράτεια  that is transliterated as “enkrateia”, the person that exhibits this character state is an 
enkrates [ἐγκράτειαν]. The question arises of whether the term incontinent applies to a specific act 
of an individual or to the individual generally. Aristotle specifically states: “No one has all the 
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forms of incontinence, but we say some people are incontinent without qualification.” (Emphasis 
added; Ross, p.121 (1146b4-5))  While Aristotle recognizes that in practice some do refer to 
individuals as incontinent without qualification, he clarifies by stating that incontinence and 
continence are concerned “with the same objects as temperance and self-indulgence” and 
incontinence is qualified as to particular passions such as anger or other goods such as wealth, 
gain, victory, and honour which can be desired to excess.  
Consequently, it seems that Aristotle’s states of character of virtue, continence, 
incontinence and vice do not apply to an individual generally but to particular actions of that 
individual. Further, as Aristotle defines the states of continence and incontinence in Chapter 7 of 
the Nicomachean Ethics, those states apply to individual actions and sets of circumstances. As a 
result, these states are of the kind genre and are not states of degree. Because Socrates questioned 
the very existence of incontinence, the Aristotelian possibility of incontinency is reviewed.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
 (3) How is incontinency possible 
Socrates argued that no person knowingly acts contrary to reason and if any person did act 
in that way, they would be acting from lack of knowledge/ignorance and thus there is no such thing 
as incontinency. In Book VII, Chapter 3, Aristotle acknowledges Socrates’ position but argues that 
the lack of knowledge or ignorance is not the basic cause of incontinency because the agent does 
recognize the reasonable moral choice but acts against this choice through appetite/desire. Again, 
additional references to Aristotle’s text and, in this regard, the thoughts of another commentator, 
Sarah Broadie, are very helpful.  
Aristotle states that the reasoning part of the soul is divided into two parts: a part that 
reasons—the intellect—and a second part—appetite/desire that does not reason but reacts to and 
obeys the first part. Further, Aristotle argues that it is appetite/desire that can cause the individual 
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to reject his knowledge that virtue and not vice is the best route to eudaimonia. Apparently to 
emphasize this concept, Aristotle uses the word and the action of “choice” as a positive concept 
such that for Aristotle, choice generally recognizes the virtuous action or alternative to a given set 
of circumstances.  
Thus, the virtuous individual and the continent individual “choose” the moral response to 
circumstances while the vicious individual and the incontinent individual accept or adopt the 
immoral response. The vicious individual and the incontinent individual for Aristotle do not 
“choose” the immoral response. In other words, “choice” is not a neutral word. Choice is an action 
through which the virtuous person attains virtue and remains virtuous. If an individual rejects the 
virtuous alternative in favor of the vicious alternative, Aristotle does not call that rejection a choice. 
However, in this age of climate change, attempting to narrowly define the word choice in this 
manner may not be the best approach and will be addressed later in this dissertation but while 
discussing Aristotle, the word “choice” is not neutral but is positive in terms of virtuosity.  
 Because both chosen moral continent actions and adopted appetitive incontinent actions 
involve desire and appetite, it is important to understand the nature of desire in both types of 
action. Desire, of course, can be both a noun and a verb while appetite is a noun. Sarah Broadie 
in her book Ethics With Aristotle123 investigates desire and its impact on human action and 
includes Chapters 5 (of the seven chapters of her book) on the topic of ‘Incontinence”. In that 
Chapter 5, she concentrates on Book VII of the Nicomachean Ethics which in the Ross translation 
is entitled “Continence and Incontinence: Pleasure”. Broadie’s Chapter 5 is of considerable value 
in understanding Aristotle’s incontinence especially concerning the syllogisms described in 
      
123 Sarah Broadie, Ethics With Aristotle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) herein referenced in text as “Broadie,  
p.__”. 
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Chapter 3 of Book VII. Because of their simplicity and the nature of the premises, these 
syllogisms are also considered useful in addressing climate change as argued below.  
 Because appetite and desire drive Aristotle’s incontinent individual to reject the moral 
syllogism and embrace the appetitive syllogism, Broadie begins with a discussion of the types of 
desire that Aristotle recognizes. She argues that Aristotle recognizes three kinds of desire. The 
first, which regards physical satisfactions and reliefs are grounded in the needs of our biological 
nature, i.e., the needs associated with food and sex. A second type regards desires for power, 
honour and many kinds of similar pleasures which are concerned specifically with the human 
enhancements of our animal substructure. The third kind, Broadie describes as desires whose 
satisfaction is neither a human enhancement nor needed for the physical well-being of the 
individual. She states that desires of the third kind are those “which [provide] the conditions of 
life in accordance with ‘second nature’ and reflective reason,” which she says humanity would 
be better off without. (Broadie, p.268)  While she gives no example of this third kind, it seems to 
be a kind that we would not consider carefully, and, because desires can always mean trouble for 
reasonability, the individual should consider each of her/his desires carefully. Any of those desires 
of the first two types can be associated with appetite.  
Broadie naturally notes that “Aristotle is concerned to distinguish incontinence from the 
vice which it most resembles namely, excessive devotion to physical comforts and pleasure.”124 
This distinction is important to Aristotle because his state of character of incontinence does provide 
the moral objective for the individual who then becomes aware of the difference between virtuous 
and vicious existence. The incontinent person becomes aware that he/she is giving in to physical 
appetite against his/her better judgment. (Broadie, p.268)  In reviewing Aristotle’s arguments 
      
124 "Vice" is giving in to physical appetite without Aristotle's concept of moral deliberation but with some apparent 
rationality. 
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about incontinence, Broadie particularly concentrates on Chapter 3 of Book VII which she states 
has generated considerable commentary. This chapter is reviewed at some length here because it 
can be thought to be obscure. Here, Aristotle is arguing against Socrates and Plato and their 
position that there is no such thing as incontinence. After stating “now this view plainly contradicts 
the apparent facts” (Ross, p.119 (1145b26-27)), Aristotle argues that there is incontinent behavior 
because the agent not only knows what he is doing but also knows what he should be doing but is 
not doing. 
After concluding that “no one has all the forms of incontinence,” Aristotle opens Chapter 
3 by stating that some of the present thoughts about incontinence “must be refuted and others left 
in possession of the field.” He then presents the questions to be investigated and initially considers 
the question of whether it is “true opinion and not knowledge against which we act incontinently.” 
He concludes that, concerning incontinence, there is no difference between the two and both can 
lead the individual into incontinence. He then considers what it means to “know” and first 
considers the difference between the sense of having knowledge but not using it and the sense of 
having knowledge and using it in the case of the incontinent person. Aristotle finds that the first 
sense is not “strange” but that the second sense is “strange” because how could that person be 
using that knowledge and yet acting against that knowledge? Recall Rorty’s explanation of the 
Socrates/Plato emphasis on knowledge where Aristotle could then use that foundation to argue for 
something beyond simple knowledge when addressing incontinence.  
Aristotle then considers a specific syllogism that includes a specific particular premise and 
questions whether a person who acts contrary to that syllogism “either has not or is not exercising” 
the knowledge of that premise. Aristotle concludes that “there will, then, be, firstly, an enormous 
difference between these manners of knowing” where the first would be “extraordinary” while the 
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second “way would not seem anything strange”. In both of these examples, Aristotle concludes 
that the action of the incontinent person requires knowledge of the entire moral syllogism of what 
he should be doing but is not doing. 
Aristotle next considers the possibilities “of having knowledge (in a sense) and yet not 
having it” where the person is “asleep, mad, or drunk”; or “under the influence of passions”; or 
using language in the manner as an actor would use it and offers the possible conclusion that 
“incontinent people must be said to be in a similar condition to men asleep, mad, or drunk.” As 
expected, he then argues against that position. 
In the sixth paragraph of Chapter 3 of Book VII of the Ross translation which begins 
“Again, we may also view the cause [of incontinency] as follows … .”, Aristotle presents the 
argument that the incontinent is acting with knowledge of what he should do but does not do. 
Throughout the entire corpus of his works and particularly in this Chapter 3, Aristotle uses the two 
types of premises, universal and particular, for syllogisms to explain the opposing arguments that 
both continent and incontinent individuals recognize in advance of acting. The “universal” premise 
has to do with basic bodily pleasures and comforts which provide universally familiar examples 
while the “particular” premise describes the particular object for consideration under the universal 
premise. Aristotle here provides the arguments from which Broadie constructs the following 
syllogisms.125 Because of the applicability of these syllogisms to climate change, the review of 
these syllogisms is important though somewhat lengthy. Broadie’s syllogisms are as follow: 
A. (U) Anything sweet is unhealthy  B. (U) Anything sweet is pleasant 
           and to be avoided in one’s diet   
      (P) This is sweet         (P) This is sweet 
      _________________________        ________________________ 
      (C) Refrain from eating this       (C) Eat this  
 
      
125 (Broadie, p.304) While Aristotle does not state the universal premise of the restraint, Broadie correctly suggests 
that it is “anything sweet is unhealthy and to be avoided in one’s diet.” 
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These two syllogisms seem to correctly relate Aristotle’s arguments found in that sixth paragraph 
of Chapter 3. Broadie’s A-argument generates the conclusion and the action that the person ought 
to do and, therefore, is what the continent person ultimately chooses while the B-argument is what 
the continent person struggles against and overcomes but what the incontinent person actually 
does. Thus, two practical arguments are involved. Broadie gives the following as her interpretation 
of Aristotle’s example. Her parts of his syllogism are labeled as follows: (U)—the universal 
premise, (P)—the particular premise, (C)—the conclusion. 
Aristotle’s statements of these arguments use the word “opinion” rather than “knowledge” 
apparently to convince his readers that there is no difference in the use of these two terms 
concerning incontinence. Aristotle’s statements are as follows: “[w]hen a single opinion [a 
conclusion] results from the two [a universal premise and a particular premise], the soul [the 
individual] must in one type of case affirm the conclusion, while in the case of opinions concerned 
with production it must immediately act … .”  Here, he says that any individual is generally 
confronted with two different “cases” when considering action. Aristotle states that in one case the 
individual “must affirm the conclusion” while in the other case if the opinions are “concerned with 
production,” that individual must “immediately act”.126 He provides the following example of the 
power of the appetite: “if ‘everything sweet ought to be tasted’, and ‘this is sweet’, in the sense of 
being one of the particular sweet things, the man who can act and is not restrained must at the 
same time actually act accordingly  … .” (Emphasis added; Ross, p.123 (1147a28-32))  
Using Aristotle’s two different cases, this portion of the sentence suggests two possible 
different cases/responses. First, affirmation apparently without physical action, or the A-argument 
and, second, with physical action, where Aristotle recognizes both the initial response of the 
      
126 Brown comments on Aristotle's use of the word "production" and states "probably Aristotle here contrasts 
theoretical with practical reasoning (despite using the word ‘productive’).” (Ross, Brown; p. 246) 
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continent individual and also the response of action of the incontinent individual. The continent 
individual affirms the conclusion of that argument, “taste this”, but struggles with that conclusion 
and through the restraint of reason (possibly through an additional motivator) rejects the B-
argument and embraces the A-argument (possibly through that motivator as well). However, the 
incontinent individual who is not restrained as the continent individual is, “acts immediately” and 
tastes/eats. 
Aristotle then continues that example and states: “When, then, … [a second] universal 
opinion is present in us restraining us from tasting [the A-argument], and there is also the [first] 
opinion [the B-argument] that ‘everything sweet is pleasant’[the universal premise], and that ‘this 
is sweet’ [the particular premise] … (now this is the opinion [the B-argument and its conclusion 
of “taste this/eat this”] that is active) … ”. Initially, Aristotle here acknowledges that the 
incontinent individual as well as the continent individual recognizes the restraint suggested by the 
moral conclusion of the A-argument and the response of “refrain from eating this/don’t taste this”, 
but, because the appetite is present with no motivator or a weak motivator, the individual is able 
to reject that restraint. Secondly, while Aristotle has changed the moral universal premise from 
“everything sweet ought to be tasted” to “everything sweet is pleasant,” he has merely changed 
the “ought to be” to the “is” of “pleasant” through which he has introduced the idea of “pleasure” 
as the basis of the “ought” which then becomes the mechanism through which the incontinent 
person avoids the restraint. Thirdly, he has identified the conclusion and action of the incontinent 
of apparently “taste this/eat this”.   
In stating that this is the “opinion” (entire argument/syllogism) that is “active”, Aristotle 
refers to this last opinion, the B-argument, and its conclusion of “taste this/eat this” that must be 
immediately enacted by the incontinent individual because of appetite and the failure of restraint. 
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(Ross, p.123 (1147a32-34)) If the agent is a temperate person, the universal opinion of the A-
argument controls the particular premise of “this is sweet” and the temperate person chooses not 
to eat the sweet thing because the conclusion of that A-syllogism is “do not eat this/do not taste 
this”. While the continent person arrives at the same controlling conclusion, the continent person 
struggles to reject the B-argument and its conclusion and succeeds. 
Aristotle explains this point as follows;  
[W]hen appetite happens to be present in us, the one opinion [the A-argument] bids 
us avoid this [the B-argument], but appetite leads us towards it [the B-argument] 
(for it can move each of our bodily parts), so that it turns out that a man behaves 
incontinently under the influence (in a sense) of reason and an opinion [the B-
argument], and of one not contrary in itself, but only incidentally—for the 
appetite is contrary, not the opinion [the B-argument]—to correct reason [the 
A-argument]. 
 
(Emphasis added; Ross, p.123 (1147a 32-b3))  Here Aristotle seems to say that if it were not for 
the A-argument, the B-argument would be acceptable under “correct reason” because that correct 
reason does not rule out pleasure since Aristotle clearly embraces some pleasure. 
 Broadie sheds needed light on Aristotle’s explanation of incontinence. Broadie argues that 
in the case of both the continent and the incontinent individual, the conclusions of the 
arguments/syllogisms are held conditionally such that the agent has the opportunity to reject or 
accept the conclusion of either argument. Further, for the agent to enact the conclusion of an 
argument/syllogism, the conclusion becomes unconditional because of the nature of the syllogism. 
She elaborates on Aristotle’s explanation of the cause of the agent following the B-
argument which is appetite and, according to Aristotle, not the B-argument itself. Broadie explains 
the effect of appetite as follows: 
The appetites and impulses, however, know nothing about holding a conclusion 
conditionally. Their objects are just what they are: drink, food, sweet things – [their 
objects are] not, drink (or food etc.) only if (for reasons having nothing to do with 
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these objects as they figure for the appetites) it is not better not. Thus when appetite 
is present, the conclusion [of “eat this”] is unconditional to that extent.  
 
(Emphasis in original; Broadie, p.304) Both the continent and the incontinent individual hold the 
A-argument conditionally subject to the consequent struggle or possible struggle.127 To explain 
the manner in which the B-argument becomes unconditional and, consequently, actionable, she 
continues: 
The appetites function in a way that by right should belong only to rational choice, 
since the dictates of rational choice are the only deservedly unconditional 
conclusions. There can be no conflict between some particular prescription of 
reason and any other option (however desirable in general) unless appetite is 
present to brutalize the latter [any other option] into unconditionality. This is 
the necessary condition for both incontinence and continence.  
 
(Emphasis added; Broadie, p.304-305)  Broadie is explaining Aristotle’s logic and requiring that 
a reasonable syllogism be unconditional because “the dictates of rational choice are the only 
deservedly unconditional conclusions” unless, as she puts it, appetite “brutalizes any other option” 
into unconditionality. This “brutalizing” takes place both in the continent person and in the 
incontinent person because it causes the struggle that the continent person experiences and to 
which the incontinent person yields. Before addressing the cause of this difference, the remainder 
of Chapter 3 is reviewed because it attempts to further explain Aristotle’s argument and also is 
believed to identify his concern for his audience. 
 Broadie rhetorically questions Aristotle’s decision to include the B-Argument, the 
argument upon which the incontinent seems to act. Broadie responds with two possibilities. First, 
while the B-argument is inappropriate, it still represents a voluntary action, and, therefore, the 
same kind that the incontinent refuses. Further, appetite has the power to move the needed parts of 
the body to action and to carry out the B-argument’s conclusion. (Ross, p.123 (1147a34-35)) 
      
127 Only unconditional conclusions are actionable. 
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Aristotle argues that the incontinent individual who chooses the B-argument not only knows that 
he is doing B but also knows that he is not doing A. Therefore, the B-argument is an extremely 
important part of the incontinent agent’s decision and must be considered, for example, when one 
elects to use fossil fuel energy (including electricity) improperly in regard to production of CO2.  
Second, Broadie argues that the universal B premise must seem “reasonable” to the 
individual if the individual completes the action. However, the (C) conclusion of the B-argument— 
and the action done by the incontinent individual—does not explain the individuals “being the 
agent of B under the circumstances, since this is due to appetite and an undisciplined character 
[and not reason]. But it is only because he is the agent of B that he acts incontinently.” (Emphasis 
added; Broadie, p.305) The B-argument cannot be reasonable because it is contrary to the 
reasonable universal premise of the A-argument and results from the appetite and undisciplined 
character of the B agent. Interestingly, Broadie specifically couples appetite with the undisciplined 
character of the agent that is present in both the continent state and the incontinent state. It is 
actually that undisciplined character of the continent agent that allows the appetite to engage the 
agent to consider the B-argument even though he/she ultimately chooses the A-argument’s 
conclusion. Character is important and it is a big deal. 
In the last sentence of the sixth paragraph, Aristotle reinforces his position by 
differentiating human animals from “lower animals”. He explains that “the lower animals are not 
incontinent, namely because they have no universal judgment [universal premise] but only 
imagination and memory of particulars.” It is reasoned knowledge and even reasoned opinion that 
provides the universal premise or judgment for humans and, consequently, they have the necessary 
apparatus not only for virtue and vice but for the states of continence and incontinence. 
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It is the seventh and last paragraph of Chapter 3 that seems to identify Aristotle’s concern 
for his audience who previously had only Socrates and Plato for reference to the important moral 
state of character of incontinence. Aristotle states:  
Now, the last premiss being an opinion about a perceptible object [and therefore 
the particular premise of “this is sweet”], and being also what determines our 
actions, this a man either has not when he is in the state of passion, or has it in the 
sense in which having knowledge did not mean knowing but only talking … [and] 
because the last term [”this is sweet”] is not universal nor equally an object of 
scientific knowledge with the universal term, the position that Socrates sought to 
establish actually seems to result … . 
 
(Ross, p.123-24 (1147b9-18)) Aristotle provides two thoughts about why Socrates’ position 
“seems to result”. Those thoughts are that a person either (1) does not have [that premise] when 
he is in a state of passion or (2) does have [that premise] “in the sense in which having knowledge 
does not mean knowing but only talking [as with actors on the stage]”. While Aristotle here seems 
to be undermining his own argument, his sentence continues as follows: “for it is not in the 
presence of what is thought to be knowledge proper that the passion occurs (nor is it this that is 
‘dragged about’ as a result of the passion), but in that of perceptual knowledge.” (Ross, p.124 
(1147b15-18))  “Perceptual knowledge” is something other than “knowledge proper”, and 
therefore apparently not what is necessary for a proper argument/syllogism.  
 Upon review, this is the only location within the Ross translation of the Nicomachean 
Ethics and also the only location within the Barnes “Complete Works”128 where the phrase 
“perceptual knowledge” is found. Consequently, this seventh paragraph of Chapter 3 seems to be 
an attempt on the part of Aristotle to give Socrates’ position some opportunity for face-saving. 
Aristotle’s audience previously had only the Socratic/Platonic interpretation and could not be 
      
128 Aristotle, The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, vol. I and II, ed. Jonathan Barnes 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984). 
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expected to immediately divorce themselves from that position, especially when Aristotle’s 
interpretation brought incontinence directly into their lives. Now, incontinency was no longer a 
product of ignorance but a product of knowledge and desire. Now doing what one ought not do 
became clearly blameworthy where it was not previously expressly blameworthy. 
Summarizing Aristotle thus far, in the situation where the universal opinion would restrain 
one from tasting and where the opinion of “everything sweet is pleasant” is challenging that 
universal opinion and it is clear that the item immediately before us is sweet, Aristotle states that 
when appetite is present and active in an individual, both the continent and the incontinent 
individual recognize that active appetite. In other words, where the universal opinion restrains a 
person who is not temperate, the active appetite attempts to lead us toward the sweet thing “(for 
[the appetite] can move each of our bodily parts).” (Ross, p.123 (1147a35))  Aristotle then observes 
that the involved individual who chooses to eat the sweet item “behaves incontinently under the 
influence (in a sense) of reason and an opinion, and of one not contrary in itself, but only 
incidentally—for the appetite is contrary, not the opinion—to correct reason.” (Ross, p.123 
(1147a34-1147b3) Therefore, it seems that the incontinent person does not act contrary to the B-
argument because that argument results in a seemingly reasonable conclusion unless it is 
challenged by a more reasonable syllogism. 
Aristotle concludes by stating that “it turns out that a man behaves incontinently under the 
influence (in a sense) of reason and an opinion, and of one not contrary in itself, but only 
incidentally—for the appetite is contrary not the opinion—to correct reason.” (Ross, p.123 
(1147a35-1147b3)) The word “opinion” seems to be the appetitive opinion of the B-argument and 
its conclusion of “taste this” where, with the appetite present and controlling, it was not chosen 
but the appetitive conclusion is adopted. Further, the phrase “(in a sense) of reason” in that last 
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quoted sentence seems to refer to apparent reason and not to correct reason. This appears to be 
the apparent reason from the “perceptual knowledge” referenced in the penultimate sentence of 
Chapter 3. Possibly, Aristotle felt that this text would both again involve Socrates/Plato and, in 
addition, make the audience question that position. Some additional thoughts of Aristotle and 
Broadie are useful. 
(4) Why continency and incontinency are important 
In the effort to address climate change and its necessary mitigation and adaptation, the use 
of the incontinency and continency concepts as included in present virtue ethical theory can 
encourage personal and governmental action toward that mitigation and adaptation. Both 
continency and incontinency are states of character that seem more easily changed than either of 
the states of virtue or vice. As states of character as defined by Aristotle, none of the four states 
are easily changed because they are the result of habituation and, therefore, have developed over 
time. However, Aristotle states that the incontinent individual “may be persuaded to change his 
mind” but with difficulty. (Ross, p.121 (1146a30-33))  Nonetheless, the incontinent mind seems 
to be able to be changed as easily as any of those four states. Its ability to change results from the 
incontinent individual’s understanding of both the A-argument and the B-argument that gives that 
individual the prospective needed for change. While that understanding seems necessary it does 
not seem sufficient but because of that necessity, the opportunity is worthy of close attention.  
Concerning that opportunity, it is evident that at present the major portion of society in the 
United States and in its governmental agencies are, at least, unwilling to meaningfully address and 
undertake the mitigation and adaptation actions needed and, therefore, that major portion can be 
considered incontinent relative to climate change and primarily because those people are unwilling 
to give up what they consider to be “pleasurable comforts”. Through reference to Aristotle’s ethical 
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explanation of incontinency, this dissertation reviews the circumstances through which an agent 
recognizes the moral choice of action, in this case, toward the mitigation of and adaptation to 
climate change but where that agent decides to avoid that choice through acceptance of the 
appetitive alternative and, therefore, the apparently “pleasurable” alternative of self-indulgence. 
Given that present attitude, the dissertation then attempts to identify mechanisms to encourage 
individuals to recognize their incontinency and move toward, at least, continency if not toward 
virtuosity. Those mechanisms must incorporate specific features or attributes. 
Initially, Aristotle requires that all moral actions and actions which adopt the appetitive 
alternative must be voluntary which Aristotle defines at some length primarily through his thoughts 
about involuntary action. After outlining the steps in proceeding from the recognition of moral 
ends to the means for chosen moral actions (i.e., wish, deliberation, choice, etc.), Aristotle initially 
states that “virtue … is in our own power and so too vice” (Ross, p.46 (1113b4-7)) when an action 
is voluntary. He defines involuntary action which begins with the concept of force which is 
conceived as the circumstances in which the individual finds himself/herself within the total power 
of another individual or group. Also, recognizing that ignorance might be claimed as a defense 
against inappropriate action, Aristotle details his concept of defensible ignorance where his 
thoughts have been adopted in the civil and criminal law of many, if not most, of today’s 
jurisdictions.  
He states that involuntary action as a result of ignorance “must be painful and involve 
regret” when, for example, the ignorance is of the circumstances or the end of the action.  (Ross, 
p. 41 (1111a19-20))  The pain and regret seem to occur after the agent has acted voluntarily against 
reason and when the agent ultimately recognizes the ignorance that was previously involved. 
Aristotle then explains that ignorance is punished if the agent is responsible for the ignorance as 
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in the case of drunkenness. He further states “we punish those who are ignorant of anything in the 
laws that they ought to know and that is not difficult, and so too in the case of anything else that 
they are thought to be ignorant of through carelessness; we assume that it is in their power not to 
be ignorant, since they have the power of taking care.” (Ross, p.47 (1113b35-1114a4))  He then 
considers individuals who do not take care and who  
by their slack lives [are] responsible for becoming men of that kind, and men are 
themselves responsible for being unjust or self-indulgent, in that they cheat or spend 
their time in drinking-bouts and the like; for it is activities exercised on particular 
objects that make the corresponding character. … Now not to know that it is from 
the exercise of activities on particular objects that states of character are 
produced is the mark of a thoroughly senseless person. … [I]t is irrational to 
suppose that the man who acts unjustly does not wish to be unjust or a man who 
acts self-indulgently to be self-indulgent. 
 
(Emphasis added: Ross, p.47 (1113b4-13))  Aristotle states: “when a man acts [unjustly] from 
choice, he is an unjust man and a vicious man.” (Emphasis in original; Ross, p.94 (1135b25-26))  
 Aristotle’s concept of “ignorance” excludes carelessness which seems to equate to our 
present concept of negligence. That concept also does not include a defense of irrationality to the 
extent that rational agents are responsible for becoming moral agents and cannot claim ignorance 
of the law where our present concept of due process has occurred—the agent has been given the 
opportunity to become knowledgeable. Consequently, the characterization of an agent as 
incontinent based on that agent’s actions must involve the determination that the actions were 
voluntary and, where any involuntary action is claimed, that claim is subjected to careful review 
of the involved circumstances. In the situation of climate change and with the publications of the 
IPCC, it seems that no individual within the United States can claim ignorance of its involved 
science or present and projected effects. 
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 (5) Discarding and avoiding incontinence 
Given the fact that the incontinent person can change, the mechanisms of acquiring the virtues and, 
therefore, the ability to act virtuously seems obviously key to leaving the state of incontinency (or worse 
the state of vice) and is also of critical importance in maintaining a life of continency or virtue. While 
Aristotle states that humans become virtuous by doing virtuous acts, he explains that it is not only the 
doing of virtuous acts that makes the agent virtuous. He specifically explains that one does not become just 
or temperate simply by doing acts of those types: 
The agent also must be in a certain condition when he does [virtuous acts]; in the 
first place he must have knowledge, secondly he must choose the acts, and choose 
them for their own sakes, and thirdly his action must proceed from a firm and 
unchangeable character. … Actions, then, are called just and temperate when they 
are such as the just or the temperate man would do; but it is not the man who does 
these that is just and temperate, but the man who also does them as just and 
temperate men do them. 
 
(Emphasis in original; Ross, p.27-28 (1105a30-1105b))  Virtuous persons then do virtuous acts 
having knowledge of the involved circumstances, choosing the act for its own sake and not for 
personal gain or advantage or for other unacceptable personal objectives, and through having a 
firm and unchangeable character from which the act precedes. The act itself is necessary but not 
sufficient because “without doing these [acts] no one would have even the prospect of becoming 
good.” (Ross, p.28 (1105b9-12)) 
 Aristotle then explains that “most people” do not do virtuous acts as the virtuous person 
would because of the failure of “most people” to comply with all three of the above three 
conditions and because: 
[M]ost people do not do [these acts of virtue] but take refuge in theory and think 
they are being philosophers and will become good in this way [simply by doing the 
acts], behaving somewhat like patients who listen attentively to their doctors, but 
do none of the things they are ordered to do. As the latter will not be made well in 
body by such a course of treatment, the former will not be made well in soul by 
such a course of philosophy. 
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(Ross, p.28 (1105b12-18))  While this analogy may not be directly applicable to climate change 
because the “patients” may not even be listening to science and “most people” may even be doing 
some minimal actions toward mitigation and adaptation, the analogy is applicable because neither 
the patients nor the people doing minimal virtuous actions are completing the necessary course of 
action through these necessary conditions to gain the state that can begin to adequately address 
climate change. 
 This then is one more statement of the difficulty of becoming virtuous and is one more 
statement of the condition of “most people” where those people are not acting for the act’s own 
sake and are not acting from “a firm and unchangeable character”. Consequently, not only 
Aristotle’s “most people” but most people today are not engaging in the struggle of the continent 
person who understands the need for those conditions and ultimately takes virtuous action. But the 
continent person is hopefully on the way to becoming virtuous because that person is doing the 
virtuous action. In addition, where those conditions are not present and the virtuous action is not 
taken but hopefully recognized, that person meets the definition of incontinency and can change. 
 It is however necessary to take a close look at the manner in which the incontinent 
individual acts. The incontinent agent, though recognizing the reasonable action, decides not to 
choose that action but to complete the alternative appetitive action because the latter action appears 
pleasurable. Because the agent recognizes the reasonable action, the incontinent agent needs a 
strategy for (1) using the ability to hold a conclusion conditionally and (2) focusing on that action 
and deliberating to the extent necessary to make the reasonable choice and reject the appetitive 
action. Again, this reasonable choice must be the mean or intermediate of the available alternatives 
if it is to be virtuous and, therefore, moral. The agent must have a strategy specifically for 
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recognizing and for making that choice of the moral alternative and for rejecting the appetitive 
alternative.  
This dissertation argues that that strategy involves at least four tactical measures. The first 
tactic regards a method (1) for recognizing the moral choice and the appetitive alternative, (2) of 
holding a conclusion conditionally and (3) then focusing and deliberating which should provide a 
clear recognition of the incontinence in the appetitive alternative. The fourth tactic is covered in 
the next chapter and regards the necessary motivator. 
In order to generate those methods of recognizing, holding, focusing, and deliberating, it 
seems important to understand the nature of seeking that reasonable choice and initially it is 
important to understand that it is not an easy activity. At the end of Book II, Aristotle discusses 
the difficulty of reaching the mean or intermediate. He further says that because “to hit the 
intermediate is hard in the extreme” (Ross, p.36 (1109a33-35)), we must work toward “a second-
best” and “must incline sometimes towards the excess, sometimes towards the deficiency; for so 
shall we most easily hit the intermediate and what is right.” (Ross, p.37 (1109b23-25)) 
Consequently, an observation—it would seem that among at least the four moral states of character 
of virtue, continence, incontinence, and vice, no individual continues throughout life in a single 
moral state. Rather he/she moves between moral states, hopefully most often from the incontinent 
to the continent state or from the continent to the virtuous state.  
In addition, we must constantly be concerned with the effort to understand and then incline 
towards the excess or deficiency and in all cases seek as best we can to hit the intermediate and 
what is right. Aristotle states: 
Hence also it is no easy task to be good. For in everything it is no easy task to find 
the middle, e.g. to find the middle of a circle is not for everyone but for him who 
knows; so, too, anyone can get angry—that is easy—or give or spend money; but 
to do this to the right person, to the right extent, at the right time, with the right 
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motive, and in the right way, that is not for everyone, nor is it easy; wherefore 
goodness is both rare and laudable and noble.  
 
(Emphasis in original; Ross, p.36 (1109a25-29)) This indicates the need be able to hold 
conclusions conditionally. For example, most people when facing a decision about action 
probably are immediately drawn to the pleasurable alternatives without seriously questioning its 
morality, especially where climate change is involved. An opportunity to consider the morality 
of the action requires the time provided by that ability of conditionality.  
 Also, in the above quote, the suggestion that goodness is rare does not particularly seem 
socially encouraging and seems to indicate that we humans are prone far too often to engage in 
the appetitive alternative action because it seems pleasurable. The mechanism for change here is 
unfortunately the recognition of both the choice and the alternative where both involve the 
opportunity and need for struggle. Because the continent individual struggles against that decision 
and avoids the appetitive alternative, it would seem that there must be struggle available in 
incontinency as well—meaning we probably find ourselves in one of those two states with the 
availability of struggle (and hopefully not in the vicious state where there is no struggle involved, 
only blind acceptance). But who today wants struggle— “we all struggle daily just to earn a 
living.”  
 Further, when we cannot seem to find the intermediate, Aristotle recommends that we 
look for the “second-best” which would seem to possibly take some struggle and which seems to 
be the continent state which again requires time through holding conclusions conditionally. As 
an example of the difficulty, Aristotle uses the passion of anger and declares that “it is not easy 
to determine both how and with whom and on what provocation and how long one should be 
angry; for we too sometimes praise those who fall short and call them good-tempered, but 
sometimes we praise those who get angry and call them manly.” (Ross, p.36 (1109b15-18)) 
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Aristotle here finds anger to be appropriate in certain circumstances and then discusses the third-
party reactions of “praise” and “manly” which are important and do seem to encourage continent 
acts. 
 Again, Aristotle continues with what seems to be specific encouragement for the continent 
person and, in fact, for the incontinent person while he also confirms the blameworthiness of 
appetitive actions.  
The man, however, who deviates little from goodness is not blamed, whether he do 
so in the direction of the more or of the less, but only the man who deviates more 
widely; for he does not fail to be noticed. But up to what point and to what extent a 
man must deviate before he becomes blameworthy is not easy to determine by 
reasoning, any more than anything else that is perceived by the senses; such things 
depend on particular facts, and the decision rests with perception.  
 
(Ross, p.36-37 (1109b17-23))  Third party reaction is again emphasized because human beings do 
follow examples where hopefully that example will be the phronimos, but again the phronimos 
example is recognized as at least uncommon. 
 Again, Aristotle also recommends that in attempting to act in the intermediate or virtuous 
manner, the individual must sometimes consciously look for both the excess and the deficiency: 
So much, then, is plain, that the intermediate state is in all things to be praised, but 
we must incline sometimes toward the excess, sometimes toward the deficiency; for 
so shall we most easily hit the intermediate and what is right. 
 
(Ross, p.37 (1109b23-26))  When reviewing pleasure, the need to incline to the deficiency is 
needed to counteract the normal excess of self-indulgence. Also, Aristotle here seems to be 
describing the tactical recognition of the contingent conclusion and the struggle of continency 
and incontinency by the agent as the method of the agent toward reaching “the intermediate and 
what is right.”  
 Brown states in her accompanying note: “the decision rests with perception: an important 
point about moral epistemology. Such matters—e.g. what counts as an appropriate display of 
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anger in a given set of circumstances—cannot be reasoned out from principles, but require a kind 
of judgment that is more akin to perception.” (Emphasis in original; Ross, Brown; p.217) 
Consequently, understanding the “given set of circumstances” and making that “kind of 
judgment” for action requires perceptional focus and then deliberation to make the moral choice. 
Those functions take time and it seems that most of the time, we are unwilling to spend the 
necessary time but immediately adopt the pleasurable alternative and forget the need for 
recognition of what the moral choice should be and the need to hold the pleasurable alternative 
contingently to allow careful deliberation. It seems that those thoughts seldom occur. 
 Aristotle describes an important aspect of the tactics of leaving incontinency and reaching 
continency. Aristotle states: “The virtue of a thing is relative to its proper work. Now there are 
three things in the soul which control action and truth—perception, reason, desire.” He states that 
perception causes no action where Brown’s notes explain that here Aristotle “uses action in a 
narrow sense, confining it to what is chosen” and, further, action in this sense turns out “to be 
choice, a combination of reason and desire.” (Ross, Brown; p. 212)  Aristotle states: 
The origin of action - its efficient, not its final cause - is choice, and that of choice 
is desire and reasoning with a view to an end. This is why choice cannot exist 
either without reason and intellect or without a moral state; for good action 
and its opposite cannot exist without a combination of intellect and character. 
Intellect itself, however, moves nothing, but only the intellect which aims at an end 
and is practical … . Hence choice is either desiderative reason or ratiocinative 
desire, and such an origination of action is a man.  
 
(Emphasis added; Ross, p.103 (1139a31-1139b5))  Consequently, not only does Aristotle once 
again confirm the need for appropriate character, but as seems natural, the need for appropriate 
reason and desire as the origination of human action. But how is it that reason and desire can get 
along and are able to decide on the reasonable choice? Recall that Aristotle states that appetite 
must (or should) follow the reasoning of intellect. 
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 Those thoughts all seems to generate the response that, “well, we always do that” but we 
many times or much of the time chose to do that without even the correct facts about the 
circumstances and allow the “focus” (or the refusal of focus) to be controlled by appetite and not 
by reason certainly in regard to climate change. That situation occurs when we allow appetite and 
not reason to control our focus and deliberation, and that occurs when we “chose” to “understand” 
the non-facts and allow appetite that can be totally controlled by desire (but seems to be 
“reasonable”129 because it is pleasurable) to overwhelm right reason. So why should that be? 
Understanding desire and our use of desire becomes critical in our attempt to perceptually focus 
and then deliberate on situations like climate change.  
Broadie comments about the frequency of potentially conflicting arguments which is 
characteristic of both continence and incontinence and states “the presence of potentially 
conflicting arguments is a feature of most if not all human action and is certainly not restricted to 
continent and incontinent behavior.” (Broadie, p.305) One does not have to reflect long to 
recognize the truth of her comment especially considering the present general political position 
about climate change.  
With climate change, it is the incontinent person that represents the problem because the 
continent person overcomes appetite and chooses the correct alternative that turns out to be a 
syllogism and does the right and reasonable thing to reject or minimize the fossil fuel alternative. 
The incontinent person not only knows that he is deciding on the use of fossil fuel energy but must 
understand the right and reasonable action for rejecting that use. Many of those who are 
“unbelievers” cling to the opinion that climate change is simply a figment of the imagination of 
      
129 The "in a sense" text at Ross, p.123 (1147b1). 
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98% of all the scientists on Earth apparently because they listen only to certain commentators. 
Unfortunately, that is not acceptable if the moral choice is to be voluntarily made. 
The challenge to the continent person toward becoming virtuous is overcoming appetite to 
the extent that the person need no longer struggle to choose the moral A-conclusion below. The 
challenge to the incontinent person is accepting the struggle to overcome appetite to the extent that 
the person will reject the appetitive B-conclusion below and thus become a continent person. It is 
that later struggle that seems decisive for addressing climate change.  
Broadie does address the fact that both the moral A-argument and the appetitive B-
argument use the same particular premise, “this is sweet.” (Broadie, p.304-305)  Some have argued 
that these arguments can have different particular premises. That is not acceptable when 
constructing those arguments for climate change and most other matters that need social attention. 
Different particular premises are not acceptable because, especially for climate change, it is the 
universal premise that must change. The particular premises for these two arguments must be 
identical because that premise or those premises address what we find pleasant, i.e., a heated and 
electrified home is now necessary and pleasant—it is necessary because we need electricity for 
heat, light, and communication. However, fossil fuel electricity should not ultimately be used and 
certainly not in excess and we should clearly identify our uses as needs and not wants. We also 
need to understand that excessive wants generally involve luxury. In addition, even though some 
fossil fuel energy must be used presently, we need to constantly remind ourselves that the use of 
fossil fuel energy is unacceptable and that solar/wind/water energy is acceptable. 
 Broadie provides this explanation of the use of the moral A- and appetitive B-arguments: 
“The right use of the A-premisses is to act on them; of the B-premisses, to act on them only when 
it is not better not to” (emphasis added; Broadie, p.306) which can only be determined if both the 
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A-and B-arguments are clearly recognized by an incontinent agent. Also, because Broadie reminds 
us that “one cannot act on either [premise] of a pair of premises except in the context of the other 
[premise]” or premises (Broadie, p. 306), an individual needs both a universal premise and a 
particular premise before proceeding to action.  Consequently, the incontinent individual 
understands the A-argument and the B-argument and that the A-argument is the right or moral 
thing to do, but because of appetite and not reason the individual is drawn to use the conclusion of 
the B-argument in addition to deciding not to use the A-argument. Broadie argues that when 
considering those two arguments, the agent during deliberation particularly of pleasurable 
alternatives must consciously consider the phrase “unless it is better not to”.  
Because it is the appetite of the individual that disregards the appropriate universal premise 
while the individual has knowledge of the A-argument, this method of review of most climate 
change concerns seems appropriate. The A-argument and the B-argument of a climate change 
syllogism could be as follows regarding the use of fossil fuels and the attendant production of 
CO2.130 
 
A. (U) Do not use fossil fuel energy to             B. (U) Use fossil fuel energy to heat or 
 electrify the home because it                       electrify the home because it is 
 produces CO2 which causes                                    cheap 
 climate change 
(P) A heated and electrified home is            (P) A heated and electrified home is   
now necessary and pleasant                     now necessary and pleasant  
      (C) Refrain from using fossil fuel                        (C) Use fossil fuel energy 
Energy 
 
 
 
      
130 While it is recognized that the United States cannot cease the use of fossil fuel today, our thoughts should presently 
and continually think of fossil fuel as an unacceptable source of heat and electricity and at the very least minimize its 
use to the extent possible whenever and wherever. 
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A second set of syllogisms could be the following: 
 
A. (U) Use solar energy to heat and           B. (U) Use fossil fuel energy to heat or 
 electrify the home because it                   or electrify the home because it is  
 does not produce CO2 and does not                    cheap 
 cause climate change     
(P) A heated and electrified home is              (P) A heated and electrified home is 
now necessary and pleasant                        now necessary and pleasant 
      (C) Use solar energy                (C) Use fossil fuel energy 
 
There must be recognition of both the universal premises of both the A-argument and the B-
argument in each syllogism. While the particular premise is identical for both A and B, it is the 
universal premise that requires that alternatives be considered. Focus must be on the universal 
premises rather than the particular premises that are the same. The universal premises of “do not 
use fossil fuel energy” and “use solar energy” are the reasoned premises capable of avoiding 
production of CO2. However, because the human appetite focuses on what is cheap and easy and 
further because of our consumerist culture that prefers the latest rather than the lasting and the 
apparent universal desire to purchase anything that is “new,” expensive and luxurious (whether or 
not there is an actual need), it seems that the majority of people in the United States allow the 
appetite and not reason to determine the action to be taken.  
Focusing on the particular premises in all of the above argument pairs, they are identical 
and concerned with bodily pleasures and comforts which Aristotle and reason argue must be 
subject to the virtue of temperance (through the use of Broadie’s phrase “unless it is not better not 
to”). The excessive involved vice is intemperance/self-indulgence and the mechanism for 
understanding that excess is the difference again between need and want. What is wanted in the 
industrial cultures of this world today seems to be far beyond need and, in many cases, is what 
must be admitted as luxury and in many situations wretched luxury. 
In closing her chapter on incontinence, Broadie reminds us that in the case of continence: 
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the [appetitive] B-argument and its conclusion must be held unconditionally, to the extent 
that appetite is present creating an actual conflict. No doubt there is the same gamut of 
possible forms: sometimes appetite distorts or hampers perception; sometimes it gives rise 
to self-deceptive misinterpretation; sometimes it takes away the sense of shamefulness 
of doing B. 
 
(Emphasis added; Broadie, p.307)  While all three of the above reasons given are important, the sense of 
shamefulness should become more important when the knowledge supporting the universal A premise is 
more than adequate and future generations are at stake. Those who disregard the universal A premise (or 
premises) concerning climate change and do nothing in terms of mitigation or adaptation will suffer the 
disdain and shame of those future generations and should be attending to the shame or other motivator that 
they now should feel for discarding reasonability and allowing appetite to direct their actions. In light of 
the above, we in the United States must recognize our incontinence (if not vicious nature) of acting against 
the reality of climate change and our responsibility for its existence.  
Broadie again reminds us of the difference between the two states of character. The conflict 
that faces both is the same conflict and is the willingness to respond to appetite rather than reason.  
She states “the continent agent (called so on the basis of what he does) pulls himself together in 
time to respect his rational choice.” Obviously, the incontinent agent yields to appetite which is  
so easy today when we especially in the United States have willingly been able to use pleasure as 
our only metric of acceptance. We have habituated that metric to the extent that it is very difficult 
to reduce its use.  
The last paragraph of Broadie’s Chapter 5 asks the question “by what mechanism does [the 
continent individual] resist temptation, and the [incontinent individual] does not?” (Broadie, p. 
307). She continues to embellish the question: “Aristotle does not trouble about this question let 
alone about the next round of questions, such as whether the incontinent has the same mechanism 
and whether, if so, he lacks a further mechanism for activating the first.” She then wonders why 
Aristotle has not sought out the source of difference between these two states in that regard. She 
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suggests that the reason is based on practical ethics. “From the point of view of the moral educator 
the two conditions [continence and incontinence] present more or less the same problem, since it 
is the purpose of training to minimize both, and the same sorts of methods are called for.” (Broadie, 
p. 307) 
The difficulty today seems to be that there may not be enough moral educators and that 
society today does not want to listen to moral educators because, concerning climate change, those 
educators must require that the time, effort and money presently spent on inordinate pleasure 
should be directed to climate change mitigation and adaptation. Therefore, the moral A-argument 
is not only unpopular but by some is believed to be unnecessary for some as yet unproven 
technological proposals and also is rejected simply as a detriment to the present “pleasurable” 
economy. Further, as James Garvey once attributed to Voltaire, “[n]o snowflake in an avalanche 
ever feels responsible.”131 The moral educator therefore is not only stymied by the pleasure to 
which society has become accustomed over the last decades but by the “snowflake” mentality that 
is so easily adopted and has only become available through the global reach of climate change 
through which we all become “snowflakes”.  
It seems today critically important to attend to Broadie’s questioning about “seeking out 
that source” of the difference between the continent and incontinent conditions. Actually, this 
dissertation argues that Aristotle did provide that mechanism and it is now necessary to concentrate 
on the source of the difference between these two states. In fact, those two conditions both seem 
to require a similar motivator which Aristotle offered in the concept of the Greek word aidōs which 
is addressed in the next Chapter. Also, Broadie’s thought of the incontinent possibly needing a 
further mechanism is also addressed but aidōs is argued as sufficient without a further mechanism. 
      
131 James Garvey, The Ethics of Climate Change: Right and Wrong in a Warming World (New York: Continuum 
International Publishing Group, 2008), p. 57, herein referenced as “Garvey, p. __”. 
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C. Summary  
As this dissertation argues, either the choice of the moral A-argument instead of the ease 
of falling into the grip of appetite can only be addressed through an improved character which may 
only be recognized by a few individuals who are willing to work toward that improved character 
through the same old tools of time, effort, and concern and the sincere dedication to not only utilize 
those invaluable tools, but also are willing to work toward the dedication of the funds necessary to 
support those tools. Maybe those old invaluable tools can be energized by renewed recognition of 
Aristotle’s motivator, aidōs, and a new virtue such as primility. 
The character of the United States population seems to have changed radically over the last 
six decades. In the period 1942 through 1950, the character of the United States population looked 
at and found important the universal moral A premises of “Nazi Germany is bad” as well as “the 
Japanese invasion of the United States is bad” and applied immediate national effort to relieve 
both the United States and the world of those vices through World War II. That took great virtuous 
character both in the leaders and in the citizens of the United States as well as in those of the Allied 
countries. That virtuous character which at that time embraced those universal moral A premises 
seems to have changed to the universal premise of “luxury is good and is worthy of making use of 
any and all other individuals on this Earth (as long as it is arguably legal)” which, of course, 
transgresses the second formulation of Kant’s Categorical Imperative. Those who embraced those 
prior moral A-premises, let’s call them the “original others,” are now being used individually and 
collectively in any way that “still others” can scheme to line their pockets with money from those 
“original others”. In addition, a majority (at least) of our legislators are making that possible by 
taking support from major fossil fuel producers and utilities and other lobbying entities and failing 
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to address the necessary tasks which result from anthropogenic causes such as climate change that 
are presently confronting all of the nations of Earth and Earth itself. 
 Notwithstanding the apparent inability of argument to encourage the present incontinent 
individual, the preceding discussion of incontinency is valuable for the following ideas. First, 
incontinency is useful because it does recognize competing universal premises. Secondly, 
incontinency highlights the importance of taking the time to conditionally hold conclusions for 
consideration of alternatives. In this day and age when everything has to happen immediately, 
there is no time to consider opposing viewpoints but only to immediately respond simply on the 
basis of pleasure. As life becomes more complex as it continues to do, time must be made available 
for such things as holding conclusions conditionally so that the person who must make actionable 
decisions can review alternative universal and particular premises before making a decision. 
Providing the time for that consideration will be difficult but necessary along with education for 
the need for opposing conclusions and universal premises. Third, recognizing that climate change 
is the first global set of circumstances that allow an individual to think that his/her voluntary 
actions make no difference because of the “snowflake” and “avalanche” comparison that, of 
course, is invalid. It seems as though society needs assistance with the ability to keep those items 
in mind as difficult decisions seem to multiply exponentially. 
 In her last paragraph of Chapter 5, Broadie worries that Aristotle did not provide a 
mechanism for differentiating continence and incontinence. I argue that he did provide that 
mechanism in the last two paragraphs of Chapter IV of his Nicomachean Ethics. However, I 
believe that because of his audience— his students and also their parents, he felt that caution and 
care were required because of the past and present reliance of that audience on Plato and Socrates. 
The following chapter reviews that mechanism.  
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 Chapter 8 - The Aidōs Response 
[A]idōs is fundamentally related to the terms aischron and kalon; and if the judgement of the  
person of practical wisdom that such and such is aischron may also encompass affective aspects,  
then there should presumably be a place for aidōs in that person's response. 
 
                                                      —Douglas Cairns (Cairns, 1993, 426) 
 A. Aidōs - Motivator and Possible Virtue132  
 (1) Aidōs - generally 
 Because argument does not seem presently effective for engaging interest in continence 
and incontinence, it is necessary to consider the motivator, aidōs, which, though it is necessary in 
its own right, could renew interest in those two states of character. Aidōs is a possible candidate 
for a virtue and, as importantly, a candidate for the concept that can encourage the acceptance of 
those two states because aidōs can energize those states. Aidōs seems similar to the virtue of 
practical wisdom (phronēsis) because it like practical wisdom can assist in the habituation of the 
other virtues. Practical wisdom is described as a virtue that must not only include all of the 
remaining Aristotelian virtues (Ross, p.116 (1144a36-37); p.117 (1144b36-1145a2)) but is also 
critical in the acquisition of those remaining virtues. Aidōs like practical wisdom is also critical to 
that acquisition.  
 While review of aidōs is required to explain its capacity as a motivator for Aristotle’s states 
of continence and incontinence and also as a motivator for a new virtue such as primility, increased 
emphasis on the use of aidōs is also a necessary ingredient within continuing virtue ethical theory 
      
132 I need to thank Dr. Joanne B. Waugh for much and especially because I owe the idea for the use of aidōs to her 
as well as the idea for the use of Paul Woodruff in Chapter 12. 
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generally and especially regarding climate change. Aidōs is applicable to all virtues Aristotelian 
and other. Its importance results from the prospective inhibitory and deterrent work of aidōs and 
also from its definition that ranges from shame to reverence. It is used by Aristotle because of its 
prospective nature and it has thus far been translated within Aristotle’s works as both shame and 
modesty. Because it has been translated as both, those Aristotelian texts are initially reviewed. 
(2) Aidōs - translated as shame  
Aidōs defined as shame which, as an antonym of honour, can be an important factor in 
addressing climate change because both shame and honour are important in most cultures today 
though not nearly as important as in Aristotle’s Greece and previously as early as Homer. Those 
were shame cultures. Further, shame unfortunately is no longer as important as it has been in the 
past because of the increased importance of the acquisition of wealth and power where the methods 
used in that acquisition have become less important. But honouring and shaming politicians, 
athletes and wall street individuals have been somewhat important and in the recent past. 
Individually, it still seems that we generally appreciate being honoured and we should abhor 
shame, whether vocationally or non-vocationally originated.  However, our culture today is not 
a shame culture but is a denial culture and shame seems to be irrelevant even if the shameless 
individual is caught— his/her problem was being caught, not doing the shameful act. 
 Nevertheless, we do honour, for the most part, and shame, to some extent, individuals that 
have died. We name buildings such as monuments, libraries, art venues, roadways, bridges, etc. 
for elected Presidents and other revered individuals and we generally do honour departed family 
members. Also, we do sometimes blame and censure cheating, lying and other disgraceful acts of 
character in politicians, athletes, national personalities and even family members when the action 
is discovered and occasionally after death, i.e. John Wilkes Booth. Further, for example, we 
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sometimes hold religious organizations accountable for actions occurring in past centuries and do 
feel that apologies are important even centuries after the involved actions, for example, Galileo’s 
excommunication. 
 Aidōs translated as “shame” is recognized by Aristotle as a passion but not a virtue although 
he equivocates a bit. Shame is also used by Confucius.133 Both philosophers lived in shame 
cultures and both employ it as an element in the production of good character because the feeling 
of anticipated shame (and then possibly anticipated disgrace) can and should deter an individual 
from bad action. The Greek word is αἰδώς; where aidōs is the transliterated version and is 
recognizable from its pronunciation is — “I ‘ (long) + dose").134 Its concept is the anticipated 
shame, private or public, and possibly anticipated disgrace (virtually always public) that could 
follow if the anticipated action is completed. Aristotle distinguishes that anticipated feeling from 
the feeling of actual previous recognized disgrace resulting from a completed shameful action 
where the Greek word is αἰσχύνη and its transliteration is aischunē.135 (Ross, p.16 (1100a20); p.32 
(1107b23))  The pronunciation of aischunē —I (long I) “shune’  + knee”.  
In addition, the Greek word, aidōs, while translating to "shame" also translates to a number 
of positive words: at the Perseus website as "reverence, awe, respect"136; also "reverence, awe, 
respect for the feeling or opinion of others or for one's own conscience, and so shame, self-respect 
      
133 For example, Confucius, The Analects, trans. R. Dawson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 52 (Book 
13:22) and p. 54 (Book14:1). 
134Greek-English Lexicon, 9th ed; compiled, H.G. Liddell & R. Scott (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1940 (9th ed.), 
1996 (new supplement)), p.36, "aidώs"; herein referenced as “Liddell-Scott, p.___”. 
135Liddell-Scott, p.43, “αἰσχύνη”; Ross, p.79(1128b21); Perseus - shame, dishonour.  
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/morph?l=ai%29sxu%2Fnh&la=greek&can=ai%29sxu%2Fnh0&prior=e)sti\n&
d=Perseus:text:1999.01.0053:bekker%20page=1128b:bekker%20line=20&i=1 ; also at that address click “LSJ”. 
136 Perseus - shame, reverence, awe, respect. 
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/morph?l=ai%29dw%5Cs&la=greek&can=ai%29dw%5Cs0&prior=h(&d=Perse
us:text:1999.01.0053:bekker%20page=1128b:bekker%20line=25&i=1 “reverence, awe, respect for the feeling or 
opinion of others or for one's own conscience, and so shame, self-respect (in full “ἑαυτοῦ αἰδώς” Hierocl.in 
CA9p.433M.), sense of honour,”    
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0057%3Aentry%3Dai)dw%2Fs 
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... , sense of honour … ."  That same website lists the definition of αἰσχύνη as “shame, dishonour”. 
Douglas L. Cairns, in his book, Aidōs: The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient 
Greek Literature,137 in the Glossary of that book lists the definition of aidōs as "aidōs (n.) shame, 
respect, sense of honour, modesty"138 and "aidōios: (adj.) reverend, deserving aidōs (less often: 
reverent, showing aidōs)." (Cairns, p.455) Concerning aischunē or disgrace, Cairns also in his 
Glossary lists: "aischunē: (n.) (objective) disgrace; (subjective) shame" which can reference 
present, past or future feelings about actions. (Ibid.) 
Aristotle's use of aidōs when translated as “shame” is always an anticipatory feeling and, 
therefore, is the anticipation of shame or disgrace resulting from a contemplated but unexecuted 
action that may not ultimately be enacted as a result of the feeling of aidōs during deliberation. 
Therefore, because the bad action will not occur if aidōs is successful in its work, aidōs as a feeling, 
cannot result in disgrace under those circumstances but may result in personal shame and even 
public shame and disgrace if the involved thought is admitted publicly even though not enacted.139   
 All of the additional translations referenced in the prior paragraphs can be forward looking 
and can become reasons for deciding against a contemplated vicious/bad action. They also seem 
to form a hierarchy of reasons with arguably different levels of acceptability, shame being the 
lowest. Consider this structure: shame, conscience or self-respect, awe, respect for others, sense of 
honour, and reverence.  
      
137 Douglas, Cairns, Aidōs: The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1993); referenced herein as "Cairns, p.___". 
138 Cairns footnotes this comment about aidōs: "In particular, since aidōs relates to others as well as to oneself, it is 
commonly more positive than shame; it is recommended as a virtue, and is valued for its maintenance of propriety in 
reciprocal arrangements in which one's own honour is bound up with one's obligations to others." (Cairns, p.14n29) 
139 But it could also result in public honour if its admission is indicative of a change in disposition to the extent that a 
vicious desire has been addressed and overcome, for example, President Jimmy Carter's admission of lust. 
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 It seems upon reflection that there are very few people alive that can be considered 
"virtuous" as Aristotle used that word if that use requires and involves no consideration whatsoever 
of possible vicious actions or thoughts. It seems that under Aristotle's list of moral (and immoral) 
states most people fall into the continent and incontinent classes as affirmed by Aristotle and as 
discussed above.  
 Aristotle in concluding the Nicomachean Ethics states: 
[Arguments] are not able to encourage the many to nobility and goodness. For 
these do not by nature obey the sense of shame [aidōs], but only fear, and do 
not abstain from bad acts because of their baseness but through fear of 
punishment; living by passion they pursue their own pleasures and the means to 
them, and avoid the opposite pains, and have not even a conception of what is noble 
and truly pleasant, since they have never tasted it. What argument would remold 
such people? It is hard, if not impossible, to remove by argument the traits that 
have long since been incorporated in the character; and perhaps we must be 
content if, when all the influences by which we are thought to become good are 
present, we get some tincture of virtue. 
  
(Emphasis added; Ross, p.199 (1179b-19))  “The many” do not seem to have passed from existence 
through the generations since the fourth century B.C.E. and especially the “many” today do not 
seem to be moved by argument or science concerning climate change. Also, the importance of 
character is once again emphasized. In addition, immediately following the above and in 
characterizing “the many,” Aristotle argues the need for laws to encourage virtues and provide 
sanctions for vices. 
However, the hope is that incontinent people will begin rejecting more of the actions 
recognized as vicious and begin choosing the virtuous alternative while the continent people will 
begin habituating the virtuous choices so the appetite no longer suggests action.  For these reasons, 
I argue that, because of its restraining nature, aidōs and its hierarchy of meanings beginning with 
shame, is a necessary candidate for revised emphasis in virtue theory possibly as a virtue or as a 
positive and necessary concept located immediately below the concept of phronēsis.   
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(3) Aristotle’s use of Aidōs 
For Aristotle and also for virtue ethics today, aidōs is a necessary concept because of its 
restraint on conceived yet unexecuted vicious action even though Aristotle explicitly and 
repeatedly states that aidōs is not a virtue but a passion. As passion it seems that he is arguing that 
aidōs is not a disposition to action and, therefore, does not determine reasonable action. (Ross, 
p.79 (1128b10-11))  Actually, based on the following discussion, it seems that an argument should 
be made for the position that aidōs obviously does promote reasonable action though it still may 
be argued that continence as a state of character should get the credit for the reasonable choice that 
results. However, without aidōs as motivator that result might not become reality. 
While Aristotle uses aidōs in a number of locations in the Nicomachean Ethics, he uses it 
most extensively in the last two paragraphs of what has become known as Book IV of those ethics 
and to which Brown has added the title “A Quasi-virtue”. In these two paragraphs which are herein 
referenced as the “Quasi-virtue Text,” Aristotle carefully differentiates between the Greek words 
aidōs and aischunē.  Both words, aidōs and aischunē, have been translated at times as the English 
word “shame” but both have different meanings as used by Aristotle in these two paragraphs.  
Further, in these two paragraphs, variants of those two words are also used but those variants retain 
the following identifying features. Aidōs and its variants are used as a present feeling about a 
contemplated but unexecuted bad act while aischunē can mean either a prospective feeling or more 
often the present or past feeling of disgrace that accompanied a completed bad act. 
(a) The Quasi-virtue Text  
Because of the importance of this text, it is reviewed sentence by sentence below. In the 
quotations from the Nicomachean Ethics found below, the Ross translation is used and the Greek 
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words listed are confirmed through the Liddell-Scott Lexicon140 and through the Perseus 
website.141 Cairns’ book contains his own translation of the Quasi-virtue Text and the 
transliterations included below are those used by Cairns.  The Greek word(s) and Cairns’ 
transliterations are shown in brackets [ ] immediately following Ross’s translated English word or 
phrase which is underlined.  
 Aidōs is the transliteration of the Greek word “αἰδώς”.  Aἰδώς, aidōs, their variants and the 
transliterations of all those words are words that, like aidōs, are prospective in that they incorporate 
meanings from shame to reverence where those feelings confront the individual who is 
contemplating a possible bad act. In addition, all those words provide anticipation of the 
individual’s fear of disgrace and, also, thereby, warn of the contemplated bad act. On pages 193-
200, aἰδώς, aidōs, their variant words, and the transliterations of all those words are bolded 
for recognition.  
  Aischunē is the transliteration of the Greek word “αἰσχύνη”. Aἰσχύνη, aischunē, their 
variant words and the transliterations of all those words are words that refer specifically to a 
disgraceful state of affairs, past, present or future. Again, on pages 194-200, aἰσχύνη, aischunē, 
their variant words, and the transliterations of all those words are type set in red for 
recognition. Those qualities of the two words are confirmed through their use by Aristotle in the 
following quotes where aidōs can even be seen (in the “eighth sentence” below) as a possible good. 
However, Aristotle's ideal of the phronimos or person of practical wisdom can never have such 
thoughts of bad acts where probably very few humans fit that description in the fourth century 
B.C.E. and even today.  
      
140 Greek-English Lexicon, 9th ed; compiled, H.G. Liddell & R. Scott (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1940 (9th 
ed.), 1996 (new supplement). 
141 Perseus 4.0 aka Perseus Hopper, http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/  
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These two translated paragraphs contain eleven sentences where six of the sentences use 
one or more instances of aidōs and/or aischunē or their variants. The first sentence as translated 
by Ross has been most influential in determining the manner in which aidōs is used by Aristotle. 
That sentence states: “Shame [αἰδοῦς, aidōs] should not be described as a virtue; for it is more like 
a passion than a state of character [ἕξει, hexis],” (Ross, p.79 (1128b10-11))  The virtues and vices, 
of course, are described by Aristotle as “states of character” which Aristotle describes as “the 
things in virtue of which we stand well or badly with reference to the passions.” (Ross, p.28 
(1105b25-26))  
Also, recall that Aristotle defines passions as “appetite, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, 
friendly feeling, hatred, longing, emulation, pity, and in general the feelings that accompany 
pleasure or pain”; and that habits once formed are not easily changed. The virtues and vices of the 
individual are the habitual activities and actions of the individual and define our states of character. 
The second sentence provides Aristotle’s understanding of the meaning of aidōs. He states: 
“It [aidōs] is defined, at any rate, as a kind of fear of dishonour, and produces an effect similar to 
that produced by fear of danger; for people who feel disgraced [οἱ αἰσχυνόμενοι, hoi 
aischunomenoi], blush, and those who fear death turn pale.” (Ross, p.79 (1128b11-13))  This is 
the first appearance in these eleven sentences of a variation of the aischunē word which here has 
been translated as “disgraced”— a feeling brought about by a third-party determination of a 
completed bad act. Consequently, this sentence initially describes aidōs as “a kind of fear of 
dishonour” and “a fear of danger” which are both feelings of anticipation but based upon prior 
experience of personal bad acts, the bad acts of others, or education which is why aischunē is an 
important part of the temperate use of the passions. The sentence then continues to describe the 
physical reaction of “blushing and turning pale” of people who feel “disgraced” as a result of a 
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completed bad act. Again, in the second sentence, aidōs is used in a prospective manner whereas 
the aischunē word is used for a feeling associated with a completed bad act and third-party 
disgrace. The third sentence then concludes that those two bodily conditions of blushing and 
turning pale characterize a passion. 
The fourth sentence states that aidōs, the passion “is not becoming to every age, but only 
to youth.” The fifth sentence explains the reason for that conclusion. In this sentence, aidōs and 
its variants appear three times whereas aischunē and its variants appear twice. Here Aristotle also 
provides the explanation of the prospective nature of aidōs. He states that “young people should 
be prone to shame [αἰδήμονας, aidēmōn], because they live by passion and therefore commit 
many errors, but are restrained by shame [αἰδοῦς, aidōs]; and we praise young people who are 
prone to this passion [αἰδήμονας, aidēmōn] … .” (Ross, p.79 (1128b16-19)) This prospective 
restraint of aidōs is, of course, critical because of its deterrent effect on the considered but yet 
unperformed bad act. 
Aristotle continues in that fifth sentence with the thought that “but an older person no one 
would praise for being prone to the sense of disgrace [αἰσχυντηλός, aischuntēlos], since we think 
he should not do anything that need cause this sense [of disgrace] [αἰσχύνη, aischunē].” Here, 
when addressing the older person, Aristotle does not use the prospective aidōs or its variants but 
uses the aischunē variant word for the retrospective disgrace concept. Aristotle has thus far been 
consistent in his use of aidōs and aischunē and their variants. 
In the sixth sentence, Aristotle uses aischunē once and three aischunē variants all of 
which are translated either as sense of disgrace, disgraceful or disgraced. That sentence is:  
For the sense of disgrace [αἰσχύνη, aischunē] is not even characteristic of a good 
man, since it is consequent on bad actions (for such actions should not be done; and 
if some actions are disgraceful [αἰσχρὰ, aischra] in very truth and others only 
according to common opinion, this makes no difference; for neither class of actions 
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should be done, so that no disgrace [αἰσχυντέον, aischunē] should be felt); and it is 
a mark of a bad man even to be such as to do any disgraceful action [αἰσχρῶν, 
aischron]. 
 
(Ross, p.79 (1128b 21-26)) In this sentence, Aristotle is describing feelings of disgrace that result 
from completed bad actions and, consequently, he uses aischunē and aischunē variant words. 
In the seventh sentence Aristotle uses both words or their variants once and, again, the 
prospective nature of aidōs is evident. “To be so constituted as to feel disgraced [αἰσχύνεσθαι, 
aischunesthai] if one does such an action, and for this reason to think oneself good, is absurd; for 
it is for voluntary actions that shame [αἰδώς, aidōs] is felt, and the good man will never voluntarily 
do bad actions.”  (Ross, p.79 (1128b26-30)) Aristotle explains why any concept of “feeling 
disgraced” [αἰσχύνεσθαι, aischunesthai] cannot be viewed as good and that the “good man” will 
not do or probably even contemplate the kind of actions that raise the sense of aidōs. (Ross, p. 120 
(1146a10-13)) Again, the “good man,” the phronimos, for Aristotle is the individual who has all 
the virtues and, as Aristotle explains, will not contemplate bad actions. While the phronimos is the 
ideal person, there have been and are now today very few of those it seems on Earth. Also, this 
sentence emphasizes the need of both states of character, continent and incontinent, to make use 
of aidōs. 
In the eighth sentence, Aristotle again uses both words or their variants once and, further 
explains his understanding of aidōs. That sentence states: “But shame [αἰδὼς, aidōs] may be said 
to be conditionally a good thing; if a good man does such actions, he will feel disgraced  
[αἰσχύνεσθαι, aischunesthai]; but the virtues are not subject to such a qualification.” Aristotle here 
again acknowledges the goodness of aidōs in preventing bad action, but, because aidōs relies on 
the recollection of bad actions to prevent further bad actions, the phronimos would not be praised 
by Aristotle for the use of aidōs. 
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In the ninth sentence Aristotle uses an aidōs variant word once and uses aischunē variant 
words in four locations to explain shamelessness - having no feeling of shame coupled with the 
lack of any aidōs - as bad. Once again, he emphasizes that it cannot be good to be ashamed of 
having done such actions. “And if shamelessness [ἀναισχυντία, anaischuntia] - not to be ashamed 
[αἰδεῖσθαι, aidōs] of doing base actions [αἰσχρὰ, aischron] - is bad, that does not make it good to 
be ashamed [αἰσχύνεσθα, aischunē] of doing such actions [αἰσχύνεσθαι, {no Cairns word}].” In 
this sentence, Aristotle describes shamelessness as having no feeling of aidōs which is bad and 
being ashamed does not make it good to be ashamed if one does such actions. 
In the tenth sentence,142 Aristotle states: “Continence too is not virtue, but a mixed sort of 
state; this will be shown later [in Book VII].” When Aristotle names continence as describing aidōs 
and uses the phrase “mixed state” to describe both, Aristotle understands both as having virtuous 
qualities and, as such, they are both very important in understanding Aristotle’s ethics. Because 
continence is one of Aristotle’s six moral states, aidōs does not seem to be a candidate for that 
type of a moral state. However, aidōs does seem to be the device or mechanism through which 
continence (and incontinence) struggle against conceived but unexecuted bad acts. Continence, 
through that struggle centered in aidōs, succeeds in precluding bad acts. In this regard, aidōs seems 
very much like a virtue because the individual acceptance and habituation of the involved activity 
determine the value of the activity (for example with liberality, courage and the remaining 
Aristotelian virtues). As explained by Cairns, aidōs has been a very important concept in Greek 
ethics as far back as Homer. It should continue to be important in this twenty-first century because 
of its prospective inhibitory, restraining and deterrent qualities. 
      
142 The eleventh sentence is simply an invitation to begin the discussion of the virtue “justice”. 
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Therefore, while aidōs has been characterized more like a passion than a state of character, 
it needs to be perceived as a state of character because it must be used much more extensively in 
this twenty-first century especially because of climate change. In addition, continence, as a “mixed 
sort of state” and while not like Aristotle’s virtue temperance, the continent’s struggle and the 
hoped for incontinent’s knowledge of the virtuous action must be emphasized, become much more 
popular, and be implemented much more extensively because of climate change. 
(b) Aidōs - translated as modesty 
Aristotle does use aidōs and its variant words elsewhere in the Nicomachean Ethics and in 
his writings generally. Some of those uses provide additional insight into his understanding and 
use of that word. However, in the following texts, no translations by Cairns could be found and, 
therefore, only the Greek words from Perseus are shown in brackets after the underlined words in 
the following translations. In Book II of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle uses aidōs which Ross 
translates as “shame”. However, in this same text, Aristotle uses aidōs and an aidōs variant word 
where Ross translates both as “modest”. Aristotle also states that passions can have intermediate 
states or means and an excess and a deficiency like virtues. Aristotle uses the Greek word αἰδήμων, 
an aidōs variant word, which Ross translates as "modest man" (Ross, p.34 (1108a36)) while in that 
same sentence Aristotle initially uses aidōs (αἰδὼς) which Ross translates as “shame”. (Ross, p.34 
(1108a32-33))  Ross translates the entire sentence as: “There are also means in the passions and 
concerned with the passions; since shame [αἰδὼς] is not a virtue, and yet praise is extended to the 
modest man [αἰδήμων].” Here, Aristotle states unequivocally that aidōs is "not a virtue" and, 
therefore, a passion.  (Ross, p.34 (1108a32))143 Also, “modesty,” which seems like a virtue, 
involves a much different feeling or sense than shame.  
      
143 But he also states that it only "is more like a passion." (Ross, p.79 (1128b10)) 
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Aristotle elaborates on that “modesty” text: “For even in these matters one man is said to 
be intermediate, and another to exceed, as for instance the bashful man who is ashamed of 
everything [αἰδούμενο]; while he who falls short or is not ashamed of anything is shameless 
[ἀναίσχυντο], and the intermediate person is modest [αἰδήμων].” (Ross, p.34 (1108a33-36)) In 
addition, Aristotle immediately states that "praise is extended to the modest man [αἰδήμων]" (use 
of an aidōs variant word and, therefore, a person who anticipates) where he describes the "bashful 
man" as the excess and as being "ashamed of everything [αἰδούμενος]" (again using an aidōs  
variant word of anticipated feeling) while the deficiency is "not ashamed of anything" and "is 
shameless [ἀναίσχυντος]" (an aischunē variant word of a recognized feeling of disgrace).  
The deficiency is explained as “shameless” - ἀναίσχυντο, an aischunē variant word, while 
the mean or acceptable feeling is “modest,” αἰδήμων, an aidōs variant word. The excessive vice 
is ashamed of everything where the word is αἰδούμενο, also an aidōs variant word. As aidōs 
variant words, they are both prospective words which have the possibility of precluding bad acts. 
As such, they both would seem to be praiseworthy because of that fact. Even the bashful man who 
is ashamed of everything is not undertaking bad acts but probably not undertaking good acts either. 
In any event, the aidōs variant words include a praiseworthy quality. 
Because Aristotle states that "the intermediate person is modest [αἰδήμων] " (Ross, p.34 
(1108a31-36)) again an aidōs variant word and a person who anticipates, this text seems important 
to show both that (1) aidōs and aidōs variant words have more than one meaning where those 
meanings can be very different, for example, shame and modest, and (2) for aidōs and aidōs variant 
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words when translated as modesty, Aristotle found a mean, an excess and a deficiency similar to 
his virtues.144  
(c) Aidōs - a virtue candidate 
 Generally addressing aidōs, Aristotle’s description in Book IV as a passion is at least 
equivocal. Further, he explicitly finds that aidōs has a mean, an excess, and a deficiency. 
Consequently, even he leaves some space for aidōs as a virtue, as a state of character. Further, it 
does seem that aidōs does determine reasonable action when steering the continent person to the 
virtuous action. In addition, aidōs does determine “inaction” if the conceived vicious action is not 
executed where the decision to refrain seems in itself to be virtuous action. As a result and 
consistent with Cairns' arguments included below, aidōs seems to be a candidate for a new virtue 
or at least a crucial feeling, sense and response that must be associated with a movement away 
from vicious through incontinence and continence to virtuousness. 
 Cairns argues that aidōs could and possibly should be recognized as a virtue, a state of 
character, a hexis.  Cairns reviews the Aristotelian Quasi-virtue Text sentences in much the same 
manner as those sentences are reviewed above where the above review is consistent with and in 
part based on Cairns’ conclusions about those sentences. (Cairns, p. 414-18)  As an example, his 
translation and transliteration of the ninth sentence follows and is in keeping with the appropriate 
concepts of both the "aischunē" variant words and the "aidōs" variant words. "For if anaischuntia 
[shamelessness] and not feeling aidōs [shame] at the prospect of doing what is aischron 
[disgraceful] are base, this does not mean that to feel aischuniē [ashamed] when one does such 
      
144 In a similar example, Aristotle, when discussing the virtue of courage, concludes that "the brave man" is correct in 
fearing “disgrace” [αἰσχρός], an aischunē variant word, as a result of modesty [αἰδήμων], an aidōs variant word. He 
states “disgrace [αἰσχρός]; he who fears this is good and modest [αἰδήμων, an aidōs variant word], and he who does 
not is shameless [ἀναίσχυντος, an aischunē variant word].” (Ross, p.49 (1115a10-15))  
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things is decent." (Bracketed words are not in Cairns quote but are consistent with the above 
translations; Cairns, p.414-15). Here, two distinct ideas are described as "base" - first, the state of 
disgrace, anaischuntia (shamelessness) and second, the state of “not feeling aidōs at the prospect” 
of doing base acts. 
The states of disgrace and shamelessness result from doing base actions while when using 
aidōs at the prospect of such acts can discourage the individual from engaging in the act. In the 
above quotes, while the first base idea is a feeling or sense following completed base actions, the 
second base idea is the failure to use aidōs. Consequently, the use of aidōs becomes the 
responsibility of the individual in introducing the question of morality at the beginning of the 
deliberation process and then in producing the hiatus that allows and requires the individual to 
hold conclusions contingent while the deliberation process proceeds. In pre-Aristotelian Greece 
and as explained by Cairns, aidōs was a feeling that either the individual could self-induce or was 
a feeling suggested to an individual by actions or others. As such, it was a common and important 
feeling both for the individual and the polis. 
Any virtue present or past needs to have a relatively easy mechanism for communication 
and understanding. Aidōs, as a virtue candidate and as explained by Cairns as an emotional 
response to bad feelings and thoughts, needs something more than resurrection of the Greek word. 
The pronunciation of that Greek word has the possibility of adopting a presently recognized phrase, 
“dose response,” used in the field of toxicology to describe the toxicity of any given substance.145   
That possible adoption could be through the phrase “aidōs response” because aidōs as a response 
      
145 http://unabridged.merriam-webster.com/unabridged/dose%20response. “medical:  of, relating to, or graphing the 
pattern of physiological response to varied dosage (as of a drug or radiation) in which there is typically little or no 
effect at very low dosages and a toxic or unchanging effect at high dosages with the maximum increase in effect 
somewhere between the extremes.” In other words, the higher the dosage, the possibility of toxicity increases. Also, 
a similar definition was obtained through a personal communication with Gary Van Gelder, Ph.D. toxicologist. 
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to a contemplated activity would be positive in terms of morality. Phonetically that phrase becomes 
“I-dose response” and its application would be closely associated with Aristotle’s virtue “practical 
wisdom” as a response to recognized circumstances. However, as argued below, I-dose response 
would be particularly associated with Aristotle’s states of character, continence and incontinence, 
and would focus on the need for the application of practical wisdom within those two states.  
In addition and consistent with the scope of the definition of aidōs, that phrase could 
become associated with its definition as described at pages 189 to 190 above as a feeling of 
“reverence, awe, respect for the feeling or opinion of others or for one's own conscience, and so 
shame,, self-respect ... , sense of honour;” so possibly the two sides of another common “coin” - 
sense of shame and sense of self-respect or honour (combined similarly to primility as the 
combination of proper pride and proper humility). The involved “aidōs response” could begin with 
shame but could become reverence through the definitional hierarchy as the individual seeks the 
good through the application of practical wisdom and through the Aristotle/Aquinas method of 
psychology (discussed below) where the action as deliberated becomes moral. 
Continuing with the nature of aidōs, Cairns argues that, because of further statements by 
Aristotle, it should not be characterized as a passion or as a capacity and should be a virtue, because 
aidōs in many or most circumstances can be praised, and, in these cases, because aidōs can be 
viewed as a mean, those attributes rigidly applied would require that aidōs, as a praiseworthy 
mean, is a hexis and moral state of character. Cairns recognizes that Aristotle’s phronimos must 
be motivated solely by practical reason and, therefore, by the intrinsic nature of the noble action. 
Consequently, the truly virtuous “perform the noble action because they see its intrinsic nobility, 
because they know it is good for them, and because they want to.” (Cairns, p.420) They do not 
perform the noble action out of “fear of dishonour” or “fear of danger”.   
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Cairns goes on to argue what does seem to be reality. Aristotle argues the necessity of 
habituation in realizing any of the virtues including practical wisdom. Cairns states: 
The person who has achieved full excellence, then, must have done so with the help 
of aidōs, and it is difficult to imagine that that person can have left aidōs entirely 
behind. Aristotle, moreover, knows very well that emotions have an important 
evaluative component, and the evaluative judgement that is constitutive of the 
emotion of aidōs has traditionally had as its content the belief that such-and-such 
is aischron [a bad act]. 
 
(Cairns, p.427) As Cairns argues, aidōs must be involved in reaching full, or even partial, 
excellence and the habituated person is not likely to forget aidōs, its focus on bad acts, and what 
it helped her/him to achieve. 
 Cairns continues: 
Admittedly, the correct but unjustified judgement that such-and-such is aischron is 
exactly what Aristotle wishes to distinguish from the judgement of the phronimos 
by means of his distinction between 'the that' and 'the because'; but one who knows 
'the because' does not abandon his previous appreciation of 'the that', and so the 
phronimos has no need entirely to leave behind his sense of aidōs. 
 
(Cairns, p.427) Again, Cairns argues what seems to be reality. Consequently, it is reasonable to 
believe that the phronimos retains her/his sense of aidōs even if she/he does not use it. 
 In addition, Cairns recognizes that aidōs can be criticized as being entirely an external 
factor in the individual’s decision-making. As such it would surely not be a candidate for a virtue. 
Cairns, in answer, reviews Aristotle’s words at the end of the Nicomachean Ethics where Aristotle 
states: 
Now if arguments were in themselves enough to make men good, they would justly, 
as Theognis says, have won very great rewards, and such rewards should have been 
provided; but as things are, while they seem to have power to encourage and 
stimulate the generous-minded among our youth, and to make a character which is 
gently born, and a true lover of what is noble, ready to be possessed by virtue, they 
are not able to encourage the many to nobility and goodness.  
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(Emphasis in original; Ross, p.199 (1179b5-11))  Having stated the problems with making “the 
many” amenable to argument as a means of achieving eudaimonia, Aristotle continues with the 
reasons for those problems. 
For these [the many] do not by nature obey the sense of shame [aidōs], but only 
fear, and do not abstain from bad acts because of their baseness but through 
fear of punishment; living by passion they pursue their own pleasures and the 
means to them, and avoid the opposite pains, and have not even a conception 
of what is noble and truly pleasant, since they have never tasted it. 
 
(Emphasis added; Ross, p.199 (1179b5-15)) With these thoughts, Aristotle has distinguished aidōs 
from fear and punishment and as Cairns observes:  
Here aidōs is associated with the possession of a character that truly loves to kalon 
[to act nobly], with avoiding the base because it is aischron [bad], and contrasted 
with fear of external sanctions. Those who possess aidōs here are contrasted with 
those who live by pathos, whereas in the previous passage at 1128b those who 
possessed aidōs were those who lived by their emotions. Here, then, aidōs manages 
to raise its head somewhat above the level of other pathē. 
 
(Cairns, p.424)  As Cairns here notes, this passage raises aidōs “somewhat above the level of other 
passions” as a feeling through which the individual obeys the sense of aidōs not from fear of 
punishment or not from ignorance of what is noble and truly pleasant. 
 The penultimate sentence in the Quasi-virtue Text states: “continence too is not virtue, but 
a mixed sort of state … .” (Ross, p.79 (1128b34-35))  In commenting on this sentence, Cairns 
states “aidōs being a species of enkrateia [continence] … the presence of the remark in itself 
suggests that there is some link in Aristotle’s mind between the two concepts.” (Cairns, p.419) 
Cairns continues and suggests that there is a self-control element in virtuous action generally and 
specifically in temperance and in continence and states: 
This might have something to do with prospective aidōs, in that Aristotle might 
believe that inhibition of an action through prospective aidōs is a form of self-
control in which the agent actually contemplates and is momentarily attracted by 
the wrong action, but, if this is Aristotle's opinion, it never permeates to the explicit 
level; nor is it necessary for the existence of an analogy between aidōs and 
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enkrateia [continence] that aidōs be a form of self-control, although it is plausible, 
and certainly traditional, that aidōs should, in certain circumstances, be felt to 
require such self-control. 
 
(Cairns, p.419)  While it may never permeate to “the explicit level” in Aristotle’s written work, it 
seems to be evident in the Quasi-virtue Text in terms of the “prevention” aspect of aidōs which 
has always been part of the Ross translation. Even if the “prevention” aspect is not included 
specifically in the definition of aidōs, “restraint” is and certainly is a reasonable result of the words 
that are included in the aidōs definition such a shame, modesty, self-respect, reverence, because 
all of those can have a preventive impact. Synonyms of the word “self-control” include 
“continence, restraint, self-command, self-control, self-restraint and its definition is “control of 
oneself: restraint exercised over one’s own impulses, emotions, or desires.”146 
 Cairns goes on to argue that aidōs, “even in its prospective form as an inhibitory emotion, 
takes the second place as a motive inferior to that of the truly virtuous, who perform the noble 
action because they see its intrinsic nobility, because they know it is good for them, and because 
they want to.” (Cairns, p.420)  Here Cairns seems to suggest that the continent person and, for that 
matter, the incontinent person should be able to use the motive of the truly virtuous person, the 
recognition of intrinsic nobility, as the reason for and means of the struggle of those individuals in 
attempting to reach virtuosity. Certainly, the individual experiencing aidōs could have that 
recognition of intrinsic nobility but his/her motive for recognizing that intrinsic nobility seems to 
be aidōs. Without aidōs, the continent individual and the incontinent individual do not seem to be 
able to recognize that intrinsic nobility of the appropriate action rather than the bad action.  
 Therefore, the difference between the virtuous individual and the continent individual does 
not seem to be in the vision of the intrinsically noble act but seems to be in the willingness to 
      
146 Emphasis added; http://unabridged.merriam-webster.com/unabridged/self-control. 
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struggle against appetite when the individual can recognize the vision of the noble act but needs 
assistance for the struggle in addition to the vision. That assistance seems to be the willingness to 
struggle and that addition seems to be absolutely necessary to get the incontinent person to the 
continent level and the continent person to the virtuous level. While the vision of the noble act is 
certainly of primary importance, without the secondary motivation and assistance of aidōs, the 
vision of the noble act will not succeed or be evident in either the continent or incontinent 
individual respectively. The search for that willingness to struggle will continue in the review of 
the Aristotelian/Aquinian psychology that may be able to further promote that willingness.   
 Summarizing (1) Aristotle calls aidōs only “more like a passion than a state of character" 
or virtue, (2) he compares it to continence, a non-virtuous state but preferable to incontinence and 
vice, (3) he finds that modesty has a mean between an excess and a deficiency, and (4) aidōs should 
be afforded praise and, consequently, Cairns seems correct in suggesting that aidōs is a virtue 
candidate.  
 (d) Aidōs - relationship to praise and honour  
 As further evidence of its candidacy for virtue, aidōs has links to praise and, therefore, to 
honour. Aristotle suggests praise for aidōs when that feeling is found in young people and, in 
addition, suggests that it “may be said to be conditionally a good thing” because of its restraint. 
(Ross, p.79 (1128b10-36)) Also, while “aidōs is not a virtue,” “praise is extended to the modest 
man [αἰδήμων147; an aidōs variant word]” again because of the restraint of aidōs. Because of that 
praise, the continent agent who uses aidōs is entitled to honour but only as a result of the use of 
aidōs. While honour is not a virtue, it is a “noble object” or objective of virtuous behavior. (Ross, 
p.52 (1116a27-28)) Aristotle also recognized honour as the “prize of virtue” especially for proper 
      
147 Liddell-Scott, p.36. 
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pride as the “crown of virtues” (Ross, p.68 (1123b35-1124a2))  Also, honour,148 as an antonym of 
dishonour for which shame is a synonym, is the result of or "reward" for honourable behavior 
where aidōs assists in fostering that behavior. Honour is also subject to a mean and, therefore, also 
something with which aidōs can assist. Aristotle discusses honour in relation to ambition which 
he equates to "love of honour" but finds that people can "desire honour both more than they should 
and less". Therefore, there should be a mean which he finds to be "unnamed" and which he states 
is disputed between ambition and unambitiousness where both seem to be honoured under different 
circumstances. (Ross, p.72 (1125b1-25))149  
 Aristotle also states that "honour," not only is the "prize of virtue," but is the "greatest of 
external goods". (Ross, p.68 (1123b20-21)) In addition, the proud individual is concerned “chiefly 
with honours and dishonours”. He also states that proper pride is not found without all of the other 
virtues. He then states “Therefore, it is hard to be truly proud; for it is impossible without 
nobility and goodness of character.” (Emphasis added; Ross, p.69 (1124a1-3))  “Goodness of 
character” is again necessary. In addition, that seems to suggest that perfect virtue is uncommon 
because he states that "there can be no honour that is worthy of perfect virtue" (Ross, p.69 (1124a7-
12)) apparently because perfect virtue is its own reward. However, Aristotle states that the properly 
proud man will accept honour because there is nothing greater in the way of reward. (Ross, pp.68-
69 (1123b16-1124a10)) He also calls honour "the end [or goal] of the political life" (Ross, p.6 
(1095b24)) which is not the current end of the political life as viewed by much of the present 
electorate and elected in the United States but may still be found in some countries of Earth and in 
some few within the elected and electorate of the United States.  
      
148 Ross, p.16 (1100a20); p.32 (1107b23) (Perseus: τιμή  - worship, esteem, honour) 
149 Could it be named “proper ambition” as in “proper pride?”   
 
 208 
  
 (e) Aidōs – how acquired  
 While aidōs as shame seems initially felt through education, after a personal bad action, or 
understood after the recognition of the shame or disgrace publicly imposed on another, aidōs  
thereafter can accompany an initial perception of a possible disgraceful act. In that regard, it can 
serve as a deterrent to, or change in, the action decision. In this way, it seems that the individual 
can be habituated through that type of education to incorporate aidōs in his/her deliberation process 
through which choice is determined. That education, consequently, can occur through personal 
experience or through parents, teachers or law in the same way that virtues are acquired. 
 Aristotle in ending his specific thoughts about aidōs compares it to continence which he 
states "too, is not a virtue, but a mixed sort of state". Aidōs as “a mixed sort of state” for Aristotle, 
is a state which incorporates something close to virtue. Aristotle also was not found to have used 
that description of “mixed state” for any other passion, capacity or state of character other than 
aidōs and continence. Continence (enkrateia) is, of course, along with virtue (aretē), one of 
Aristotle’s desirable moral states and as argued in this dissertation a "disposition to act" and the 
one as defined by Aristotle into which hopefully the majority of human beings eventually will fall. 
Consequently, both Aristotle's aidōs and his continent and incontinent states of character are 
unique in regard to Aristotle’s determination of that “mixed sort of state”.  
 It is interesting that Aristotle discusses aidōs because he must have believed that it was 
needed by that portion of his generation that he found in the states of continence and incontinence 
probably because of the greed, avarice and other vices associated with his generation. It also seems 
that aidōs applies to the present generation for those same vices and specifically the present 
generation’s unwillingness to accept responsibility for climate change and to accept the need for 
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the serious actions of mitigation and adaptation where this failure to accept seems once again 
caused by greed, avarice and other vices.   
This all seems to be a further method of accepting that even the “ancient” concept of virtue 
ethics has a point of departure toward a more meaningful ethics of climate change. The view that 
Aristotle’s ethics reflect something that is “ancient” though seems strange. Recall the thought of 
John Stuart Mill about “the comparatively early state of human advancement in which we now 
live” which he wrote in the mid-nineteenth century, not two hundred years ago. (Mill, 1861, p.34) 
Also recall the fact that this planet Earth is over four billion years old and that Homo sapiens has 
only been using written language for about six thousand years. Therefore, it seems that our 
civilization must be characterized as infantile notwithstanding the technological advancements 
which have been made in those same two hundred years, maybe two thousand years, where that 
period of time is but a heartbeat in the life of this planet and, for that matter, this civilization. 
Greed, avarice and lust for power seem as prevalent as ever and where that greed, avarice and lust 
seem to use much of that technological advantage for the personal advantage of the very few. To 
Aristotle’s eternal credit, he was extremely insightful about not only human nature during his 
lifetime but generally to date. 
  
 B. Aischunē – Another Perspective  
 Melissa Marie Coakley in her dissertation entitled Aeschynē in Aristotle's Conception of 
Human Nature,150 argues that aeschynē, another transliteration of αἰσχύνη as well as aischunē,151 
can like aidōs precede a bad act, and, when coupled with phronēsis (φρόνησις) can discourage the 
      
150 Melissa Marie Coakley, Aeschynē in Aristotle's Conception of Human Nature (2014). USF Graduate Theses and 
Dissertations found at http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/4999 ; referenced herein as "Coakley, p__". 
151 Coakley uses the transliteration, aeschynē, for the Greek word “αἰσχύνη”. Because Cairns uses the 
transliteration form of “aischunē” for that Greek word, this dissertation for consistency uses “aischunē”. 
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individual from engaging in the act. She argues that aischunē with phronēsis consequently should 
be accepted as a virtue. Coakley focuses on Aristotle’s use of both Greek words, aidōs and 
aischunē. While accepting aischunē as a passion, Coakley argues that the translation of aischunē, 
solely as a passion, is inaccurate based on Aristotle's use of that word and that the manner of his 
use of that word allows and requires that aischunē with phronēsis should be recognized as a virtue. 
While she notes that the word, aidōs, can also be translated differently and more broadly, she 
accepts Aristotle's stated position of aidōs as a passion and focuses on aischunē with phronēsis as 
the virtue.152 
 Coakley argues that both aidōs and aischunē have been translated improperly as simple 
shame when both have characteristics that significantly differentiate them and allow translation to 
concepts different than shame. She argues that aischunē, when associated with phronēsis should 
be recognized as a "civic virtue," a virtue upon which community depends. While most translations 
do translate aischunē as "shame or a sense of disgrace," she argues that aischunē is both a passion 
that, through the application of practical wisdom, is also a virtue. Aischunē, she argues consistently 
with others, operates individually over the past and in both the present and future, while aidōs 
operates prospectively. 
 It is that prospective operation that recommends aidōs as a virtue or as an idea approaching 
a virtue, as well as, the traditional use of aidōs defined in both negative and positive terms, for 
example, as shame, respect, self-respect, reverence, and awe. Aeschynē is on the other hand defined 
solely in negative terms such as shame, dishonour and disgrace which are not consistent with the 
      
152 She argues that aeschynē, a Greek word generally incorrectly translated as "shame" and which appeared in the 
Greek language later than the word aidōs, should be recognized as a virtue when associated with phronēsis or practical 
wisdom. Specifically, she argues that "the function and responsibility of aeschynē in Aristotle's work is recognized in 
its full potential as a civic virtue; specifically, in conjunction with metriopatheia" which she defines as moderation of 
passions. (Coakley, pp.iii,104-105) That definition appears accurate because the Greek-English Lexicon defines it as 
"restraint over the passions." (Liddell-Scott, p.1122, "μετριο-λογέομαι ... πάθεία[πα], ή, restraint over the passions, ... 
."   
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concept of a virtue or of an idea approaching a virtue (see page 189 and fn135 on that page). In 
addition, aligning aeschynē with practical wisdom does not seem to specifically identify it as a 
virtue because Aristotle states that the virtue of practical wisdom is found in an individual with all 
of the moral virtues. (Ross, p.120 (1146a7-9))  However, Aristotle did not recommend that either 
aidōs or aeschynē be given the state of character of a virtue. Actually, as argued in this dissertation 
below, it does not seem to be necessarily important that aidōs be given that state to be effective in 
Aristotle’s virtue ethical theory. 
 
 C. Aidōs - The Work of Aidōs and Aischunē 
 Cairns argues both that aidōs would be the proper choice for a virtue and that aidōs and 
aischunē work together. This dissertation argues with Cairns for all his reasons reviewed and 
because aidōs is always prospective and, therefore, less complex in regard to application, it would 
seem to be a better candidate for a virtue. In addition, aidōs has positive meanings such as 
reverence and modesty where Aristotle states that aidōs defined as modesty is a mean in the nature 
of a virtue and where the response associated with aidōs can result in praise as is characteristic of 
all virtues. 
Cairns argues that aidōs and aischunē, while having differences in definition, work 
together. Cairns argues that, in order to act prospectively, aidōs must at least initially rely on past 
experience for its operation and, therefore, on aischunē. Consequently, Cairns argues that aidōs 
and aischunē work together though they do have at least one distinguishing characteristic. Cairns 
states:  
In ordinary Greek aidōs and aischunē are synonyms, except when the latter refers 
to a disgraceful state of affairs rather than the individual’s reaction [aidōs] to that 
[disgraceful] state, but aidōs is the older and more poetic term, and it draws its 
claim to be considered as a virtue from its use in highly poetic contexts where 
something of its importance originally accorded the concept is preserved.  
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(Cairns, p.415) When the immoral action is considered, aidōs recollects the thought of that 
disgraceful state when the possibility of a disgraceful action comes to mind. 
 When considering the possibility of aidōs as a possible virtue, Cairns recognizes that 
Aristotle would not place the full mantle of virtue on aidōs because of Aristotle's argument that 
phronēsis is a possibility for any rational human being. Therefore, the existence of any human as  
phronimos is possible and that person should have no need for either aidōs or aischunē. However, 
Cairns has reminded us that the phronimos "who knows 'the because' does not abandon his 
previous appreciation of 'the that', and so the phronimos has no need entirely to leave behind his 
sense of aidōs." (Cairns, p.427) "An appreciation of to kalon ["action 'for the sake of the noble'" 
(Cairns, p.421)] and to aischron [base action, what a good man would never do (Cairns, p.414-
15)153] in themselves and without reference to external sanctions suggests not a capacity that is 
totally distinct from aidōs, but a variety of aidōs which responds to aischron without reference to 
external standards." (Cairns, p.427-28)  
 Cairns argues that the process through which the individual "is brought to regard to kalon 
as pleasant and to aischron as unpleasant" will include aidōs as "indispensable, both as the force 
which makes one sensitive to the opinions of those, such as parents and teachers, who constitute 
the media through which one learns to subscribe to the standards of one's society, and as the basis 
for one's acquired sense of the intrinsically aischron or kalon." (Cairns, p.426-27)  Because of this 
and while Cairns promotes the possibility of aidōs as a full-fledged virtue, he states that Aristotle 
“is right, I think, to resist the temptation to create a revisionary aretē out of aidōs, and clearly 
      
153 Cairns also includes the following as "aischron:"—pretending to know what one does not, and failure to pursue 
the truth (Cairns, p.371n82) See also, Liddell-Scott, p.43 (αίσχρόυ - "causing shame, dishonouring, reproachful, ... 
ugly, ... in moral sense, shameful, base ... ." 
 213 
  
prefers to treat the concept as a necessary condition and preliminary for complete aretē, a crucial 
element in the acquisition of an attraction to to kalon for its own sake.” (Cairns, p.429)  Rather 
than lower the ideal concept of phronēsis, it seems actually more appropriate to recognize reality 
and to emphasize the responsive restraining nature of aidōs because of its primary importance to 
the states of continence and incontinence which are again both very important states in the journey 
from vicious to virtuous. 
  
 D. Aidōs - External/Internal Work 
 Concerning honour and the argument that aidōs is merely a mechanism to generate honour 
for one’s self, Cairns comments that there is "a strong suggestion that aidōs is concerned with 
external honour and reputation alone. Honour is not an ignoble motive for Aristotle (he even posits 
particular states of character which relate to one's attitude toward honour),[154] but it is not the 
supreme motive for moral action." (Cairns, p.420-21) Cairns recognizes that the supreme motive 
is "a form of conscience based on internalized moral standards". (Cairns, p.430) Still, Cairns 
concludes that "aidōs is an indispensable ally in the process of moral development, something 
which can give one a genuine desire to do what is kalon [good] and avoid what is aischron [bad], 
not because of what others might say or do, but because it encompasses a distaste for the aischron 
[bad] as such." (Cairns, p.425) 
 Further, Cairns recognizes that aidōs, as described particularly in the Magna Moralia, is 
not a limited concept because it is “concerned with the aischron and kalon across the range of 
words and deeds.” (Cairns, p.429):  
Modesty [aidōs] is a mean between shamelessness and bashfulness, and it has to do 
with deeds and words. For the shameless man is he who says and does anything on 
any occasion or before any people; but the bashful man is the opposite of this, who 
      
154 Ross, p.68-69 (1123b35); Rhetoric, Roberts, p.38 (1360b24-28). 
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is afraid to say or do anything before anybody (for such a man is incapacitated for 
action, who is bashful about everything); but modesty [aidōs] and the modest man 
are a mean between these. For he will not say or do anything under any 
circumstances, like the shameless man, nor, like the bashful man, be afraid on every 
occasion and under all circumstances, but will say and do what he ought, where he 
ought, and when he ought. 
 
(Barnes, p.1887 (1193a1-11))155 This idea of the modest person is, of course, also found within 
the Nicomachean Ethics and this quote is very similar to the idea found in Book II Chapter 9. The 
person with aidōs will "say and do what he ought, where he ought, and when he ought." That 
seems to cover just about everything that a person says or does under any set of circumstances. 
Consequently, the breadth of aidōs is as Cairns suggests "across the range of words and deeds". 
(Cairns, p.429) For those reasons, Cairns states that: 
A full account of the place of aidōs in Aristotle's theory of virtue, therefore, 
must take account of its contribution to excellence of character as a whole, 
recognizing its importance as a source of the affective and evaluative 
dispositions which can be developed into that complete form of excellence of 
character which is informed by phronēsis. Seen in this light, aidōs emerges as 
indispensable in the inductive process which develops in tandem the desiderative 
and the rational aspects of complete aretē [virtue], and if Aristotle fails to make the 
part of aidōs in all this as clear as he might have, this is to be taken as a mere lacuna, 
rather than a substantive defect in his account. 
 
(Emphasis added; Cairns, p.429-30)  However, it may not have been “mere lacuna” on the part of 
Aristotle, but his possible recognition in the Quasi-virtue Text of the work that aidōs must do 
within the states of incontinence and continence and his desire not to alienate the wealthy in Greek 
society. It is also this “contribution to excellence of character” through its inhibitory properties 
that makes renewal of the use of aidōs necessary in mitigating and adapting to climate change.  
 Cairns concludes in part that:  
Aristotle may leave us to reconstruct his essential position on the true contribution 
of aidōs to excellence of character, but what emerges from such a reconstruction is 
a mature and suggestive appreciation that aidōs, even if conceived as a mere 
preliminary to complete aretē, cannot simply be regarded as a fear of the unpleasant 
      
155 The Greek from Loeb Classical Library, Aristotle, Magna Moralia, 287: 529-531. 
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consequences of ill-repute and is thus not incompatible with the form of conscience 
based on internalized moral standards; aidōs can encompass rejection of the 
aischron as such, and it is therefore clear that Aristotle regards it as quite 
uncontroversial that at least those of his fellow countrymen whose natural 
aptitudes had received the proper habituation should be concerned for the 
intrinsic character of their actions rather than simply for their consequences.  
 
(Emphasis added; Cairns, p.430)  It is this “true contribution of aidōs to excellence of character” 
and the recognition that the concern then and the concern today needs to be “the character of our 
actions” rather than simply the consequences of those actions which for the individual today are 
more tons of CO2 and other greenhouse gases into our troposphere that will impact future 
generations to a much greater extent than that individual.  
 Again, as James Garvey notes: “No snowflake in an avalanche ever feels responsible.”156 
That tonnage of CO2 (and other greenhouse gases) for each of the more than three hundred fifty 
million individuals in the United States and the rest of the seven billion plus people now on Earth 
is having consequences that are extremely important for our children, grandchildren and for the 
future generations of all life on Earth. Cairns continues: 
To attain the goal of complete excellence may be a rare or impossible 
achievement, but it is an ideal which Aristotle is able to construct on the basis 
of the categories of evaluation which he found in ordinary moral discourse, and 
it is an ideal in whose construction he is remarkably successful in combining 
a system based on a natural teleology of man with an account which saves most 
of the phenomena of common belief.  
 
(Cairns, p.431) This seems like an appropriate evaluation of Aristotle’s virtue ideal and yet 
through concepts like continence and incontinence, he included “ordinary moral discourse”. It 
certainly has been successful in terms of an enduring ideal but not an embraced ideal. 
Aidōs can be both an external motivator and also an internal motivator and through those 
functions can be a very important part of the individual character. 
      
156 (Garvey, p.57) 
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We should thus see in his overall approach to aidōs, and to what may be made 
of aidōs in the good man, a recognition of the central thesis of this work, that 
aidōs is not solely dependent on the judgements of others, that it can spring 
from a form of conscience based on internalized moral standards, and that 
it can express a concern for the intrinsic character of one's actions. 
 
(Emphasis added; Cairns, p.431)  When understanding aidōs as Cairns explains it, one of the most 
important aspects of aidōs is that it is both a standard that is externally imposed and can be or 
become an extremely important internal moral standard. That again is what is needed to adequately 
address climate change and its mitigation and adaptation. 
 In his Epilogue (as in his entire book), Cairns links aidōs and the Greek word “time” which 
translates to honour, prestige, and worth. He states 
The link between aidōs and timē is, of course, fundamental, but the crucial point is 
that aidōs includes concern both for one's own timē and for that of others. As a 
result, part of the function of aidōs is to recognize the point at which self-assertion 
encroaches illegitimately upon the timē of others, and this means that aidōs, while 
always responding to a situation in which timē is relevant, is concerned not only 
with one's own prestige, but also with the concepts of moderation and 
appropriateness in the pursuit of prestige. 
 
(Cairns, p.432) Cairns recognizes the community nature of aidōs and timē and the fact that self-
assertion can “encroach illegitimately” upon the timē of others. While timē – honour – is as 
Aristotle states a valid reward for a virtuous life, he also understands and has expressed the 
problems of desiring honour both more and less than is appropriate (Ross, p.72 (1125b1-25)) 
especially considering the impact that both that excess and deficiency have on community which 
is a primary concern of Aristotle. 
 Cairns elaborates on honour as both resulting from “one’s outward reputation” and also 
one’s “individual determination actually to possess an excellence”: 
Behind the idea of one's own timē, moreover, lies a subjective claim to honour and 
an internalized self-image that is not wholly dependent on the opinions of others; 
to be concerned for one's self-image in Greek is to be concerned for one's timē, but 
at no stage does this necessarily imply concern for one's outward reputation 
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to the exclusion of one's image in one's own eyes. The code of honour to which 
aidōs relates demands individual determination actually to possess an excellence, 
not merely that one should seem to others to possess it. 
 
(Emphasis added; Cairns, p.432)  Here Cairns recognizes Aristotle’s plan to use community and 
the hope for its ability to recognize and reward virtuous character and through that use and ability 
to instill in the individual the determination to possess the excellences of the virtues and to reject 
the vices. Also, Cairns recognizes the importance in that regard of the unfinished business involved 
in promoting and developing that determination.  
 He then addresses the two-millennial distance between Aristotle’s words and today’s 
individuals and institutions who view “ancient” as irrelevant. He comments that the Greek 
distinctions of aidōs such as blushing and lowering of the eyes, are not necessarily what we would 
associate with aidōs today.  
[T]his sense of distinctness should not be allowed to dispel a corresponding sense 
of  familiarity, first of all  because, to a large extent, the  concept of aidōs covers 
aspects of the emotional life of human beings which can be readily recast  in our  
own (more differentiated and less inclusive) terms, and secondly because the  
conceptual uniqueness of aidōs and of the categories of value with which it  belongs  
does not preclude such familiar features of our moral and emotional life as 
conscience, the possession of internalized standards, or concern for the 
character of our actions as such.  
 
(Emphasis added; Cairns, p.433) Cairns then argues that there is no easy ability to attempt to 
differentiate the present “us” from the “them” of the Greeks of the fourth century B.C.E. The aidōs 
of “them” is still the operative aidōs of today. 
Concerning the standards of the honourable, the fine, or the appropriate as 
discussed [in this book], one major argument of this work is that there is no case 
for sharp distinctions between self- and other-regarding motives, competitive and 
co-operative values, non-moral and moral responses.  
 
(Cairns, p.433-34) Cairns then argues that, while these categories concern our present moral 
thinking and are not the categories of the Greeks, the Greek categories in which aidōs belongs can 
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cover both sides of these modern disjunctions with no implication that either is to be reduced to 
the terms of the other.  
 Consequently, I argue with Cairns the importance of aidōs today. Aidōs is crucially 
meaningful and understandable as a motivator necessary for addressing climate change in this 
twenty-first century. Aidōs can possibly be accepted as a virtue but its work seems to be needed 
more importantly as assistance in the determination of the individual human to possess the virtues. 
 Because of the result of our present vicious appetitive actions, for example, of our addiction 
to fossil fuel energy here on Earth, all future life-forms, human and non-human, will suffer because 
of the character of the present individuals in these United States that causes us to deny the 
importance of climate change through our willingness to disregard science and the importance of 
present mitigation of, and adaptation to, climate change. As a result, the majority of present 
individuals particularly in the United States may well find themselves the subject of books entitled 
"The Dishonourable Generation" or "The Shameful Generation" or "The Disgraced Generation" 
or "The Condemned Generation” specifically because of climate change. Honour and shame have, 
of course, been important concepts throughout the millennia because humanity has depended on 
community for its existence for probably at least the last few millions of years. That community is 
dependent upon cooperation and technology that improve the community and that does not destroy 
the community where that destruction seems to be the direction that present actions are taking 
Earth and its inhabitants today. 
 Finally, the ultimate concept of aidōs is arguably reverence. The final chapter of this  
dissertation considers the methods for recognition of and feeling awe for the regeneration of aidōs, 
reverence and proper primility in the individual human character. The next Chapter argues that the 
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Aristotelian/Aquinian psychology is an important mechanism for using aidōs, recognizing 
incontinence, and achieving continence and virtuosity. 
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Chapter 9 - Aquinas on Aristotelian Psychology and on Law and Community 
[W]hen human beings will some particular good, their will is not right 
unless they refer that good to the common good as an end; after all, even the 
natural appetite of each part of a thing is directed toward 
the common good of the whole. 
. 
                                —Thomas Aquinas (Aquinas, circa 1268, 487-488) 
 
 
 A. Aquinas Generally 
 Knowing the value of aidōs, continence, incontinence, proper pride, proper humility, 
honour and shame is, of course, crucial. The thoughts of Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) assist in 
explaining the Aristotelian importance of those concepts. Those thoughts are primarily found in 
Aquinas’s extensive Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics157 (herein referenced as the 
"Commentary") and are reviewed briefly below. Knowing how to use these concepts in everyday 
life is equally crucial where the thoughts and psychology of Aquinas (following Aristotle) in two 
of his written works construct a personal method for that use:  his Treatise on Happiness (herein 
referenced as “Happiness”) and his Treatise on Human Acts (herein referenced as "Human 
Acts").158 Additionally, Aquinas had some important thoughts about governing laws and the 
common welfare that are also included in this dissertation.  
      
157 Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, rev. ed and trans. C.I. Litzinger, O.P. (Notre 
Dame, IN: Dumb Ox Books, 1993) herein referenced as “Commentary, p. __". 
158 The Thomas Williams’ translations of Aquinas's Treatises on Happiness and Human Acts are primarily used in 
this dissertation. Those translations are found in Thomas Aquinas, The Hackett Aquinas: Basic Works, ed. Jeffery 
Hause and Robert Pasnau (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2014), pp.316-502. Where another 
translation is used, it is fully cited. All citations to the Williams’ translation are included in text as follows: "Williams, 
p.110, Q20a1" where the "p.__" refers to the page number of the above publication, the"Q20a1" refers to the Summa 
Theologicae, Prima secundae, Question 20, Article 1. Without more, this refers to the "On the Contrary" and/or the 
"Reply". If the citation is to a Response, the citation is stated as follows: "Williams, p.110, Q20a1r1" where the "r1" 
refers to "Response to 1".   
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 Aquinas was, of course, Christian but also amazingly Aristotelian. Aquinas completed 
commentaries or what he called "sententiae" on other of Aristotle's works including On the Soul, 
Physics and Metaphysics. As was true of most 13th-century writers, Aquinas apparently did not 
know Greek but used Latin translations of these Aristotelian works where those translations were 
not complete and, while some had been translated from the Greek, others had been translated from 
Arabic translations of the Greek. Nonetheless, Aquinas's mastery of Aristotle's work is evident 
from the comparison of the Commentary and the most recent Aristotelian translations directly from 
the Greek. The Commentary is about 650 pages in length and, upon review, is extremely accurate 
based on those recent translations. 
  
 B. Aquinas’s Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics  
 While the Commentary covers the entire Nicomachean Ethics, for the purposes of this 
dissertation, the Commentary specifically helps in understanding Aristotle's thoughts about proper 
pride and humility (Ross, p.67-72 (1123a33-1125b25)), about aidōs and aischune (found primarily 
at Ross, p.79 (1128b10-36)), and about continence and incontinence (found primarily at Ross, 
p.118-141 (1145a15-1154b35)). First, in considering Aquinas's Commentary, it is necessary to 
mention some of the differences between Aristotle and Aquinas. For example, Aquinas is accused 
of attempting to "baptize Aristotle". Aquinas uses "sin" in many places where Aristotle uses "bad" 
but both Aristotle and Aquinas use "evil" on occasion. (Ross, p.73 (1126a10-12); Commentary, 
p.255)  The word "humility" is not found in the Aquinas translation and, where Ross uses "unduly 
humble," Aquinas uses "pusillanimous". Interestingly, the present dictionary definition of 
"pusillanimous" (which includes “mean-spirited”) is more demeaning than the dictionary 
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definition of "humble" which includes "not proud or haughty".159 Aquinas, because of his religion, 
can be expected to accentuate the more demeaning definition.  
 Unlike Ross who translated the Greek word, μεγαλοψυχία (or magnanimitas), as "proper 
pride", Aquinas uses the word "magnanimity". Aquinas uses the word "pride" only twice in the 
Commentary at paragraphs 2129 and 2130 on page 636 and as a thing that can stand against a 
person's happiness. This again can be expected in the thirteenth century when the word "pride" 
was and is still today thought of Biblically as a detrimental characteristic. This, of course, is one 
more reason that Ross's translation of "proper pride" is a reasonable translation. Actually, the 
Perseus-Tufts website which acknowledges the translation "greatness of soul" also states 
"μεγαλοψυχία, magnanimitas means lofty pride and self-esteem rather than magnanimity or high-
mindedness (in the modern sense of the word)."160 This Perseus-Tufts translation harmonizes with 
Ross's translation of "proper pride".  
 Ross translates the excess and deficiency of proper pride as "empty vanity" and "undue 
humility" (Ross, p.32 (1107b22)) and the entire sentence as: "With regard to honour and dishonour 
the mean is proper pride, the excess is known as a sort of 'empty vanity', and the deficiency is 
undue humility … ." Aquinas on the other hand uses the following translation of that sentence: 
"The mean in regard to honor and dishonor is magnanimity. But the excess is chapnotes (i.e., 
presumption); and the defect, smallness of soul." (Commentary, p.115)  While no definition of 
"chapnotes" could be found, the parenthetical of "presumption" helps as its definition includes "the 
      
159 The Merriam Webster Unabridged Dictionary defines “pusillanimous" as "lacking or showing a lack of courage 
and manly strength and resolution:  marked by mean-spirited and contemptible timidity." (http://unabridged. merriam-
webster.com/unabridged/pusillanimous) "Humble" is defined as "having a low opinion of one's own importance or 
merits:  modest or meek in spirit, manner, or appearance:  not proud or haughty ... ." (http://unabridged.merriam-
webster.com/unabridged/humble). 
160http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0054%3Abekker+page%3D1123a%
3Abekker+line%3D20 
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overstepping of limits of propriety, courtesy, or morality"161 which seems similar to "empty 
vanity". Also, "smallness of soul" seems similar to "undue humility". Therefore, the Ross 
translation and Aquinas’s translation are consistent despite the difference of about seven-hundred 
years between them. 
 Also, Ross translates the Greek word, ἕξει, as "state of character" that differentiates "virtue" 
from Aristotle's "passions" and "capacities" as the "three kinds of  things found in the [human] 
soul". (Ross, p.28 (1105b19-22))  Aquinas translates ἕξει simply as "habit" apparently because of 
its Latin root. While a habit is a state of character and while both can be either good or bad, state 
of character is more descriptive.  Also, "state of character" seems a more accurate translation 
because passions seem amenable to habit as well. (Ross, p.34 (1108a31-36))  State of character is 
also more appropriate for this dissertation because of its focus on character.162  
 At page 274 of the Commentary, Aquinas addresses Aristotle's comments on "shame". 
(Ross, p.79 (1128b10-35))  Here Aquinas does use "shame" for the translation of aidōs and seems 
to use "disgrace" or "shamelessness" for the translation of aischunē and its variants. Regarding, 
aidōs, Aquinas accepts Aristotle's position that it is a passion (though without Aristotle's 
equivocation) and also that it is not a virtue even though Aquinas admits its laudability in a 
continent person.163 In addition, Aquinas uses "evil actions" where Ross uses "bad actions." In the 
      
161 http://unabridged.merriam-webster.com/unabridged/presumption 
162 As one can easily imagine, because of Aquinas’s religion, he does use some different terms to describe Aristotle's 
thought especially of badness. For example, Aquinas may use wicked, evil or sin where Aristotle uses bad. In addition, 
where Aristotle uses the word "god" Aquinas would be expected to capitalize that word, for example, at 1096a24-26. 
(Ross, p.8; Commentary, p.24). Also, where Aristotle uses the word "gods", Aquinas may use that same word without 
capitalization, for example, at 1137a28. (Ross, p.98; Commentary, p.339). Both philosophers write of things spiritual 
but differently based on the belief in numerous gods in B.C.E. where for Aquinas spirituality and divinity reside in a 
single God. Nevertheless, based on those examples, the Commentary is still very useful in understanding Aristotle's 
Nicomachean Ethics. 
163 It is interesting that at 1108a30 (Ross, p.34; Commentary, p.115), Aquinas translates aidōs as "modesty" unlike its 
translation of "shame" at 1128b10 (Commentary, p.274). In both cases, Ross's translation uses "shame". (Ross, p.34; 
p.79)  Both agree with Aristotle's unequivocal statement at 1108a30 that aidōs is not a virtue but a passion that has an 
excess and a defect and that is praised because of its intermediate nature. Modesty, of course, is an accepted translation 
of aidōs. In that same paragraph, both translate ἀναίσχυντος as "shameless" and αἰδήμων as "modest" but they differ 
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last sentence of that text, Aquinas's translation states "continence is not a virtue but has a mixture 
of virtue" while Ross translates "Continence too is not virtue, but a mixed sort of state." While "a 
mixture of virtue" is not precisely "a mixed sort of state", it is helpful because it includes the word 
“virtue”. Aquinas's Commentary thoughts about that sentence are:  
Then … , at "Likewise, continence," he introduces something similar concerning 
continence which, although laudable is not a virtue but has an admixture of virtue. 
Certainly, the continent man follows right reason, and this pertains to virtue. 
Nonetheless, he suffers vehement and evil desires, and this pertains to lack of 
virtue. … . It is enough that he brings out in a fitting manner shame's resemblance 
to continence because shame is especially necessary where evil passions abound, 
as they do in continent people. 
 
(Emphasis in original; Commentary, pp. 276-77)  Those last three sentences in the above quotation 
summarize Aquinas's position on continence. Shame remains laudable because it requires that the 
continent person ultimately use right reason. However, Aquinas’s phrases of "suffers vehement 
and evil desires" and “evil passions” describe different and more violent feelings than would the 
Greek word aischunē or its variants. Also, it seems that Aquinas’s translation is much narrower 
than aischunē or its variants when translated as disgrace or bad and as such would limit the reach 
of continence to a degree not intended by Aristotle. Possibly, Aquinas was concerned that too 
permissive a translation might incur the greater wrath of the religious leaders in the thirteenth 
century.164   
 In considering the importance of Aquinas, one must always keep in mind that in addition 
to being Christian, he was also Aristotelian which, when considering the ideology included in 
      
at 1108a34 in the translation of αἰδούμενος [to be ashamed] with Ross translating to "ashamed of everything" and 
Aquinas translating to "bashful".  Both translations seem consistent at 1179b11 (Ross, p.199; Commentary, p.638) 
where they both translate aidōs as "shame". All of the above translations of the Greek are from Perseus and all seem 
consistent with Liddell-Scott. 
164 Keep in mind that some of Aquinas’s writings were condemned by some religious leaders shortly after his death 
apparently because of the tension between the Franciscans and the Dominicans. 
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Christianity at that time, seems to represent considerable courage on the part of Aquinas. It does 
seem significant that he wrote in the thirteenth century C.E., a difference of about fifteen hundred 
years after Aristotle wrote. This fact emphasizes the importance of Aristotle's thoughts over those 
fifteen hundred years and suggests that those thoughts can be as relevant and important today as 
they were in the fourth century B.C.E and in the thirteenth century C.E.  
 Today, the three-month period between the financial reports of public corporations may 
seem lengthy. As a society, a century seems like an eternity today but when one recognizes that 
Earth has been here for four billion plus years and that Homo sapiens has only been using written 
expression for about six thousand years, our society is in its infancy. Neither Aristotle's ethical 
thoughts nor Aquinas's ethical thoughts should or can be considered irrelevant. 
 
C. Aquinas’s Treatises on Happiness and Human Action 
 Possibly most importantly, Aquinas's Treatises on Happiness and Human Action are 
extremely helpful in organizing and crystallizing Aristotle's psychology and, through those efforts, 
those Treatises provide an instructive process for acquiring and applying the virtues and thus for 
realizing flourishing. Aquinas wrote these Treatises as the first questions of the Prima Secundae 
of his Summa Theologiae sometime between about 1260 and 1273. While that time period may 
again seem to suggest irrelevancy concerning the twenty-first century, the topics addressed by 
Aquinas (and Aristotle) are relevant today particularly concerning the fundamental values and 
virtues of humans and the processes that we can use to acquire and implement those values and 
virtues. With both Aristotle and modern philosophers as well as many recent philosophers, 
Aquinas holds that all humans act toward much the same end, goal or good. That end or goal (in 
this chapter "end" is collectively used) is human happiness and flourishing which is addressed in 
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the Treatise on Happiness where he also endorses free choice (Williams, p.319, Q1a2) though his 
concept of free choice is still the subject of much attention.165 
 (1) Treatise on Happiness 
 In this treatise,166 Aquinas considers those things of which happiness seems to consist 
which are wealth, honours, fame or glory, power, bodily health, pleasure, the soul (which consists 
of such things as power, habit, or act), and what he calls "created good" where this seems to be 
either a natural physical object or an artifact. He specifically finds that happiness cannot consist of 
any one or any combination of these things. (Williams, pp.327-39, Q2a1-8)  Aristotle, of course, 
finds happiness or flourishing to be the ultimate lifetime end of all humans where Aquinas also 
finds the ultimate end to be happiness but he defines it as eternal life with God (Williams, 
p.341,Q3a2r1) and argues that this ultimate end cannot be experienced during human life. 
(Williams, p.338-39, Q2a8)  However, Aquinas does advocate imperfect happiness which can be 
experienced during human life. Also, Aquinas does seem to agree with Aristotle’s ultimate activity 
of contemplation. 
  Contra Aristotle, Aquinas takes the position that companionship of friends is not required 
for perfect happiness but is required for imperfect happiness where he references Aristotle's 
unequivocal statement that "the happy person needs friends ... for the sake of good activity." 
(Williams, p.363, Q4a8; see Ross, p.176 (1169b22)) He asks whether deeds are necessary for 
happiness and answers, with Aristotle, "one comes to happiness through action" (Williams. p.373, 
Q5a7; see Ross, p.15 (1099b25-27)) that seems at odds with some interpretations of Christianity 
which require only grace and personal acceptance of that grace. He addresses grace in an 
      
165 For an in-depth discussion of this topic, see Thomas Williams, "Human Freedom and Agency," in The Oxford 
Handbook of Aquinas, ed. Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 199-208. 
166 The Treatise on Happiness is herein referenced as "Happiness". 
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interesting way. (Commentary, p.420, Q12a2) While he acknowledges that grace "is not given on 
account of prior works," he states that "grace, after all, is not a term of motion, as happiness is; 
rather, [grace] is a starting point of the motion by which one tends toward happiness." (Williams, 
p.374, Q5a7r3) 
 Aquinas argues that both the intellect as the seat of reason and the will as the seat of action are 
involved in his process of the development of proximate or intermediate ends but not in the 
development of the ultimate end. (Hereinafter “proximate/intermediate ends” will be referenced simply 
as “ends” while “ultimate ends” will always be so named.) For both Aquinas and Aristotle, the ultimate 
end for all humans is not developed by the individual but for all humans is simply happiness or 
flourishing. For example, Aquinas states: “there is only one ultimate end. … .” (Williams, p.420, 
Q12a2; Ross, p.10 (1097b1-7); p.14 (1099a26-31)) In the process of achieving ends, Aquinas holds 
that the concept of any good end and also any “apparently good end” (which is actually bad) 
(Williams, p.407, Q9a6r3), first occurs in an act of the intellect and not of the will which upon 
reflection seems to be the way things work. “Apparently good (but bad) ends” are always named 
in that manner in this dissertation.  
 He further states that external goods are not required for perfect happiness which of course 
is not available during one’s life but are required for "imperfect happiness" which again can be 
experienced during an individual's life. He states that external goods do not "belong to the essence 
of happiness; rather, they are instruments that are of service to happiness, which consists in the 
activity of virtue" where he does reference Aristotle for the thought that "happiness is an activity 
of the soul in accordance with perfect virtue". (Ross, p.19 (1102a5); see Williams, p.362, Q4a2)   
 Aquinas also addresses things that he finds required for happiness which are delight, 
comprehension, rectitude of will (morally correct behavior or thinking) and something like the 
resurrection of the body. (Williams, p.352, Q4) Aquinas concludes that everyone "wants to be 
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happy" but that "not everyone grasps happiness, because not everyone knows the particular thing 
to which the abstract notion of happiness applies" and in this case "not everyone wants happiness". 
(Williams, p.375, Q5a8) In this regard, he states:  
[I]f one understands that [definition of happiness] in terms of the things that human 
beings will according to the apprehension of reason, then having everything one 
wants is not characteristic of happiness, but rather of misery, since having such 
things can stand in the way of having everything one wills naturally, in much the same 
way that reason sometimes takes certain things to be true that in fact stand in the way 
of knowing the truth. It is because he understands the definition in this way that 
Augustine adds "and wants nothing bad" to complete the definition, although the first 
part—"they are happy who have everything they will"—would be sufficient if 
interpreted correctly.  
 
(Emphasis added; Williams, p.375, Q5a8r3) The concept of this "understanding" that focuses on 
"wants" rather than what one would "will naturally" has not changed since the thirteenth century. 
In the twenty-first century, we have a name for this "want" problem - consumerism - which also 
stands in the way of having natural and virtuous happiness and arises because the individual has 
dispensed with her/his own reason and focuses on what someone else for profit suggests is the 
source of happiness. This explains why an automobile seems not to be a means of moving from 
one location to another but a means of displaying a hoped-for exhibition of material wealth. This 
is an example of how Aquinas’s thoughts in the thirteenth century apply directly to one of the 
major problems of the twenty-first century. Mere material wealth displayed through costly “stuff” 
but lacking any connection to valid intentionality is looked upon as a source of happiness when in 
reality it becomes a burden to happiness/flourishing because of its requirements of care, for 
example, cost of insurance, maintenance, our time. etc. 
 The use of the concept of happiness or flourishing, as it has been for Aristotle, Aquinas, 
Kant, Bentham, Mill and many others, will continue to be of primary importance to the future of 
humankind and Earth and can be of extreme importance in displacing the present perceived 
primary importance of material wealth, consumerism, economic growth, pleasure and other things 
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which “promise” but (if we are honest with ourselves and others) fail to produce those results. 
Further, those items when subjected to Aquinas’s psychological process confirm the opposite 
results. Therefore, Aquinas's Treatise on Happiness with its emphasis on the need for some 
ultimate moral end which is reasonable for both the individual and her/his community present and 
future, is extremely valuable in this twenty-first century.  
 Some ultimate end is necessary for all humans as it is for both Aristotle and Aquinas—
perhaps preservation of Earth to the extent possible for the promotion of all life on Earth present 
and future through proper primility or another new or revised virtue. As Aquinas capably argues, 
it will not consist in any of those items listed above on page 226. In addition, it is consistent with 
proper primility, the combination of proper humility and proper pride as defined in Chapter 11. 
Aquinas's position on happiness is as good today (maybe better) than it was in the thirteenth 
century. Therefore, it should continue to be taught, embraced and implemented. In Human Acts, 
Aquinas details his psychology for acquiring happiness. 
 (2) Treatise on Human Acts  
 (a) Generally - Aristotle’s psychology organized by Aquinas 
 Aquinas's Human Acts immediately follows Happiness because it is through his concept 
of the “human act” that the individual finds that happiness or flourishing. This treatise addresses 
and details the acts necessary for the origination of an end, for the required intermediate events of 
thought about and action for that end, and for the means— the object—of achieving that act’s end. 
Further, that process can guarantee that the identified end is moral and, therefore, represents the 
good for not only the individual but also for her/his community on which each individual depends 
now more than ever in the past. Therefore, careful attention to this process seems capable of 
providing the basis for achieving the good and for avoiding apparent but false goods and for 
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promoting a new or revised virtue, always keeping in mind that Aristotle and Aquinas following 
him, agree that habituation is necessary for all Human Acts if they are good. Human Acts include 
the measures for the formation of virtues where the virtues are the measures for achieving 
happiness and flourishing. (Williams, pp.428, Q13a3r2) 
 Aquinas's process is argued as capable of achieving the climate change goals of mitigation 
and adaptation. Its value is evident though the following summary. Initially, it is necessary to 
understand Aquinas's differentiation between "human acts" and "acts of human beings". Aquinas 
defines "human acts" as those willed, voluntary acts that result from rational, moral deliberation. 
(Williams, p.376, Q6)  In this dissertation, the terms “human act” and “human acts” use initial 
capitals to ensure that those terms are recognized specifically as those of Aquinas. Also, as Aquinas 
states, Human Acts are always for the sake of an end where that end can be a good end or an end 
perceived as good—an apparently good end which for Aquinas is a bad end. All other acts that are 
not so willed, Aquinas calls "acts of human beings" which are somewhat difficult to find because 
Aquinas states that even an "idle word" can have good or bad effects. (Williams, pp.471, Q18a9)  
 (b)   Aquinas’s Interior Acts and Exterior Acts generally 
 In Human Acts, Aquinas names twelve possible individual events or acts that identify his 
process from inception to completion of the Human Act. Those twelve acts are explained in detail 
in Section (1)(d) below but are first explained generally concerning their interaction. Aquinas’s 
process codifies Aristotle and identifies the separate events or acts through which an individual 
makes a decision for acting. Therefore, it applies to practically every voluntary movement of the 
individual’s body.167 I argue that using Aquinas’s process, when consciously adopted, greatly 
assists in the everyday individual decisions necessary to meaningfully move toward mitigation of, 
      
167 An example of a movement or action that would not qualify as voluntary, would be the motion of the human heart 
pumping blood or an action where the individual was not in control of her/his own movements. 
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and adaptation to, climate change. I argue that this assistance is provided by recognizing that these 
possible twelve events are discrete opportunities for using (1) Aristotle’s states of continence and 
incontinence, (2) Broadie’s Contingent Conclusion, and (3) the motivation of the Aidōs Response. 
 Aquinas’s Human Act involves both the individual’s power of the intellect and the 
individual’s power of the will where both are rational powers. (Williams, p.409, Q10a2) The 
intellect makes use of the individual’s cognitive powers those being knowledge, imagination, 
wisdom and reasoning to instruct the individual’s will and, therefore, the individual’s action 
through the development of both the act’s end and the object necessary to achieve that end. The 
will makes use of its ability to initiate action in itself and also to initiate action through the separate 
powers of the motive parts of the individual, i.e., the individual’s muscles, and other motive 
components of the human body.   
 For Aquinas, the will’s power is restricted to accepting or rejecting intellect’s instructions 
because the will itself has no power to change the details of either the end or the object as presented 
by the intellect. Aquinas states: 
Now there are two ways in which a power of the soul can be in potentiality to 
diverse things: [first] with respect to acting and not acting, and [second] with 
respect to doing this or that. … The exercise of the act depends on the subject, 
which sometimes acts and sometimes does not act [by the power of the will]; but 
the determination of the act depends on the object by which the act is specified [by 
the power of the intellect]. 
 
(Emphasis added; Williams, p.399-400, Q9a1) Intellect’s reason determines the “doing this or 
that” while the will acts or doesn’t act. The intellect controls the generation of the details of the 
doing of the act but the will determines whether the act will occur or not. Aquinas confirms this in 
Question 10 and adds an additional characterization: "particular goods … can be regarded as not-
good insofar as they are lacking some good; thus, depending on how one looks at them, the will 
can either reject them or approve them … ." (Emphasis added; Williams, p.410, Q10a2; see also, 
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p.397-98, Q9a1; p.381, Q6a3) Based on the above references, the will can only act or not act, and, 
through this response to the intellect, either reject or approve goods or apparent goods as presented 
by the intellect. 
 Of the twelve possible acts, he assigns six to the reason of the individual’s intellect and the 
other six to the individual’s will. The intellect and the will interact in the following manner: the 
intellect initiates the idea of the action including its end and object and provides those ideas as 
instructions to the will. The involved end can be a good end or an apparently good (but bad) end. 
The will does not have the power to revise the details of the intellect’s instruction but does have 
the power to accept or reject that instruction. If it rejects, the process can begin again. If it accepts, 
then the intellect once again takes charge and moves on to its next act in the process. Each of those 
possible twelve acts is subject to the Aristotelian process of habituation where hopefully those 
habits that the individual literally creates will be virtuous and not vicious. The twelve acts and 
their associated citations are provided and explained in detail at C.(2)(d) below and in Appendix 
B. 
 He places the initial eight acts of the intellect and the will where the will exercises its own 
internal power in his Order of Intention. These acts are totally within the control of the agent 
because they are internal to the agent and depend solely on the agent’s power of will. When the 
act uses the individual’s muscles and other bodily physical components, Aquinas places these four 
acts in his Order of Execution. While the will has the power to direct those other powers, Aquinas 
now recognizes that in the Order of Execution the action is underway and, while the action may 
possibly be aborted by the individual, the details of the implementation of the act cannot now be 
changed by either the intellect or the will but can be somewhat influenced by the agent as explained 
below in his Question 20 and certainly by forces outside the agent (such as climate).  Those exterior 
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forces and obstacles, of course, may frustrate those exterior acts and the actualization of the 
intended end. (Williams, p.484, Q19a8) 
 In addition, Aquinas names the eight specific acts of the intellect and the will where those 
acts of the will originate through the will’s own power, “interior acts” that make up his Order of 
Intention. Aquinas names the four remaining possible acts “exterior acts,” which occur in his Order 
of Execution. While those four acts occur in that Order of Execution, they are planned in the Order 
of Intention.  
 (c) Aquinas’s Object, End and Circumstances and their goodness and badness 
 David Gallagher summarizes and explains Aquinas’s moral Human Acts in his essay 
“Aquinas on Moral Action: Interior and Exterior Acts”.168 Gallagher’s essay covers most of the 
above as the requirements of Aquinas’s Human Act and, therefore, is recommended as a good read 
involving Aquinas’s Human Acts. Gallagher states that for Aquinas the three elements that 
determine the moral goodness of an act are “1) the object of the act, 2) the end for which it is done, 
and 3) the circumstances which surround it”. He elaborates: “The object of the act is what is done; 
the end is why the agent does it. … .  Properly speaking, circumstances alone [for Aquinas] do not 
make an act good or bad, but only increase or diminish the goodness or badness contributed by the 
other two elements.” (Gallagher, p.119) The object of the act provides the means through which 
the end is achieved. Hereinafter, the word “object” includes those “means”. 
 To explain these elements, Aquinas and Gallagher use the example of an agent who gives 
alms to the poor where this “giving” is the object of the act—what happens in the world.169 The 
end of the act is the agent’s motive and could be one of a number of things; two of which could be 
      
168 David Gallagher, "Aquinas on Moral Action: Interior and Exterior Acts" in Proceedings of the American Catholic 
Association, vol. 64, 1990, pp. 118-129., herein referenced as "Gallagher, p.__". 
169 While Aristotle could not be found to have used this precise example, the example is consistent with Aristotle's 
text. (See Ross, p.61 (1120a15-31)) 
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assisting the poor or could be improving the agent’s image in his community. The first is a good 
end while the second is a bad end because it is self-serving and results from the vice of vanity. For 
Aristotle and Aquinas, one bad element in the twelve possible acts is enough to render the entire 
action bad. Consequently, attention to all of these acts is important. 
 As further suggested in this example, the agent steals the funds which are given which is 
obviously bad for Aristotle and Aquinas in any set of end, object and circumstances. This method 
of acquiring funds could be seen as the circumstance of “how” or, as Aquinas explains, it can 
become part of the object and then render the object bad in its entirety and not only in regard to 
increasing or diminishing that result.170 (Williams, pp.472-73, Q18a10; Gallagher, p.119fn3) 
Because of the difficulty of determining whether a detail of an act is part of the object or is simply 
a circumstance, hereinafter all “circumstances” are included in the “object” of the action. The 
complexity of the world today introduces the possibility of goodness or badness much more 
frequently in the elements of actions that Aristotle and Aquinas call “circumstances” and especially 
for actions addressing climate change. Actually, while attempting to retain the distinction between 
object and circumstances in the first portion of his essay, Gallagher also in finishing his essay 
includes “circumstances” in the “object”.  (Gallagher, p.124fn19) 
 Concerning the end, Aquinas always uses the word “end” as the name of this element which 
describes the agent’s motive for the act. In the alms giving example, the end is, of course, why the 
agent does the act and, for Aristotle and Aquinas, is the important element and could be generosity 
in the form of assistance to the poor (which is good) or could be vanity and the improvement of 
the agent’s reputation in the his/her community (which is bad). The object of giving to the poor is 
      
170 “Circumstances” are explained by Aquinas referencing Aristotle as “who, what, where, by what helps, why, how, 
when". (Williams, p.392, Q7a3) Aquinas explains that Aristotle's "particulars" (also "circumstances; "Ross, 
p.40;1110b34)) are external to the act but can be important in determining the morality of any possible human act. 
(Human Acts, p.389, Q7)   
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a good in itself but can become bad as a result of the end.171 Concerning, for example, climate 
change, adaptation and mitigation would be part of the object as well as the reduction of CO2 and 
other greenhouse gases in the troposphere. The end would be a future climate that promotes future 
life. However, the present object today of burning fossil fuel to produce energy is the “apparently 
good (but bad) end”.172 Because of our past habituation and addiction to fossil fuel energy, it 
cannot be eliminated immediately even though it is bad. But its use needs to be reduced to zero as 
soon as possible.  For climate change, that explains the end where the object also needs to include 
a carbon tax and/or a better method for reducing CO2 and the other greenhouse gases.   
 (d)  Aquinas’s Interior Acts and Exterior Acts 
  Aquinas explains the twelve possible events of the Human Act in Questions 11 through 17 
of Human Acts. Recall that the first eight are in Aquinas’s Order of Intention and are named 
“internal acts” because they are totally controlled by the agent. The final four acts are in his Order 
of Execution and are named “external acts” because they are no longer within the total control of 
the agent after they originate in the Order of Intention. To assist in understanding the twelve acts, 
Appendix B is included which also contains the citations for both the Aquinas and Aristotle 
references. Further, though the order of the internal acts can vary, the order used here and in 
Appendix B assists explanation.173 
 In the Order of Intention, Aquinas names the four possible acts of the intellect 
“apprehensive” acts collectively and “perception”, “presentation”, “deliberation”, and “judgment” 
      
171 Gallagher points out that Aquinas at least once specifically suggests that the end is included in the object which 
Gallagher states causes a certain ambiguity in Aquinas’s use of the word “object”. (Williams, p.,466-67, Q18a6; 
Gallagher, p. 125) While Gallagher notes that, for Aquinas, the end maybe included in the object, it seems to be 
included only as recognition of what the object must keep in mind.  
172 As explained in Part I, CO2 is only one of the greenhouse gases but it is by far the most important because of the 
quantity generated through the combustion of fossil fuels. 
173 Citations to the Aquinas and Aristotle texts that explain these acts are not given in text in order to avoid clutter but 
are provided in the chart attached as “Appendix B”. 
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individually. Each of these apprehensive acts is followed by one of the four possible responsive 
acts of the will named “appetitive” acts collectively and “wish”, “intention”, “consent”, and 
“choice” individually. Intellect’s reason initiates an apprehensive act and the will responds with 
its appetitive act. In the first four acts in the Order of Intention, the intellect and the will determine 
the act’s end. In the second four acts, the intellect and the will determine the act’s object. Also, 
any of these first eight possible acts can determine the goodness or badness of the act as described 
below. Aquinas places the last four acts in his Order of Execution where the end can be actualized.  
As explained, these four acts can still be aborted through the efforts of the agent but the details of 
the act as finalized in the act of choice cannot be discarded for alternative acts. 
 Questions 11 through 17 of Aquinas’s Human Acts detail the six possible apprehensive 
exercises or acts of the intellect and the six possible appetitive responsive acts of the will that 
collectively take the Human Act from the intellect's “perception” of an end to the will’s 
“enjoyment” of that end. Those Questions also describe the method through which those acts of 
the will and the intellect interact.  
 The power of the intellect constructs the details of the act while the power of the will 
provides the doing necessary for the realization of the act. The first two acts of the intellect of 
perception and presentation and the two responsive acts of the will, wish and intention, establish 
the end of the Human Act. The next two acts of the intellect of deliberation and judgment and the 
two responsive acts of the will, consent and choice, establish the object necessary to reach the end. 
 Concerning deliberation, while Aquinas identifies a specific act of deliberation, Aquinas 
also states generally that “You see, since it is reason’s job to direct, if an act that proceeds from 
deliberative reason is not directed to an appropriate end, that very fact makes the act repugnant to 
reason, and the act is bad.” (Williams, p.471, Q18a9)  Consequently, it seems as though the 
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intellect relies on deliberative reason for all of its acts that instruct the will. However, the intellect’s 
specific act of deliberation regards the act’s object. 
  It is important to detail the nature of each of these possible acts. While all twelve acts of 
Aquinas’s process may not be used when the act is simple such as opening a door to go outside, 
all twelve acts can be illustrated through a common end such as “enjoy a healthy dinner”. Here the 
first exercise of the intellect is "perception" of the good end, “enjoy a healthy dinner”. The first 
responsive act of the will is "wish" through which Aquinas provides that the agent’s will approves 
that perception of “enjoy a healthy dinner” as the end of a possible action. Of course, the will could 
reject that because there may be a host of other acts needed before planning to “enjoy a healthy 
dinner”. But just assuming that now is a good time to think about enjoying a healthy dinner, the 
will accepts that preliminary instruction of the intellect. Aquinas then gives the intellect and the 
will the opportunity to think more seriously about that end in the intellect’s act of presentation and 
the will’s finalizing that end in its act of intention. Aquinas supports this result of first finalizing 
the end through the acts prior to and including the will’s act of “intention” when he states: “[T]here 
can be intention of an end even when one has not yet figured out the things that are for the end 
which are the objects of choice.” (Williams, p.422, Q12a4r3) 
 Having the end finalized, the process then moves to two further acts of the intellect and 
two acts of the will where these four acts, of course, are still within the Order of Intention. The 
intellect first “deliberates” about the generation of the object or what happens in the world to 
accomplish the end. The intellect could suggest "eat out at a restaurant".  The will in its act of 
“consent” can respond with an acceptance of "sounds good" or “let's review that” because of the 
habit of considering cost or increased fossil fuel use or home cooking is always healthier, etc. In 
the event of rejection, the intellect can then revise its deliberation instruction to the object of "a 
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home-cooked meal of pot roast, mashed potatoes, green beans, salad and low-calorie dessert". If 
the will “consents” to that instruction, that object is once again considered by the intellect in its act 
of “judgment” where the intellect can apparently embellish that object further through the 
instruction to “drive to the store for those ingredients and cook them at home”. The will then 
responds with its acceptance or rejection through Aquinas’s act of "choice". 
 The will could agree or could reject possibly on the basis of the habit of looking in the 
freezer to see if the ingredients can be found there. If the latter, the intellect could revisit its act of 
"judgment" and recommend "go to the store for pot roast" because the other ingredients were found 
in the freezer or it could suggest "no need to go the store because there is salmon in the freezer" 
which is healthier. At that point, the will through its act of "choice" resolves the determination of 
the dinner ingredients and how those ingredients will be obtained and prepared. Aquinas’s 
procedure up to “choice” has provided as many as eight opportunities to question the morality of 
the intellect’s perception of the act where that questioning is based on the prior habituation of both 
the intellect and the will possibly through the individual’s prior opportunities of Aristotle’s states 
of continence and incontinence, Broadie’s Contingent Conclusion, and/or the Aidōs Response. If 
any one of those opportunities indicates a bad item, the entire act is doomed to be bad. That process 
has allowed consideration, for example, of the morality of any use of fossil fuel through use of an 
automobile or through use of natural gas which might produce less CO2 or through use of electrical 
energy from the solar panels on the roof which would produce no CO2.  And there are still four 
more acts where morality can further be questioned.  
 After choice, those remaining possible two acts of the intellect and two acts of the will that 
bring the end to “enjoyment” or fruition are again part of Aquinas's Order of Execution. 
Immediately following the will’s acceptance through "choice," the intellect exercises "command" 
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through which. for example, it suggests the actual movements of the muscles and the timing 
necessary for preparation of the dinner. Again, the will, the appetitive actor, through its act of 
“use” responds and rejects or employs the instruction through the other powers that must be 
involved. Again, the opportunity for accepting or rejecting arises if the will’s prior habituation 
does not conform or if, for example, the Aidōs Response suggests something better. Possibly prior 
habituation requires that, if the clouds are opening, it is better to wait to allow the sun to generate 
electrical energy through use of the solar panels. If the will accepts that command, the intellect 
through its exercise of "execution" apparently reconsiders or endorses that use. If the intellect 
endorses, the will and the intellect then have the pleasure of the experience of the healthy dinner 
through exercise of the will’s act of "enjoyment".  
 While Aquinas specifically restricts the act of “choice” to the determination of the things 
that are for the end (i.e., the object of the act— the measures to achieve the end) and not to the end 
itself, he also states that there can be “choice” between and among proximate ends: “Whenever 
there is more than one end, there can be choice among the various ends insofar as they are directed 
toward a further end.” (Williams, p.428, Q13a3, Q13a3r2) This seems to provide that Aquinas 
recognizes that his twelve-step psychology can be used to make choices among various proximate 
ends and not only among available objects. This would suggest that in making choices between 
various proximate ends, the agent would utilize the internal acts in the Order of Intention and not 
the external acts because this decision is not one that is necessarily made “in the world”. The 
opportunity for seeking third-party advice seems always to be available in Aquinas’s specific act 
of deliberation and possibly in the intellect’s other acts. 
 The importance of the eight acts in the Order of Intention resides in the opportunity to 
review possible alternatives for the end and the object and then choose the most suitable object to 
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morally achieve the end while the four acts in the Order of Execution provide further opportunities 
for assessing the morality of the act and continuing toward, or aborting, the achievement of the 
end. As examples of possible acts that presently require some electricity generated through the 
burning of fossil fuel and that therefore will exacerbate climate change, the following are offered:  
• Provide a meal as above. 
• Operating an automobile through the use of the power generated by a fossil fuel internal 
combustion engine that produces CO2 (among a few other unhealthy compounds) or 
through the use of electricity generated by a fossil fuel electric utility or by solar panels.  
• Boiling water through combustion of natural gas or propane on the stove top or through 
use of electricity as generated above. 
• Turning on a water faucet that requires electricity to operate the pump needed to keep 
pressure on the water pipe through the use of electrical power generated as above.  
• Turning up the temperature in the house or building (1) through use of a fossil fuel furnace 
at the house or building or (2) through a heat pump at the house or building both of which 
use electricity generated as above. 
• Turning down the temperature in an air-conditioned house or building through use of 
electricity generated as above.  
• Turning electric lights on in a home or building or at a sports stadium or field through use 
of electricity generated as above. 
• Turning on the computer or TV through use of electricity generated as above. 
• Any other activity that requires electricity generated as above. 
 
Concerning climate change, all of those actions must be powered by solar panels or curtailed to 
the extent possible if powered by fossil fuel generated electricity to minimize the generation of 
CO2. Unfortunately, very little present thought is involved in those actions if we even think about 
them because, since about 1960, they have involved little relative cost. However, before about 
1960, they were kept to a minimum to save money - all of them. Also, keep in mind that in 1960 
there were only about three billion people on Earth and now there are about seven billion and 
estimated at about nine to eleven billion by 2050. Also, in 1960 most households only had one 
vehicle and now have two, three or four. In addition, few homes and buildings (except in the 
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southern states) were air-conditioned and now most all are air-conditioned throughout the United 
States where that use requires large quantities of electrical energy. 
 Therefore, Aquinas's psychology (or at least an equivalent psychology) for making 
decisions about the generation of CO2 has become extremely important. That decision process can 
include those possible six acts of the intellect and as many acts of the will. Keep in mind that both 
Aquinas and Aristotle maintain that the intellect generates all the ends such as providing a healthy 
dinner or picking up one’s son or daughter after school, etc. (actions that require the generation of 
CO2) and the object (vehicle trips, use of electricity and natural gas, etc.) for attaining those ends 
(providing a healthy dinner, picking up children, etc.). The intellect has the knowledge, 
recollection, and reasoning necessary to generate those ends and the necessary objects. The will 
has the power to reject or implement those ends and those objects but, without the necessary 
habituation, that rejection will never occur. That habituation can only occur through education and 
repeated actions and the above process must become second nature to produce that habituation. 
  Most if not all of above twelve acts of Aristotle/Aquinas that involve the human intellect 
and will can be necessary for complex decisions. For many ends, there are fewer necessary acts 
because of the lack of complexity of the ends involved. If we are attempting to open a door, the 
intellect's act of deliberation may include only whether it will be done with the left or right hand 
but, if it is a door to the cold out-of-doors, the thought of opening the door less often may be 
appropriate. However, with most ends and objects in this twenty-first century, the use of 
considerable quantities of energy will be required where the generation of that energy from fossil 
fuel will produce CO2. Therefore, those ends and objects must be considered as complex and 
therefore requiring consideration of many if not all of the twelve acts of the Aristotle/Aquinas 
psychology or some equivalent psychology.  
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The moral psychology found in Aquinas's Human Acts provides a process which obviously 
cannot be employed in making every decision that faces a human being on a day-to-day basis. 
However, it or a similar process must be embraced globally by individual humans to begin to 
adequately address the mitigation of, and adaptation to, climate change and, in addition, generally 
in making important decisions such as determining how wealth, time, energy and honour (among 
other aspects of life) should be morally employed. The vocabulary of that process may arguably 
need some review but Aquinas’s framework seems conducive to proper moral thought, especially 
the idea of the importance of habituation in assisting in the generation and realization of moral 
ends and objects. 
 (e) The requirement of habituation 
 Because of the requirement of the generation of good habits for both Aristotle and Aquinas, 
an explanation of the development of habituation in both the will and the intellect is important. 
Initially, Aquinas confirms that "acts of the will and of reason can be directed to each other ... an 
act of the will proceeds from an act of reason and vice versa." (Williams, p.448; Q17a1) He also 
cites Aristotle for the proposition that while the intellect rules over the will, that rule is not 
dictatorial but of a "constitutional and royal rule" nature (Everson, p.16 (1254b3-7); Human Acts, 
p.455, Q17a7) and, consequently, again both the intellect and the will can change the morality of 
an act and acts of the intellect influence acts of the will and vice versa. In Question 20, Aquinas 
specifically provides that an act of will can change the moral nature of the human act when he 
states that "moral goodness and badness resides primarily in the will." (Williams, p.490, Q20a1) 
However, the will cannot change the details of the act because again it can only accept or reject 
the instruction of the intellect as good or bad based on prior habituation.  
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 Aquinas is clear in describing the inability of the will to revise the details of any of 
intellect's apprehensive instructions.  In Article 2 of Question 20, the question presented is whether 
the morality of the exterior act depends totally on the will. Aquinas's answer is that it does not. 
Relying on other portions of the Summa Theologicae and Aristotle’s central importance of 
habituation, Aquinas argues that the will through habituation has the power of acceptance or 
rejection of both the end and the object of a Human Act. That power is the power to simply accept 
or reject intellect's apprehensive instruction where that ability is associated with the generation of 
habits in powers (FF, p.331, Q50a2)174 such as the will because again habits result from actions 
and repeated actions. 
Aquinas defines "habit" with Aristotle as "a disposition in accord with which what is 
disposed is disposed either well or badly, and this either in its own right or with respect to another ... 
in the way that health is a certain habit.” (FF, p.326, Q49a1; see Barnes, p.1614 (1122b10-12))  Further, 
"As for the nature of the habit, it belongs to every habit to have in some way an ordering toward an 
act. ... . Hence, a habit implies an ordering not only to the thing’s very nature but also, as a consequence, 
to an [act], insofar as that [act] is the end of the nature or something that leads to that end." (FF, p,329; 
Q49a3) As a result, habit of both the will and the intellect is ordered to both an act's end and object but 
it can be ordered to each differently which is confirmed in Article 8 of Question 19. (Williams, p.484-
485, Q19a8) There, Aquinas states and argues that “[i]t is possible for an intention to be good but the 
will bad.” 
 Again, for Aquinas, both the will and the intellect are powers and habituated powers. (FF, 
p.328, Q49a4r3; p.334, Q50a5; p.349, Q53a1) Because the influence of intellect's reason in the 
presentation of an end or object can be inconsistent relative to good and bad, that seems to indicate 
      
174 Alfred J. Freddoso, New English Translation of St. Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae (Summa Theologica) 
(University of Notre Dame) which is available at http://www.nd.edu/~afreddos/summa-translation/TOC.htm. 
Citations are similar to those given in footnote 158 but are preceded by "FF".   
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that reason's intellect, which is again capable of habituation (FF, pp.333-34, Q50a4), can be 
differently habituated in relation to the end and to the object. That ability is again associated with 
the generation of habits in powers (FF, p.331, Q50a2) such as the will because habits result from 
actions and repeated actions. (FF, p.340, Q51a3) In other words, the end may involve the reduction 
of the use of fossil fuels while the object can require excessive use of fossil fuels, for example, 
“let’s eat at home but make three trips to the store.” 
 The process of habituation is as follows. If the will is drawn to, influenced toward, or 
attracted to a particular act as presented by the intellect, then, once attracted, the will may only act 
or not act because those are its only options. However, once habits begin to form, the result changes 
from the will being drawn to the idea of the action suggested by the intellect to the result that the 
will, with the assistance of the habit, becomes disposed toward or against that suggested action. In 
other words, the nature of the will's desire initially is simply drawn to a suggested action through 
whatever desires are present but then, with the assistance of habit, can change to the disposition of 
embracing or rejecting that action through the will’s applicable habituated virtues or vices and 
hopefully virtues. 
 Further, if the presented action is recognized as good, an individual may not need to reflect 
on her/his habituation because habits can become automatic. However, if the action is bad, 
conscious reflection is necessary, for example, through the use of continence and incontinence, 
Broadie’s Contingent Conclusion, and/or the Aidōs Response. In any event, reflection provides 
reinforcement for the good in the individual's habit repertory and also constant presentation can 
illustrate the need for rectification of a bad in that repertory. To illustrate, both the intellect and 
the will can develop the habit that requires certain circumstances to turn the heat up from 68 to 
72°F or develop the habit of putting on a sweater or coat. The intellect may say "I'm cold" and 
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present the alternative of turning up the heat and the will may then because of habituation reject 
that action because it has become a habit for the will to reject turning up the heat in favor of putting 
on a sweater or coat. In any event, both the intellect and the will, for Aquinas can develop habits 
either good or bad. If the will is confronted with something that is not in its habit repertory, the 
will seems required to follow the intellect's recommendation. 
The important benefit of this process involves the availability of opportunities to question 
the intended act and its morality and to develop good habits. The process, therefore, provides 
illumination of moral concerns associated with an apparently good (but bad) end such as “use 
fossil fuels” and then requiring avoidance of the use of any fossil fuels. 
 (f) Further determination of the goodness or badness of a Human Act 
 The primary purpose of Aquinas’s psychology is the determination of goodness or badness 
before acting. Aquinas confirms that every Human Act is not necessarily good because the initial 
perception of the end, while it may seem good to the agent, may only be an apparently good (but 
bad) end which is, therefore, "deficient". (Williams, p.461, Q18a1r1; p.464, Q1a4r1)  Aquinas in 
Questions 18 through 20 explains further how human acts can be determined to be good or bad. 
Because habituation can be either good or bad, we can become habituated to apparent goods rather 
than goods. Therefore, an individual must continually question her/his habituation. Also, in 
Question 19, Aquinas explains that “good and bad are intrinsic differences of an act of will because 
good and bad pertain to the will intrinsically, just as true and false pertain to reason intrinsically 
… .”  and, therefore, to acts of the intellect as well. (Williams, p.475, Q19a1)  
 While the goodness and badness of an act relate to the will, because it is the acting element 
in a Human Act, the will receives its instruction from the intellect where that instruction can be 
either good or bad. Aquinas also states in Question 18 that goodness and badness can be the result 
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of the end, the object or the circumstances of the act as described above. If any of those items 
indicate the presence of a vice, that item or those items make the entire act bad. While Aquinas 
discusses badness at some length, he also seems to indicate that there are opportunities for 
eliminating badness that are found in his twelve-step process. He states:    
[A]ssuming that someone seeks an empty reputation, he will sin if he does what is 
necessary for him to achieve such a reputation, … . Even so, he is not in a state of 
perplexity, because he can get rid of his bad intention. And similarly, assuming a 
mistake of reason or conscience that arises from nonexcusing ignorance, something 
bad in the will necessarily follows yet one is not in a state of perplexity, because one 
can correct the mistake, since the ignorance is voluntary and can be overcome. 
 
(Williams, p.482, Q19a6r3)  The idea of the ability to “get rid of his bad intention” seems to be 
through the will’s rejection of the intellect’s intention as found in its act of “presentation” where 
the exercise within the Order of Intention then seems to return to the intellect to suggest another 
intention, this time hopefully good. In other words, the opportunity for the “get rid” seems to result 
from the will’s ability to reject the intellect’s bad intention that has been provided. On the other 
hand, if the instruction of the intellect is good and the will rejects that instruction, then the will by 
definition is bad. Further, Aquinas seems to provide that a mistake of reason or conscience can 
occur but that it can “be overcome”. (Williams, p.479, Q19a5)  Again, it seems that the correction 
takes place as a result of a rejection by the will. All of this accentuates the importance of 
habituation. 
 It is also possible for the intellect to generate a good end and then generate a bad object as 
a result of habit or mistake. (Williams, p.484-85, Q19a8; p.482, Q19a6r3)  Both the end and the 
object can be apparently good or one can be apparently good while the other is actually good. In 
either case, the entire Human Act is bad because a single bad in a Human Act makes the whole act 
bad. Aquinas states: “It is important to note that (as I said above [I-II.19.6 resp. 1]) one individual 
defect is sufficient for something to be bad, whereas in order for something to be unqualifiedly 
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good, one individual good is not enough; instead, complete goodness is necessary.” (Williams, p. 
491, Q19a2) Again, habituation is necessary to avoid defects in a Human Act. 
 The goodness or badness of the exterior acts is a special problem for Aquinas and he 
devotes Question 20 to that matter. The exterior acts are formulated through the interior acts and, 
therefore, will have a certain goodness or badness after completion of the will’s act of choice. The 
intellect’s acts are command and execution which relate to the determination of the exterior powers 
other than that of the will where the will seems to be able to energize those exterior powers but 
does not directly control their activities. Also, recall that the will’s exterior acts can be interrupted 
by outside obstacles. However, it still seems that the will can, through its powers of acceptance 
and rejection, decide that its powers of “use” and “enjoyment” should or should not act. Therefore, 
the question seems to be whether intellect’s reason can somehow affect the goodness or badness 
of its acts through its command and execution acts. 
 Possibly to keep interest alive in the exterior acts, Aquinas raises the argument that they 
can be good or bad in two ways:  
[O]ne based on appropriate matter and circumstances, the other based on [the 
exterior act’s] order to an end. And of course the one that depends on its order to 
an end depends wholly on the will. But the one that derives from appropriate matter 
or circumstances depends on reason, and the goodness of the will insofar as it is 
drawn to that act depends in turn on this second goodness. 
 
(Emphasis in original; Williams, p.491, Q20a2)  The “order to an end” goodness or badness of the 
will seems to be clearly in the will’s decision to accept or reject. The will when making that 
decision must keep the end as its focus of determination. If the end is good, the act can be good. If 
the end is an apparently good (but bad) end, the act will be bad.  Again, habituation determines the 
will’s decision. 
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 When one observes the second way—deriving from appropriate matter and/or 
circumstances depending on reason—if it involves an inappropriate instruction, the will is, of 
course, involved in deciding to accept or reject. Now the will’s involvement depends upon the will 
being drawn toward or disposed to the instruction provided. If the instruction is bad and if the will 
is drawn toward or disposed to that instruction, then the act is bad. While reason formulated the 
bad instruction in the Order of Intention, the badness of the act depends upon the will’s acceptance 
of that instruction. This seems like “a second bite at the apple” because the will apparently had its 
first bite through its act of choice. However, here matter and circumstances are at issue, and not 
the end. While the will should be focused on the end involved, the matter and circumstances may 
be sufficient to distract the will. 
 Aquinas provides one more thought about the exterior act when he questions whether that 
act can add any goodness or badness beyond that which is already in the exterior act because of an 
interior act. He states that there are three ways through which that can occur where they all 
individually seem to involve either the persistence of the agent (or agents) or the intensity of the 
agent with which the act is done. Obviously, agents act differently in terms of both persistence and 
intensity in the manner in which the agent addresses the object of the act. This difference can be 
easily observed and possibly Aquinas is, through this Question, encouraging both of these 
attributes and, in that way, is making use of the exterior acts.175  
 Aquinas does caution that some acts can be indifferent in species such as "walking through 
a field". (Williams, p.469, Q18a8)  Consequently, indifferent acts are not moral acts and, therefore, 
would not be Human Acts but acts of a human being. However, again, Aquinas says that all 
      
175 In these exterior acts in which reason is involved, and if there is goodness in either the end or the matter and/or 
circumstances, Aquinas even argues that apparently the goodness of the one can "overflow" into the other if the agent 
will encourage that overflow. (Williams, p.492, Q20a3) 
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"individual acts" have the potential to be Human Acts because even an "idle word" can have moral 
implications and, therefore, be a Human Act. (Williams, p.470, Q18a9) That is especially true 
today where practically all (if not all) of our acts involve some generation of CO2 through the use 
of fossil fuel electrical energy where that CO2 affects all present and future life on this Earth 
through climate change. 
 In addition to arguing the goodness or badness of an act in relation to other individuals, 
Aquinas also argues that an individual good or bad Human Act will not only affect the agent and 
another individual but also the entire community of which the agent is a part. This is an important 
aspect of Aquinas’s psychology. His Question 21, the last in the Human Acts treatise, does discuss 
the two kinds of end, ultimate and proximate. The ultimate end is, of course, that happiness or 
flourishing which Aristotle argues can be enjoyed during life and Aquinas argues cannot be 
experienced in this life but only after death. A proximate end however should be ordered to the 
ultimate end and again can be either good or bad. Aquinas also states that a Human Act is 
praiseworthy or blameworthy "simply because it is good or bad." (Williams, p.499, Q21a2) He 
then considers whether a Human Act is "meritorious" or "demeritorious" simply because it is good 
or bad and concludes that those adjectives apply and are the result of the act’s badness or goodness. 
 However, he explains this result further on the basis of community:  
[I]t is important to note that everyone who lives in any society is in a way a part 
and a member of the whole society. So whatever anyone does for the good or bad 
of someone who lives in a society overflows into the whole society, as someone 
who causes injury to a hand causes injury to a person. Therefore, when someone 
acts for the good or bad of another individual, the act is meritorious or 
demeritorious in two ways: first, in that it deserves recompense from the individual 
who is helped or harmed; and second, in that it deserves recompense from society 
as a whole.  
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(Williams, p.500, Q21a3)  Recognition of the community is, of course, of central importance in all 
concepts of virtue ethics and especially that of Aristotle which Aquinas follows because 
community provides the opportunity for happiness and flourishing but, as a result, requires ethics.  
 Aquinas, in the last article of Question 21, argues that God cannot "acquire or lose anything 
in and of himself through a Human Act, but human beings, for their part, do take something away 
from God or offer something to him when they preserve, or fail to preserve, the order that God has 
instituted." (Williams, p.502, Q21a4r1) Even when a person does not accept the concept of God 
as originating that order, it seems that somewhere within every person there must, at least should, 
be the belief that that order is worthy of awe and should be preserved for an infinite number of 
reasons including the reason that it will be at least as important to future generations as it has been 
to generations past and present. 
 Concerning climate change, that order is maintenance of the approximate concentrations 
of CO2 and other greenhouse gases in the troposphere prior to the anthropogenic increases of those 
gases. Therefore, Aquinas's statement reflects the need for concern about order without necessarily 
involving concern about the origination of that order. However, recall Part II of this dissertation 
which referenced evidence that the United States has played the major role in the increases of CO2 
and a number of the other greenhouse gases until the last few years when other nations have for 
the first recent time exceeded the emissions of the United States. However, the per capita emissions 
of the United States are now only exceeded by Australia, a number of the fossil fuel producing 
countries, and a few much smaller countries.176 
      
176 “United Nations Statistics Division, Environmental Indicators, GHGs, Last update: July 2010” found at 
https://unstats.un.org/unsd/ENVIRONMENT/air_greenhouse_emissions.htm 
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 So, from an ethical theory point of view, what can Aristotelian ethics and Aquinas’s 
process as presently conceived offer as a point of departure for a virtue ethical theory that might 
be able to address some or many of the needs associated with climate change that neither utilitarian 
nor deontologic theories offer? Virtue ethics offers the following opportunities: the states of 
character of continency and incontinence which recognize the real world but within the ideal, 
Broadie’s Contingent Conclusion, and the Aidōs Response, where Aquinas’s codification of 
Aristotelian psychology provides for the implementation of all these opportunities. Actually, 
Broadie’s “Contingent Conclusion” can be revised without affecting any change in its effect 
through naming it “Contingent Choice” consistent with Aquinas. 
 In light of the above process and its twelve possible acts, an acceptable single Human Act 
can take much thought, time and energy of the involved agent or agents in considering both the 
object and the end of the action. As one might perceive, there has been much discussion about the 
need for some of the above twelve acts. However, the concept of the individual will responding in 
all the above acts to the intellect is a productive concept especially where the use of fossil fuel 
energy is involved. Each instruction and each response provides an opportunity for a moral 
assessment before an object or end is finalized. Further, through the increased use of this process 
and its increased habituation, the more quickly it will become second nature. Where both the will 
and the intellect are habituated and take the time and make the effort to reject the bad—more than 
likely the apparent good, more good choices will be made more easily.  
 For climate change, that requires less CO2 in the troposphere so that future generations will 
experience a more acceptable climate rather than an intolerable climate produced by excessive 
CO2 which will remain in the troposphere for centuries and possibly millennia.  
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(g) Precautionary Principle assistance 
 The precautionary principle has been invoked in 1992 in Item 3 of Article 3 of the 1992 
United Nations Framework Commission On Climate Change177 where that Principle is stated as 
follows:  
Principles: Article 3. The Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, 
prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects. 
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific 
certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures, taking into 
account the policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost-
effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost. 
 
In the last twenty-five years, this Principle has received little attention. A host of arguments have 
been made against this Principle by entities who have invested far too heavily in fossil fuel assets 
and production. These arguments have failed to address the basic science of climate change 
apparently for the primary reasons of greed and avarice. Also, the Precautionary Principle has been 
ignored even though the science of climate change continues to advance rapidly and the impact of 
climate change continues to worsen as revealed in the IPCC’s Assessment Report 5. As Stephen 
M. Gardiner argued in 2011:178 
[T]he precautionary principle is sometimes said to be vacuous, extreme, or myopic. 
There is something to these charges if the principle is conceived of in a completely 
open-ended way. But there are more restricted ways to understand it, and under 
these kinds of conditions the principle signals a reasonable concern. In addition, 
the case for precaution is stronger when the decision-makers are not those 
vulnerable to unacceptable outcomes, but impose the threat of them on 
innocent others. Given that the main actors have already accepted the need for 
precaution as part of the UNFCCC [the United Nations Framework Convention On 
Climate Change], the burden of proof on inaction is even greater. 
 
      
177 United Nations Framework Convention On Climate Change, 1992; Article 3, p.9, the United States is a signatory; 
http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/background_publications_htmlpdf/application/pdf/conveng.pdf 
178 (Emphasis added: Gardiner, Stephen M., A Perfect Moral Storm: The Ethical Tragedy of Climate Change (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), p.402) 
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This Principle can be implemented by Aquinas’s twelve step psychology to a much greater extent 
than without that psychology. The Precautionary Principle addresses a primary concern of climate 
change, the imposition of harm on nonexistent future generations by decision makers who are not 
those vulnerable to the unacceptable outcomes of climate change. Because the nations of Earth 
have stated the need for precaution and embraced the Precautionary Principle, Gardiner argues that 
the burden of proof for inaction becomes much greater and is placed squarely on those arguing 
inaction especially where their offered “proof” is bad science or where that proof is non-existent. 
Aquinas’s psychology can assist. 
  
 D. Aquinas on Law and the Common Welfare 
 Recognizing that climate change requires law for its adaptation and mitigation, both 
Aristotle’s thoughts179 and Aquinas’s thoughts about the laws enacted by society are relevant. 
Aquinas argues as follows in Question 97: “Changes in Human Law”, where Article 1 posed the 
question “Should human law in any way be changed?” As is his pattern, he presents a proposed 
answer contrary to his position in order to generate argument. For Question 97, he offers the 
argumentative answer as “It seems that human law should not in any way be changed … .” 
Aquinas’s “But contrary to this” response is “In De Libero Arbitrio 1 Augustine says, ‘Even if a 
temporal law is just, it can nonetheless be justifiably modified as time goes on.’” He states his 
Reply or response in part as: 
As was explained above (q. 91, a. 3), human law is a certain type of dictate of reason 
by which human acts are directed. Accordingly, there are two possible reasons 
why human law might justifiably be changed, one on the side of reason and the 
other on the side of the men whose acts are regulated by the law.  
 On the side of reason, it seems natural to human reason that it should 
gradually move from what is imperfect toward what is perfect. Hence, we see in 
      
179 Aristotle's thoughts the necessity of laws is found initially in the Nicomachean Ethics (Ross, p. 199-203 (1179b 
5-1181b25)) and then, of course, in his Politics. 
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the speculative sciences that those who first philosophized handed down what was 
imperfect and this was later made more perfect by their successors. The same thing 
holds true in the practical sciences. Those who first intended to discover 
something useful for the human community, unable to take everything into 
consideration on their own, instituted certain practices which were deficient 
in many ways and which their successors changed by instituting other 
practices that were less prone to fail with respect to the common welfare. 
 
(Italicized emphasis in original, bolded emphasis added; FF, p.665, Q97a1)180 The two ways that Aquinas 
presents should always control the legislative mind. Reason, as the first way, is obviously necessary because 
circumstances and conditions change and, as that change occurs, laws need to change to reasonably address 
those changes in present and anticipated situations. His second way seems unfortunately many times lost to 
greed and avarice. He suggests that lawmakers should intend “to discover something useful for the human 
community” but, because being human, those lawmakers cannot contemplate all circumstances that need to 
be addressed and, therefore, the laws that they pass will be imperfect. Consequently, the legislature who 
should discover things useful for the human community should be vigilant and continually be prepared to 
institute laws that are “less prone to fail with respect to the common welfare,” in other words, establishing 
laws that better serve the common welfare. Not unexpectedly, it seems that the lobbyists are continually 
successful in their efforts to have legislative bodies pass laws that serve the personal interest of those that can 
afford the fees of the lobbyists and also afford to support the legislators. Therefore, the concept of legislating 
for the common welfare seems lost. In addition, the “common welfare” is no longer only the welfare of the 
present generation but also that of the future generations of all life. It must again be noted, that at least in the 
1950s humanity had discovered that it was anthropogenically possible to change the global climate system.181 
      
180 Thomas Aquinas, Treatise on Law, trans. Alfred J. Freddoso (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2009), 
hereinafter referenced as “FF, p.__.” Also available at Alfred J. Freddoso, New English Translation of St. Thomas 
Aquinas's Summa Theologiae (Summa Theologica) (University of Notre Dame) at 
http://www.nd.edu/~afreddos/summa-translation/TOC.htm , p.28.  
181  Gilbert N. Plass (Michigan State University), “Effect of Carbon Dioxide Variations on Climate” in American 
Journal of Physics (1956) vol. 24, p376, 384, 385. 
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 Aquinas, in Article 2 of Question 97, asks: “Should human law always be changed when 
something better comes along?” As usual, he then presents an answer that is contrary to his own 
position; "It seems that human laws should always be changed when something better comes 
along …  . ”  His “But contrary to this” response is “Decretals, dist. 12, says, ‘It is a ridiculous 
and wholly abominable disgrace for us to break off the traditions which we have received from 
our fathers.’” In his Response, he reminds us that in Article 1, he recommends change when it 
serves “the common welfare”. (FF, p.72, Q97a2) 
 He also argues that custom “contributes to the observance” of laws and therefore, “the 
constraining force of law is diminished” when custom is nullified. He then argues that “human 
law should never be changed unless the damage done to the common welfare by the change 
is wholly compensated for in some other way.” (Emphasis added; FF, p.72, Q97a2)  He offers 
two ways in which this compensation can occur. The first he states is a change through which 
“some very great and obvious advantage comes from the new statute,” and second where “there is 
some urgent necessity stemming from the fact that the established law either involves a manifest 
iniquity or is such that its observance is very harmful.” (FF, p.72, Q97a2)182 Climate change meets 
all of these requirements for change where the iniquity is directed most importantly at future 
generations and for centuries if not millennia. 
 
E. Chapter Summary 
Aquinas’s codification of Aristotle’s psychology provides up to twelve different possible 
specific acts between the individual’s intellectual “perception of good” in terms of the ability to 
focus on the ends whether proximate or otherwise that are actually beneficial to the individual, 
      
182 Also available at http://www3.nd.edu/~afreddos/summa-translation/Part%201-2/st1-2-ques97.pdf   (p.665, Q97a2) 
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his/her community, and her/his enjoyment of attaining those ends. Again, Aquinas argues that it is 
the individual’s intellect which generates those ends while it is the individual’s will that mobilizes 
the effort necessary to attain those ends. For Aquinas and Aristotle, the intellect has the freedom 
to focus on the multitude of beneficial ends available and provide its instruction to the will. The 
will has the freedom to either reject or embrace the instruction presented. That process for the 
intellect begins with “perception” and depending on acceptance by the will, then proceeds through 
its work of “presentation”, “deliberation”, “judgment”, “command”, and “execution”. Upon the 
instruction of each of those acts by the intellect, the will has its own acts of rejection or acceptance 
through its acts of “wish”, “intention”, “consent”, “choice”, “use”, and finally “enjoyment”. 
If an individual considers each of those opportunities of both of the intellect and the will, 
it provides up to twelve opportunities to ensure that both the object and the end are carefully 
assessed to ensure that they are moral and, therefore, beneficial.  Certainly, all twelve of those 
opportunities are not necessary for many of the moral decisions that need to be made. However, if 
the objective is the consideration of the purchase of a new or used vehicle under the conditions 
that exist today, more or all of those twelve acts represent opportunities for the recognition of 
continence and incontinence, the use of Broadie’s Contingent Choice, and the Aidōs Response are 
available and are needed to determine whether the purchase should be a vehicle powered by fossil 
fuel or electricity which today is a moral decision. Keep in mind, power plants are much more 
efficient in terms of producing energy than are individual internal combustion engines and, 
therefore, for a given quantity of energy a power plant will produce less CO2.  
If all of Aquinas’s twelve acts are used, the first letters of those names produce the acronym 
PWPI-DCJC-CUEE which could bring to mind the names of those responsive acts but which is 
far from an easily used acronym. However, to facilitate the use of Aquinas’s process, elimination 
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of some of those acts produces an acronym that may be more memorable, for example PIDCJC 
for presentation, intention, deliberation, consent, judgment, and choice. A shorter acronym of 
PIDC for presentation, intention, deliberation and choice might provide for even greater use of the 
concept. 
This dissertation has thus far attempted to cover the “what”—climate change, the “why”— 
insufficient mitigation of and adaptation to climate change, the “when”—now because of the 
relatively indestructible nature of CO2, the “how”—changing our moral attitude toward climate 
change through (1) Aristotelian incontinence and continence, (2) Broadie’s “Contingent Choice”, 
(3) the Aidōs Response—development of feelings from shame to awe and reverence, and (4) 
Aquinas’s PIDCJC or possibly just PIDC. Chapter 10 summarizes the importance of the 
combination of these elements. Chapter 11 defines the needed new virtue and Chapter 12 then is 
of extreme importance in identifying the “where” of the generation of the necessary awe and 
reverence to encourage the use of those concepts. 
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Part V  Proper Primility: An Aristotelian Answer for Climate Change and Beyond 
  
This is aischron [disgraceful] even for future generations to hear, … .183 
Shameful indeed that future men should hear, … .184 
A shameful thing is this even for the hearing of men that are yet to be, … .185 
       —Homer (Iliad, ca. 1300 B.C.E) 
Granting that the earth is for man — there is still the question: what man? … Five races—five 
cultures— have flourished here. We may truthfully say of our four predecessors that they left the 
earth alive, undamaged.  
Is it possibly a proper question for us to consider what the sixth shall say about us? 
If we are logically anthropomorphic, yes.186 
 
                                                                             —Aldo Leopold (Leopold, ca. 1923 C.E) 
 
 
       Chapter 10 – The Aristotelian Combination and Climate Change 
 Homer’s words resulted from the Athenian army’s retreat before the victory was won and 
the attendant shame and disgrace that would last through future generations. Again, Greece in the 
times of Homer through Aristotle was a culture in which shame was a serious concept. It is not 
such a concept within the United States today where the United States’ culture is recognized as a 
denial culture. However, fast-forward to the twentieth century and, while Aldo Leopold does not 
      
183 Homer, Iliad 2. 119-22; translation by Douglas L Cairns, Aidōs: The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame 
in Ancient Greek Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p.59. 
184 Homer, Iliad 2. 138; translation by Robert Fitzgerald (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004), p.33. 
185Homer, Iliad 2. 119-22; translation by A.T. Murray, in two volumes. (Cambridge, MA., Harvard University Press; 
London, William Heinemann, Ltd., 1924), or at http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text;jsessionid =6BC8042CD* 
85C5327A83B69C979D492CE?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0134%3Abook%3D2%3Acard%3D119. (* 
Eliminate the space at this location of the address.) 
186 Leopold includes in this quote at the ellipses the following text: "Granting that the earth is for man— there is still 
a question: what man? Did not the cliff dwellers who tilled and irrigated these our valleys think that they were the 
pinnacle of cration [sic]— that these valleys were made for them? Undoubtedly. Then the Pueblos? Yes, and then the 
Spaniards? Not only thought so, but said so. And now we Americans? Ours beyond a doubt! (How happy a definition 
is that one of Hadley's which states, ‘truth is that which prevails in the long run’!) Aldo Leopold, “Fundamentals of 
Conservation in the Southwest” (ca. 1923) in Environmental Ethics, vol. 1, issue 2, 1979, pp.131-141; herein 
referenced as "Leopold, 1923, p.__". 
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use the word shame or disgrace, in or about 1923, he was concerned about the shame and disgrace 
that would be attributed to the “fifth culture”—us—by the “sixth culture”—the next generation or 
generations that will inhabit what is now, and what hopefully will continue to be, the United States. 
Climate change will be one of the major sources of our shame and disgrace if not the major source.  
 We who are presently citizens of the United States have virtually lost our appreciation of, 
respect for, and awe of, Earth and its inhabitants, even its human inhabitants. The citizens of this 
country, virtually all of us, have come to look upon Earth and most of its inhabitants, human and 
nonhuman—even ourselves as individuals—as entities to be exploited which generally results in 
benefit for the few, not even the many. We have let ourselves believe that we must exploit 
ourselves and forgo possible joy in order to further benefit the few through our fossil fuel addiction, 
our rampant consumerism, and our un- or under-regulated capitalism and we will fight to the death 
to retain those vices. 
 As a result, that exploitation seems to rein in the United States because those losses seem 
to be caused by the greed and avarice of the few, not the many. The many are encouraged by the 
few to accept the idea of greed and avarice in the few through the life focus of materialism that the 
many are led to believe that they “enjoy”. But that materialism is not the source of the honour and  
joy that would result from flourishing. We seem to have come to believe that materialism is a 
virtue simply because it is struggle which we seem to exert against our fellows in an effort to 
increase our own material wealth which the few encourage us to do without ceasing because 
through that effort of the many, the few are able to increase their material wealth to a wretched 
level. That level becomes wretched when it merely increases the level of luxury of the few and 
does not promote the common advantage rather than the unfair advantage that the few are able to 
promote through their ability to line the pockets of individual legislators. 
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 Can the combination of Aristotelian continence and incontinence, the Broadie Contingent 
Choice, the Aidōs Response, and Aquinas’s psychology help us to avoid that disgrace and shame 
through the implementation of the new virtue, Proper Primility, (or something similar) and for a 
renewed interest in virtue ethics generally for providing the necessary interest in attacking our 
anthropogenic climate change and implementing the mitigation and adaptation necessary for that 
attack? A review is helpful. Virtues and vices as Aristotle argues are states of character and, of 
course, can be either good or bad. Again, Aristotle names four practical kinds of moral states where 
two kinds are to be avoided - vice and incontinence - and where "the contraries of two of these are 
evident - one we call virtue, the other continence … ." (Ross, p.118 (1145a15-20))  When defining 
continence and incontinence, he states that they are neither virtue nor vice but that the former is 
"thought to be included among things good and praiseworthy" while the latter is "among things 
bad and blameworthy”. (Ross, p.119 (1145b7-20))  This  dissertation is concerned with all four of 
those states which have been discussed at length previously in this dissertation.   
 In summary, Aristotle's route to a virtuous and, therefore, a flourishing life (likely a happy 
life) and to avoidance of personal and public shame and disgrace is through a moral character that 
results from the rational recognition that doing actions based on the deliberated choice of a mean 
or intermediate action - a virtue as a state of character - is the correct choice between possible 
actions that exhibit vices as excess or deficiency of that virtuous intermediate action. Also, that 
character that requires recognition and choice of the intermediate or mean will not only promote 
individual relationships but will support a virtuous and flourishing community in which the 
individual will have a much better opportunity of living that flourishing and truly enjoyable life. 
Recognizing (1) the importance of Aristotle’s states of continence and incontinence, (2) the 
Broadie Contingent Choice, (3) the Aidōs Response and (4) Aquinas’s systematic means of 
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adopting Aristotle's psychology of habitual action (items (2) through (4) facilitate the development 
and maintenance of the continent and incontinent states of character) provide the method for the 
valuable struggle of developing a flourishing and happy life and on the way necessarily 
undertaking the work of the mitigation of and adaptation to climate change. Without this work 
which addresses the concern of the present human generation for the future generations of all life 
on Earth and without the necessary awe and reverence for those generations and Earth generally, 
there will likely be no continuing flourishing or happiness to be found on Earth. 
            Initially, a quick review of Aristotle's available virtues brings to light their invaluable worth 
but also their inability to address the crisis of climate change through promotion of a character 
needed to address that necessary mitigation and adaptation. Aristotle's moral virtues or virtues of 
character include courage, liberality (generosity), temperance, truthfulness (about one's self), 
justice (including honesty and equity) (Ross, Brown; p.xxiii  (1138a1-3)), friendliness, proper 
pride (magnanimity; literally "greatness of soul"), ready wit, good temperedness, magnificence, 
righteous indignation and the “no name” virtue (between ambition and unambitiousness (being 
properly honourable?)). His chief intellectual virtues are scientific knowledge, art, intuitive reason 
(which constitute wisdom and includes philosophic wisdom) and practical wisdom (prudence, 
phronēsis). His minor intellectual virtues are goodness in deliberation, understanding, and 
judgment.  
 He also includes aidōs in his Nicomachean Ethics, generally translated as shame, with his 
virtues of character but states that aidōs is "more like a passion than a [virtue]." (Ross, p.79 
(1128b10))  The fact that he includes aidōs with his virtues of character indicates the importance 
that he attaches to aidōs in the development of virtuous character and most importantly and 
necessary for the incontinent person and continent person on the way to the hoped for capacity of 
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phronēsis and virtue. Mitigation of and adaptation to climate change would seem addressed 
through some if not all of Aristotle’s virtues listed above. However, because again the immediately 
existing generation is not harmed to the severe extent of future generations of all life, the present 
generation, at least in the United States, is for the most part, conveniently refusing to accept the 
science of climate change (though that generation is aware of the IPCC and the AR5) and is placing 
the blame elsewhere (for example, on China and India where those countries are, in fact, becoming 
leaders in the use of alternative energy sources). For either of those excuses, the present United 
States generation is for all practical purposes willing to continue life on a "business as usual" basis.  
 A further associated problem is that those virtues (save possibly “proper pride”) seem to 
relate to relationships between existing individuals and societies. However, if honour, dishonour 
and aidōs (translated as “shame”) are the result of the practice or failure of the practice of those 
present virtues, then we should also recognize that those three concepts transcend the idea of 
present existence. Individuals have been, are, and will be honoured and dishonoured after death.   
Further, honour, dishonour and shame are, of course, not only applied to individuals but the 
societies and cultures, for example Tom Brokaw’s recognition of honour for the Great Generation. 
It is snowflakes that cause the avalanche and it is us snowflakes that are causing climate change 
and will be honoured or shamed by the future as a result. Therefore, we should recognize honour 
and shame as of primary importance for addressing future generations and climate change.  
Relative to the mitigation of and adaptation to climate change, I argue that present virtues 
or states of character, Aristotelian or otherwise, are not sufficient to address that work because 
they are not presently equipped to address the extension of ethical consideration to unborn life or 
to address Earth-wide crises such as climate change because those virtues and their underlying 
principle of reciprocity do not address transgenerational concerns or anthropogenic planet wide 
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pollution such as that which causes climate change. Those present virtues are therefore temporary 
and unenduring in this age of fossil fuel energy and expanding population for the benefit primarily 
of ephemeral, individual wealth and its accompanying vicious luxury.  
The task of the needed new virtue is the extension of that ethical consideration to unborn 
generations of not only Homo sapiens but all of Earthly life including, but not limited to, Earth 
herself because she sustains all of that life. Future life is of critical importance if present life has 
any meaningful importance. The accumulation of wealth for other than the common welfare is 
without any permanent worth because of its lack of distributive justice, especially to future 
generations. Therefore, proper primility as the inseparable combination of proper pride and proper 
humility is offered as a possibility of addressing all of those concerns. Proper primility may not be 
the best concept or the appropriate name for a new virtue but it is offered as a foundational virtuous 
concept.  
In addition, Aristotle and the Greeks who inspired him also have given us, not only the 
intermediate states of character of continence and incontinence as methods to achieve virtuosity 
but also a major and multifaceted motivator that seems to have been overlooked for centuries, 
aidōs. Aristotle called this motivator “more of the passion than a state of character.” Aristotle’s 
virtues are states of character while this motivator is “more like a passion.” At least one author and 
philosopher, Douglas Cairns, argues that this motivator should be accepted as a virtuous state of 
character. In this twenty-first century, this motivator needs to be no less than a state immediately 
below that of a virtuous character especially in light of its importance to the states of continence 
and incontinence and also in light of climate change. 
That motivator is enshrined in the Greek word “aidōs” and can be further enshrined in the 
phrase, the Aidōs Response. The elegance, beauty and value of aidōs is found in its numerous 
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meanings that range from shame to reverence with a number of intermediate meanings. Further, 
aidōs is a prospective concept and, as such, for Aristotle and the Greek authors before him, 
becomes apparent to an agent as an action is conceived but is as yet unexecuted. Aristotle found 
aidōs morally useful because of its ability to question a conceived action concerning its immorality 
and, therefore, because of the ability of aidōs to preclude the agent from executing the vicious 
action. Finally, Aquinas organized Aristotle’s psychology/procedure which provides a method for 
the requirement of calling aidōs to mind when morality is involved which today is virtually always 
because fossil fuel generates at least 85% of the electricity that creates CO2, the material cause of 
climate change where we as the users of fossil fuels that generate that CO2 are the efficient cause.  
Again, Aristotle’s four moral states of (1) virtue, (2) continence, (3) incontinence and (4) 
vice are critical for addressing climate change. Incontinence is of particular importance in 
addressing climate change because of its anthropogenic origin - its sole present cause being Homo 
sapiens and its addiction to fossil fuel energy and population growth for the benefit of consumerism 
and un- and under-regulated capitalism. Aristotle’s concept of incontinence includes the ability of 
the agent to recognize (1) the immorality of conceived action but also (2) the inability of the agent 
to engage any and/or all of her/his action attributes toward that moral action and (3) then the 
willingness of that agent to nonetheless engage in the immoral/bad action. At the very least, there 
is recognition of the moral action when otherwise the vicious action could somehow be 
rationalized as virtuous. Aidōs was, is, and will be available to remind the agent of the moral 
alternative and, thus, to possibly preclude the agent from immoral action. Agent activity that 
promotes climate change is immoral. Consequently, aidōs is available in this twenty-first century 
to preclude agents from taking actions which promote climate change.  
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This Chapter 10 brings together the argument that Aristotle’s states of vice and 
incontinence are the cause of climate change and that aidōs is necessary to convert that vice and 
incontinence into Aristotle’s state of continence which then serves to facilitate the mitigation of, 
and adaptation to, climate change. The explanation of these Aristotelian states of character and the 
nature of aidōs are found in Chapters 7 and 8 above. The procedure or psychology for their 
effective implementation as organized by Aquinas is found in his Treatises on Happiness and 
Human Action reviewed in Chapter 9 above. Through that psychology, those elements provide a 
possible method for the effective implementation of Aristotelian continence, Broadie’s Contingent 
Choice, aidōs and a new virtue, possibly proper primility. Aristotle’s incontinence as exhibited 
especially in the United States today and the application of Broadie’s Contingent Choice, aidōs 
and proper primility are argued as having the possibility of addressing that incontinence and 
reforming it at least to Aristotle’s concept of continence if not to his concept of virtue, thereby 
addressing climate change’s mitigation and adaptation for the benefit of our present generation 
and the unborn generations of all life on Earth.    
Again, in Chapter 11, proper primility is explained and argued as necessary to address the 
crisis of climate change where that crisis is recognized in large part as the lifespan of centuries and 
possibly millennia of the waste of all fossil fuel combustion, CO2, and its durability for those 
periods. Chapter 12 suggests the method of finding proper primility through the geography in 
which its components, proper pride and proper humility, can be most directly and easily found and 
enjoyed and then implemented through the elements summarized in this Chapter 10. 
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Chapter 11 - Proper Primility: The Concept of a New Virtue 
 
The crisis, in sum, consists in the overshoot and its climatic effects. As we turn Earth into a 
harsher world, we make it into an enemy of civilization. … The ecological crisis of the twentieth 
century is becoming a human crisis in the twenty-first century. And as that, its root cause is a 
market failure; its beneficiaries are corporations, banks and the top one percent income holders. 
Everyone else is in harm’s way: young and old, men and women, states and societies, affluent 
and poor nations, we and posterity. 
 
 Martin Schönfeld (Wisdom, 2016, pp.194-195)  
  
 So, what can be done? As Schönfeld observes, climate change highlights gaps in our 
conventional notions of accountability, responsibility and guilt. In addition and of major concern 
is the fact that our society generally and our laws specifically are virtually all the result of our 
reliance on the concept of reciprocity where there is no provision within that present concept for 
any notion of reciprocity with unborn entities.187 While it seems that the present United States’ 
generation cannot help but understand the importance of these climate change concerns, that 
generation finds at least as inconvenient any real constructive action for resolution of those 
concerns in terms of its apparent desire for an ever increasing attempt at an ever increasing 
materialistic standard of living. Also, our present generation in the United States appears to be 
willing to take full credit for our "improved" standard of living which may only be a detrimental 
result of the apparent willingness to worship at the altars of an overly free-market capitalism, 
rampant consumerism, and a rampant willingness to promote increased population for the purpose 
of serving that capitalism and consumerism. 
      
187 As above, it is suggested that a sense of reciprocity may be involved in the honour to be bestowed on the present 
generation by future generations. Aristotle does argue that honour and not material wealth is or should be the greatest 
of external goods. (Ross, p.68 (1123b18-22)) 
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 The importance of recognizing ancestral or future generations and the present generation's 
"benefits from," "debts to," or "dependence on" and the associated accountability and 
responsibility are concerns about which present Western ethical theories say very little and nothing 
substantial. In addition, the deontological and utilitarian theories seem to have nothing to say about 
humility, guilt or shame, which at this point in Earth's history, are of critical importance and sorely 
needed especially in the United States. However, virtue ethics, both Aristotelian and Confucian, 
at least, begin to address some of those concerns where some of those beginnings suggest the 
ability to bear further fruit.   
 To address these problems through a climate ethic, proper primility combines the concepts 
of proper pride and proper humility as those terms have previously been defined and are further 
defined herein. While “ancient” virtue ethical theory as stated by Aristotle, Confucius, Mencius, 
Aquinas and others did not specifically and clearly consider future generations or global concerns 
such as climate change (because they were not issues during their lifetimes), all of those 
philosophers do provide support for extending ethical consideration to future generations and for 
addressing concerns such as climate change. Further, I argue that they all support concepts of 
proper pride and proper humility. In this dissertation, only Aristotle and Aquinas particularly have 
been reviewed for their support for those considerations and concepts. The Eastern philosophers 
mentioned above will need to be reviewed in a further paper. While proper primility is offered, 
other concepts may be more successful in extending and improving moral consideration. In any 
event, something new and/or revised is required.  
 Generally, both Aristotle and Aquinas do address both the individual and community. In 
addition, it seems that initially attempting through community to reform the individuals necessary 
to bring about change is at least difficult if not impossible. What seems needed presently are a few 
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individuals within community who understand the need for change and are equipped to act 
accordingly.   
 Whether this virtue should be called “proper primility”188 or given some other name, I 
argue that to consider extension of ethical consideration to unborn generations of all life and to 
address climate change, a concept incorporating both "proper pride" and "proper humility" as 
indivisible components is critical. Schönfeld argues that these two concepts are really two sides of 
the same coin and virtue.  As such, they represent a kind of Western version of the Eastern yinyang 
which represents the interdependence of what seem to be opposites.  
 I argue that it is not simple pride and simple humility that can be brought together in 
primility because they are indeed opposites. More appropriately, proper primility becomes the 
conjoining of proper pride and proper humility. Within proper primility, neither can be present 
without the other. Proper primility then becomes a concept similar to that of the yinyang concept 
which has been described as follows:189 
Yinyang (yin-yang) is one of the dominant concepts shared by different schools 
throughout the history of Chinese philosophy. ... [T]hree basic themes underlie 
nearly all deployments of [yinyang] in Chinese philosophy: (1) yinyang as the 
coherent fabric of nature and mind, exhibited in all existence, (2) yinyang as jiao 
(interaction) between the waxing and waning of the cosmic and human realms, and 
(3) yinyang as a process of harmonization ensuring a constant, dynamic balance of 
all things.  
 
      
188 If the word "primility" is "googled," websites containing that word are retrieved. Those websites are maintained 
by Jerod Morris who apparently generated the word some years ago and applied it to individuals but not to humankind 
in general as it is, in addition, applied in this dissertation. Morris indicates a definition of having a high opinion of 
one's own importance while simultaneously maintaining a modest opinion or estimation of that importance. Because 
these seem to be opposites, the definitions and concepts included in this dissertation among other purposes seek to 
eliminate that appearance. Morris's websites relate to achieving success vocationally and in life generally which are 
certainly worthy causes. See, www.primility.com/about/  
189 Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (ISSN 2161-0002), author, Robin R. Wang, PhD., Loyola Marymount 
University. 
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Concerning climate change and its issues, it seems that all three of these themes are required. 
Initially, that "coherent fabric" seems to have been rejected during prior decades at least in the 
United States. Secondly, that "interaction" has yielded to the human attempt at control through the 
human causes of climate change, while, thirdly, that "harmony" is in the process of being destroyed 
over that same period by the imbalance causing climate change.  
 Dr. Wang's definition continues with a reference from the Zhuangzi (Chuang-tzu).190   
As the Zhuangzi (Chuang-tzu) claims, “Yin in its highest form is freezing while 
yang in its highest form is boiling. The chilliness comes from heaven while the 
warmness comes from the earth. The interaction of these two establishes he 
(harmony), so it gives birth to things. Perhaps this is the law of everything yet 
there is no form being seen.” (Zhuangzi, Chapter 21).  
 
The rebirth of that harmony is critical. His definition concludes with the following characterization 
of the yinyang: 
In none of these conceptions of yinyang is there a valuational hierarchy, as if yin 
could be abstracted from yang (or vice versa), regarded as superior or considered 
metaphysically separated and distinct. Instead, yinyang is emblematic of 
valuational equality rooted in the unified, dynamic, and harmonized structure of the 
cosmos. As such, it has served as a heuristic mechanism for formulating a coherent 
view of the world throughout Chinese intellectual and religious history.   
 
Because proper primility is being suggested as similar to yinyang, it is hoped that it can be 
seen as a "process of harmonization" ensuring not only a return to a prior "constant, dynamic 
[natural] balance," but also the ongoing heightened balance required by climate change. That 
balance needs to be viewed as the "valuational equality" of those two concepts "rooted in the 
unified, dynamic, and harmonized structure" of a flourishing ontology of all life on Earth. In order 
for this to be achieved, a heightened respect for, and relationship with, Earth and all of its present 
      
190The source of this translation is not provided with the definition, but a translation can be found in Victor Mair's 
Wondering on the Way where the translation is somewhat different. (See, Chuang Tzu, Wandering on the Way: Early 
Taoist Tales and Parables of Chuang Tzu, trans. Victor H. Mair (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1998), p.202 
(Book 21, Chapter 4)) 
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and future content must be generated. Initially, each of these "proper" concepts needs to be fleshed 
out to begin to understand this hoped for appropriate balance. Consequently, proper pride, an 
Aristotelian virtue, is described and then proper humility is described. Thereafter, proper primility 
can be described and defined. 
  
A. Proper Pride - An Aristotelian Virtue  
 David Ross, in his translation of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, translates the Greek word 
"megalopsychia"  (μεγαλοψυχία, literally "great souledness") as "proper pride" remembering that 
Aristotle is describing a virtue. (Ross, p.32 (1107b22); fn pp.224-25)  Also, recall that the Perseus-
Tufts website which acknowledges the translation "greatness of soul" also states "μεγαλοψυχία, 
magnanimitas means lofty pride and self-esteem rather than magnanimity or high-mindedness (in 
the modern sense of the word).” (See page 222 above)  The term “proper pride” harmonizes with 
“lofty pride” and, therefore, Ross’s translation of proper pride is used.  As a result, proper pride 
cannot include the state of having hubris or inordinate self-esteem, being conceited, being 
ostentatious, being avaricious, greedy or engaging in disdainful behavior or treatment of other life. 
Aristotle initially states: "With regard to honour and dishonour the mean is proper pride, the excess 
is known as a sort of 'empty vanity', and the deficiency is undue humility ... ." (Ross, p.32 
(1107b22-24))   As argued below, this deficiency of undue humility or "being too humble" strongly 
suggests that humility could be a mean and a virtue with "unduly humble" as the excess and 
possibly "arrogance" or "hubris" as the deficiency. More on humility below.  
Continuing with proper pride and expanding that concept, Aristotle states: "he who thinks 
himself worthy of great things, being unworthy of them, is vain … ." though Aristotle qualifies 
this by suggesting that the properly proud man must at times think of himself as worthy of more 
than he may be at the moment in order to continually advance with this virtue. In addition, “it is 
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hard to be truly proud; for it is impossible without nobility and goodness of character.” (Ross, p. 
69 (1124a3-4)) 
 Aristotle states that the desert of pride is "honour" and, concerning "desert," Aristotle 
states: "Desert is relative to external goods … and the greatest of these [external goods] … is 
honour ... [;] [i]t is evident that proud men are concerned with honour; for it is honour that they 
chiefly claim, but in accordance with their deserts." Aristotle continues: "The proud man, then, is 
an extreme in respect of the greatness of his claims, but intermediate in respect of the rightness of 
them; for he claims what is in accordance with his merits, while the others go to excess or fall 
short." (Ross, p.68 (1123b13-15))  He further requires that: "the truly proud man must be good. 
And greatness in every virtue would seem to be characteristic of a proud man. … Pride, then, 
seems to be a sort of crown of the virtues." (Ross, p.68-69 (1123b29-1124a2)) 
 Aristotle addresses the desert of honour again immediately following his thoughts about 
proper pride in his discussion of ambition and unambitiousness. Concerning ambition and 
unambitiousness, Aristotle associates ambition with honour. He initially suggests that we blame 
ambition as seeking honour excessively and from improper sources and blame unambitiousness as 
being unwilling to accept honour even where noble reasons are involved and honour is merited. 
However, Aristotle capitulates a bit and maintains that praise and honour are sometimes due the 
ambitious person "as being manly and a lover of what is noble" and are sometimes appropriate for 
the unambitious person for "being moderate and self-controlled". He argues that there must be a 
mean between ambition and unambitiousness but finds that it is without a name.  
Further, he opines that sometimes in regard to ambition, unambitiousness may seem to be 
the mean while in certain circumstances ambition appears to be the mean. He states: "Relatively 
to ambition [the mean] seems to be unambitiousness and relatively to unambitiousness [the mean] 
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seems to be ambition, while relatively to both severally [the mean] seems in a sense to be both 
together." (Ross, p.72 (1125b1-25)) While giving the mean this seemingly confused definition, 
Aristotle still specifically says that this "without a name" mean "is a state of character that is 
praised" (Ross, p.72 (1125b21-22)), and, it, therefore, is a virtue.  
 In addition, this seemingly confused definition can be construed as Aristotle's recognition 
of two ideas, the first of which is that not only are there some virtues that have not yet been named, 
and there may be virtues that have not been recognized especially in light of changes in culture, 
tradition, science and human behavior in general. Secondly, his thought that, depending on the 
circumstances, both ambition and unambitiousness could be means, would seem to be one more 
example of the appropriate mean being "proper ambition" where the object is being "properly 
honourable".  Also, his use of the phrase, "both together," is an argument for the association of 
proper pride with proper humility becoming the single virtue of proper primility. 
 Aristotle also describes the proud person as one that "will also bear himself [/herself] with 
moderation towards wealth and power and all good or evil fortune ... and will be neither overjoyed 
by good fortune nor over-pained by evil." (Ross, p.69 (1124a13-15)) Also, Brown in a note 
reminds us that the good person does not actually focus on the honour but on the virtue that merits 
it. (Ross, Brown; p.225) While the honour is desirable, it is virtue that creates it if, and only if, the 
ambition is genuine. Aristotle comments further and specifically on the goods of power and wealth 
which are "thought to contribute towards pride". He states and warns:  
Hence even [goods of fortune and wealth and power] make men prouder; for they 
are honoured by some for having them; but in truth the good man alone is to be 
honoured … .  But those who without virtue have such goods are neither justified 
in making great claims nor entitled to the name of "proud"; for these things imply 
perfect virtue. Disdainful and insolent, however, even those who have such goods 
become. For without virtue it is not easy to bear gracefully the goods of fortune; 
and, being unable to bear them, and thinking themselves superior to others, they 
despise others and themselves do what they please. 
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(Emphasis added; Ross, p.69 (1124a21-b5))  It is important to note that Aristotle states that it is 
the proud virtuous man that should receive honour and that there are dangers associated with the 
goods of fortune, wealth and power. In the United States, these dangers have been realized as the 
result of those “apparent goods”. As is widely recognized, pride is not necessarily looked upon as 
a virtue, for example, in the Bible where pride is generally looked upon as a sinful disposition. 
(Proverbs 16:18; Isaiah 2:11; Daniel 4:37; Mark 7:22)191 This, of course, is one more reason why 
the virtue should not be common pride but must be "proper pride”. 
 
B. Proper Humility 
(1) Aristotle's humility 
 Aristotle does not specifically address humility other than in his discussion about pride. 
While the mean is proper pride, the excess is "vanity" and the deficiency, also a vice, is "unduly 
humble" (Ross, p.68 (1123b5-14)) or "undue humility". (Ross, p.71 (1125a32))  Ross translates 
"μικρόψυχος" as "unduly humble" and μικροψυχία as "undue humility." (Ross, p.32 (1107b26); 
p.71 (1125a32))192 Ross translates Aristotle's description of this person as:  
[T]he unduly humble man, being worthy of good things, robs himself of what he 
deserves, and seems to have something bad about him from the fact that he does 
not think himself worthy of good things, and seems also not to know himself … . 
Yet such people are not thought to be fools, but rather unduly retiring. 
 
      
191 New Revised Standard Version (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1989); The New Oxford Annotated Bible: 
New Revised Standard Version With The Apocrypha, ed. M.D. Coogan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). But 
see Hebrews 3: 6 (pride of hope). 
192 The Perseus website translates "μικρόψυχος" as "meanspirited" and "μικροψυχία" as "littleness of soul, meanness 
of spirit" all of which seem to be descriptive of a vice. (http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=* 
Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0053%3Abekker+page%3D1123b%3Abekker+line%3D10). Ross may actually be 
purposely understating his translation in an effort to mollify the twentieth century reader. (* - Eliminate the space at 
this location of the internet address.) 
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(Ross, p.71 (1125a19-24)) Aristotle's thought here seems applicable to the early twenty-first 
century in the following way. The present generation seems to be so focused on the goods of 
fortune, wealth and power that it robs itself of true flourishing and, therein, has become vicious or 
at least incontinent and without virtue. Aristotle then immediately concludes that undue humility 
is actually more common and, in fact, worse than vanity because unduly humble people may 
refrain from taking noble actions. This emphasizes the value of the virtue of proper pride through 
encouraging the individual to undertake virtuous and honourable actions because of the 
appropriate pride involved in the willingness to undertake and complete those actions. 
 Continuing with Aristotle's idea of undue humility, he states: "The man who thinks himself 
worthy of less than he is really worthy of is unduly humble whether his deserts be great or moderate 
… . And [that] man whose deserts are great would seem most unduly humble … ." (Ross, p.68 
(1123b8-14))  Therefore, "proper humility," for Aristotle could arguably be a virtue with the excess 
as "undue humility" or too much humility and its deficiency, too little humility or improper pride 
or arrogance which then would make the mean either proper pride or proper humility both of which 
could be collectively called “proper primility” as the single mean. While there may be logical 
arguments against that conclusion, it seems on its face to be a good modality for understanding 
"undue humility" as Aristotle's and Ross's vice.  
 As an additional thought about the concept of proper humility, it seems we should feel 
proper humility when we truly understand our absolute dependence on others and on Earth in this 
present world. We are totally dependent on those others (and Earth) that grow and those others 
who process our food, that produce our electricity and water supply, that provide our means of 
communication, etc. 
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 (2) Proper Humility -  a present definition 
 Present environmental ethics offers many positive recommendations for climate change, 
one of which is the "proper humility" offered by Thomas E. Hill, Jr. as a necessary virtue. 
Aristotelian and Confucian ethics, while considering humility, do not seem to embrace it as a full 
virtue. As above, humility is not an Aristotelian virtue but, as above, the thought of proper humility 
can be found within Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. 
 Proper humility, as an individual virtue, was introduced by Hill in his environmental ethics 
essay published in 1983,193 where he argues that the problem of the human animal concerning 
his/her respect for the natural environment is the lack of "a proper humility, self-acceptance, 
gratitude, and appreciation of the good in others". With Hill, I argue that the climate change 
intergenerational problem stems primarily from a lack of proper humility and that the lack of self-
acceptance, gratitude, and appreciation of the good in others, whether life forms or inanimate 
things, is a result of the lack of a proper humility in the agent. This lack along with the problem of 
reciprocity seems to preclude this present generation from collectively concerning itself with the 
good of unborn generations and with recognizing its own reasonable good for that matter. 
 Hill offers that idea as an addition to virtue ethical theory generally. While Hill is 
commenting on someone who is needlessly replacing plants with asphalt, his comments about 
humility regard present society collectively. Initially, he suggests that those who destroy the 
natural environment are thought to lack an appreciation for their position in the natural order of 
things because they are thought to  
be ignorant or have too little humility … [where] their attitude may well be rooted 
in [1] ignorance, [2] a narrow perspective, [producing the] inability to see things as 
important apart from themselves and the limited groups they associate with, or [3]  
reluctance to accept themselves as natural beings. Overcoming these deficiencies 
      
193 Hill, Thomas E. Jr., "Ideals of Human Excellence and Preserving Natural Environments," in Environmental Ethics, 
Vol. 5, No. 3 (1983), pp. 211-224; herein referenced as "Hill, 1983, p.__". 
 276 
  
will not guarantee a proper moral humility, but for most of us it is probably an 
important psychological preliminary.  
 
(Hill, 1983, p.216) All of the above three deficiencies are present in at least the United States 
community today. If an individual, corporation, community, or nation can begin to accept 
accountability, responsibility, guilt and shame for climate change, Hill's proper humility seems 
like a required initial step toward a meaningful climate change ethic.  
 He defines proper humility as involving "that sort and degree of humility that is a morally 
admirable character trait. How precisely to define this is, of course, a controversial matter; but 
the point for present purposes is just to set aside obsequiousness, false modesty, underestimation 
of one's abilities, and the like." (Hill, 1983, p.219)  He further states "Learning humility requires 
learning to feel that something matters besides what will affect oneself and one's circle of 
associates." (Hill, 1983; p.220)194 The means of acquiring proper humility is through habituation 
as recommended by both Aristotle and Aquinas and as addressed in Chapters 7 and 9 above. 
 But even with Hill's proper humility, no importance seems to be placed directly on the 
dishonour that future generations will feel toward our present generation and the attendant disgrace 
of our generation instead of the honour, for example, that has been expressed for the "Great 
Generation" of the United States born in the first twenty-five years of the twentieth century. In 
fact, the present generation does not seem to even remember that it owes that generation anything. 
Therefore, anticipated shame as expressed through the word aidōs seems necessary. Further, aidōs 
with its breadth of translated meaning, offers if not a new standalone virtue, the opportunity of 
growth from Aristotelian incontinentancy toward Aristotelian continency and virtuosity as argued 
above. If viciousness exists, Aristotle argues that in some cases it cannot be cured. (Ross, 
      
194 Here, Hill's reference to "one's circle of associates," clearly reflects those associates who are presently in existence 
and, therefore, some intergenerational concept needs to be added. 
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p.130(1150a15-23)). For Aristotle, self-indulgence is the vice associated with the virtue of 
temperance (Ross, p.32 (1107b6); p.25 (1109a317-18); p.57 (1118b7-1119b18)) and self-
indulgence seems rampant in this twenty-first century, especially in the United States. 
 
C. Proper Primility  
 If virtues are defined as “dispositions to act,” can proper primility and its component of 
proper humility be considered "dispositions to act"? I argue that they are dispositions to act because 
proper pride is a recognized Aristotelian virtue, a virtuous state of character and disposition to act, 
and, therefore, as an accepted antonym of proper pride, "proper humility" is a virtue as well.  Proper 
primility then by definition is also a virtuous disposition to act. 
 Further, in light of the above non-proper descriptions, the following possible definitions 
are suggested for proper pride and its partner, proper humility. 
Proper pride - (1) the informed knowledge and appreciation of, and respect for, 
one's own strengths both physical and mental, and, (2) also, the informed 
knowledge and appreciation of, respect for, and felt imaginative empathy with, the 
beauty, bounty, capacities, and capabilities and the strengths (a) of Earth and (b) all 
its life forms including, without limitation, the global human community of which 
each human is a part and a co-creator, and, also, including all future generations of 
that community. 
 
Hill's proper humility then can be further defined as: 
Proper humility - (1) the informed knowledge and appreciation of, and respect for, 
one's own limits both physical and mental, and, (2) also, the informed knowledge 
and appreciation of, respect for, and felt imaginative empathy with, the beauty, 
bounty, capacities, and capabilities of Earth and the limits (a) of Earth and (b) all 
of Earth's life forms including, without limitation, the global human community of 
which each human is part and co-creator, and including all future generations of 
that community.195  
      
195 Because this concept of "co-creator" is that authored by Roger T. Ames in his essay, "Reading the Zhongyong 
'Metaphysically'", in Chinese Metaphysics and Its Problems, ed. Chenyang Li and Franklin Perkins (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015); pp.85-104, I attempt to incorporate that concept in this dissertation. His concept 
involves humans as co-creator with Earth to achieve a dynamic and flourishing Earth and its life. In at least one respect 
of many, humanity is a co-creator, at least, in a negative sense because it has generated climate change. Maybe 
humanity can cognitively embrace its positive co-creator potential and responsibility in that regard and otherwise. 
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Proper primility then cannot be described as just a combination of pride and humility but can be 
defined as: 
Proper primility - the dynamic ability of knowing, appreciating, respecting and 
using one's own strengths and knowing, appreciating and respecting one’s own 
limits, both physical and mental, and also of knowing, appreciating,  
respecting, promoting, and, the felt empathizing with, (1) the beauty, bounty, 
capacities and capabilities and the balance and limits of those attributes (1) of 
Earth and (2) all of Earth's past, present and future life of which each human is a 
part and a co-creator, and, as a co-creator, of ensuring continuance of that life and 
that beauty and bounty and those capacities and capabilities.  
  
Also, it must be a very personal virtue because accepting that definition must begin with the 
individual who, to the extent possible, fully understands the personal and social benefits of that 
dynamic ability and responsibility and the balance of a proper humility and a proper pride.  
 As an alternative to the vicious characters of self-indulgence, insensibility, vanity and 
undue humility, among others, that have generated climate change, proper primility is offered as 
the mean necessary to exceed the virtuous character of the Great Generation. The individual must 
better understand both her/his own limits and strengths, physical and mental, but must better 
understand Earth's strengths and limits, both physical and spiritual. Humanity since the industrial 
revolution has chosen to test and then exceed Earth's physical limits and, as a result, its spiritual 
limits as well. Exceeding Earth's physical limits is the result of humanity’s hubris exhibited 
through its willingness to allow rivers to burn, to allow waste to pollute (including nuclear waste 
especially without any yet acceptable solution), to allow other forms of genial life to disappear, to 
allow Hume's "unlimited abundance" to become limited to the extent that they have become private 
property.  
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 Chapter 12 - Finding Proper Humility, Proper Pride and, Therefore, Proper Primility 
   Through Awe and Reverence 
 
Reverence is not enough by itself for completely good character.  
You need to develop other capacities in order to live a morally good life. … Does it take 
reverence to be courageous? I think so. … [C]ourageous people would be ashamed and therefore 
afraid of doing wrong because of the respect they feel for moral ideals. Their capacities for 
shame and respect grow from reverence.  
        
      —Paul Woodruff (Woodruff, 2014, 58) 
 
 Paul Woodruff in his book Reverence: Renewing a Forgotten Virtue196 argues that while 
we should not attempt to imitate ancient Greek or Chinese cultures, “we are better off for studying 
them”. Also, recalling that aidōs has been and can be translated as awe and reverence, his book is 
another necessary read concerning proper primility and its components of proper pride and proper 
humility. He defines reverence as “the capacity to feel respect in the right way toward the right 
people, and to feel awe toward an object that transcends particular human interests.” 
(Emphasis added; Woodruff, p.184) Particularly concerning leaders, Woodruff argues that 
“Reverence, not justice, is the virtue that separates leaders from tyrants, as the old Greek poets 
knew well. … When leaders are reverent, they are reverent along with their followers, and their 
common reverence unites them in feelings that overcome personal interests, feelings such as 
mutual respect.” (Woodruff, p.184) He argues that this mutual respect takes the “sting” out of the 
normal tools of leaders those being “persuasion, threats of punishment and manipulation by means 
      
196 Paul Woodruff, Reverence: Renewing a Forgotten Virtue (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014); herein 
referenced as "Woodruff, p.__". 
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of rewards” because “there are no winners and losers where there is reverence. Success and failure 
are dwarfed” by the object that both the leader and the followers hold in awe. It is important further 
to recall that aidōs has been and can also be translated as “respect, awe and reverence”. 
 Woodruff argues that it is crucial to be able to feel an honest sense of awe to experience 
the virtue of reverence. I argue that it is crucial to feel an honest sense of awe to begin to understand 
proper primility and its components of proper pride and proper humility. In addition, I argue with 
Woodruff that this feeling of an honest sense of awe can be a foundation of virtue ethical theory. 
He argues that reverence requires “feelings and emotions that are linked; it is a sense that there is 
something larger than a human being, accompanied by capacities for awe, respect, and shame; it 
is often expressed in, and reinforced by, ceremony.” (Woodruff, p.57)  He argues that we can feel 
awe when we recognize and feel that there is something or there are some things that are “above 
us all as human beings” where “this feeling helps us to avoid treating other human beings with 
contempt.”  
 In addition, both Greek and Chinese traditions (that are about as much as a mere 6000 years 
old) hold that a sense of shame is always important to all humanity. That sense keeps our primility 
and our pride and humility in equilibrium and, therefore, at the proper level. Woodruff argues that 
it is reverence with its sense of awe that accomplishes this leveling. He states  
Without reverence, we may feel shame as the pain of being exposed to other people 
for having violated community standards— and this is not a virtuous response, 
because it may have nothing to do with right and wrong. But when reverence is in 
play, we feel shame when exposed in our own minds to shortcomings vis-à-vis the 
ideals toward which we stand in awe, and this reaction does belong to virtue … .  
 
(Woodruff, p.57)197 Woodruff has specific recommendations as to where we can expect to find 
this honest sense of awe. He begins with the following statement “Reverence is a matter of feeling, 
      
197 A central problem of present humanity is that we at times hold vicious ideals in awe.   
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and as far as feelings go, it doesn’t much matter what you believe. … . Reverence makes few 
demands on belief. … Reverence must stand in awe of something—something I will call the object 
of reverence.” (Woodruff, p.113)  That something must be “Something that reminds us of human 
limitations …” which with but little reflection is easily recognized.  
 He then lists four conditions and states that the “Something” must satisfy at least one of 
these conditions “[1] it cannot be controlled by human means, [2] was not created by human 
beings, [3] is not fully understood by human experts, and [4] is transcendent. Such beliefs are the 
least an individual must have in order to be reverent.” He states that, therefore, this Something “is 
usually inarticulate”—unable to be fully articulated. (Woodruff, p.60) He lists a number of 
examples one of which is the following: “For a reverent statesperson, the Something might be 
justice, conceived as an ideal, dimly grasped and much disputed, by which we should try to 
regulate our poor systems of law. This might satisfy all four conditions.”  
 Future generations as the object or source of awe and reverence seem also to satisfy all four 
conditions because they are always transcendent in relation to the present generation and without 
question satisfy the first three of these conditions because (1) those beings cannot be controlled 
totally by the present generation, (2) those beings are not artifacts created by the present 
generation, and (3), because they are not present, they are not fully understood by the present 
generation. Therefore, future generations should be an object—more a source—of awe and 
reverence of the present generation and, therefore, climate change cannot be ignored or denied but 
must be embraced as an opportunity by the present generation. 
 Woodruff suggests that, the Something, the object or source “could be nature or the 
universe”. No matter what the Something, object or source is, Woodruff argues that it must not 
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require that the individual “abandon the feelings that keep us humble and respectful of each other”. 
(Woodruff, p.113-114) He considers creation and when reviewing Tennyson states: “Many of us 
are awestruck when we contemplate the design we see in nature or the universe, and from awe we 
find our way quickly to reverence. So far, so good.” However, we should always recognize that 
nature and the universe among certain other identifiable objects, though they are identifiable to a 
degree, they have always and still do retain that inability of full articulation which result in awe 
and reverence.198 
 Those four conditions require frequent review and reinforcement through the following 
questions. 
1. Can the Source be controlled by human means?  
2. Is the Source a creation solely of humans (remembering that houses, cathedrals, 
and skyscrapers are all artifacts)? 
3. Is the Source fully understood by human experts? 
4. Is the Source transcendent?  
While he describes transcendent as “otherworldly”, he suggests that “readers who wish to reserve 
reverence for transcendent objects may respect non-transcendent objects for representing to us the 
majesty of otherworldly powers (as a great tree might be thought to represent the majesty of God).” 
(Woodruff, p.276). Actually, a great tree is certainly something that we do not yet fully understand. 
For example, to my knowledge, science and technology have not yet harnessed chlorophyll so that 
it is able to turn all of our anthropomorphic production of CO2 into cellulose and oxygen (O2). 
 Woodruff again uses trees as a method of attaining awe and reverence. He quotes the 
following passage from John Steinbeck’s Travels with Charlie: In Search of America. 
      
198 Woodruff refers us to David Hume who he says asked questions about creation and "showed that there is no 
particular story of creation by a specific deity that we can reasonably infer from our empirical observations. [Hume] 
has never been refuted." (Woodruff, p.119) 
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The redwoods, once seen, leave a mark or create a vision that stays with you 
always. No one has ever successfully painted or photographed a redwood tree. The 
feeling they produce is not transferable. From them comes silence and awe. It’s 
not their unbelievable stature, nor the color which seems to shift and vary under 
your eyes, no, they are ambassadors from another time. They have the mystery of 
ferns that disappeared a million years ago into the coal of the carboniferous era. 
They carry their own light and shade. The vainest, most slap-happy and irreverent 
of men, in the presence of redwoods, goes under a spell of wonder and respect. 
Respect— that’s the word. One feels the need to bow to unquestioned sovereigns. 
 
(Woodruff, p.276) While Woodruff does not list Hill in his bibliography, both use trees as 
examples of the ability to generate the awe necessary to achieve reverence and proper humility 
respectively. Hill in his essay, “Ideals of Human Excellence and Preserving Natural 
Environments”, in which he endorses “proper humility” states the following as a means of 
recognizing proper humility in the experience of “standing humbly before nature”. 
That idea [standing humbly before nature] is not simply that experiencing nature 
tends to foster proper humility before other people; it is, in part, that natural 
surroundings encourage and are appropriate to an ideal sense of oneself as part of 
the natural world. Standing alone in the forest, after months in the city, is not 
merely good as a means of curbing one’s arrogance before others; it 
reinforces and fittingly expresses one’s acceptance of oneself as a natural 
being. 
 
(Emphasis added; Hill, 1983: p.221)  While Hill does not explicitly state that acceptance of oneself 
as a natural being is necessary for the experience of proper humility, the above quotation requires 
that result.  
 The German language has a word for that feeling. The word is “Waldeinsamkeit” which 
can be defined as “the feeling of being alone in the woods, and easy solitude and a connectedness 
to nature.” Ella Frances Sanders in her book Lost in Translation includes the following comment 
about that word: “A feeling that most of us don’t often experience anymore, as city parks are a 
poor substitute for the woods. It seems that we are connected to just about everything except nature, 
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where reality can be allowed to slip away between the branches. Your soul will thank you for some 
time in the trees.”199 
 In support of that “standing alone” concept, Hill states the following: “As human beings 
we are part of nature, living, growing, declining, and dying by natural laws similar to those 
governing other living beings; despite our awesomely distinctive human powers, we share many 
of the needs, limits and liabilities of [nonhuman] animals and plants.” (Hill, 1983: p.222) 200 Hill 
uses an additional natural occurrence as another method of gaining proper humility. He states:  
A storm in the wilds helps us to appreciate our animal vulnerability, but, equally 
important, the reluctance to experience it may reflect an unwillingness to accept 
this aspect of ourselves. The person who is too ready to destroy the ancient red 
woods may lack humility, not so much in the sense that he exaggerates his 
importance relative to others, but rather in the sense that he tries to avoid seeing 
himself as one among many natural creatures. 
 
(Emphasis in original; Hill, 1983: p.222) “A storm in the wilds!” It is truly something to experience 
and is something that very few humans especially today have ever experienced.201 However, that 
was something that was obviously experienced by Americans and by the citizens of all countries 
not so many centuries ago. That storm is an important leveling experience but not near the leveling 
quality of Schönfeld’s waterfall experience. As we continue to read more about and experience 
more of climate change henceforth as we will, it will be well to keep that storm and more 
importantly Schönfeld’s waterfall experience in mind. 
      
199 Ella Frances Sanders, Lost in Translation: An Illustrated Compendium of Untranslatable Words from Around the 
World (Berkeley, CA: Ten Speed Press (2014) (unpaginated) (ISBN 978-1-60774-710-9). 
200 Konrad Lorenz made this point very forcefully in his 1966 book On Aggression in which he noted that human 
beings have the following instincts common to all animals, human and nonhuman: (1) aggression, (2) flight, (3) hunger 
and (4) reproduction. This book in part was responsible for his receipt of the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine 
in 1973. In that book Lorenz searches for the mechanics of redirecting aggression to a neutral drive in light of the fact 
that the aggression instinct is the cause of war. Actually, those four instincts are also found in plants but are observed 
over much longer periods of time. Konrad Lorenz, On Aggression, trans. M K Wilson (Orlando, Florida: Houghton 
Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company, 1963,1966) herein referenced as “Lorenz, p.__”. See Lorenz generally in On 
Aggression. 
201 A good example that comes very close to “being there” is the following book: Jon Krakauer, Into Thin Air (New 
York: Anchor Books, published by Doubleday,1997). 
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 Hill ends his 1983 essay with the following sentence: “The point is not to insinuate that all 
anti-environmentalists are defective, but to see that those who value such traits as humility, 
gratitude, and sensitivity to others have reason to promote the love of nature.” (Hill, p. 224) In this 
twenty-first century, the love of nature seems necessary, of course, because climate change impacts 
all life and detrimentally. Of great importance to climate change generally is emphasis on the traits 
of humility, gratitude and sensitivity to others where that sensitivity now becomes necessary to 
future generations of all life on Earth.202 
 To promote Hill’s “love of nature,” an individual must experience nature that can only 
occur by physically being “in nature”. It is impossible to experience nature through any medium 
such as television, film, etc. or through the experiences of zoological parks, circus performances 
or the like. To experience nature, an individual must go to the woods, to uninhabited portions of 
mountains, to rivers and streams from which one can drink clean water where those rivers and 
streams are much fewer and farther between than they were a mere eight to nine decades ago. It 
is, however, possible to find one or more of those opportunities even today in most of the States 
of these United States.  
 It further must occur without the music created by human beings. To experience nature, 
one must search for and listen to the music of nature—the songs of birds and whales, the wind in 
the leaves of a forest, the quiet of a snowfall, the roar of a stream cascading down a mountainside, 
the regular crash of waves against a shoreline—and it certainly is not the sound of a battery-
operated boombox anywhere nor it is the sounds emitted from prerecorded records or CDs even 
of nature. It is standing alone without other humans if possible in the forest, in the mountains, on 
the seashore, or anywhere in those locations where one is not enclosed within walls, floors and 
      
202 In Hill's works referenced in the Bibliography of this dissertation, no reference to reverence or to Woodruff could 
be found. 
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ceilings even with windows and doors. To even begin to experience nature, the individual needs 
to be in what is sometimes called the “out-of-doors”. 
 In addition to Woodruff and Hill, many others value the natural Earth for finding the virtues 
which must include proper humility, proper pride and, therefore, proper primility. The following 
additional examples are offered. In October, 2015, the journal Science published an article entitled 
“The rewards of roughing it” written by Xin Lu, a professor of zoology at Wuhan University in 
China and the co-director of the Wuhan University-Tibet University Field Research Station for 
Tibetan Wildlife. He is also Vice President of the China Ornithological Society. In that article he 
writes as follows about his fieldwork “on the cold, windy and oxygen-poor Tibetan Plateau”. 
Getting into the fantastic wild of Tibet through fieldwork feeds my imagination and 
inspires me to view the world in ways that go beyond science. … I have experienced 
the generosity of Tibetan villagers who, despite the hardships they have suffered, 
always gave me as much help as they could when I needed shelter, food, horses, 
and dogs. Fieldwork teaches me that struggle can lead to joy. 
 
(Emphasis added; Science, vol. 350, issue 6258; p.350 (sciencemag.org)) The references to 
inspiration and struggle indicate the value of both and, therefore, concerning struggle, the value of 
the struggle that is involved in Aristotelian continence and incontinence against the vicious. 
 In or about 1861, John Stuart Mill listed nature as the first item of “inexhaustible interest” 
in the exercise of human faculties as follows: “the objects of nature, the achievements of art, the 
imaginations of poetry, the incidents of history, the ways of mankind, past and present, and their 
prospects in the future.” (Mill, 1861, p.14)  Possibly Mill’s word “objects” could better have been 
“entities”. The word “object” seems to include a context of lifelessness, for example a stone. 
However, a human being which could be considered an object of nature would never appreciate 
being considered within the same genus as a stone. The word “entity” seems to carry a greater 
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possibility of active life. Nevertheless, Mill placed nature at the head of this list of items which he 
felt provide “inexhaustible interest” for the human faculties. 
 Albert Schweitzer in or about 1923 in his book, Civilization and Ethics, devoted the two 
final chapters to “The Ethic of Reverence for Life”.203 Schweitzer begins by recommending three 
things for ethical thought and theory. That thought and theory (1) “must have nothing to do with 
an ethical interpretation of the world”; (2) “must become cosmic and mystical, that is to say, it 
must seek to conceive all the self-devotion which rules in ethics as a manifestation of an inward, 
spiritual relationship to the world”; and (3) “must not lapse into abstract thinking, but must remain 
elemental, understanding self-devotion to the world to be self-devotion of human life to every form 
of living being with which it can come into relation”. (Schweitzer, p.307)  That seems to say that 
those ethics (1) cannot begin with any kind of a theory of the world and its beginnings, (2) must 
include devotion of the individual human being conceived as a requirement for a spiritual 
relationship of that individual with all life in the world, and (3) must require a relationship that 
cannot be an abstract feeling but must be a feeling of individual devotion to every form of living 
being in the world with which the individual can come into relation. Those devotion and 
relationship requirements unfortunately do not seem common in this twenty-first century but seem 
as though they should be. 
 That devotion needs to be founded on a personal level and must include a personal respect 
for the recognition that the life enjoyed by that individual is an integral part but nonetheless just a 
part of all life in the world. Schweitzer argues “Reverence for life as the highest court of appeal” 
of the determination of the individual’s actions. Woodruff comments that Schweitzer “writes 
eloquently of reverence for life, but he does not propose to worship life, and so by monotheistic 
      
203 Albert Schweitzer, The Philosophy Of Civilization, Part 1, The Decay And The Restoration Of Civilization; Part 
2, Civilization And Ethics (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1959); herein referenced as "Schweitzer, p.__". 
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standards is not guilty of idolatry.” (Woodruff, p.121)  Woodruff further comments that 
“Reverence stands in awe, but awe is not the same thing as fear. Schweitzer was never afraid of 
life, though life was an object of his reverence.” Woodruff in explaining reverence states “fear of 
punishment is the opposite of reverence; if all you have to keep you in line is the fear of God, then 
you have denied yourself all of the virtues, including reverence. Virtues are the source of feelings 
that make you want to do the right things … .” (Woodruff, p.121)  
 Life as the object or source of one’s reverence or spirituality could be the source of 
reverence for Woodruff and the source of spirituality for Schweitzer and could easily include future 
life as well as present life. For climate change, life in general seems to be the appropriate object or 
source of spirituality, reverence and awe as indicated by the above proposed definitions for proper 
pride, proper humility and proper primility. Concerning Woodruff’s transcendence, Konrad 
Lorenz (zoologist, ethologist and Nobel Laureate) makes the statement: “[T]he origin of life is still 
the most puzzling of all natural phenomena.” (Lorenz, p.227)   
 Aldo Leopold (1886-1948) in his book, A Sand County Almanac and Sketches Here and 
There, first published in 1949,204 includes what he calls “three kinds of cultural nutriment available 
to our outdoor roots.” The first he calls the “value in any experience that reminds us of our 
distinctive national origins and evolution, i.e. that stimulates awareness of our history. … I shall 
call this, in our case, the ‘split-rail value.’” He gives the examples of a Boy Scout who “has tanned 
a coonskin cap, and goes Daniel Booneing in the Willow thicket below the tracks” and “a farmer 
boy [who] arrives in the school room wreaking of muskrat [because] he has tended his traps before 
      
204 Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac And Sketches Here and There (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989 
(copyright 1949) and published earlier by others, for example, A Sand County Almanac with Essays on Conservation 
from Round River (New York: Ballantine Books, 1970). Herein this book is referenced with two page numbers; the 
first referencing the 1989 publication first referenced in this footnote and the second to the 1970 publication as follows 
"Leopold, 1989, p.__; 1970, p.__". 
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breakfast.” Leopold then states “Ontogeny repeats phylogeny in society as well is in the 
individual.” (Leopold, 1989, p.177-78; 1970, p.211-12)  Not difficult to endorse. 
 The second nutrient is the “value in any experience that reminds us of our dependency on 
the soil-plant-animal-man food chain, and of the fundamental organization of the biota.” He then 
states: 
Civilization has so cluttered this elemental man-[E]arth relation with gadgets and 
middlemen that awareness of it is growing thin. We fancy that industry supports us, 
forgetting what supports industry. Time was when education moved toward soil, 
not away from it. The nursery jingle about bringing home a rabbit skin to wrap the 
baby bunting in is one of many reminders in folklore that man once hunted to feed 
and clothe his family. 
  
(Leopold, 1989, p.178; 1970, p.212) In a few short seven or eight decades, this concept has not 
only grown thin, we in the United States, have forgotten it. Leopold’s third nutrient is the “value 
in any experience that exercises those ethical restraints collectively called ‘sportsmanship’.” He 
explains this value as follows: “Voluntary adherence to an ethical code elevates the self-respect of 
the sportsman, but it should not be forgotten that voluntary disregard of the code degenerates and 
depraves him.” This admonition of course relates not only to the sportsman but to every human 
being.   
 After having described these three nutrients for “our outdoor roots” which are as valid 
today as they were in 1948, he reminds us that “[t] he extraction of value is never automatic; only 
a healthy culture can feed and grow. Is culture fed by our present forms of outdoor recreation?” 
That question is also as valid today as it was in 1948 and today it reasonably must be answered 
“not generally”. Sitting in a sports stadium or watching a golf tournament can hardly be called 
outdoor recreation that can feed and grow our culture. Hiking in our wilderness areas in the United 
States comes much closer to outdoor recreation that feeds and grows our culture by providing 
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opportunities for the awe and reverence required for the virtues of proper pride, proper humility 
and proper primility. 
 Leopold closes this chapter with a short discussion of behavior patterns in rabbits. He 
comments that these patterns can be described as cycles of which the animal itself is unaware and 
which cannot be understood in the individual rabbit or in a short period of time. “The cycle concept 
springs from the scrutiny of the mass through decades.” He then questions whether human 
populations are similar. “This [concept of cycles] raises the disquieting question: do human 
populations have behavior patterns of which we are unaware, but which we help to execute? Are 
mobs and wars, unrests and revolutions, cut of such cloth?” He then states:  
It is reasonable to suppose that our social processes have a higher volitional content 
than those of the rabbit, but it is also reasonable to suppose that we, as a species, 
contain population behavior patterns of which nothing is known because 
circumstance has never evoked them. We may have others the meaning of which 
we have misread. 
 
(Leopold, 1989, p.186; 1970, p.222) Today it seems that our population behavior patterns of fossil 
fuel addiction, consumerism, and un- and under-regulated capitalism have produced climate 
change because anthropogenic circumstances never before evoked the result of global climate 
change. At best, we have misread the meaning of those patterns and need to recognize and react 
to those present circumstances and admit our past inability to read the meaning of those patterns 
correctly. 
 Leopold ends his chapter on our “wild rootage” with the following paragraph. 
To sum up, wildlife once fed us and shaped our culture. It still yields us pleasure 
for leisure hours, but we try to reap that pleasure by modern machinery and thus 
destroy part of its value. Reaping it by modern mentality would yield not only 
pleasure, but wisdom as well. 
 
(Leopold, 1989, p.187; 1970, p.222)  Immediately prior to that closing paragraph he describes 
what he means by “modern mentality”. He recognizes how “ecology is now teaching us to search 
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in [nonhuman] animal populations for analogies to our own problems.”205 He opines that this 
learning of “some small part of the biota” instructs us about how “the whole mechanism ticks”. 
He then states “the ability to perceive these deeper meanings and to appraise them correctly, is the 
woodcraft of the future.” 
 His “woodcraft of the future” is his “modern mentality”. Through this modern mentality, 
our civilization needs to perceive the deeper meanings of climate change and to appraise them 
correctly and to address them correctly. Leopold recognized that there would be situations and 
circumstances that require our species to recognize our patterns that are leading us down the wrong 
path in light of present situations and circumstances like the wrong path of the anthropogenic 
creation of global climate change which the United States generally refuses to acknowledge 
because of the greed and avarice involved in fossil fuel addiction, consumerism and un- and under-
regulated capitalism. 
 Recall that in or about 1923, Leopold wrote the following: 
Granting that the earth is for man— there is still a question: what man? Did not the 
cliff dwellers who tilled and irrigated these our valleys think that they were the 
pinnacle of cration [sic]— that these valleys were made for them? Undoubtedly. 
And then the Pueblos? Yes. And then the Spaniards? Not only thought so, but said 
so. And now we Americans? Ours beyond a doubt! (How happy a definition is that 
one of Hadley’s which states, “truth is that which prevails in the long run”!) Five 
races— five cultures— have flourished here. We may truthfully say of our four 
predecessors that they left the earth alive, undamaged. Is it possibly a proper 
question for us to consider what the sixth shall say about us? If we are logically 
anthropomorphic, yes. 
 
(Leopold, 1923, p.141)  Also recall that even Homer some thousands of years ago commented that 
the present generation should not participate in actions such as those that promote climate change 
where the present refusal to adequately address climate change is “a shameful thing … for the 
      
205 See, of course, Lorenz generally in On Aggression. 
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hearing of men [and women] that are yet to be, … .”—those future generations that have a right to 
life just as we have had. 
 Piers H. G. Stephens in 2009 in his essay “Toward A Jamesian Environmental 
Philosophy”206 in supporting the natural philosophy of William James and that of Leopold as well, 
comments on James’s “introspective attention to quiet experience” available through immediate 
natural experiences which “are more like surprises or gifts, not amenable to production on demand 
or to ordinary goal-seeking rationality” where Stephens offers the language of Anthony Weston.207 
Stephens then notes the experience of Iris Murdoch when, brooding about personal image, “a 
hovering kestrel” is observed and “in a moment everything is altered. The brooding self with its 
hurt vanity has disappeared. There is nothing now but kestrel. And when I return to thinking of the 
other matter it seems less important.” 208 (Stephens, p.235) 
 After Stephens’ convincing argument that the kestrel cannot be duplicated through a 
Disneyland robot, Stephens describes these experiences as follows: “The experiential paradox is 
this: nature can fulfill instrumental purposes of mental well-being only if we avoid initially 
approaching it with instrumental rationality in mind.” (Emphasis in original; Stephens, p.236) 
Stephens further describes what the Jamesian component offers.  
What the Jamesian component provides is an anti-reductionist commitment to 
appreciate the non-instrumental elements in the experience of valuing nature, a 
commitment that may better capture the value of nature as experienced, and thus 
also help bring on board those environmentalists who now see pragmatism as too 
managerialist or technocratic to properly capture the valuing of nature.  
 
(Stephens, p.237)  Stephens argues that there is a need in the human being for “self-transcendence” 
through identifying ourselves “in a field of other selves” which need not be human selves but better 
      
206 Piers H. G. Stephens, “Toward A Jamesian Environmental Philosophy” in Environmental Ethics, vol. 31, pp.227-      
244; herein referenced as "Stephens, p.__". 
207 Anthony Weston, “Between Means and Ends,” The Monist 75 (1992): pp.236–49,237. 
208 Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good (London: Routledge,1989); p.84. 
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can be wild species “precisely to the degree that they are valued and admired not for our sake and 
gratification but for themselves — for what they are” which he borrows from Ernest Partridge.209 
He then states “Once again, … the paradox arises that attaining certain goods instrumental to 
flourishing, such as the meaningful moral location of the self in a broader context, can only be 
achieved by a willingness to initially ‘let be’ and be informed.” He then comments on the danger 
of “a truly post-natural artifactual world”. 
Whereas evolutionary nature provides grounds for human collective identity—that 
is, other humans and creatures for us to be related to and differentiated from in the 
stream of life— a truly post-natural artifactual world would rip us asunder from the 
regularity and coherence which makes freedom meaningful. Only nature, precisely 
because it operates outside the domain of arbitrary will, can provide such a 
grounding context of coherence upon which culture may build, and thus provide a 
bedrock within which value judgments may be made and freedom exercised, in 
which a human being may be led to a whole and fulfilled life rather than a 
fragmented, power-driven, estranged one. 
 
(Emphasis in original; Stephens, p.243-44)  Here Stephens argues the necessity that human animals 
not only need relation to other human beings but also need relation to nonhuman beings that are 
found in nature and only in nature. 
 Of course, a human being can stand alone in the forest only where that aloneness is the 
absence of other human beings. If one has tried to stand alone in a forest, the knowledge is 
immediate that you are standing in the midst of teaming life in the form of plants and nonhuman 
animals. One of the joys of standing alone in a forest is the opportunity to listen to the indigenous 
birds singing magnificently. Unless one is standing in that forest and not otherwise moving, those 
birds cannot be heard as clearly because the footfalls on the trail or path discourage that singing or 
cover it and the benefit of that experience is lost. Just the experience of standing silently in a forest 
is the experience of “letting be” and through that letting be we find our relation to the stream of 
      
209 Emphasis in original; Ernest Partridge, “Nature as a Moral Resource,” in Environmental Ethics 6 (1984): 102, 121. 
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life much more readily and easily than in a city or even in a city park where other human animals 
and artifacts are sure to abound. 
 Also, Stephens draws a meaningful distinction which he says provides the clarity that there 
is a difference in “having an interest in” something rather than “being interested in” something and 
describes this as the “having/being distinction” and that “to be initially interested in an item is not 
thereby to define it in use-value terms.” (Stephens, p.240)210 
 There is further a need to make this natural distinction early in life as it then provides an 
easier transition to the later life much or most of which is confined to four walls, a floor and a 
ceiling and from that confining experience to the necessary concept of the value that results from 
the truly natural experience. Richard Louv in his book Last Child in the Woods: Saving Our 
Children from Nature-Deficit Disorder [“NDD”]211 recognizes that “Within the space of a few 
decades the way children understand and experience nature has changed radically. The polarity of 
the relationship is reversed. Today, kids are aware of the global threats to the environment— but 
their physical contact, their intimacy with nature is fading” and not only fading but becoming 
nonexistent. Even Henry David Thoreau (1817-1862) recognized this disappearing relationship. 
“Here is this vast, savage, howling mother of ours, Nature, lying all around, with such beauty, and 
such affection for her children, as the leopard; and yet we are so early weaned from her breast to 
society, to that culture which is exclusively an interaction man on man … .”212 
 Louv’s book and the other seven books that he has written about NDD represent an extreme 
effort to renew this relationship even in the face of the greater difficulty today of finding the wild 
      
210 Erich Fromm agrees that there is a huge difference between being and having. See Erich Fromm, To Have or To 
Be (New York: Continuum, 1977). 
211 Richard Louv, Last Child in the Woods: Saving Our Children from Nature-Deficit Disorder (Chapel Hill, NC: 
Algonquin Books of Chapel Hill, 2008), herein referenced in text as “Louv, Last Child, p.__"; see also Richard Louv’s 
seven other books on the same general topic. 
212 Emphasis in original; Henry David Thoreau, Civil Disobedience and Other Essays (New York: Dover Publications, 
Inc., 1993), p. 68. 
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or wilderness. Earth is being over-populated because the few have come to believe that Earth is 
here only for exploitation and for the expanding population needed to feed the greed and avarice 
of those few.  Louv ends his book with the following paragraph: “We have such a brief opportunity 
to pass on to our children our love for Earth, and to tell our stories. These are the moments when 
the world is made whole. In my children’s memories, the adventures we’ve had together in nature 
will always exist.” However, if the foremost desire is to exploit Earth, there will be no love which 
will be tragic. Without love for Earth that sustains us, there will no longer be real love between 
human beings. Without love for the non-human inhabitants of Earth, there will be no love for the 
human inhabitants. One way to extend that love is to recognize that love must be extended beyond 
the life that exists today. Without the necessary love, respect, awe and reverence for future as well 
as present life and for Earth to support that life, the desire for exploitation continues.  
 With that love, respect, awe and reverence, we in these United States and elsewhere will 
be better able to extend ethical consideration to future life and Earth generally and we are being 
challenged today by climate change to extend that ethical consideration. Will we, or won’t we? 
Aristotelian incontinence and then continence, the Aidōs Response, Broadie’s Contingent Choice 
and Aquinas’s psychology will help if we will struggle to incorporate those concepts into our lives. 
When was anything really worthwhile without struggle? However, the struggle seems considerably 
less difficult when we human beings learn once again to enjoy nature and the quiet and the “let 
be” that it offers when it is not being exploited for the greed and avarice of the few and when it is 
allowed to provide not only that quiet and “let be” but the sustenance that a reasonable population 
needs for that life, human and nonhuman.  
 No respected philosophers were found that promoted the exploitation of Earth beyond its 
reasonable capacities. Those capacities were exceeded when Hume’s natural “unlimited 
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abundance” no longer existed. It certainly no longer existed when laws became necessary to 
privatize what was no longer an unlimited abundance. Schönfeld concludes as follows: 
[S]ince the consequences of boundary-crossing will only worsen the deeper the 
overshoot gets, the consequence of this outcome is that any further demographic 
and material growth is unsustainable. This is the ultimate meaning of the crisis: we 
have finally reached the limits of growth.  
 
(Schönfeld, Wisdom, p.195)   “We have finally reached the limits of growth” on Earth and not far 
beyond the prediction of John Stuart Mill in or about 1849. 
 As a result, it seems that the focus must become the “common advantage” of the many 
instead of the “unfair advantage” exercised to promote the luxury of the few, and in some cases  
its wretchedly excessive luxury. How and when were the many convinced that Earth was here to 
promote the luxury of the few? Greed, avarice and pleonexia are powerful vices but can be 
overcome by powerful virtues. The promotion of the common advantage needs more powerful 
virtues that extend ethical consideration to all life—present and future—and to Earth which is and 
for the foreseeable centuries will be necessary to support that life—present and future. Maybe 
proper primility or a similar virtue.213 
In the meantime, think CO2 and continence/incontinence, Broadie’s Contingent Choice, 
the Aristotelian/Aquinian psychology, and the Aidōs Response when doing any of those actions 
listed on page 240 above or similar actions. Also, remember that we should constantly focus on 
our responsibility individually for looking for the “common advantage” and we should think 
seriously about rejecting the “unfair advantage” especially for the purpose of accumulating 
“wealth” that will ultimately turn to dust. That just does not seem to have anything to do with a 
      
213 Possibly humanity should ponder the need for reciprocity in our ethics. This may be necessary because humanity 
seems to have found ways to circumvent Lorenz's two great constructors, natural selection and mutation. Humanity 
has found the means to change natural systems, for example climate but also the means to pollute and thereby destroy 
Earth’s air, water and soil. 
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truly flourishing life or society. And globally and individually, based on the above and especially 
Chapters 2 and 3, there is enormous work to be done by most disciplines, especially philosophy, 
to confront and reverse climate change toward the flourishing of all of Earth’s life. 
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 Appendix A: Further Empirical Facts: 
The entire explanation for SYR Figure.SPM.4 (referenced on page 29 above) follows: 
 
“Figure SPM.4 | Based on the available scientific literature since the IPCC Fourth 
Assessment Report (AR4), there are substantially more impacts in recent decades now 
attributed to climate change. Attribution requires defined scientific evidence on the role of 
climate change. Absence from the map of additional impacts attributed to climate change 
does not imply that such impacts have not occurred. The publications supporting attributed 
impacts reflect a growing knowledge base, but publications are still limited for many regions, 
systems and processes, highlighting gaps in data and studies. Symbols indicate categories of 
attributed impacts, the relative contribution of climate change (major or minor) to the 
observed impact and confidence in attribution. Each symbol refers to one or more entries 
in WGII Table SPM.A1, grouping related regional-scale impacts. Numbers in ovals 
indicate regional totals of climate change publications from 2001 to 2010, based on the 
Scopus bibliographic database for publications in English with individual countries 
mentioned in title, abstract or key words (as of July 2011). These numbers provide an overall 
measure of the available scientific literature on climate change across regions; they do not 
indicate the number of publications supporting attribution of climate change impacts in each 
region. Studies for polar regions and small islands are grouped with neighbouring continental 
regions. The inclusion of publications for assessment of attribution followed IPCC scientific 
evidence criteria defined in WGII Chapter 18. Publications considered in the attribution 
analyses come from a broader range of literature assessed in the WGII AR5. See WGII 
Table SPM.A1 for descriptions of the attributed impacts. {Figure 1.11}”  
 
(Emphasis added; SYR, p.7) 
 
In addition; Table WGII, SPM.A1 which is referenced in the explanation of SPM 
Figure.4 immediately above (and on pages 29 and 30 above) is included below in its entirety.214  
The explanation for Table SPM.A1 (below) follows: 
 
“Table SPM.A1 | Observed impacts attributed to climate change reported in the scientific 
literature since the AR4. These impacts have been attributed to climate change with very low, 
low, medium, or high confidence, with the relative contribution of climate change to the 
observed change indicated (major or minor), for natural and human systems across eight major 
world regions over the past several decades. [Tables 18-5, 18-6, 18-7, 18-8, and 18-9] 
Absence from the table of additional impacts attributed to climate change does not imply that 
such impacts have not occurred.” 
 
(WGII (Part A), p.30) 
 
      
214 All Figures and Tables referenced in Table WG II, SPM.A1 (which is included below) can be found in the AR5 
WGII full publication:  
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 Appendix A: Additional Empirical Facts:  
 
Table WGII (Part A), SPM.A1 (WGIII, p.30-32): 
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 Appendix A: Additional Empirical Facts (cont.): 
 
 
 
 
 314 
  
 Appendix A: Additional Empirical Facts (cont.): 
 
 
 
 315 
  
 Appendix A: Additional Empirical Facts (cont.): 
Figure SPM.10 (referenced on page 53 above): 
 
Figure SPM.10 “The relationship between risks from climate change, temperature change, 
cumulative carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions and changes in annual greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
by 2050. Limiting risks across Reasons For Concern[215] (a) would imply a limit for cumulative 
emissions of CO2 (b) which would constrain annual GHG emissions over the next few decades (c). 
Panel a reproduces the five Reasons For Concern [Box 2.4]. Panel b links temperature changes to 
cumulative CO2 emissions (in GtCO2) from 1870. They are based on Coupled Model 
Intercomparison Project Phase 5 (CMIP5) simulations (pink plume) and on a simple climate model 
(median climate response in 2100), for the baselines and five mitigation scenario categories [216] (six 
ellipses [used in WGIII; p.430,Table 6.2]). Details are provided in Figure SPM.5. Panel c shows the 
relationship between the cumulative CO2 emissions (in GtCO2) of the scenario categories and their 
associated change in annual GHG emissions by 2050, expressed in percentage change (in percent 
GtCO2-eq per year) relative to 2010. The ellipses correspond to the same scenario categories as in 
Panel b, and are built with a similar method (see details in Figure SPM.5).” 
 
(All emphasis in original; SYR, p.18) 
 
      
215 For “Reasons For Concern,” see SYR Box 2.4 below in this Appendix A. 
216 For the mitigation categories, see WDIII Table 6.2 (WGIII, p.430) below in this Appendix A. WGIII Table 6.3 
(WGIII, p.431) referenced in Table 6-3, is also included below in this Appendix A.  
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 Appendix A: Additional Empirical Facts (cont.): 
 
SYR Box 2.4, p.72: 
 
 
 (All emphasis in original; SYR, p.72-73) 
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 Appendix A: Additional Empirical Facts (cont.): 
WGIII Table 6.2 (WGIII, p.430): 
Table 6.2 | Definition of CO2eq concentration categories used in this assessment, the mapping 
used to allocate scenarios based on different metrics to those categories, and the number of 
scenarios that extend through 2100 in each category. [Note: This table shows the mapping of 
scenarios to the categories; Table 6.3. shows the resulting characteristics of the categories using 
this mapping. The table only covers the scenarios with information for the full 21st century. The 
mapping of scenarios based on 2011 – 2050 cumulative total CO2eq emissions is described in the 
Methods and Metrics Annex. 
 
1 Scenarios with information for the full 21st century were categorized in different categories 
based on their 2100 full radiative forcing/CO2eq concentration level (including GHGs and other 
radiatively active substances). 
2  If insufficient information was available to calculate full forcing, scenarios were categorized, 
in order of preference, by 2100 Kyoto gas forcing or cumulative CO2 emissions in the 2011–
2100 period. Scenarios extending only through 2050 were categorized based on cumulative CO2 
emissions in the 2011–2050 period. Those scenarios are not included in this table. (See the 
Methods and Metrics Annex for more information.) 
3 The column indicates the corresponding RCP falling within the scenario category based on 
2100 CO2 equivalent concentration. 
4 Number of scenarios in the respective category, which report at least total CO2 emissions (and 
potentially other GHGs and other radiatively active substances) to 2100. Numbers in parentheses 
denote all scenarios in the respective category, including those scenarios that report only CO2 
emissions from fossil fuels and industry (but not land-use CO2). 
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 Appendix A: Additional Empirical Facts (cont.): 
   
WGIII Table 6.3 (WGIII, p.431): 
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           Appendix B     
Chart of Aguinas's Human Actions and Names of the Actions: 
For each Act, the citation to the Aquinas reference 
follows his name immediately below the name of 
the act. If the name is in quotes, it is used by the 
Philosopher whose name(s) follow. Page numbers 
are from the T. Williams translations in The Hackett 
Aquinas: Basic Works 2014. 
For each Act, the citation to an Aristotle reference 
follows his name immediately below the name of 
the act. If either Ross or Barnes use a name different than 
the Williams name, that name appears in parentheses 
after the Williams name. Page numbers are from 
Aristotle, 
Ross, 2009; if from Aristotle Barnes, the Barnes name 
appears. 
Apprehensive Acts {Acts of the Intellect) Appetitive Acts {Acts of the Will) 
  
Perception (apprehension of the good) - Aristotle "Wish" - Aristotle 
Aquinas - p.395,Q8al;p.400,Q9alr2 Aquinas - p.407,QlQal; 
Aristotle -  p.183(1172a34-b7) Aristotle - p.42{1111b26-29),p.45{1113a15-24). 
  
Presentation {presenting) – Aquinas "Intention" - Aquinas (voluntary- Aristotle) 
Aquinas -  p.400-401,Q9a1&2 Aquinas - p.418-23,Q12 
Aristotle - no references found Aristotle - p.38-49{1109b30-1114b34); pp.212,218 
  
"Deliberation" - Aquinas, Aristotle "Consent"- Aquinas 
Aquinas - p.431-38,Q14 Aquinas - p.438-42,Q15 
Aristotle - p.131{1150b19-28); p.135 Aristotle - no references found 
{1152a26-36);p.45(1113a7-14); p.41-43  
{1111b3-1113a14)  
  
"Judgment" - Aquinas, Aristotle "Choice" - Aquinas, Aristotle 
Aquinas - p.427,Ql3a3 Aquinas - p.424-31,Q13 
Aristotle - p.45(1113a7-12) Aristotle - p.41-45(1111b4-1113a13); 
 p.l03-04 (1139al7-bl5) 
  
"Command"- Aquinas, Aristotle "Use" - Aquinas 
Aquinas - p.447-59,Q17 Aquinas - p.443-47,Q16 
Aristotle - p.112(1143a7-10) Aristotle? 
  
"Execution" - Aquinas "Enjoyment" - Aquinas, Aristotle 
Aquinas - p.447,Q16a4r1 Aquinas - p.413-18,Q11 
Aristotle? Aristotle - p.135(1152b4-8)) 
David Gallagher, "Aquinas on Moral Action: Interior  
and Exterior Acts," in Proceedings of the Amer. Cath. 
Philosophical Association, Vol. 64, 1990, pp. 118-
129. 
Gallagher's "Order of Intention" - acts of will in 
the shaded area above. 
Gallagher's "Order of Execution" -acts of will in the 
unshaded area above. 
 
